Napoleonic Union

Basic Idea. What would the world be like today if Napoleon's empire didn't fall? What would he need to do(or not do) in order to accomplish this?
 
Basically, have Napoleon just STOP after the Treaties of Tilsit and Fontainebleau in 1807. After that point, everything's gravy. Gradually, Britain and France would make peace, probably by 1810. Continental system would be abandoned within a decade in favour of free marketry.

Napoleon would probably still divorce Josephine and marry royalty, unless we tweak the TL to have Josephine not infertile. Which is doable without radically altering Napoleon's campaigns up to 1808.
 
Invading Spain, mostly.
His war in 1809 weren't as devastating, of course, but it led right into the war with Russia in 1812. Which killed his Empire.
But, if you can enforce the treaty that partitioned Portugal and keep Spain on France's side, you can prevent the Peninsular War. If you can prevent that, you can prevent British involvement on the continent itself, and eventually strangle Britain economically with the Continental system (as long as Russia stays on the bandwagon).

Probably by 1810, peace would be made, the System ended, and a reconciliation begin between Britain and the French hegemony. With that, you have much greater prosperity and thus stability in the French dominions, including French client states. That is the key to keeping Napoleon's empire in existence.
 
Also, slightly less harsh terms at Tilsit and in general would help. Frankly the alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prussia was pretty unusual in comparison to the previous century. If napoleon has to keep fighting wars with all three, sooner or later he is going to get into trouble. But if he can keep them divided, and at least make the status quo acceptable to some of his former enemies, then he might make it. Perhaps cultivating an alliance with Austria would be the way to go?

Also, stay out of Spain. It turned into a bloody ulcer for napoleon, and staying out keeps the British off the continent. Although if the British invade, let the Spanish turn against them, and maybe send a few corps of the grande armee to ensure that they succeed.

Finally, ditch the continental system. It had no real effects on britain, wrecked the economies of much of europe, and made a lot of people mad at the french.
 

Redbeard

Banned
If Napoleon only had been engaged in Spain, he would eventually subdue that area, no matter what GB tries. In 1809 the British already were in deep trouble in Spain, when Austria declared war and Napoleon and the Guard left Spain to face the much bigger threat.

What brought Napoleon down was the major continental powers (Austria, Russia and Prussia - in that order) finally fighting Napoleon at the same time and place - i.e. Saxony autumn 1813.

So if Napoleon and Metternich actually finds together at their meeting in mid 1813, Prussia and Russia would have to fight the autumn campaign alone, with a great risk of a decisive defeat. If/when that happens, Napoleon can turn his focus on Spain - and bye-bye Wellington.

The price to get Austria to stay put, would probably have been returning the areas taken in 1809. Seen from 1813 that was a (too) high price for Napoleon, but if it was the price to keep Napoleon and his dynasty in power it of course wasn't, and it would not have made Austria a significantly more difficult rival in the future.

But the map of Europe in 19th century would have been a huge France, incl. Benelux, Germany to the Rhine and N-Italy. Germany will be a number of smaller states, some controlled by "family" (like Westphalia, Naples and Spain), others by home made monarchs, like Saxony and Bavaria, and yet others by allied Monarchies around Germany (like Denmark-Norway).

Prussia will not be trusted, and will envily watch all the favours given to Denmark, Saxony, Warsaw etc. Austria will be watched with suspicion too, but on a more friendly level due to the dynastic connections. Austria might even be given a kind of free hand on the Balkans, and the Zar in Moscow will be advised to turn his attention to the Caucasus or somewhere else far away, if he wants to avoid "Daddy's" anger.

I guess the British will not give up that easy, and keep on trying to create new coalitions. The Zar could probably be talked into many schemes, he is not that exposed to French wrath, but Austria probably will not need that many favours from France before another coalition against France will be too risky.

If things stay reasonably under control on the continent, I guess the French will soon start to build a fleet appropriate for a power not taking any sh.. from Britania. The British OTOH might have trouble finding timber, tar, rope etc to maintain a big navy. In OTL the Baltic was a major source, but here they probably will be cut off. Canada will be an area of strategic contest. France will support US ambitions for an "anschluss", but OTOH Britain have a real motivation to fight their way back to gaining access to the resourses of the old colonies.

India could be an important provider of naval supplies and other commodities to the British, and it will anyway soon be obvious to the French, that they need a really big navy if they want to tame the British.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The UK wouldn't make peace with Napoleon. There is no upside for them. Once peace is declared, then Napoleon has time to start building a navy, which will then be used to invade the UK. Why would the UK want to allow Nappy the breathing space to go and do that?

Russia, the UK, and Austria refused at accept permanent Napoleonic hegemony over Europe. Napoleon refused to accept anything other than permanent French hegemony. His invasions of Spain and Russia demonstrate the amazing (overreaching) breath of his ambitions. He seems to have always believed himself one more victory away from the final blow. The problem was that arrayed against the UK and Russia, there was no military solution.

So Nappy wanted to rule the world, and the rest of Europe just wanted to make sure Nappy didn't rule the world. Europe's goal was a much more achievable one.
 
I'm not sure about the lasting nature of Napoleon's Empire. Of course, as it ended when it did and such, we have limited evidence to go on, but all accounts seem to point to the idea that Napoleon could only successfully fund his military campaigns from the spoils of war. That's all well and good for a while, but eventually you get to the point when the best loot has been taken, the populations you are conquering are hacked off with being repeatedly plundered for your gain, and so on. Napoleon reached a point IIRC around 1812 (probably before that, actually) where his armies could no longer fund themselves and had to be induced to keep going, whereupon taxes in France rose substantially to make up the difference. By about 1814 the French were sick of the constant war and the taxes and Napoleon's government was becoming more and more unpopular. I think by the 100 days campaign he was reaching the status of "hated" in his own country as much as in others. Sure, there are ways you can have Napoleon avoid crucial defeats, not waste troops invading Russia, etc, but most every POD is still going to leave Napoleon needing more campaigns than he can fund to pacify Europe. I think by all accounts, short of a blitzkrieg war which catches everyone off-guard, as the Egyptian campaign was supposed to be, a successful invasion of India - one of Napoleon's endgame targets for his campaigns - is going to be too much for France to finance and thus become impossible to pull off. And as it has been alluded to above, countries made peace with Napoleon but weren't happy to welcome him into the "European rulers club" as it went completely contradictory to the Balance of Power ideal which Europe had based its politics around for a century or two by this point. IMO unless you find a POD far earlier and make Napoleon's Empire a whole load more restrained, eventually there is going to come a point when France just has to step down its army, seems weak to the European nations, who are then bought into military service by British subsidies and overcome France while it is weak...just. Rather as in OTL.

In response to Redbeard, I'd point out that most of the British naval supplies came from Sweden in this point, not the Baltic. I personally think that a non-neutral or ultimately pro-British Sweden would be hard to engineer, especially considering their centuries-old rival, Denmark's, acceptance of being cajoled by France. Given this, I think the British are going to be assured of access to naval materials. I sincerely doubt the French/Danish ability to prevent the British from sailing through the Sund to retrieve vital naval supplies, even if it means utilising the contemporarily-unpopular convoy system to pull it off.
 
So if Napoleon and Metternich actually finds together at their meeting in mid 1813, Prussia and Russia would have to fight the autumn campaign alone, with a great risk of a decisive defeat. If/when that happens, Napoleon can turn his focus on Spain - and bye-bye Wellington.

I'm not totally sure Napoleon would have beaten off Wellington in Spain so easy actually.
Napoleon was a great strategiest and tactican but his real strategic sense mostly worked where he could fight the enemy in an open battle. The Pennisuelar war was from the spanish side IIRC a guerilla war where Napoleon couldn't fight them in a real battle.
Correct me if I'm wrong.
 
I'm not totally sure Napoleon would have beaten off Wellington in Spain so easy actually.
Napoleon was a great strategiest and tactican but his real strategic sense mostly worked where he could fight the enemy in an open battle. The Pennisuelar war was from the spanish side IIRC a guerilla war where Napoleon couldn't fight them in a real battle.
Correct me if I'm wrong.

Yes and no. The war in the penninsula was a guerilla war (IIRC the word guerilla comes from that war), but not quite in the 20th century connotations. There were guerillas, particularly in the various mountains, but they were never a real threat to French control, and were often easily dispatched if the Allied field armies were incapable of assistence. There were still a fairly large number of set piece battles, sieges, and other hallmarks of 18th and 19th century warfare. If Napoleon takes the Grand Armee into Spain, depending on the conditions, it shouldnt be to unlikely to see him and Wellington facing off in the field.

To be honest, the Penninsula was one of Napoleon's greater blunders, but it could have been easily won. The french tended to have numbers on their side, and the Iberian guerillas were rarely a threat as long as the Allied Field armies could be eliminated. And as late as 1812 the country was for the most part in French hands. If Napoleon had taken the time (or been given it) to focus on events beyond the Pyrenees, or if his Marshalls had not squandered the war effort, a victory in the penninsula even as late as Vitoria is easy to concieve. Have the generals move faster to aid Joseph in the Talavera campaign; have Soult not be suprised at Second Oporto; replace Massena (he never wanted to go) with somebody more capable, or make him fight an effective campaign; have Soult sieze Cadiz when he had the chance; a different outcome at Salamanca (Marmont concentrates his forces or is not wounded early in the action, Joseph arrives earlier); have Joseph catch Wellington at Salamanca in 1812; or a better tactical and strategic direction at Vitoria. The Penninsular war is littered with missed opprotunities for the french to avoid defeat. Instead, it became an open sore that bled Napoleon at a time when he could least afford it.
 
Russia, the UK, and Austria refused at accept permanent Napoleonic hegemony over Europe. Napoleon refused to accept anything other than permanent French hegemony. His invasions of Spain and Russia demonstrate the amazing (overreaching) breath of his ambitions. He seems to have always believed himself one more victory away from the final blow. The problem was that arrayed against the UK and Russia, there was no military solution.

I disagree with you about Russia and Austria. Austria was willing to tie itself to some sort of Napoleonic system, as Metternich seemed to want, to ward off Russia. And Russia was none too fond of Britain either; witness, for instance, the neutrality league.

I don't know if requires Nappy falling off a horse right after Tilsit or what, but I think you underestimate France's, if not Nappy's, odds.
 
We can have Napoloen III re-estblish the French Empire in an alternate TL. Then the Empire can rival that of the Brittish.
 
The British won the Napoleonic wars because they had all sorts of advantages - advantages that don't go away even with no Peninsular war.

1. They Royal Navy. The RN after Trafalgar was unmatched, and, I'd argue, unmatchable. Yeah, the French could build more ships. But could they man them with experienced sailors and admirals? The Royal Navy keeps Britain fed, supplied, the Empire in line, and keeps the French from expanding their empire out of Europe. No French Algeria, or Morrocco, or India.

2. French population. However you look at it, the French were a minority within Europe. Eventually, others were going to resent French dominance, no matter how 'nice' the French were. The revolutions of 1848 in 1825, anyone? Nationalistic asperations were inevitable.

3. Other allies. If the French are looking tough enough, the British can always find new allies...say the USA. The early USA would have been little more pleased with a hegemonic French Empire in Europe than the British. With a bit of common sense both the USA and UK could have their 'special relationship' about 100 years early. Even foregoing military cooperation, the USA would be only too happy to sell stuff to the British, especially if the Europeans were unable to because Nappy ruined their economies.

4. Strong Economy. The British won in large part because their ecopnomy was strong, and they could fund allies against Napoleon. Even if Napoleon elects to play it safe, the British may not let him. I have a hard time with the British accepting any Hegemon over Europe - in particular a French one. The British will simply fund group after group (be that 'group' a country or a movement) against Napoleon, not really caring whether that group won or lost, just that it kept wearing down the French.

Mike Turcotte.
 
To be honest, the Penninsula was one of Napoleon's greater blunders, but it could have been easily won. The french tended to have numbers on their side, and the Iberian guerillas were rarely a threat as long as the Allied Field armies could be eliminated. And as late as 1812 the country was for the most part in French hands. If Napoleon had taken the time (or been given it) to focus on events beyond the Pyrenees, or if his Marshalls had not squandered the war effort, a victory in the penninsula even as late as Vitoria is easy to concieve.

You're right that the Peninsula War could have been won for France, but I think you underestimate the contribution of the guerrillas and the difficulty Napoleon would face. For most of the occupation of Spain, France had 300,000 troops in Spain, yet was only able to utilise about a third of them at any one time. The guerrillas weren't great when they faced defended locations, and could be dispelled with some ease, but that was inconsequential really. The Spanish guerrillas may have acted like irregular cavalry, but their ability to disappear and reappear was rather indicative of the Vietnam War, as was the way that the locals often protected them from being found and the way that the occupier often had to persecute or slaughter villages of innocents to try to shake the guerrillas into giving up. The guerrillas were just very, very effective at appearing from nowhere and cutting the French supply lines, forcing the French to post garrisons in the most inconsequential places and send battalions running all over the place. For this reason the French can't concentrate their forces as you would expect them to if you just read the numbers on paper available. And yes, the French still had a numerical advantage on the British/Spanish/Portuguese armies, but I think you'd have to expect that Wellington would take overall control of any and every battle against Napoleon, and with Wellington being a man very much inclined to picking his battlefields and letting his opponent do the hard work, the end result of some crucial battles may not be unquestionably French victories. The British also have the Lines of Torres Vedras to fall back on, where Wellington was happy to sit and wait for a better moment, and with Napoleon a very impatient character I can see him giving up on Spain for better places to conquer and win glory, leading to repeats of the OTL French reverses in Spain.

I'm not saying that the French would be hard-pressed to actually win the Peninsula War, but I'm not convinced that Napoleon would have the patience to comprehensively clean up and win the campaign, and I think if he gets bored and wanders off, the end result is entirely uncertain.
 
You're right that the Peninsula War could have been won for France, but I think you underestimate the contribution of the guerrillas and the difficulty Napoleon would face. For most of the occupation of Spain, France had 300,000 troops in Spain, yet was only able to utilise about a third of them at any one time. The guerrillas weren't great when they faced defended locations, and could be dispelled with some ease, but that was inconsequential really. The Spanish guerrillas may have acted like irregular cavalry, but their ability to disappear and reappear was rather indicative of the Vietnam War, as was the way that the locals often protected them from being found and the way that the occupier often had to persecute or slaughter villages of innocents to try to shake the guerrillas into giving up. The guerrillas were just very, very effective at appearing from nowhere and cutting the French supply lines, forcing the French to post garrisons in the most inconsequential places and send battalions running all over the place. For this reason the French can't concentrate their forces as you would expect them to if you just read the numbers on paper available. And yes, the French still had a numerical advantage on the British/Spanish/Portuguese armies, but I think you'd have to expect that Wellington would take overall control of any and every battle against Napoleon, and with Wellington being a man very much inclined to picking his battlefields and letting his opponent do the hard work, the end result of some crucial battles may not be unquestionably French victories. The British also have the Lines of Torres Vedras to fall back on, where Wellington was happy to sit and wait for a better moment, and with Napoleon a very impatient character I can see him giving up on Spain for better places to conquer and win glory, leading to repeats of the OTL French reverses in Spain.

I'm not saying that the French would be hard-pressed to actually win the Peninsula War, but I'm not convinced that Napoleon would have the patience to comprehensively clean up and win the campaign, and I think if he gets bored and wanders off, the end result is entirely uncertain.

Very valid points. I will admit that I have been rather underestimating the Spanish guerrillas recently. Though they were never enough to completly defeat teh French on their own, they definitly contributed to the Napoleonic defeat in the Penninsula. My point was rather that, while they were often difficult to locate and forced the french to spread their forces, they could be defeated if the French were ever given a chance to go after them unhindered. And that means the defeat of the Allied field armies.

As for that battle, I dont think that a French victory is nearly as hard to imagine. Wellington was a good general, but he had more than a fair share of luck during the Penninsula (to be fair, the same could be said to apply to almost any successful general). It doesnt even need to be Napoleon that defeats him (although the Emperor having the time to return to the Penninsula would obviously be a plus for the French). Simply more able command, from the top and from the generals subordinate to whoever was in command at the time could have made all the difference. For example, replace Massena with a younger man willing to go and you could quite possibly produce a victory. For some reason, I am thinking of Davout, Ney, St Cyr, Soult, and Suchet as candidates. Whether they would necessisarily have won is debatable, but it would not be impossible to assume. Or have Joseph's various generals get to him in time for him to trap Wellington at Talavera.

The point about Napoleon becoming weary of fighting across the Iberian countryside is valid. But it is not strictly necessary for him to show up to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Napoleon's marshalls were capable of winning in Spain, as long as they were able to bring the allies to battle and defeat them, as they had several chances to.
 
The British won the Napoleonic wars because they had all sorts of advantages - advantages that don't go away even with no Peninsular war.

1. They Royal Navy. The RN after Trafalgar was unmatched, and, I'd argue, unmatchable. Yeah, the French could build more ships. But could they man them with experienced sailors and admirals? The Royal Navy keeps Britain fed, supplied, the Empire in line, and keeps the French from expanding their empire out of Europe. No French Algeria, or Morrocco, or India.

I wouldn't be so sure about this. You're positing indefinite Royal Navy blockade of Europe. Sure, I can't see the French projecting forces to India, but I wouldn't underestatimate other responses. Or count on jingoism and training matching the first ironclads from the Belgium/Ruhr/Alsatian industrial complex.

2. French population. However you look at it, the French were a minority within Europe. Eventually, others were going to resent French dominance, no matter how 'nice' the French were. The revolutions of 1848 in 1825, anyone? Nationalistic asperations were inevitable.

Indeed, who can forget the ruthless Alsatian revolt, or the Wallonian insurrections?

3. Other allies. If the French are looking tough enough, the British can always find new allies...say the USA. The early USA would have been little more pleased with a hegemonic French Empire in Europe than the British. With a bit of common sense both the USA and UK could have their 'special relationship' about 100 years early. Even foregoing military cooperation, the USA would be only too happy to sell stuff to the British, especially if the Europeans were unable to because Nappy ruined their economies.

Hrm. The problem I have with this is that we know the historic American reaction to a French mercantilist policy in Europe and a British blockade. The War of 1812 doesn't seem to auger well for a future alliance.
 
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