Napoleon Wins Decisively at Waterloo...then what?

What you sorte seems very reasonable.

The problem is you are not Atkins into account a few key data.

Having France build a new colonial empire ?
But the UK did not want this. It had fought and won the seven years war in order to destroy the previous french empire. This was not a cooperative world. It was, and this was especially true for the UK, a mercantilist world in which "I want all and the winner takes all."

The UK did not want France in India or North America. And it could and did stop them there. Stopping the French in north Africa is an entirely different ball game. For starters, the region is very close to France, and the ability of UK to intervene effectively there is much more limited. The real tragedy of the French is they never focussed on one region. They spread themselves all over the world and that was their major problem. While what you say may be true for the British, it is also true that Napoleon took too much from the continental countries. Without big continental allies, Britain would not be able to do a lot (other than naval attacks, but these were a double edged weapon). It was the fact that everyone else had signed a truce with Napoleon that persuaded the British to sign the peace of Amiens.

Having France be satisfied with its Rhine frontier ?
You are right. It should have. But the UK would not have. France holding Belgium and Antwerp was a casus belli for the UK.
In the treaty of Amiens of 1802, the brits only "tried" the peace solution because it was on the edge of a popular revolt against its oligarchy and needed time to rest and rebuild its forces.

No - but he had always had grand pretensions. He crowned himself with the Iron Crown of Lombardy in Milan, frightening Austria about the meaning of the act. Then, there was the murder of the Duc d'Enghien (c'est pire qu'un crime, c'est une faute!). But the real reason was that Napoleon had taken too much from Austria in the previous wars (what was the point of taking Dalmatia or Ionian islands, or even Tuscany, in the treaty of Luneville?), and the Revolution and its acts had terrified everyone. Napoleon, more than anyone else, had to be more careful than the other aristocrats - they did not intend to change the format of rule. The revolution did. Napoleon could and should have pacified Austria, at least. And without Austria, Russia would not have entered the Third Coalition. Operating against France from Russia is a tad hard ....

Before its invasion of Spain in 1808, Napoleon never triggered hostilities. The UK forced war on France and Napoleon. And since every previous peace treaty appeared to be a joke, Napoleon felt its only solution was to take more territorial guarantees. In some way, as you noticed, this was a dead end. But this apparent dead end would have in fact worked if Napoleon had not messed everything up with his disastrous russian campaign (I don't mean disastrous war since war with Russia was unavoidable in 1812 but I mean the disastrous way Napoleon led his campaign, abandoning the sound strategy he had initially conceived and losing his army in the russian gigantic territory.)

I am not sure it would have worked. The German situation was going into a tizzy, and Austria re-entered the war in 1809, although they were badly bruised in 1805. The situation Napoleon had was anything but stable. He had had a chance at stability in 1802. He should not have lost it. Even a war with Britain should not have brought the others into a Coalition against France.

The league of neutrals ? It was useless against the UK. The UK of the early 19th century was all but a democracy. It did not care about public opinion. Especially not foreign public opinion.
A coalition is always weaker than a single great power, on sea as well as on land. The british on sea used the watchword "divide and crush". They crushed Denmark when they felt they needed to. And the message sent was very efficient with other neutrals.

Not quite. If Napoleon had played his cards correctly, it would be the British who would be forced into more suicidal acts like the attack on the Danes. Russia and Denmark had been considering a Baltic naval alliance, to stop British attacks on their fleet. For Britain, blockades were always extremely expensive affairs, diplomatically. Seizing Austrian, Prussian or Russian ships sailing to France would damage them far more diplomatically than anything France could do. And while Britain might not care very much what they others thought, she was always anxious never to be left without any allies on the continent. As the British kept launching their attacks on the neutrals, more and more would be implementing their own version of the Continental policy, without any prodding from France.
 
What do you MEAN, our only ally is the Iroquois!?

<snip>
Not quite. If Napoleon had played his cards correctly, it would be the British who would be forced into more suicidal acts like the attack on the Danes. Russia and Denmark had been considering a Baltic naval alliance, to stop British attacks on their fleet. For Britain, blockades were always extremely expensive affairs, diplomatically. Seizing Austrian, Prussian or Russian ships sailing to France would damage them far more diplomatically than anything France could do. And while Britain might not care very much what they others thought, she was always anxious never to be left without any allies on the continent. As the British kept launching their attacks on the neutrals, more and more would be implementing their own version of the Continental policy, without any prodding from France.

Quite right.

Feel free to correct me if I am wrong:eek:, but I always got the impression that the UK screwed over it's allies (mainly Prussia) at the end of the Seven Years War, expressly for the purpose of grabbing everything that it possibly could for Britain, regardless of the long term consequences of her relations with Continental Powers. As if, somehow, someway, they would always be able to summon up continental european allies in the next war whenever they needed them.

Which led, as I see it, a royal screwing over for Britain herself when the American Revolutionary War started. Once the Continental Powers realized the Americans were making a serious bid for Independence (and thereby shaking the First British Empire to its foundations), they acted (DoWs by France and Spain, Britain's extremely unwise attack on an overly pro-American Netherlands, the Russian-supported League of Neutrality). And when it came time for Britain to reach out to prospective allies in the ARW, they suddenly found themselves at the beggars table.:p They found their old enemies still having a lot of debts to pay against Britain, and their old allies seriously pissed (or at least vulnerable to diplomatic pressure) from being formerly left in the lurch by Britain at the end of the 7YW. There was a price for Britain to be paid for the gaining of all those goodies at the expense of her "allies". And said former allies were not interested in trusting Britain two wars in a row.

Perhaps the end results of the 7YW and their circumstances as a result in the ARW served as an excellent primer for the British in how NOT to conduct diplomacy in wartime?

Opinions?:confused:
 
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Perhaps the end results of the 7YW and their circumstances as a result in the ARW served as an excellent primer for the British in how NOT to conduct diplomacy in wartime?

Opinions?:confused:

To some degree, but did it really make that much difference?

Austria and Prussia had fought each other to a standstill, and were unlikely to resume hostilities any time soon. And since Austria and France were now allied, Austria no longer needed help to defend her Belgian and Italian lands. So even if Britain had been more tactful, none of these powers had any further need of her support, so no particular reason to help her in the ARW.

Indeed, one could argue that the French Revolution was the luckiest break that Britain had ever had. Because the Continental monarchs hated it, we were transformed at a stroke from being totally isolated in Europe to having virtually the whole continent bar France (and for a time Spain) behind us. Now if only there had been some way to make the French Revolution come before the American - -
 
To some degree, but did it really make that much difference?

Austria and Prussia had fought each other to a standstill, and were unlikely to resume hostilities any time soon. And since Austria and France were now allied, Austria no longer needed help to defend her Belgian and Italian lands. So even if Britain had been more tactful, none of these powers had any further need of her support, so no particular reason to help her in the ARW.

Yes, but the death of the Czarina also saved Frederick's ass. Had she lived longer, and healthier, the relatively fresh Russian Army would have eaten the exhausted Prussian Army's lunch. So yes, the sense of Britain leaving Prussia in the lurch was still very much a political reality in terms of perception, with only the fickle finger of fate preventing Frederick's doom.:(

Indeed, one could argue that the French Revolution was the luckiest break that Britain had ever had. Because the Continental monarchs hated it, we were transformed at a stroke from being totally isolated in Europe to having virtually the whole continent bar France (and for a time Spain) behind us. Now if only there had been some way to make the French Revolution come before the American - -

I'm curious, how do you see that developing, then? And how does the Revolution happen without the "Wind From America"? A more enlightened, reformist, anti-merchantilist policy towards the Colonies by London?
 
I'm just throwing things out here as I find them out, so I apologize if I'm not responding to arguments. I really am lacking knowledge in the period, so I'm just trying to get other people's opinions really (which have been great so far).

So, adding up the numbers, Napoleon was up against roughly a combined 500,000 troops correct (adding the coalition armies together) as per the hastily signed treaty? And counting the conscripts Davout was training in Paris, his total forces would be somewhere around 300,000 when the conscripts were ifnished training? Correct me if I am wrong.

Considering the losing side would often take much higher losses than the victor (Prussians lost 20,000 dead and 10,000 deserters at Ligny compared to 7,000 french casualties). So assuming the Prussians are dealt a death blow at Ligny or Grouchy is successfully able to chase Blucher down, and Napoleon decisively defeats Wellington at Waterloo, the British and Prussian forces would be knocked out completely at least for the rest of the year.

I'm not sure how he would deal with Austria and Russia, but assuming France has military success, and counting what seemed like more reasonable diplomatic/politcal stances from Napoleon, plus the factt hat the coalition hated each other slightly less than they hated Napoleon, is there even a slight chance the coalition can fall apart?
 
Considering the losing side would often take much higher losses than the victor (Prussians lost 20,000 dead and 10,000 deserters at Ligny compared to 7,000 french casualties). So assuming the Prussians are dealt a death blow at Ligny or Grouchy is successfully able to chase Blucher down, and Napoleon decisively defeats Wellington at Waterloo, the British and Prussian forces would be knocked out completely at least for the rest of the year.

I think your numbers for Prussian losses are elevated, but not by that much. And it would take very bad generalship on the part of the Prussians to be destroyed at Ligny, as they had good ground and a good escape route available. It was really only a question of where they would escape to. It's not a question of Napoleon, or later Grouchy beating the Prussians, but of whether they would beat themselves. With Blucher in charge, that wasn't going to happen. Besides, as history showed, Grouchy simply lacked the forces necessary to destroy Blucher by himself. His missions were to prevent a linkup by Blucher with Wellington, and to linkup with Napoleon himself. In both missions, he failed.

I'm not sure how he would deal with Austria and Russia, but assuming France has military success, and counting what seemed like more reasonable diplomatic/politcal stances from Napoleon, plus the fact that the coalition hated each other slightly less than they hated Napoleon, (1) is there even a slight chance the coalition can fall apart? (2)

There was no question of diplomatic success for Napoleon. His envoys were arrested at the borders, and the alliance declared war on HIM, not France. That pretty much makes clear Europe's political intentions towards Nappy. By the time of Waterloo he had everyone except the Turk either lining up against him or potentially ready to do so.

1) I would say a LOT less, considering. By 1815 the alliance was well aware that Napoleon's only hope for survival, and therefore continuing the Napoleonic Wars, was their own disunity. THEY could always negotiate their differences at a peace table. For Napoleon, every treaty was just a restful prelude to the next campaign.

2) IMVHO, no.
 
1) I would say a LOT less, considering. By 1815 the alliance was well aware that Napoleon's only hope for survival, and therefore continuing the Napoleonic Wars, was their own disunity. THEY could always negotiate their differences at a peace table. For Napoleon, every treaty was just a restful prelude to the next campaign.

2) IMVHO, no.

I'd add this to #1 as a rather vital issue:

Napoleon's ambitions - even if stopping at the Rhine and no matter what diplomacy he uses and so on and so forth - are basically for France to be the dominant power in Europe.

That's not wrong, but that's going to mean that there's no possibility of a "mutually acceptable peace" that the majority of the Great Powers can live with.

For example, Russia, Prussia, and Austria could agree to divide Poland amongst themselves in a way that everyone was satisified (except the Poles). This does not lead to one of those powers making the other two combine against it, and Britain can't be bothered to take sides.

But if Napoleon claims an enlarged France, then that is at the expense of the interests of others. There is no equilibrium, no Pentarchy.

And I don't think Napoleon was able or willing to accept that as a limitation on himself. More to the point, I am sure that no one believed Napoleon was so willing/able in 1815.

The rest is the coalition that finally brought him down for good
 
Yes, but the death of the Czarina also saved Frederick's ass. Had she lived longer, and healthier, the relatively fresh Russian Army would have eaten the exhausted Prussian Army's lunch. So yes, the sense of Britain leaving Prussia in the lurch was still very much a political reality in terms of perception, with only the fickle finger of fate preventing Frederick's doom.:(


I'd need to check the exact timing there. I always had the impression that the subsidies were terminated only after Russia quit the war ie when Frederick's "ass" was reasonably safe. Had we gone on paying them, we'd have been subsidising him in an aggressive war to reconquer Saxony or whatever - something we had no particular interest in doing. And like I said, neither he nor any other continental ruler would have had any special interest in supporting us in America, whatever had happened in 1763.



I'm curious, how do you see that developing, then? And how does the Revolution happen without the "Wind From America"? A more enlightened, reformist, anti-merchantilist policy towards the Colonies by London?


I think this may have been done before, but iirc there was very nearly a war in 1770 over the Falkland Islands. OTL, Louis XV declined to support Spain, but had he did sooner, a teenage Louis XVI might have done so.

Assuming that (after maybe an initial disaster in the British military tradition) the Bourbons get their backsides handed to them, France is set on course for bankruptcy a few years sooner than OTL, while Britain has been forced to pull in her horns vis a vis America, at least for a time.

Big question is whether France takes a different course without the American example. It is just conceivable that hey go more in the direction of limited monarchy (under Philippe Egalite?) than Republic but I wouldn't bank on it. The French are not apt to be hugely influenced by any foreign people. So if te FR follows anything like irts OTL course., with Goddesses of Reason being enthroned in Cathedrals, a lot of New Englanders and others are liable to be frightened off.
 
I'd need to check the exact timing there. I always had the impression that the subsidies were terminated only after Russia quit the war ie when Frederick's "ass" was reasonably safe. Had we gone on paying them, we'd have been subsidising him in an aggressive war to reconquer Saxony or whatever - something we had no particular interest in doing. And like I said, neither he nor any other continental ruler would have had any special interest in supporting us in America, whatever had happened in 1763.

Frederick the Great sure seemed to believe his ass was most definitely NOT safe. I think you may be guilty of the same concept of war as Cardinal Richelieu's, that war is simply a matter of counting coins. Frederick was being overwhelmed by sheer numbers, aided only by the incompetence of the military commanders he faced as well as political disunity amongst his allies.

But Czarina Elizabeth was always his most determined enemy. Keep that up past 1761-1762, and Frederick is dogmeat.

It's hard to personalize a comparative example that really fits, since most similar situations involve more than one person being involved. But what happens to the Napoleonic Wars should political chaos strike Britain? Or for that matter, Russia?

While it is true that no continental power would be interested (normally) in supporting Britain in North America per se, the British normally should have been able to gain the support (even if as Pro-British neutrals) of SOME of its traditional allies (Prussia, Portugal, the Ottoman Empire). Instead, they faced the hostile Anti-British League of Neutrality, which certainly served the interests of the Rebels about as well as they could expect. There was a sense in Europe that after the 7YW Britain had emerged far too full of herself and really in need of being brought down a peg or two.

I think this may have been done before, but iirc there was very nearly a war in 1770 over the Falkland Islands. OTL, Louis XV declined to support Spain, but had he did sooner, a teenage Louis XVI might have done so.

Assuming that (after maybe an initial disaster in the British military tradition) the Bourbons get their backsides handed to them, France is set on course for bankruptcy a few years sooner than OTL, while Britain has been forced to pull in her horns vis a vis America, at least for a time.

Big question is whether France takes a different course without the American example. It is just conceivable that hey go more in the direction of limited monarchy (under Philippe Egalite?) than Republic but I wouldn't bank on it. The French are not apt to be hugely influenced by any foreign people. So if te FR follows anything like irts OTL course., with Goddesses of Reason being enthroned in Cathedrals, a lot of New Englanders and others are liable to be frightened off.

Very interesting analysis.:cool: Though I don't think the Americans would be frightened off by a French Revolution until the full Reign of Terror had begun. It is more a question of the butterflies released by an Anglo-French War of 1770-(?) and how it would impact troubles that were already starting to brew in the Colonies.

What do you think?

Do the British pull in their horns in the Colonies or use wartime emergencies to extend them further?:confused:
 
Spain actually was on the French side until Napoleon invaded it.

I think this is a bit unfair. Napoleon didn't trust Spain because prior to Austerlitz, and then again when Russia joined the war, Godoy was pretty clearly preparing to invade France and stab it in the back. Removing the Boruons was a mistake, but installing Ferdinand would have been entirely logical.

To some degree, but did it really make that much difference?

Austria and Prussia had fought each other to a standstill, and were unlikely to resume hostilities any time soon. And since Austria and France were now allied, Austria no longer needed help to defend her Belgian and Italian lands. So even if Britain had been more tactful, none of these powers had any further need of her support, so no particular reason to help her in the ARW.

Austria and Prussia actually fought a war while the Revolution was going on, the War of Bavarian Succession, no?

Moreover, nations intervened in wars that didn't directly effect them all the time in the 18th century to preserve the balance of power and uphold alliances. Prussia, in contrast, actively hindered British recruitment of mercenaries (and refused to send any troops itself). Britain would have loved a continental front in the Revolution, but it couldn't get one.

What it did get was war against its traditional Dutch ally, Spanish intervention on the side of a republican colonial independence movement, and Russia forming an alliance of neutral directed at Britain's view of naval warfare. That's an epic fail, to be honest.
 
Austria and Prussia actually fought a war while the Revolution was going on, the War of Bavarian Succession, no?

Moreover, nations intervened in wars that didn't directly effect them all the time in the 18th century to preserve the balance of power and uphold alliances. Prussia, in contrast, actively hindered British recruitment of mercenaries (and refused to send any troops itself).

I knew I'd forgotten something important.:eek:

Britain would have loved a continental front in the Revolution, but it couldn't get one.

After the 7YW, "or else" :rolleyes:seemed to be the only diplomatic inducement the British seemed ready to use with other nations. Their diplomacy definitely left something to be desired.

What it did get was war against its traditional Dutch ally, Spanish intervention on the side of a republican colonial independence movement, and Russia forming an alliance of neutrals directed at Britain's view of naval warfare. That's an epic fail, to be honest.

And there's France...:cool: Talk about fail. I always wondered if the people in charge knew what was happening between Spain and France at the time in terms of war strategy? Because far more than Paris, Madrid was looking to take down Britain Detroit-style with a full blown do-or-die invasion.

Had:

1) France, and specifically Vergennes, been more enthusiastic
2) Disease not hit the French ports
3) London decided to send the Militia to crush the Irish Free Trade Protests (leaving the fortifications of Southern England empty:eek:)
4) A storm scattered the Channel Fleet just before the Franco-Spanish Invasion Fleet set off...

Unspeakable Sealion by sail?

To be fair, the British were cursed with the near-universal incompetence of the North Government (excepting the Earl of Sandwich, Lord of the Admiralty), and a Mad King George III who was never madder than when it came to America.:( But they also had at the time their Best Loyal Opposition ever.:cool: Which makes the nature and composition of North's government not at all surprising.

No wonder the British did such a bang up job in fighting Napoleon. So many of those grand Opposition Members from the ARW were running things by then. They'd learned their lessons. Those who did not already always know them.:cool:

EDIT: I know "3)" is ASB. It was too much even for the same Westminster that passed the Boston Port Bill to strip England of her defenses to "put down" what was after all a very genteel (by Irish standards) series of protests in Dublin. The North Government and the House totally caved to the rather minor (Free Trade) demands of the Irish.
 
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I would agree with a bunch of people here, a win at Waterloo only had a slim chance of saving Napoléon, though if anyone good pull it off, Napoléon could, better options would be the Peace of Amiens or Napoléon sends in The Guard at the Battle of Borodino. At the beginning of the Invasion of Russia, and before the formation of the Sixth Coalition Napoléon defeats the Tsar's forces at Borodino, and his advisers tell him to send in The Guard to finish the job, (something Napoléon would usually do anyway) but he refuses, and has to chase the Russian army through Russia leading up to the Russian failure an loss of the Grand Armée. If the Guard was sent in he might have destroyed the Russian army completely forces the Tsar to surrender and resume the European Blockade. The Grand Armée would have stayed whole, Austria would not have broken their alliance with France and it would be Great Britain against Europe again.
 
Correct me if I am wrong here, but I was always under the impression that not sending in the guard actually kept them as the only really intact unit to cover his retreat. Or something along those lines.

Or am I way off?
 
I would agree with a bunch of people here, a win at Waterloo only had a slim chance of saving Napoléon, though if anyone good pull it off, Napoléon could, better options would be the Peace of Amiens or Napoléon sends in The Guard at the Battle of Borodino. At the beginning of the Invasion of Russia, and before the formation of the Sixth Coalition Napoléon defeats the Tsar's forces at Borodino, and his advisers tell him to send in The Guard to finish the job, (something Napoléon would usually do anyway) but he refuses, and has to chase the Russian army through Russia leading up to the Russian failure an loss of the Grand Armée. If the Guard was sent in he might have destroyed the Russian army completely forces the Tsar to surrender and resume the European Blockade. The Grand Armée would have stayed whole, Austria would not have broken their alliance with France and it would be Great Britain against Europe again.


Napoleon tried to commit the Guard when he knew he would win - not when he had to win. At Borodino the Guard would probably have won but probably could have destroyed French morale as at Waterloo if they had struggled or been repulsed.

Anyway - even if Borodino had been a much more decisive victory for the French the casualty list would still be huge on the French side and they would still be stuck in the burnt out ruins of Moscow as in OTL. The Czar would not have surrendered (the Czar never surrendered even after Austerlitz and Borodino was no Austerlitz, even if the Guard had won through).

Only by retiring on his supply line after Borodino would the Grand Armee have been kept (mostly) intact. A retreat to Smolensk may have seen Russia disintergrate under its internal pressures (starvation, war weariness) and sue for peace - or at least cease to be militarily efective.

Then Napoleon would have to take the core of the Army to the other side of Europe to defeat Wellington whilst avoiding any rebellions in Germany

Too many plates........
 
Correct me if I am wrong here, but I was always under the impression that not sending in the guard actually kept them as the only really intact unit to cover his retreat. Or something along those lines.

Or am I way off?
yes and no, that is how most generals fought and that is why Napoleon did it, however it was very "un-Napoleon" on him because it is one of the only time he had ever played it safe in his life (taking into account of the situation)
 
yes and no, that is how most generals fought and that is why Napoleon did it, however it was very "un-Napoleon" on him because it is one of the only time he had ever played it safe in his life (taking into account of the situation)

He was pretty cautious at Borodino as well, and frankly the 1809 campaign against Austria was pretty uninspired.
 
Napoleon tried to commit the Guard when he knew he would win - not when he had to win. At Borodino the Guard would probably have won but probably could have destroyed French morale as at Waterloo if they had struggled or been repulsed.

Anyway - even if Borodino had been a much more decisive victory for the French the casualty list would still be huge on the French side and they would still be stuck in the burnt out ruins of Moscow as in OTL. The Czar would not have surrendered (the Czar never surrendered even after Austerlitz and Borodino was no Austerlitz, even if the Guard had won through).

Only by retiring on his supply line after Borodino would the Grand Armee have been kept (mostly) intact. A retreat to Smolensk may have seen Russia disintergrate under its internal pressures (starvation, war weariness) and sue for peace - or at least cease to be militarily efective.

Then Napoleon would have to take the core of the Army to the other side of Europe to defeat Wellington whilst avoiding any rebellions in Germany

Too many plates........
Just as a clearification I'm taking some of this scenario from Napoleon's own writings (so it is a bit biased), as for the Guard retreating I doubt he would have considered it the first time in history the Guard had retreated was at Waterloo, and the two situations are not comparable, what would be left of the Russians forces would have made an organized retreat well enough to cause the devastation they did, and the Czar would have much choice if his army wasn't together, and the key to the Prussian rebellions was Austria, prior to the Retreat from Russia Austria was in an Alliance with France through a marriage alliance, if Napoleon didn't lose the Russian campaign then Austria wouldn't have seen France as weak, and wouldn't have broken their alliance
 
Actually, this brings me to a point I was considering. Would it be possible for Napoleon, post Amiens (where he had got the farthest borders of France, and reasonable security for those borders), to forge a lasting partnership with Prussia, Austria or even Russia? What would it take for a Franco-Prussian/Austrian/Russian alliance to be secure?

I can imagine Austria being told that Napoleon would support their Italian (non Cis-Alpine, non Ligurian republic) claims. If necessary, even Tuscany can be returned to Austria/Austrian choice ruler, and Naples can be left under a pro-Austrian ruler. Austria would welcome the return of her Ionian and Dalmatian territories. With her interests east of the Rhine secure, could Napoleon not knit a France-Austria-Bavaria-Saxony alliance?

As for Prussia, she wanted to lead a north German alliance. Could France support her north German ambitions to win a France-Prussian alliance? Of course, this would run into opposition from Austria, but I am assuming that Napoleon would not care about Austria if he could get Prussia on his side. Is there a dynastic alliance that can be nurtured if a Franco-Prussian alliance takes shape?

And finally, Russia. This alliance had the most potential, frankly. If her Polish demands had been conceded, and Napoleon supported her Finnish and Danubian claims and a war with the Ottomans, would Russia stay allied? Napoleon tried this kinda-sorta IOTL, but it did not work because of the Continental policy. But post 1802, when there was no Continental policy, would this policy work?

In all this, I am assuming another thing. That Britain will be opposed to France always. Is this necessary? Why is it so important for Britain to oppose France, particularly if she agrees to leave Malta in British hands, and supports her colonial claims? Maybe even a naval treaty that Napoleon will have no more than 1/3rd the size of the British navy?

Your thoughts would be greatly appreciated.
 
I'm just throwing things out here as I find them out, so I apologize if I'm not responding to arguments. I really am lacking knowledge in the period, so I'm just trying to get other people's opinions really (which have been great so far).

So, adding up the numbers, Napoleon was up against roughly a combined 500,000 troops correct (adding the coalition armies together) as per the hastily signed treaty? And counting the conscripts Davout was training in Paris, his total forces would be somewhere around 300,000 when the conscripts were ifnished training? Correct me if I am wrong.

Considering the losing side would often take much higher losses than the victor (Prussians lost 20,000 dead and 10,000 deserters at Ligny compared to 7,000 french casualties). So assuming the Prussians are dealt a death blow at Ligny or Grouchy is successfully able to chase Blucher down, and Napoleon decisively defeats Wellington at Waterloo, the British and Prussian forces would be knocked out completely at least for the rest of the year.

I'm not sure how he would deal with Austria and Russia, but assuming France has military success, and counting what seemed like more reasonable diplomatic/politcal stances from Napoleon, plus the factt hat the coalition hated each other slightly less than they hated Napoleon, is there even a slight chance the coalition can fall apart?

You also have to remember that Wellington only fought at Waterloo because he was expecting support from Blucher. If Blucher gets mauled more severely, then Wellington will withdraw up his supply lines.
 
Actually, this brings me to a point I was considering. Would it be possible for Napoleon, post Amiens (where he had got the farthest borders of France, and reasonable security for those borders), to forge a lasting partnership with Prussia, Austria or even Russia? What would it take for a Franco-Prussian/Austrian/Russian alliance to be secure?

I can imagine Austria being told that Napoleon would support their Italian (non Cis-Alpine, non Ligurian republic) claims. If necessary, even Tuscany can be returned to Austria/Austrian choice ruler, and Naples can be left under a pro-Austrian ruler. Austria would welcome the return of her Ionian and Dalmatian territories. With her interests east of the Rhine secure, could Napoleon not knit a France-Austria-Bavaria-Saxony alliance?

As for Prussia, she wanted to lead a north German alliance. Could France support her north German ambitions to win a France-Prussian alliance? Of course, this would run into opposition from Austria, but I am assuming that Napoleon would not care about Austria if he could get Prussia on his side. Is there a dynastic alliance that can be nurtured if a Franco-Prussian alliance takes shape?

And finally, Russia. This alliance had the most potential, frankly. If her Polish demands had been conceded, and Napoleon supported her Finnish and Danubian claims and a war with the Ottomans, would Russia stay allied? Napoleon tried this kinda-sorta IOTL, but it did not work because of the Continental policy. But post 1802, when there was no Continental policy, would this policy work?

In all this, I am assuming another thing. That Britain will be opposed to France always. Is this necessary? Why is it so important for Britain to oppose France, particularly if she agrees to leave Malta in British hands, and supports her colonial claims? Maybe even a naval treaty that Napoleon will have no more than 1/3rd the size of the British navy?

Your thoughts would be greatly appreciated.

interesting idea, I've actually never thought of this, unfortunately while Prussia did want to lead a North German alliance, I tend to see them in the same boat as Britain
 
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