Well, I don't deny that it was quite weak, but quite weak support is surely better than no support, which Napoleon met in central Russia, isn't it? And while talking about CS and restoring it, you forget one important thing. Grain produced in Ukraine was one of the main Russian export products to Britain at that time (Odessa was later nicknamed by historians: "European Hongkong", because there was that much grain trade with British being done by it), so cutting this export by setting up a puppet Poland in this place doesn't sound like a bad idea to accomplish the purpose of strategically weakening Britain and cutting it's trade gains.
I’m afraid that you are more than a little bit confused regarding structure of the Russian exports at that time. Grain was not atop item on the list (items needed for the ship building were). Odessa became important much later and the same goes for the exports through the Black Sea (access to which was during that period quite often blocked by the Ottomans. Russian main ports were St. Petersburg, Archangelsk and Riga.

Conquest of Ukraine would, as I already said, benefit the Polish nobility but in a process of doing them such a favor Napoleon would have his flank and rear exposed and the whole affair turning into a prolonged war with no clear outcome and a need of a massive long-term commitment, something he already had going on in Spain and tried to avoid in Russia.

Last but not least, an idea of cutting British trade gains is great but would not work: Britain had a negative trade balance with Russia. 😜
 
If Napoleon was aware of this, would he even care about imposing CS on Russia?
Of course, Nappy was aware of this. It is just that you did not pay attention to what is written: Russia was supplying Britain with the "strategic materials" needed for its navy and manufactures. Russian commitment to the CS would hit (at least in theory) the British military effort and economy.


The grain got on the top of the list of the Russian exports only in 1840s and in OTL in 1815 Britain introduced the Corn Laws which restricted imports of the Russian grain.

Edit. To give an idea, in 1802 the British export to Russia amounted to 1,282,000 pounds and import from Russia to 2,182,000. Actually, I have to correct myself: after cancellation of the restriction to the grain export established by Paul, grain as a single item did get to the 1st place in the list of exports. The early XIX: grain (with the flour and other grain-based products) - 10,087 ,000 rubles, hemp - 8,741,000, fat - 7,167,000, flax - 5,366 ,000, flax and hemp-based materials - 2,820,000, iron - 2,672,000. But the main ports were St-Petersburg, Archangelsk, Riga. The CS cut grain export almost 4 times (from 19,873K puds до 5,120 K). However, the group of technical materials (flax, hemp, tow and related materials) amounted by cost to 33.5% of the export beating the grain. http://rta.customs.ru/nrta/attachments/4290_978-5-9590-0993-9.pdf
 
Last edited:
I never said occupy. It would happen after Russia would be defeated so new independent (French puppet) principalities would be created and Russia wouldn't defeat the Grand Army in detail because there wouldn't be a Russia (or at least it wouldn't be at war with France).
Napoleon didn't have to split his army to keep occupying Switzerland/Germany/Netherlands/Italy to keep his puppet states there up.
It would be close to impossible for Nappy to defeat Russia to such a degree that Alexander agrees upon losing a significant piece of a territory (with a possible but not quite likely exception of Lithuania), which (following your own logic) means that the whole schema of the "principalities" is impractical beyond the empty titles like "Prince of Moscow" which Ney got. Russian army did not have to defeat the GA to win a war: at Borodino Napoleon could bring approximately 25% of the force he initially had on the main direction without a single serious battle fought in between. The GA was falling apart on its own and the proposals regarding a different style of the campaign or different route change little.

Anyway, creation of the brand new state entities surely would require a French military presence because if it is not there, a newly-appointed prince would be forced to run away unless he prefers to be killed. Tradition of the meaningful principalities was lost in Russia centuries before 1812 so the right analogy would be Spain, not Germany.
 
there wouldn't be a Russia if Russia was decisively defeated and then broken up into principalities.

Why should a defeat, however "decisive" cause Russia to break up?

Also indeed, GA can't stand in a particular place forever. Which is why France and Russia would sign a peace treaty.

Again, *why* would there be a treaty? The Tsar knows that Napoleon cannot stay in Russia forever, so all he has to do is move his government somewhere out of Napoleon's reach, while recruiting a new army in those provinces the GA doesn't occupy (which will be most of them). What does Napoleon do? Just keep marching and counter-marching up and down Russia until gradual shrinkage has reduced tthe GA to a corporal's guard?

In which, if France was winning enough could get a positive treaty for themselves. Which is where I am saying could include territories Russian Empire is giving away could be divided into independent principalities.

Why should Russia give away *any* territories? The only Russian territory Napoleon controls is what his troops are actually camped upon, which is a minute fraction of the whole country. And even that can't be held for very long.
 
Napoleon didn't have to split his army to keep occupying Switzerland/Germany/Netherlands/Italy to keep his puppet states there up.


He *would* have had to had those countries been as big as Russia.

Also, most European countries had some vital spot (usually the capital) whose capture would effectively knock than out. Thus Austria soon came to terms once Vienna was taken, and France had to quit once the Allies occupied Paris. . OTOH Russia (like Spain, or like America in the ARW) had no such spot. Napoleon could capture any place he liked, without it making a blind bit of difference. He would still hold only the patch of land he was sitting on.
 
It would be rather difficult for Napoleon to save Estonian girl because he was nowhere close to Estonia and, sorry, but a proposed scenario is plain silly. The same goes for the parallels with WWI and WWII.

Nappy was popular in Lithuania because its nobility counted on restoration of the PLC. That was it. The ruling class of the Baltic provinces was quite loyal to the Russian empire, Russian army was packed with the officers and generals from that region and there was no reason for them to look for any changes. Anyway, Nappy was not in the region and as a result could not create any satellite states there.
what if the ruling class in baltics/livonia(germans) be purged and replaced by natives

And i said,a Estonian saving napoleon,not napoleon saving her(some short of The Footprint of Mussolini like PoD)
 
Top