Napoleon Wins Decisively at Waterloo...then what?

I'd add this to #1 as a rather vital issue:

Napoleon's ambitions - even if stopping at the Rhine and no matter what diplomacy he uses and so on and so forth - are basically for France to be the dominant power in Europe.

That's not wrong,

I am a fan of Napoleon, especially of his military exploits, but why would this not be wrong? I think Europe would be better off if not one of its countries is a dominant power. This would make each European country feel equal and not second-class.
 
I am a fan of Napoleon, especially of his military exploits, but why would this not be wrong? I think Europe would be better off if not one of its countries is a dominant power. This would make each European country feel equal and not second-class.

Speaking for myself as a fan of Team Habsburg, it would verge on Fancophobic to cheer for Austrian victories but condemn Napoleon for his ambitions. And I'd rather not go there - being sympathetic to Austria and to England leads me too close for my peace of mind as is.

So what I meant was, I'm not saying Napoleon was an evil conqueror (unlike Alexander the Destroyer or Tamerlane or Hitler) - just an ambitious one.
 
The UK did not want France in India or North America. And it could and did stop them there. Stopping the French in north Africa is an entirely different ball game. For starters, the region is very close to France, and the ability of UK to intervene effectively there is much more limited. The real tragedy of the French is they never focussed on one region. They spread themselves all over the world and that was their major problem. While what you say may be true for the British, it is also true that Napoleon took too much from the continental countries. Without big continental allies, Britain would not be able to do a lot (other than naval attacks, but these were a double edged weapon). It was the fact that everyone else had signed a truce with Napoleon that persuaded the British to sign the peace of Amiens.



No - but he had always had grand pretensions. He crowned himself with the Iron Crown of Lombardy in Milan, frightening Austria about the meaning of the act. Then, there was the murder of the Duc d'Enghien (c'est pire qu'un crime, c'est une faute!). But the real reason was that Napoleon had taken too much from Austria in the previous wars (what was the point of taking Dalmatia or Ionian islands, or even Tuscany, in the treaty of Luneville?), and the Revolution and its acts had terrified everyone. Napoleon, more than anyone else, had to be more careful than the other aristocrats - they did not intend to change the format of rule. The revolution did. Napoleon could and should have pacified Austria, at least. And without Austria, Russia would not have entered the Third Coalition. Operating against France from Russia is a tad hard ....



I am not sure it would have worked. The German situation was going into a tizzy, and Austria re-entered the war in 1809, although they were badly bruised in 1805. The situation Napoleon had was anything but stable. He had had a chance at stability in 1802. He should not have lost it. Even a war with Britain should not have brought the others into a Coalition against France.



Not quite. If Napoleon had played his cards correctly, it would be the British who would be forced into more suicidal acts like the attack on the Danes. Russia and Denmark had been considering a Baltic naval alliance, to stop British attacks on their fleet. For Britain, blockades were always extremely expensive affairs, diplomatically. Seizing Austrian, Prussian or Russian ships sailing to France would damage them far more diplomatically than anything France could do. And while Britain might not care very much what they others thought, she was always anxious never to be left without any allies on the continent. As the British kept launching their attacks on the neutrals, more and more would be implementing their own version of the Continental policy, without any prodding from France.

Could you explain to which extent the french attempts to spread all over the world was exceptionnal and not clever ?

Did the british not do so ? And the spanish ? and the dutch ?
Of course they did.

Your position is quite puzzling since it is similar to General Quintus' dialogue with Maximus in Ridley Scott's Gladiator :
"- People should know when they are conquererd.
- Would we Quintus ?"

The french did not want. The russians did not want to accept british world domination. This was a legitimate claim. I have no problem with the "Vae victis" point of view but this does not make your statement right.

North Africa was not and never was a profitable region for any colonial power.
The UK did not only want to shut France away from India. As far as North America is concerned, things semm quite different to me : the english-speaking colonists wanted to expel the french. The UK did not care so much.
Napoleon crowned himself king of Italy in 1805, not in 1803 or in 1802.

But I maintain that the UK did not want the french from dominating the Rhine and having the Rhine frontier. That was the main reason for this 23 years conflict between the UK and France. The UK did not fight against the revolutionary ideology. It fought against the ambitions of France whatever the french political regime. From 1688 to 1815, the UK's main political goal in Europe was containing and weakening the french power.
The old reflex came back in 1918 when Germany was defeated. The brits did not want the french to weaken France because it feared a possible return of french hégemony on the continent.

The peace of Lunéville vith Austria was very mild. It was a reassertion of the peace of Campo Formio though Austria had been defeated for the second time.

I understand perfectly that Austria still did not accept the peace of Campo Formio. But each country's point of view was understandable and legitimate. Or would you support the point of view that any country but France could gain territory in Europe ?
The french point of view - and this was especially the position of Talleyrand - was that the european balance of powers had been broken by the partitions of Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria.

The duke of Enghien was not murdered. He was victim of what was ans is still called "reason of state". Arrested abroad, judged, condemned and executed in France for political reasons and for a crime he had not committed but with which he declared solidarity ?
Why was he chosen ? Because there was a series of murder attempts by royalists against Bonaparte.
So Napoleon accepted the proposition of his advisors to send a message bymaking a terrible example. He took the Bourbon he could take and had him executed. Then there was no more murder attempt against him by french royalists.

As far as the league of neutrals. What you are stating seems top me wishful thinking.
What were the bad consequences for the UK of the british attacks of Denmark ? None that had not been anticipated. The goal was to prevent the dutch Navy joining Napoleon's. Mission accomplished.

The russians would never have blockaded the Baltic sea for a long time because :
- they had not the navals means to do so,
- they, and especially the russian nobility, had an absolute need to export their raw materials and the UK was Russia's number one client.

I agree that the other european countries treaties or truces with France was taken into account by the UK in considering signing the peace of Amiens. But this is not contradictory with the fact that the UK needed to rest anyway. And the UK did not either hesitate to fight without allies when it thought it had no other choice.

But I may have contributed to go off the point.

So as far as Waterloo is concerned, I think that there was no chance for Napoleon and France to start things anew. the UK and its allies won the war because of Napoleon's faults and failures from 1808 on. Napoleon never accepted backing away. He prefered losing everything rather than accepting losing a part of what he had taken before.

Winning at Waterloo would still have left France exhausted against a strong coalition uniting all the other european powers.
 
Last edited:
Could you explain to which extent the french attempts to spread all over the world was exceptionnal and not clever ?

The problem was that the French efforts always lacked focus. In India, their policies were conflicting, and contradictory. The British victory over the others in India was more because of the failure of French diplomacy, and British naval superiority. In the Americas, there were ten times more British settlers in the eastern seaboard of the US, compared to the French settlers in Canada and further inland in the (today's) US.

Did the british not do so ? And the spanish ? and the dutch ?
Of course they did.
The circumstances were wholly different. When the Spaniards started their colonisation, they were able to take and hold huge areas without competition. Who opposed Spanish rule in Peru or Mexico?

As for the Dutch, they ended up with nothing but Indonesia for their efforts. They started earlier, and what did they get finally, for their world wide spread?

The British were a wholly different proposition. They were guarded by that bloody ditch of the Channel. They would sit behind their ditch and mock everyone, with their extremely strong navy guarding them. While everyone had to spend on both army and navy, the British problem was simplified that their navy was more than sufficient to guard their possessions.

The french did not want. The russians did not want to accept british world domination. This was a legitimate claim. I have no problem with the "Vae victis" point of view but this does not make your statement right.

North Africa was not and never was a profitable region for any colonial power.
The UK did not only want to shut France away from India. As far as North America is concerned, things semm quite different to me : the english-speaking colonists wanted to expel the french. The UK did not care so much.
Napoleon crowned himself king of Italy in 1805, not in 1803 or in 1802.
It is debatable how rich or otherwise north Africa is. But there is a point you are missing. The British may indeed have started their war in 1803, but they got no allies until 1805 (Austria and Russia). Austria was panicked by Napoleonic actions.

But I maintain that the UK did not want the french from dominating the Rhine and having the Rhine frontier. That was the main reason for this 23 years conflict between the UK and France. The UK did not fight against the revolutionary ideology. It fought against the ambitions of France whatever the french political regime. From 1688 to 1815, the UK's main political goal in Europe was containing and weakening the french power.
While you may be right about UK, the point is UK alone would not be able to do a lot to accomplish her aims. No amount of British funding would be sufficient to start new coalitions if the others did not fear France themselves. And Britain was in no position to start a continental war with France.

The peace of Lunéville vith Austria was very mild. It was a reassertion of the peace of Campo Formio though Austria had been defeated for the second time.
The peace of Luneville legitmised French occupation of Tuscany (which was seen as creeping French encroachment in Italy, by Austria). And the division of Venice was a huge problem, since it gave French footholds in the Adriatic that they could in no way defend, but was sufficient to frighten the Austrians about French ambitions. If Venice was going to be abolished, it would have been better for the Austrians to be granted all of Venetian territories.

I understand perfectly that Austria still did not accept the peace of Campo Formio. But each country's point of view was understandable and legitimate. Or would you support the point of view that any country but France could gain territory in Europe ?
The french point of view - and this was especially the position of Talleyrand - was that the european balance of powers had been broken by the partitions of Poland between Russia, Prussia and Austria.
I am very sympathetic to the French position. Which is why I said the French should have held territory up to the Rhine in Germany, to compensate for the Prussian and Austrian gains at the expense of Poland. But you are overlooking one point. The French diplomacy failed. If you cannot attract any single ally despite your overwhelming military superiority on land, there is something seriously wrong with your diplomacy.

The duke of Enghien was not murdered. He was victim of what was ans is still called "reason of state". Arrested abroad, judged, condemned and executed in France for political reasons and for a crime he had not committed but with which he declared solidarity ?
Why was he chosen ? Because there was a series of murder attempts by royalists against Bonaparte.
So Napoleon accepted the proposition of his advisors to send a message bymaking a terrible example. He took the Bourbon he could take and had him executed. Then there was no more murder attempt against him by french royalists.
Maybe you should take a look at `Le Grand Consul' by Lentz. He explores this point in great depth. You are overlooking just how much Revolutionary France was feared by other countries. The Revolutionary Republic had done away with a whole lot of aristocrats, and here was Napoleon, continuing down that path. The murder of a prominent Bourbon seemed like the start of a new persecution to most countries in Europe. This was one reason why Austria was so spooked.

As far as the league of neutrals. What you are stating seems top me wishful thinking.
What were the bad consequences for the UK of the british attacks of Denmark ? None that had not been anticipated. The goal was to prevent the dutch Navy joining Napoleon's. Mission accomplished.
Except they could no longer trade with Norway or Denmark. And it did not prove costly because the British could keep finding continental distractions for Napoleon, most of them, thanks to Napoleon's own diplomatic blunders.

I agree that the other european countries treaties or truces with France was taken into account by the UK in considering signing the peace of Amiens. But this is not contradictory with the fact that the UK needed to rest anyway. And the UK did not either hesitate to fight without allies when it thought it had no other choice.
The `when it had no choice' is the point. Napoleon, after a lot of conquests, had generated a lot of fear in Europe. Diplomacy demanded that he tread very carefully to digest his conquests. Napoleon should have known better than anyone else just how hard UK would be to defeat for him. Is it not reason enough, then, to actually soothe their concerns? I am not so sure that they would have been successful, even if they started a war in 1803, without any large allies on the continent. And Napoleon, after his military victories, should have translated his gains diplomatically, by bringing Austria and/or Prussia firmly on to his side.
 
Top