Actually, the roads had been better than during the War of the 4th Coalition about which Napoleon said that for Poland the God invented the 5th element, the dirt. The offensive stage of the campaign of 1812 happened during the summer/early fall which were mostly dry and, until Napoleon failed to prevent junction of the Russian armies, it was happening on a reasonably wide front with Davout acting as pretty much independent army commander trying to cut off Bagration’s 2nd Army (task in which he was almost successful but “almost” does not co7nt). Even at Smolensk there were attempts to cut off the Russian army (task simplified by the quarrel between commanders of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies which almost made it successful). Only when they failed, a straightforward pursuit by the Smolensk Road started but by that time summer was dry and a road wide enough to allow marching by few parallel columns. However, by that time the campaign was already strategically lost and even victorious major battle would not save it.

At Borodino, the Russian position was allowing the French maneuvers against both flanks so the choice of the OTL plan was strictly Nappy’s decision. With the campaign going nowhere, he expected that a major victory would provide enough of a psychological pressure to force Alexander to start peace talks and manauvers could result in a further Russian withdrawal without a battle.

As for the supplies and logistics in general, this campaign was a classic illustration of the shortcomings of the system. There were adequate food supplies carried with the army in the beginning but the horses started suffering from forage shortages soon enough and cavalry troops demonstrated a complete incompetence in taking care of them. Then, the army did not have a well-organized supply service in general relying on the looting activities of the small detachments. Napoleon ordered organization of few big magazines along the route but they were not guarded properly and on the way back had been mostly looted by the disorganized troops. Getting food from the nearby area was done by a traditional looting with the occasional attempts to pay by the counterfeit paper money to which Russian peasants were not accustomed. As was commented by one of the Russian contemporaries, if the French were paying in gold and silver, they’d have little problems with getting food and forage. When the retreat started, there was enough food available in Moscow and nearby region but Napoleon did not give the explicit orders, Bertier did not perform his duty as a chief of staff and, with the exception of Davout, the corps commanders did not care. Army went out of Moscow overburdened by the loot, short on supplies and only horses of Naploeon’s Household got proper winter horseshoes.

From Calabria to Spain to Russia, to say nothing of half of Massena's career, it seems like an overdependence on looting was a persistent weakness of the French army in this period. Wonder if anyone else was really much better, though. The British were spoiled by their navy and fighting in friendly territory on the Peninsula.
 
In most areas of military art and organization, the French were either definitively better or at least not worse than their contemporaries. For example, while none of Napoleon's subordinate commanders were as good as him, and there wasn't a good professional military education system in France, but the marshals were easily on par with most generals in the coalition armies, almost none of whom had good professional education in the sublime part of war either. All contemporary armies relied on local requisition for the bulk of their supplies. Berthier didn't have much authority as chief of staff, but the equivalent position did not carry much authority in the armies of France's rivals anyway. Faced with larger coalitions for enemies, these flaws were more salient for the French, but their military system has to be understood in the context of their time.
 
All contemporary armies relied on local requisition for the bulk of their supplies.

The British did not, while the British Army had many flaws in the Napoleonic Wars it was generally was the least dependent on local supplies and was the only force that paid in cash pretty much all the time. Now that says more about how much cash Britain had compared to everyone but still.
 
The British did not, while the British Army had many flaws in the Napoleonic Wars it was generally was the least dependent on local supplies and was the only force that paid in cash pretty much all the time. Now that says more about how much cash Britain had compared to everyone but still.
Were they getting their fodder and water shipped from Britain?
 
Were they getting their fodder and water shipped from Britain?

Water obviously not but they absolutely shipped horse fodder into the Peninsular and unlike the French endeavoured to match the amount of cavalry to the amount of fodder available including withdrawing Cavalry Regiments back to Portugal from Spain because they couldn't ship enough fodder forward.
 
Yet another person asking about Nappy. I know. Sorry. He is an interesting and important figure though, so there`s a reason so many people want to write TLs focusing on our boy.

Anyway. The Questions. I was inspired by the "Napoleon breaks up Austria" thread. Lets say Nappy balkanizes Austria like this (ignore Portugal):

View attachment 463824

And revises the continental system to be less harsh on most things but block grain imports to Britain (Grain being the main resource Britain lacked at the time, especially due to lack of a significant presence in the Canadian prairies) to starve Britain out but piss everyone off a bit less.

We now have a starving Britain, a few states in the former Austrian Empire that rely on Napoleon for survival (the manpower is the same as OTL but troops and commanders from the region are more loyal). Could this be enough to win? If no, what else has to change?

These are the important questions:
Given this scenario (with any necessary changes) what happens with...
  • Russia - are they confident enough to turn on France?
  • Prussia - same question
  • The US - does the war of 1812 go better? They're still probably not taking Canada, but do they get something just to f*ck off?
  • Colonies - Specifically Indonesia. Nappy would have to return northern Germany to the Rhenish bois and give the Dutch independence post-war. Indonesia was occupied by France and then by the Brits. Who gets it?
  • The Ottomans - Napoleon will probably keep them around as a counterbalance to Russia, but will he take anything from them? Ie. let Russia take Moldavia, takes Algeria and/or Tunisia. Could he buy Algeria or something? The Ottos were getting pretty weak.
  • The Illyrian Provinces - they ain't staying French. Who gets them? Italy? Do they get independence? Does Illyrian Tyrol go back to Austria?
  • I assume he's taking Sicily and Sardinia and giving Pomerania to either Prussia or the Rhenish fed.
I've already asked a lot, so that's it.
Britain will not starve, other nations, especially Russia supplied grain as was stated above.
Russia is in the same position as the 1812 situation- the Continental System is not acceptable.
Prussia in 1812 or there about can Not be aggressive.
The war of 1812 does not get affected - why would it?
The colonies are at the mercy of the Royal Navy. Remember that Britain had “stations” around the world, each with there own naval force and a garrison of troops, all stations able to mount actions of a small nature against local targets.
The Ottoman Empire, as you say, is weak. It’s biggest threat in this period is Russia - nuff said! Napoleon was never in a position to cleve elements of the Ottoman Empire off for his own purpose.
The Illyrian Provinces were never to be free to be a bargaining tool for France, they, like the Ottoman lands, are too remote and independent of France, but not their local politics.
The Mediterranean states are under the protection of the Royal Navy, and a considerable force of British and allied forces. How is France with its lesser Navy, even assuming a reverse Trafalgar, going to mount a combined opps to gain these islands?
He has just twonked Prussia, why would he give them anything?
 
Britain will not starve, other nations, especially Russia supplied grain as was stated above.
Russia is in the same position as the 1812 situation- the Continental System is not acceptable.
Prussia in 1812 or there about can Not be aggressive.
The war of 1812 does not get affected - why would it?
The colonies are at the mercy of the Royal Navy. Remember that Britain had “stations” around the world, each with there own naval force and a garrison of troops, all stations able to mount actions of a small nature against local targets.
The Ottoman Empire, as you say, is weak. It’s biggest threat in this period is Russia - nuff said! Napoleon was never in a position to cleve elements of the Ottoman Empire off for his own purpose.
The Illyrian Provinces were never to be free to be a bargaining tool for France, they, like the Ottoman lands, are too remote and independent of France, but not their local politics.
The Mediterranean states are under the protection of the Royal Navy, and a considerable force of British and allied forces. How is France with its lesser Navy, even assuming a reverse Trafalgar, going to mount a combined opps to gain these islands?
He has just twonked Prussia, why would he give them anything?

Thank you. That was nice and concise.
 
From Calabria to Spain to Russia, to say nothing of half of Massena's career, it seems like an overdependence on looting was a persistent weakness of the French army in this period. Wonder if anyone else was really much better, though. The British were spoiled by their navy and fighting in friendly territory on the Peninsula.

Let’s put it that way: to a certain degree looting did exist in the contemporary armies but in the French army it was well above and beyond the average level. Even Napoleon acknowledged that at Bailen the French list because they were overburdened with a loot and enormous amount of loot (including the official “trophys”) carried from Moscow was one of the main factors contributing to the disaster of 1812.
 
Let’s put it that way: to a certain degree looting did exist in the contemporary armies but in the French army it was well above and beyond the average level. Even Napoleon acknowledged that at Bailen the French list because they were overburdened with a loot and enormous amount of loot (including the official “trophys”) carried from Moscow was one of the main factors contributing to the disaster of 1812.

That's also a consequence of French success, because so much of their fighting was outside France they were more free to loot, have a higher tooth to tail ratio and thus were more deadly. The Allies meanwhile had to develop their logistical networks to support forces comparable in size to the French but with much less looting because they were on their own territory. Then come 1812-14 the Allies had a logistical network that could support them in devastated terrain. The French didn't.
 
That's also a consequence of French success, because so much of their fighting was outside France they were more free to loot, have a higher tooth to tail ratio and thus were more deadly. The Allies meanwhile had to develop their logistical networks to support forces comparable in size to the French but with much less looting because they were on their own territory. Then come 1812-14 the Allies had a logistical network that could support them in devastated terrain. The French didn't.

Agree. But it should not be forgotten that the looting was (semi-)officially sanctioned at least since the 1st Napoleonic campaign in Italy: “I will led you into the richest area of Europe!…”. Armies of the Republic were notoriously ill supplied so at least some degree of looting had to be expected and general Bonaparte seemingly elevated it into the completely different area by the combination of the official confiscations and contributions and activities of the members of his entourage. The fish stinks starting from the head and, anyway, the lower ranks should be stimulated and patriotic demagoguery already became something of a grey noice.

Later, during the Empire, he was providing his marshals, top generals and other leading figures with a lot of wealth and required that they maintained a lavish life style but the wealth he was giving could be taken back at any moment so it is not a big surprise that everybody was trying to get something of his own. And, as you correctly noticed, not bothering too much with the “infrastructure” and other boring administrative activities was much easier than bothering. The same goes for many other aspects. Take, for example, medical services during campaign of 1812: they were pretty much overlooked from the very beginning. Take horses: why bother with learning how to tend to them properly if they can be easily replaced with the stock captured in a conquered area?

Then goes a fundamental “social” difference: armies of the opponents still were pretty much old style armies, socially, and strong discipline was considered a necessity to keep troops in a good order, minimize desertions, etc. Armies of the Republic and Empire were, at least formally, “citizens armies” and while discipline improved comparing to the earlier days of the Republic, the notion of a patriotism was a binding factor was still there and the methods of enforcement were much milder (AFAIK, the soldiers could not be flogged, which was a common punishment everywhere else). The same goes for a general attitude toward the officers: with every soldier having a realistic chance to raise to their level, they were not “superior beings”.
 
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