Napoleon wins in Russia 1812

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It came a tad early and it was normal temperature, falling above average as the winter went on.

Here's a great (French) source for it.

http://vannevar.blogspot.com/2009/03/minard-napolean-russia-1812-best-chart.html

The trouble is, Napoleon was already beaten by the time the cold came on. The cold made the retreat a disaster, but absense of it wouldn't have given him a victory.

 

[fhaessig]

It came a tad early and it was normal temperature, falling above average as the winter went on.

Here's a great (French) source for it.

http://vannevar.blogspot.com/2009/03/minard-napolean-russia-1812-best-chart.html

That gives temperatures, for a few days. Where does it compare it to normal average for the day and location?

 

[Lord Malikai]

Assuming the ASBs teleport Tesla and his weather-control machine back to 1812 I think we might want to ask the mad genius to make the year colder not warmer. Between the start of the Invasion and Borodino (June 24-September 7) Napoleon lost about 320,000 men mainly due to the summer heat. After Borodino i.e. during the actual winter Napoleon lost only 90,000 men. A warmer winter might save 10,000 of the Grande Armee but it was in a desperate position already. The General Winter effect owes more to Operation Barbarossa and general perception of Napoleon's invasion than actual fact.
The real flaw with invading Russia was, again the massive troop numbers and failure to gain a decisive battle before the Russians won the inevitable battle of attrition. Napoleon really needed a smaller army, better supply lines, and a victory on the frontier, instead of the massive drive on Moscow. The weather can be mitigated in any number of ways, the inherent shortcomings in the basic plan can't.

 

[LordKalvan]

Also, restore the Kingdom of Poland. But all of these come down to two things: one is just more cautious military planning, but the other is a revolutionary assault on the whole Russian state. This is the rub, as Napoleon's objective was to force an intact Russia back into the continental system.

Zamoysky makes both points very clearly in his book: I do believe that the second one (Nappy trying to force Alexander to sit at the peace table rather than destroying Russia) is the key one (after all, Nappy going for the throat results almost automatically into the re-creation of a Poland). Zamoyski makes also a third point: Nappy's health starting to deteriorate with the result that l'empereur is less focussed than usual. If this is true, the negative impact on the war would be gigantic.

One can overestimate Russia's supplies of manpower, and underestimate Napoleon's. Sure, the Tsar could keep demanding every hundredth, twentieth, tenth serf, but this wasn't any more effective than Napoleonic conscription (in fact it could be less, since the landlords were laothe to part with any but the sickliest and weakest serfs), and while the tsar had Russia, Napoleon had large parts of Europe. Witness how he lost the larger part of an army in Russia, summoned a new one into being and won battles with it, lost a lot of that one at Leipzig and trhough the subsequent defections, and then conjured up another one for the 1814 campaign which, while a forlorn hope, was tactically some of his finest hours. Sure, they were down to the "Marie-Antoinettes" by then, but as I said, Russia's manpower supply was prone to turn up poor quality recruits. And the reason Napo had to keep raising new troops was because of the winter retreat. It wasn't like his troops were just fated to die in 1812. That they could have avoided that fate is rather the point.

Agreed on all points: Alexander's Russian Empire had really nothing to do with Stalin's USSR and cannot turn out very easily officers and sergeants. Why Nappy really decided to go and invade Russia with a gigantic and unwieldy army which was almost impossile to keep provisioned beats me: unless one looks at it as a kind of imperial progress aiming to overawe Alexander and bring him to the peace table.

Funny story courtesy of Zamoyski: they had been so indoctrinated that when some Russian villagers met a Polish Uhlan who said "God Bless You!" by way of a greeting (and such basic phrases can be understood across the languages), they, having thought that Napoleon's minions all worhsipped Satan, immediately became friendly. Not that the Russians didn't run a formidable propraganda operation, but it was prone to overstretch like this, and then there were the Poles, who in western Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania were pretty much the whole of the educated elite. Czartoyski had got his "Vilnius Education District" extended even to Kiev.

There are quite a number of funny stories in Zamoyski's 1812: quite a nice book to read

 

[I Blame Communism]

Zamoysky makes both points very clearly in his book: I do believe that the second one (Nappy trying to force Alexander to sit at the peace table rather than destroying Russia) is the key one (after all, Nappy going for the throat results almost automatically into the re-creation of a Poland). Zamoyski makes also a third point: Nappy's health starting to deteriorate with the result that l'empereur is less focussed than usual. If this is true, the negative impact on the war would be gigantic.




Agreed on all points: Alexander's Russian Empire had really nothing to do with Stalin's USSR and cannot turn out very easily officers and sergeants. Why Nappy really decided to go and invade Russia with a gigantic and unwieldy army which was almost impossile to keep provisioned beats me: unless one looks at it as a kind of imperial progress aiming to overawe Alexander and bring him to the peace table.



There are quite a number of funny stories in Zamoyski's 1812: quite a nice book to read

Glad to see I'm not the only one who's read it. It's a cracking book, as a narrative and as a history.

 

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Agreed on all points: Alexander's Russian Empire had really nothing to do with Stalin's USSR and cannot turn out very easily officers and sergeants. Why Nappy really decided to go and invade Russia with a gigantic and unwieldy army which was almost impossile to keep provisioned beats me: unless one looks at it as a kind of imperial progress aiming to overawe Alexander and bring him to the peace table.

Moreover, if you eliminate the 200,000 men the Russians have facing the Grande Armee, Alexander will negotiate.

But Alexander was already planning to not engage. Battles that were actually given were given to keep up morale, primarly, and to whittle down the French only secondarily.

My own personal nationalistic hypothesis is that Napoleon lost nerve. The Russian army was among the few that gave almost as good as it got, so maybe that's why he went for the overkill instead of moving in 90-150K troops and goading the Russians into a big set piece.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Moreover, if you eliminate the 200,000 men the Russians have facing the Grande Armee, Alexander will negotiate.

But Alexander was already planning to not engage. Battles that were actually given were given to keep up morale, primarly, and to whittle down the French only secondarily.

My own personal nationalistic hypothesis is that Napoleon lost nerve. The Russian army was among the few that gave almost as good as it got, so maybe that's why he went for the overkill instead of moving in 90-150K troops and goading the Russians into a big set piece.

And of course, this is Napoleon we're talking about. His natural response to anything was ro raise an army, win a battle, and then decide what to do. Sort of a safety blanket for him. But the Napoleonic Russian army certainly deserves more credit that it often gets. It wasn't all the winter!

 

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It wasn't all the winter!

Well, to be honest, almost none of it was the winter.

It was the droughty summer, the scorched earth, the big losses in the few set pieces, the need to garrison ruined towns, the harrassment by cossacks and opolcheniye, the inability of his marshalls to clear the flanks of Russian armies, Borodino, and finally the big fire in Moscow. That and the not-giving-up by the Russians.

The winter simply killed off the remaning 15% of an already thoroughly beaten army, and more of them died in mild September than nasty late October at that. The fact that the Russians forced him to retreat through the same road as he came in by (no food or shelter anywhere) made it so much worse.

 

[DAv]

One possible chance of victory might come if Napoleon aims not for Moscow after meandering a bit but heads straight for St. Petersburg. Moscow was the heart of the Russian Empire to be sure but St. Petersburg was the administrative capital and a much more valuable target.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Well, to be honest, almost none of it was the winter.

Hmm. Very good points. General January and General February are medal-jangling wastes of space, it would seem. Am I right in thinking that, if we absolutely insist on overemphasising the weather's role at Moscow, '41, we should actually be looking at the Autumn rains more than anything?

One possible chance of victory might come if Napoleon aims not for Moscow after meandering a bit but heads straight for St. Petersburg. Moscow was the heart of the Russian Empire to be sure but St. Petersburg was the administrative capital and a much more valuable target.

I don't think it would do any more to compell a Russian surrender, but it could mean the Grand Army leaves the place in a somewhat better shape. Could.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Glad to see I'm not the only one who's read it. It's a cracking book, as a narrative and as a history.

What is it exactly? I'm quite intrigued.

 

[LordKalvan]

What is it exactly? I'm quite intrigued.

1812: Napoleon's fatal march on Moscow by Adam Zamoyski. Very well researched and a history book that does not tire a reader. I liked it very much and would recommend it.

If you like 1812, I suggest also Rites of Peace: the fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, by the same author. It picks up the threads left at the end of 1812 and goes on until 1820. IMHO this is another cracking book and I liked it even more than 1812.

Optional would be reading The Last King of Poland, again by Zamoyski. In a way it can be seen as a prequel to 1812, and it's also quite well done.

 

[LordKalvan]

Well, to be honest, almost none of it was the winter.

It was the droughty summer, the scorched earth, the big losses in the few set pieces, the need to garrison ruined towns, the harrassment by cossacks and opolcheniye, the inability of his marshalls to clear the flanks of Russian armies, Borodino, and finally the big fire in Moscow. That and the not-giving-up by the Russians.

The winter simply killed off the remaning 15% of an already thoroughly beaten army, and more of them died in mild September than nasty late October at that. The fact that the Russians forced him to retreat through the same road as he came in by (no food or shelter anywhere) made it so much worse.

The list of Napoleonic blunders starts much earlier than that: before starting the war he managed to piss off Bernadotte (not that he was a fan of Nappy, but he was also certainly not a friend of Russia) and push him in Alexander's arms by occupying Swedish Pomerania (to bolster the Continental System) and completely neglected the advantage of making an alliance with the Ottomans, who were already fighting the Russians (and the Russians managed to sign an armistice just a couple of week before the invasion).

Then he never came out clearly to state that he would re-create the kingdom of Poland (the partitions of Poland happened less than a generation before 1812). To make things even more difficult he toyed with the idea of appointing his brother Jerome as king of Poland (still without declaring it). Jerome quickly managed to turn Warsaw against him with his behavior and then went on and completely failed in his attack against Bagration's second army (which should have been trapped and utterly destroyed at the beginning of the war).

Finally he lost a lot of time trying to bring Alexander to a negotiating table (and this delusion went on until after Borodino and the occupation of Moscow) while he should have focussed in bringing Barclay's first army to a battle which might have been decisive (and most likely would have been, given the lack of unified command and the intrigues festering in the Russian army).

Should I go on?

 

[I Blame Communism]

1812: Napoleon's fatal march on Moscow by Adam Zamoyski. Very well researched and a history book that does not tire a reader. I liked it very much and would recommend it.

If you like 1812, I suggest also Rites of Peace: the fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna, by the same author. It picks up the threads left at the end of 1812 and goes on until 1820. IMHO this is another cracking book and I liked it even more than 1812.

Optional would be reading The Last King of Poland, again by Zamoyski. In a way it can be seen as a prequel to 1812, and it's also quite well done.

Read half od one, the other's on my last. Thanks, man!

 

[LordKalvan]

Read half od one, the other's on my last. Thanks, man!

The only problem is that each book is around 500 pages plus notes: it takes time to read and digest them

 

[DAv]

I don't think it would do any more to compell a Russian surrender, but it could mean the Grand Army leaves the place in a somewhat better shape. Could.

I suppose a lot might depend on the Russian reaction. If they do try to prevent Napoleon from taking St. Petersburg a lot more than they did Moscow, it could lead to even more blunders by the Russian camp which could work to Napoleon's advantage.