Napoleonic Questions

[Višeslav]

Yet another person asking about Nappy. I know. Sorry. He is an interesting and important figure though, so there`s a reason so many people want to write TLs focusing on our boy.

Anyway. The Questions. I was inspired by the "Napoleon breaks up Austria" thread. Lets say Nappy balkanizes Austria like this (ignore Portugal):

And revises the continental system to be less harsh on most things but block grain imports to Britain (Grain being the main resource Britain lacked at the time, especially due to lack of a significant presence in the Canadian prairies) to starve Britain out but piss everyone off a bit less.

We now have a starving Britain, a few states in the former Austrian Empire that rely on Napoleon for survival (the manpower is the same as OTL but troops and commanders from the region are more loyal). Could this be enough to win? If no, what else has to change?

These are the important questions:
Given this scenario (with any necessary changes) what happens with...

• Russia - are they confident enough to turn on France?
• Prussia - same question
• The US - does the war of 1812 go better? They're still probably not taking Canada, but do they get something just to f*ck off?
• Colonies - Specifically Indonesia. Nappy would have to return northern Germany to the Rhenish bois and give the Dutch independence post-war. Indonesia was occupied by France and then by the Brits. Who gets it?
• The Ottomans - Napoleon will probably keep them around as a counterbalance to Russia, but will he take anything from them? Ie. let Russia take Moldavia, takes Algeria and/or Tunisia. Could he buy Algeria or something? The Ottos were getting pretty weak.
• The Illyrian Provinces - they ain't staying French. Who gets them? Italy? Do they get independence? Does Illyrian Tyrol go back to Austria?
  
• I assume he's taking Sicily and Sardinia and giving Pomerania to either Prussia or the Rhenish fed.

I've already asked a lot, so that's it.

 

[alexmilman]

Lets say Nappy balkanizes Austria like this (ignore Portugal):

And revises the continental system to be less harsh on most things but block grain imports to Britain (Grain being the main resource Britain lacked at the time, especially due to lack of a significant presence in the Canadian prairies) to starve Britain out but piss everyone off a bit less.

Here goes the major problem:

The main (AFAIK) source of grain imports to Britain was Russia. And for Russia the main source of gold (at least for the Russian nobility) was export of the raw materials (including grain) produced by their estates to Britain. Then, of course, there was a general issue of the imports of the manufactured goods to Russia from Britain.

So, to break the whole chain of the mutual dependencies and interests, Nappy would need to substitute the British imports/exports with the French ones or (with some POD) Russia may not have these dependencies. Which is easily said than done because France, AFAIK, was lagging behind Britain in the terms of a manufacturing and was reasonably OK with its own agricultural production. At least shortly before the French Revolution Russian-French trade treaty died due to an absence of the French interest (even if at that time France had a positive balance of trade with Russia). To change the whole schema you'd need to go at least couple generations back and implement at least one of two PODs:

(a) France, at least from the reign of Louis XIV starts developing its own manufacturing instead of getting involved in a series of the mostly pointless wars which were destroying its economy. At the same time France is modernizing its financial system by creating a state bank and whatever else is necessary. If implemented successfully, this could allow France to replace Britain as a major supplier of the manufactured goods in Continental Europe even without a naval supremacy.

(b) Starting from the reign of Peter I Russia concentrates on creating a self-sufficient economy minimizing imports to the luxury items. Government keeps exports of the timber, iron and other "strategic materials" under strict control never allowing Britain into a position of a monopolist importer/exporter. Limiting bread exports (BTW, as soon as the Napoleonic Wars were over, the Brits slapped the high tariffs on the grain imports to help the local growers and these tariffs existed for the next 3 decades, which indicates that starvation part may not work at all). These restrictions should start well before the French Revolution so that they are not associated with the Continental System and do not trigger Paul I scenario. The obvious problem is that, while being beneficial for the lower classes, the lower grain prices would hit nobility in a pocket and the government did not have money to launch some kind of the subsidies program. So, you'd probably need to butterfly some of the expensive nonsensical activities of Elizabeth I and Catherine II, like Russian participation in the 7YW, mess with the PLC, extremely expensive court, inefficiently fought Ottoman War (especially second). Actually, France may start importing Russian grain in the late XVIII through the Black Sea/Med (which would require some changes of the diplomatic outcome of Catherine's 1st Ottoman War).

With these things happening, Russia ceases to be so closely tied to the British interests and may assume a friendlier position toward Napoleon (especially if he is playing nicely).

 

[Višeslav]

(a) France, at least from the reign of Louis XIV starts developing its own manufacturing instead of getting involved in a series of the mostly pointless wars which were destroying its economy. At the same time France is modernizing its financial system by creating a state bank and whatever else is necessary. If implemented successfully, this could allow France to replace Britain as a major supplier of the manufactured goods in Continental Europe even without a naval supremacy.

Wouldn't this drastically alter the French revolution?

 

[alexmilman]

Wouldn't this drastically alter the French revolution?

It could. That's the whole problem: Nappy was trying to put France into a position which it could, for a while, maintain militarily but not economically. Which means that sooner or later the system would crumble. To add economic power to France you need a much earlier POD but that POD may change a lot of things in the future.

Of course, if the military/diplomatic component is effective enough, then the system may have enough time for evolving into some XIX equivalent of the EU where sum total of the internally produced products practically eliminates a need of the British imports. This is not putting Britain out of business because it still has its markets but elevates Franco-British conflict into Euro-British one which it could not win just due to the costs and numbers.

 

[Draeger]

It could. That's the whole problem: Nappy was trying to put France into a position which it could, for a while, maintain militarily but not economically. Which means that sooner or later the system would crumble.

Not if you smash everyone hard enough, and make them all economically/militarily dependent on you.

This is not putting Britain out of business because it still has its markets but elevates Franco-British conflict into Euro-British one which it could not win just due to the costs and numbers

Napoleon's France in 1812 does not have the ability to subsidize industrialization across Europe, such that the Continental System could be effectively self-sufficient. Britain (and thanks to naval dominance, no one else) has access to capital (human and physical), resources and markets that easily outstrip the nascent industrial sector of the entire rest of the Continent.

IF, however, you move the POD back to Trafalgar and have the British lose, then Napoleon can invade across the Channel with the entire might of the Grande Armee (stationed at Boulogne awaiting news of what N thought was certain victory, and should have been on paper), and absolutely wreck the UK. Breaking-up of the UK is MUCH more devastating than breaking up the Habsburg Empire in the long run.

 

[Deckhand]

France winning Gibraltar was pretty thin given Britain's superiority in seamanship and leadership over the french, let alone the horrible spanish navy. But it would be irrelevant anyway, as Nelson's fleet was not the Fleet covering the Channel. That fleet was about twice the size. Basically France would have to run the table and win 3-4 gibraltar scale victories to pull this off. I suppose it is more possible than Sealion, but not much.

 

[Draeger]

Basically France would have to run the table and win 3-4 gibraltar scale victories to pull this off. I suppose it is more possible than Sealion, but not much.

Napoleon was willing to sacrifice every ship and sailor available to him in order to get his army across, so confident was he of his ability to break the British at home, and he had loads of reasons to believe it would work.

 

[alexmilman]

Not if you smash everyone hard enough, and make them all economically/militarily dependent on you.

Napoleon's France in 1812 does not have the ability to subsidize industrialization across Europe, such that the Continental System could be effectively self-sufficient. Britain (and thanks to naval dominance, no one else) has access to capital (human and physical), resources and markets that easily outstrip the nascent industrial sector of the entire rest of the Continent.

IF, however, you move the POD back to Trafalgar and have the British lose, then Napoleon can invade across the Channel with the entire might of the Grande Armee (stationed at Boulogne awaiting news of what N thought was certain victory, and should have been on paper), and absolutely wreck the UK. Breaking-up of the UK is MUCH more devastating than breaking up the Habsburg Empire in the long run.

To start with, Napoleon could not “smash everyone hard enough” as was proven in Spain and Russia. French resources were not unlimited and his system had its limitations. Then, he could not make even the subdued part of Europe economically dependent on France because France was not economically developed up to the necessary degree. Even France itself needed British imports. So the picture of the XIX EU is a theoretical possibility with a low chance of implementation. Of course “industrialization” in Europe circa 1800 is rather “manufacturization” with a predominantly manual labor. Not quite impossible: during few years between the Tilsit and 1812 cutting the British imports caused a sharp increase of the manufactures in Russia with a substitute of the imports with a domestic product. But it also produced a lot of unhappiness among the nobility because their incomes were falling. It seems that in the Northern Germany and the Netherlands the Continental System never truly worked. Can not tell how it would impact independent states created within this AH. Poles were seemingly solidly behind the Nappy.

Even if Trafalgar was a Franco-Spanish victory, Napoleon would not be able to invade Britain because he was already marching against the Austrians and Russians (camp of Boulogne had been broken on August 25 and Trafalgar fought on October 21) and Villeneuve got orders to sail to Naples. By the time of Trafalgar Napoleon already defeated Austrians at Ulm and was far away from the coast. Anyway, the initial plan for the Franco-Spanish fleet was not to fight the Brits but to evade them and join the French fleet in Brest which would allow to concentrate 59 ships of the line to cover the crossings from Boulogne to Britain.

 

[Višeslav]

I`ve seen a lot of people saying no peninsular war would be the best option, but I really like the idea of France having Catalonia. Is there a way both could happen? Or just a less costly peninsular war? Maybe Napoleon installs a more popular, and more Spanish, king but keeps Catalonia?

 

[wcv215]

Or just a less costly peninsular war? Maybe Napoleon installs a more popular, and more Spanish, king but keeps Catalonia?

He puts Ferdinand VII on the throne rather than his brother.

 

[Višeslav]

He puts Ferdinand VII on the throne rather than his brother.

If I write this TL, it's gonna have 3 or 4 PODs. Bruh. That`s a surprising amount of work to make Napoleon win.

 

[Thoresby]

That`s a surprising amount of work to make Napoleon win.

OTL was pretty much the best possible scenario for French military success, France 1793-1812 is like Germany 1936-Dec 1941, everything that could go right did but you can't stop gravity. In 1805 French armies were quantitatively and qualitatively larger and better than anyone else but that wasn't because of the innate superiority of Frenchmen but the because the French developed and implemented several key organisational and tactical advances*. But those advances spread and eventually became universal and then the French Empire of that map was doomed.

*Grand Battery, mass use of skirmishers, levee en mass, corps structure etc.

 

[alexmilman]

OTL was pretty much the best possible scenario for French military success, France 1793-1812 is like Germany 1936-Dec 1941, everything that could go right did but you can't stop gravity. In 1805 French armies were quantitatively and qualitatively larger and better than anyone else but that wasn't because of the innate superiority of Frenchmen but the because the French developed and implemented several key organisational and tactical advances*. But those advances spread and eventually became universal and then the French Empire of that map was doomed.

*Grand Battery, mass use of skirmishers, levee en mass, corps structure etc.

That’s true and it also should not be forgotten that Napoleonic military systems had numerous limitations and faults which eventually played against it.

Napoleon created a system that almost completely depended on him personally both in the military and administrative areas. With the armies growing in size and fighting on more than one theater this started creating considerable problems. He simply could not control everything, his Chief of Staff was not doing anything without his orders (in a normal army it would be his duty to take care of the administrative and logistical issues) and neither did most of his corps commanders.

Supply system was not getting enough attention which was OK for the short campaigns in the rich areas of Europe but in Spain and Russia this turned to be a terrible problem. One aspect of it was that nobody paid proper attention to the horses: usually, they were easily replaceable by the local stock. But in the Russian campaign most of the horses were in a really bad shape even before Smolensk was reached and during the retreat many of them had been lost just due to the absence of the proper horseshoes and food (quite a few had been taken by the Russians and, after being fed and getting the proper horseshoes, put into service).

The system was victory-oriented and successful commander was not criticized for the losses.

Looting was permitted and both in Spain and Russia the results were disastrous. At the retreat from Moscow only the Guards and Davout corps had properly organized baggage train but army was overburdened by the private carriages and carts carrying loot at the expense of supplies.

 

[Thoresby]

@alexmilman agreed, the Napoleonic Army was much like the Wehrmacht, it got some very important things right before anyone else and that combined with an enormous amount of luck enabled them to achieve a superficially impressive but practically unsustainable position. Then when the laws of gravity reasserted themselves and things started to go wrong all the flaws that had been obscured before came to the surface and now they didn't have the space or the time to fix things, also while they had been luxuriating in their victories their enemies had been learning from their defeats.

Napoleon, unlike Hitler, remained a great commander, his Battle of the Frontiers was near perfect but he didn't have the numbers and after Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had reformed the Prussian Army he didn't have a qualitative edge either.

 

[alexmilman]

@alexmilman agreed, the Napoleonic Army was much like the Wehrmacht, it got some very important things right before anyone else and that combined with an enormous amount of luck enabled them to achieve a superficially impressive but practically unsustainable position. Then when the laws of gravity reasserted themselves and things started to go wrong all the flaws that had been obscured before came to the surface and now they didn't have the space or the time to fix things, also while they had been luxuriating in their victories their enemies had been learning from their defeats.

Napoleon, unlike Hitler, remained a great commander, his Battle of the Frontiers was near perfect but he didn't have the numbers and after Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had reformed the Prussian Army he didn't have a qualitative edge either.

Qualitative edge was seemingly shrinking even in 1812: during his tenure as Minister of War Barclays managed to implement a number of substantial reforms on all levels. Strictly speaking from a purely structural point of view Russian army was even slightly ahead because it had a standard corps structure and a regulated army level organization. The French advantages were in a quality (and in 1812) the numbers but the numbers did not last forever, quality of the troops was a matter of experience and while Napoleon was a factor of its own, the Allied commanders eventually grew up to the needed level.

 

[Thoresby]

Qualitative edge was seemingly shrinking even in 1812

The qualitative edge was shrinking earlier than that, at Aspern the French and Napoleon were not just out generalled then were outfought, with Austrian artillery proving particularly effective. Now that was an exception and Wagram and Jena showed that the French still had a qualitative edge but it peaked in the War of the Second Coalition in my opinion.

 

[TRH]

I`ve seen a lot of people saying no peninsular war would be the best option, but I really like the idea of France having Catalonia. Is there a way both could happen? Or just a less costly peninsular war? Maybe Napoleon installs a more popular, and more Spanish, king but keeps Catalonia?

Maybe a POD back in 1794-ish when France and Spain were fighting, and the Spanish do much worse then. That would have major implications before Napoleon even gets an army command, including probable poisoning of Franco-Spanish relations for years afterward, but you kind of have to accept that if you want to do this.

 

[alexmilman]

The qualitative edge was shrinking earlier than that, at Aspern the French and Napoleon were not just out generalled then were outfought, with Austrian artillery proving particularly effective. Now that was an exception and Wagram and Jena showed that the French still had a qualitative edge but it peaked in the War of the Second Coalition in my opinion.

Well, War of the Second Coalition saw French being defeated in Italy by Suvorov and Charles had been successful on the Rhine so I’d be cautious about its being a peak. But the 3rd was brilliant both strategically and tactically.

Quite agree with you about Essling and Wagram was a butchery: it can be argued that with a greater vigilance Charles could prevent the crossing, that his position was giving Napoleon advantages of the shorter distance and that Austrian cavalry was not used aggressively enough but both sides had been fighting practically on the equal terms; the same goes for 1812: Napoleon failed to outmaneuver the opponent and force a decisive battle(s) close to the border, which pretty much doomed the campaign, and Borodino was a terrible butchery on both sides even if there were obvious problems with the Russian leadership (inept commander in chief, quarelling army commanders, etc.), the troops had been placed not in the best way and Russian artillery lacked the long range pieces (even if it was, generally, of a heavier caliber). But choice of the straightforward battle was Napoleon’s: he rejected all possibilities of outmaneuvering opponent (actually, the Russians expected him to do something of the kind, hence seemingly useless field fortifications on their right flank).

 

[TRH]

Well, War of the Second Coalition saw French being defeated in Italy by Suvorov and Charles had been successful on the Rhine so I’d be cautious about its being a peak. But the 3rd was brilliant both strategically and tactically.

Quite agree with you about Essling and Wagram was a butchery: it can be argued that with a greater vigilance Charles could prevent the crossing, that his position was giving Napoleon advantages of the shorter distance and that Austrian cavalry was not used aggressively enough but both sides had been fighting practically on the equal terms; the same goes for 1812: Napoleon failed to outmaneuver the opponent and force a decisive battle(s) close to the border, which pretty much doomed the campaign, and Borodino was a terrible butchery on both sides even if there were obvious problems with the Russian leadership (inept commander in chief, quarelling army commanders, etc.), the troops had been placed not in the best way and Russian artillery lacked the long range pieces (even if it was, generally, of a heavier caliber). But choice of the straightforward battle was Napoleon’s: he rejected all possibilities of outmaneuvering opponent (actually, the Russians expected him to do something of the kind, hence seemingly useless field fortifications on their right flank).

I'm no expert, but perhaps the supply problems and shitty roads in Russia made fancy maneuvering less feasible? You wouldn't want to risk your outflanking forces suffering unexpected delays and missing the battle, or something.

 

[alexmilman]

I'm no expert, but perhaps the supply problems and shitty roads in Russia made fancy maneuvering less feasible? You wouldn't want to risk your outflanking forces suffering unexpected delays and missing the battle, or something.

Actually, the roads had been better than during the War of the 4th Coalition about which Napoleon said that for Poland the God invented the 5th element, the dirt. The offensive stage of the campaign of 1812 happened during the summer/early fall which were mostly dry and, until Napoleon failed to prevent junction of the Russian armies, it was happening on a reasonably wide front with Davout acting as pretty much independent army commander trying to cut off Bagration’s 2nd Army (task in which he was almost successful but “almost” does not co7nt). Even at Smolensk there were attempts to cut off the Russian army (task simplified by the quarrel between commanders of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies which almost made it successful). Only when they failed, a straightforward pursuit by the Smolensk Road started but by that time summer was dry and a road wide enough to allow marching by few parallel columns. However, by that time the campaign was already strategically lost and even victorious major battle would not save it.

At Borodino, the Russian position was allowing the French maneuvers against both flanks so the choice of the OTL plan was strictly Nappy’s decision. With the campaign going nowhere, he expected that a major victory would provide enough of a psychological pressure to force Alexander to start peace talks and manauvers could result in a further Russian withdrawal without a battle.

As for the supplies and logistics in general, this campaign was a classic illustration of the shortcomings of the system. There were adequate food supplies carried with the army in the beginning but the horses started suffering from forage shortages soon enough and cavalry troops demonstrated a complete incompetence in taking care of them. Then, the army did not have a well-organized supply service in general relying on the looting activities of the small detachments. Napoleon ordered organization of few big magazines along the route but they were not guarded properly and on the way back had been mostly looted by the disorganized troops. Getting food from the nearby area was done by a traditional looting with the occasional attempts to pay by the counterfeit paper money to which Russian peasants were not accustomed. As was commented by one of the Russian contemporaries, if the French were paying in gold and silver, they’d have little problems with getting food and forage. When the retreat started, there was enough food available in Moscow and nearby region but Napoleon did not give the explicit orders, Bertier did not perform his duty as a chief of staff and, with the exception of Davout, the corps commanders did not care. Army went out of Moscow overburdened by the loot, short on supplies and only horses of Naploeon’s Household got proper winter horseshoes.