Napoleon Wins Decisively at Waterloo...then what?

France had defeated 6 coalitions before this one and it had been vastly outnumbered in strategic terms each time just like this once. Numbers mean nothing if they are not present at the same time. The allies were determined to defeat Napoleon but would this determination have held up under major military defeats? Cracks may very well have appeared.


They held up despite defeat at Dresden in 1813 and Montmirail in 1814. Any reason why a loss at Waterloo in 1815 should have had any different consequences?
 
WI :a French win at Waterloo with the caveat that either then the final minutes (to late to stop an effective French victory) or just afterwards Nappy get wounded enough that he dies a few weeks later by complications ... would we see the same picture as OTL? French won the war but lost their leader
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Not this time. The days of Napoleonic divide-and-conquer strategies were over. The French Army's tactics by this time had been adopted by their enemies

The 1813 and 1814 campaigns saw the French inflict several tactical defeats on their enemies. The Six Days Campaign in February of 1814 was Napoleon's most impressive tactical display since at least 1805.

and the French could no longer employ the numbers they once could.

But the army Napoleon could have deployed in 1815 would have been larger than that of 1814.
 
The 1813 and 1814 campaigns saw the French inflict several tactical defeats on their enemies. The Six Days Campaign in February of 1814 was Napoleon's most impressive tactical display since at least 1805.

It sounds to me like you're making the Bobby Lee over U.S. Grant argument. Tactical victories mean nothing when you are losing the strategic battles. And the only really important battle is the last one, when it ends in a victory:cool:

Anaxagoras said:
But the army Napoleon could have deployed in 1815 would have been larger than that of 1814.

???:confused: 1814? You mean after he got his head handed to him in the Battle of Nations?:confused:

Couldn't he just use river barges? :p

Unspeakable Sea Mammal 0.5?:p
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
???:confused: 1814? You mean after he got his head handed to him in the Battle of Nations?:confused:

I said that Napoleon's army in 1815 would have been larger than the army he fielded in 1814. In 1814, huge numbers of French troops were a) trapped in besieged or isolated garrisons (such as Davout in Hamburg) far from the actual fighting fronts and b) rotting away in Russian/Prussian/Austrian prisoner of war camps or British prison hulks. In 1815, these troops - many of them hardened veterans and fiercely loyal to Napoleon - had returned to France and would have been available for duty.
 
I said that Napoleon's army in 1815 would have been larger than the army he fielded in 1814. In 1814, huge numbers of French troops were a) trapped in besieged or isolated garrisons (such as Davout in Hamburg) far from the actual fighting fronts and b) rotting away in Russian/Prussian/Austrian prisoner of war camps or British prison hulks. In 1815, these troops - many of them hardened veterans and fiercely loyal to Napoleon - had returned to France and would have been available for duty.

I would posit that the various armies of Europe were equally hardened by this time, far more numerous, and just as determined to see Napoleon go down.
 

Tamandaré

Banned
Even if Napoleon gets a peace, that would be just a extended ceasefire, at best. Everyone else would sharpen their knives and polish their guns for the next, final round. Could Napoleonic France handle ANOTHER Napoleonic War five or ten years later against Britain, Austria, Prussia and possibly even the Netherlands, Spain, Russia and Portugal?
 
Even if Napoleon gets a peace, that would be just a extended ceasefire, at best. Everyone else would sharpen their knives and polish their guns for the next, final round. Could Napoleonic France handle ANOTHER Napoleonic War five or ten years later against Britain, Austria, Prussia and possibly even the Netherlands, Spain, Russia and Portugal?


Why five years? The Peace of Amiens lasted barely one year.
 
I said that Napoleon's army in 1815 would have been larger than the army he fielded in 1814. In 1814, huge numbers of French troops were a) trapped in besieged or isolated garrisons (such as Davout in Hamburg) far from the actual fighting fronts and b) rotting away in Russian/Prussian/Austrian prisoner of war camps or British prison hulks. In 1815, these troops - many of them hardened veterans and fiercely loyal to Napoleon - had returned to France and would have been available for duty.



OTOH the captured horses were not returned - they were legitimate war booty.

Napoleon had lost most of his horses in the Russian campaign, which in many ways was more serious than the loss of men. A cavalry horse takes a lot more training than an infantryman.
 
Even if Napoleon gets a peace, that would be just a extended ceasefire, at best. Everyone else would sharpen their knives and polish their guns for the next, final round. Could Napoleonic France handle ANOTHER Napoleonic War five or ten years later against Britain, Austria, Prussia and possibly even the Netherlands, Spain, Russia and Portugal?

You forgot Sweden. They had a pretty big army back then.

And I agree with Mikestone8. It would be little more than a single year ceasefire, until the armies could rest, rearm, and redeploy for battle.
 
Why five years? The Peace of Amiens lasted barely one year.

The Peace of Amiens was where Napoleon could (should!) have stopped. In 1802, it was Britain that was more or less isolated (what with the attacks on Denmark and all that - other European countries were considering a naval alliance to protect themselves from British attacks), with everyone else having made peace with France. If he had concentrated on absorbing what he had won (and even in Luneville, Napoleon was busy grabbing Ionian islands - he truly had to be bonkers to want that!) France needed one big ally in Europe (preferably two). Austria was a natural ally, if her interests in central/eastern Europe and the Adriatic were conceded by France, Spain, Bavaria, Denmark, Saxony, and Netherlands could have been persuaded to join the side of France, and finally, Sweden should have been kept neutral. Prussia would not dare do much against this Alliance - and in fact, they were rather hesitant in joining the war against Napoleon. That would leave the two outliers, Britain and Russia (and their minor satellites), who could have been contained. If the peace of Amiens continues, Napoleon has grabbed all territory up to the Rhine, has a satellite in northern Italy and Netherlands, and with an alliance with Austria, could have been secure in his new conquests. Instead, he chose to ruin it all by attempting a mafia-ish grab of everything he could see.

Napoleon was a superb general, and a very good administrator (if nothing else, the Napoleonic code is an excellent piece of work), but a pathetic diplomat, who did not know when to stop.
 
The Peace of Amiens was where Napoleon could (should!) have stopped. In 1802, it was Britain that was more or less isolated (what with the attacks on Denmark and all that - other European countries were considering a naval alliance to protect themselves from British attacks), with everyone else having made peace with France. If he had concentrated on absorbing what he had won (and even in Luneville, Napoleon was busy grabbing Ionian islands - he truly had to be bonkers to want that!) France needed one big ally in Europe (preferably two). Austria was a natural ally, if her interests in central/eastern Europe and the Adriatic were conceded by France, Spain, Bavaria, Denmark, Saxony, and Netherlands could have been persuaded to join the side of France, and finally, Sweden should have been kept neutral. Prussia would not dare do much against this Alliance - and in fact, they were rather hesitant in joining the war against Napoleon. That would leave the two outliers, Britain and Russia (and their minor satellites), who could have been contained. If the peace of Amiens continues, Napoleon has grabbed all territory up to the Rhine, has a satellite in northern Italy and Netherlands, and with an alliance with Austria, could have been secure in his new conquests. Instead, he chose to ruin it all by attempting a mafia-ish grab of everything he could see.

Napoleon was a superb general, and a very good administrator (if nothing else, the Napoleonic code is an excellent piece of work), but a pathetic diplomat, who did not know when to stop.

A brilliant analysis.:cool:

What do you have to say about Britain's performance against Napoleon? Specifically, diplomatically? And what would or could they have done had Napoleon followed your advice?
 
Austria was a natural ally, if her interests in central/eastern Europe and the Adriatic were conceded by France, Spain, Bavaria, Denmark, Saxony, and Netherlands could have been persuaded to join the side of France


Spain actually was on the French side until Napoleon invaded it.



Napoleon was a superb general, and a very good administrator (if nothing else, the Napoleonic code is an excellent piece of work), but a pathetic diplomat, who did not know when to stop.


Couldn't put it better.

Looking back on it all, I wonder if Napoleon's career wasn't of more benefit to Britain than to France. Perhaps he should get that fourth plinth in Trafalgar Square, as a founding father of the Second British Empire.
 
A brilliant analysis.:cool:

What do you have to say about Britain's performance against Napoleon? Specifically, diplomatically?

Britain was following a very aggressive policy that could have made them look like a war-monger if Napoleon had played his cards right. In 1803, even without a declaration of war, they seized all French and Dutch ships (and their crew) in and around Britain, ending the peace of Amiens. This was dangerous diplomatically, but not so militarily. The British navy was stronger than the navy of all of Europe in the early nineteenth century. However, they counted on Napoleon taking more than was feasible, and their calculations proved right. Austria had never reconciled herself to losing as much as she had in the previous treaties, and the British stipends brought in Russia, since they were also unhappy with the way the previous war ended. Britain kept subsidising every country that could/would make war against Napoleon, and they bought cannon fodder with British gold (something they had, thanks to the successes in India and other colonies). Britain's diplomacy was basically to keep finding allies on the continent with gold, and hold out at sea, until Napoleon made a mistake. This was similar to the Fabian strategy against Hannibal.

And what would or could they have done had Napoleon followed your advice?
If Napoleon had gone into a pacifistic mode, you mean? I don't see why they should do anything. Napoleon is not going to be in a position to threaten Britain in any case in the foreseeable future. The French navy was in shambles - it needed a long time to be resurrected into a capable force. Britain was in no danger, and their (and everyone else's, as well) policy was never to have a hegemon on the continent. If Napoleon shows no signs of becoming a destabilising force or hegemon, they would not need to do anything. In fact, antagonising large parts of Europe was anathema to Britain. They depended on trade, and trade depends on trust and goodwill. British actions came dangerously close to ruining that.

In 1802, Napoleon had got everything that France could possibly want (and more, - infact, that was the problem!). He had got the border of the Rhine, (the farthest borders of France envisioned by anyone), security for his country by having puppet states in Netherlands, Switzerland and northern Italy, an allied Spain, and Bavaria, and most importantly, a peace with everyone which fully permitted the state of affairs. He should have returned Ionian islands to Austria. allowed them a say in northern Italy and Germany, where they had legitimate interests, and forborne from invading Naples, or Sicily, or anywhere else. In fact, a northern Italy split between Austria and a French puppet state would be the best way of ensuring Austria is non-hostile. The Italians would, after the birth of Italian nationalism, be more inclined to be favourable to an Italian republic (particularly if Napoleon does not intervene too much in it), and be hostile to Austria, since it was a foreign occupier. Then, Austrians would be dependent on the French keeping their part of Italy peaceful (since, Napoleon can influence the north Italian republic, and keep them from any rash intervention).

In fact, a clever policy for Napoleon would have been to push for French colonisation (earlier French north Africa, for instance? Or maybe even Indo-China?), and go into a kind of partnership with Britain. Something like a support for each others' claims, and non-interference in each other's colonial claims and affairs. This would have benefited the economy, helped integrate the new areas into France (after all why would a Dutchman or German of the Rhineland, or a Savoyard or Swiss of the south have any sympathy for the French rulers, if he cannot benefit economically?) built up French navy, given crews and ships a chance to venture out, and exercise their new skills, and most of all, found something for the rabble of the army of the Revolutionary wars something to do, rather than burn down stuff in Europe.

More importantly, Britain's attack on the fleets of neutral countries had caused a lot of heartburn against Britain. Napoleon should have insisted on shipping safety, and created a Naval Safety Union (this was being discussed by most European capitals in the wake of the British attack), offered never to seize ships and/or crews without declaring war, and have turned the issue of the British evacuation of Malta into an issue between the Russians and the British (Malta was under the Knights, whose technical head was the Russian Tsar).

The crowning folly of Napoleon was his de facto unification of Germany, by creating the Confederacy of the Rhine. It de facto united large parts of Germany, turned Austria and Prussia into perpetual enemies of Napoleon, because their interests were destroyed, it gave the Germans an idea of the kind of power they could wield united, and finally, destroyed Germany in his wars, turning the Germans into irrevocable enemies.

But then, as they say, hindsight is 20-20.
 
What you sorte seems very reasonable.

The problem is you are not Atkins into account a few key data.

Having France build a new colonial empire ?
But the UK did not want this. It had fought and won the seven years war in order to destroy the previous french empire. This was not a cooperative world. It was, and this was especially true for the UK, a mercantilist world in which "I want all and the winner takes all."

The UK would have tried to destroy any power threatening its supremacy.
It did so with France in what was an other 100 years war between 1688 and 1815. As well as they would have prevented France from building anew a war fleet which could threaten it.
Then it did the same containing the russian empire in the years 1815-1856.
Then it did it again with Germany from 1890 on when Wilhelm II launched its weltpolitik and its massive military naval constructions.

Having France be satisfied with its Rhine frontier ?
You are right. It should have. But the UK would not have. France holding Belgium and Antwerp was a casus belli for the UK.
In the treaty of Amiens of 1802, the brits only "tried" the peace solution because it was on the edge of a popular revolt against its oligarchy and needed time to rest and rebuild its forces.

Before its invasion of Spain in 1808, Napoleon never triggered hostilities. The UK forced war on France and Napoleon. And since every previous peace treaty appeared to be a joke, Napoleon felt its only solution was to take more territorial guarantees. In some way, as you noticed, this was a dead end. But this apparent dead end would have in fact worked if Napoleon had not messed everything up with his disastrous russian campaign (I don't mean disastrous war since war with Russia was unavoidable in 1812 but I mean the disastrous way Napoleon led his campaign, abandoning the sound strategy he had initially conceived and losing his army in the russian gigantic territory.)

The league of neutrals ? It was useless against the UK. The UK of the early 19th century was all but a democracy. It did not care about public opinion. Especially not foreign public opinion.
A coalition is always weaker than a single great power, on sea as well as on land. The british on sea used the watchword "divide and crush". They crushed Denmark when they felt they needed to. And the message sent was very efficient with other neutrals.
 
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