Napoleon wins at Waterloo

I'll take one that is prepared to accept the former at some later point.

Britain and the US, over Austria and Russia and over Napoleon.



I can see why someone might have reasons for choosing Britain, US or Austria over Napoleon; but Russia? Don't make me laugh. Russia at the time was a country populated by superstitious serfs (i.e. slaves) ruled by an oppressive oligarchy in the Tsars. What are your reasons for choosing Russia over Napoleon?


I don't think Napoleon would have made the world a fundamentally worse place, but I don't think he was doing anything to make it better, either - especially in the context of those who had to pay taxes and give up sons thanks to the wars.

Napoleon, even if he was a hypocrite in not applying its ideals, was the one that spread the ideals of the Revolution throughout the rest of Europe and also spread the Napoleonic Code. Without him, it is doubtful that Europe would have been better off as it is today.

That factor is why I condemn him - the Napoleonic Wars rest on his head.

He didn't start most of the wars. Most of his wars were defensive. The Napoleonic Wars rests on the head of the Coalition.
 
He didn't start most of the wars. Most of his wars were defensive. The Napoleonic Wars rests on the head of the Coalition.

He ordered the Directory to support his attacks in Italy and Egypt and, when First Consul, caused the breaking of cease fires by using the all-to-common French backed coups to overthrow kingdoms and republics. You may also wish to specify which Coalitions, as motives changed. Napoleon might have managed to secure France's frontiers at the Rhine and Alps with some quid quo pro, such as supporting the partition of Poland and the mediatization of church lands and small states in Italy and the Germanies. Ahh, and he had been planning constant conquests, including in the Americas, Near East, Middle East, and Far East.
 
I've never understood the slavery one. It makes sense for the Old Regime to think in those terms - reflexive conservatism if nothing else. What's Napoleon's excuse?
Economics?
And of course Josephine was from a plantation-owning family...
 
I don't think it would. No one felt the British army was some invincible force that was the only thing able to stand against Napoleon, so it losing (probably not for the first time, though I'd want to check Moore's retreat to be sure) would not be a dreadful shock.

It isn't the British army itself that's held in high regard but Wellington himself. He was seen as their best general, sent to the nearest theatre to France where he would have to absorb Napoleon's first blows while the rest of the Coalition pulled their armies together. Yet even he was surprised by the speed of the French advance. If Napoleon wins at Waterloo he would have finished off Allied Europe's shining general in a campaign of barely four days - definitely very deflating for the Allies.

France raising more troops doesn't mean that the Allies won't be, and the issue of horses for the cavalry and artillery is not something there's a quick or easy solution for - which makes his position much weaker than in his prime.

OTL, the lack of cavalry at Bautzen and Lutzen meant Napoleon could not pursue the enemy his infantry had already defeated. A lack of horses would weaken his position, sure, but not fatally so, especially fighting on home ground. And Napoleon seemed to have more than enough artillery at Waterloo, in fact, a hundred more guns than Wellington did.

Surely the true comparison is the campaign of 1814.

In that, Iirc, Napoleon didn't win just one victory, but several, some of them impressive. But with what result? The Allies just picked themselves up, replaced their losses, and pressed on to Paris. Is there any reason to expect a different outcome the following year?

The difference is that Napoleon actually has more men at hand in 1815 than he did a year earlier. In the Six Days' Campaign he fought with barely 30,000 against 120,000 enemy troops, and that number ballooned to half a million already in the theatre. In 1815 he has 120,000 with him to march into Belgium, at least 66,000 more recruits waiting in the depots, 10-20,000 men including Guard detachments in the Vendeé quelling a revolt that will soon be over, and the admittedly miniscule detachments protecting the rest of France's borders. Nevertheless, if he won at Waterloo, Napoleon would soon have had a field army to nearly equal the force he had in 1805. The Allies may be stronger now, more united, but surely we can't completely dismiss his chances in this campaign?

In a best case scenario, this is what I see happens. After defeating or driving away the British army at Waterloo, he pays great care to maintain the illusion that the army remains in Belgium, when in fact Napoleon is moving south to meet the Austrian army of Scwarzenberg, still separated by some distance into two 100,000-strong bulks.

When the Austrian right wing (composed mostly of Bavarian troops under Prince Wrede) gets news of Waterloo he halts (as in OTL) at Nancy to wait for the Russian army to arrive - it should be mustered at Kaiserslautern by July 1. Wrede's last encounter with Napoleon was an attempt to block the French retreat from Leipzig in which he managed to lose 9,000 troops. By the time he realises Napoleon's field force is coming for him, it is too late to withdraw safely over the Saar, and the Rhine presents no secure path of retreat as General Rapp still holds Strasbourg (also as in OTL). Scwarzenberg will attempt to send the left wing up north from the Swiss border as quickly as possible but there is little time before the French army reaches the now-outnumbered Austrian right wing. On French soil, surely Napoleon can wage the battle he likes best, cutting the Austrians off from retreat via Saarbrucken, fighting a quick action and forcing the surrender of the bulk of their forces.

The Austrian left wing will attempt to flee back over the Rhine (which they should manage before Napoleon can catch them). The Russians will hesitate by necessity on the French border while the Allies regroup. They will hope to be joined by the remaining undefeated corps (such as Bulow's) of the Prussian army and Schwarzenberg's so-called left column - 100,000 strong. There will definitely be jitters after three such major defeats - Ligny, Waterloo, and perhaps the Battle of Metz. But (as in OTL) the Allies underestimated Napoleon's true strength of numbers. He will be joined by the 25,000 Frenchmen centered at Strasbourg under Rapp and attempt to strike the Russians arrayed along the Saar before they can be reinforced and commence the invasion.

It would be roughly 140,000 French troops against at most 200,000 Russian soldiers under de Tolly. Those are most definitely odds Napoleon can deal with. If he can defeat this force too the Allies must now surely at least consider peace with him, especially if he agrees to the 1792 borders.

It seems like a fantasy, maybe, but so do many episodes from Napoleon's story. The main difference from 1814 here is that the war will be following Napoleon's script from the start. The commencement of hostilities in 1815 came with more surprise to the Allies than any of Napoleon's previous wars. This showed itself in the Waterloo Campaign. Blucher and Wellington explicitly trusted each other, so much so that they were described as the war's Malborough and Eugene - but even they let their armies separate, failing to anticipate the boldness and rapidity of the French offensive that nearly succeeded in completely separating the Allied force in half. All that in the space of four days. That Napoleon could do the same to other less competent commanders is a given.
 
I would imagine that the British and Prussians would be in a weaker position, while Austrians would be in a stronger position. I think Russia got what they could get. But Austria may be able to force the Wittelsbach to accept losses in Bavaria against a stronger position in the Rhineland. The Dutch will likely get Belgium (no one wanted France to keep it, but neither was anyone willing to get and be neighbour to France), but also greater gain in the Rhineland. I could see the Grand Duchy of the Lower Rhine being split between Netherlands and Palatinate, the first will make the British happy. While the latter will serve as part of the trade with Bavaria for losses in their homeland. Alsace may either go to Bavaria or be split between Bavaria and Baden. Austria take Bavarian Franconian, Salzburg and Oberpfalz (they would rather have the south, but are not willing to restart the war over it). Because Prussia do not gain the Lower Rhine, instead they keep their part from the second partition of Poland (Congress Poland become slightly smaller). The HRE is reestablish under a Austrian emperor.

The Congress of Vienna was already enacted before Waterloo, dramatic changes to its outcome like this are not going to happen. Russia certainly isn't going to lose territory, nor do I see your revisions to the Rhineland as likely. Your proposal is essentially an Austria wank. A longer 100 Days isn't going to make Austria this aggressive and risk war rewriting the map of Europe at the expense of Prussia and Russia.

Maybe a bit too much, but if ITTL Scharzenberg is the one, who defeats Napoléon and not like IOTL Wellington and Blücher, then Austria should be able to get a result, which will give them a better position in the German Lands. The HRE won't be re-established IMHO just like IOTL a German Confederation is more likely. But I do find a bit less gains for Prussia conceivable, but at the same time king William I of the Netherlands, just like IOTL won't get his desired eastern gains. Austria could get a bit more Bavarian territory, but maybe not all the lands suggested by ingemann, however the Palatinate could be compensated in the area of the Lower Rhine (without the 'Dutch share' going into that equation).
I also agree, that Russia probably won't accept anything less than IOTL; either they were the only other undefeated army in the field of that campaign or they actually defeated Napoléon together with the Austrians.
 
I can see why someone might have reasons for choosing Britain, US or Austria over Napoleon; but Russia? Don't make me laugh. Russia at the time was a country populated by superstitious serfs (i.e. slaves) ruled by an oppressive oligarchy in the Tsars. What are your reasons for choosing Russia over Napoleon?

I might have worded that poorly: Not Britain & US > Austria & Russia > Napoleon but that I'd rather not live in any of the latter three and would pick the first two.

Napoleon, even if he was a hypocrite in not applying its ideals, was the one that spread the ideals of the Revolution throughout the rest of Europe and also spread the Napoleonic Code. Without him, it is doubtful that Europe would have been better off as it is today.

I'm not sure how much the former can be credited to him - the French Revolutionary ideas floating about started before he was even consul, let alone Emperor - and what the Napoleonic Code would be replaced with in a world where he failed (dies in Egypt, say) is a question I'm not sure of the answer to, and thus not sure how to compare it.

He didn't start most of the wars. Most of his wars were defensive. The Napoleonic Wars rests on the head of the Coalition.

They rest on the head of the man who could not accept the concept of mutually acceptable peace with his neighbors or the idea that other countries should not be subject to his economic control (the Continental System).

It isn't the British army itself that's held in high regard but Wellington himself. He was seen as their best general, sent to the nearest theatre to France where he would have to absorb Napoleon's first blows while the rest of the Coalition pulled their armies together. Yet even he was surprised by the speed of the French advance. If Napoleon wins at Waterloo he would have finished off Allied Europe's shining general in a campaign of barely four days - definitely very deflating for the Allies.

Wellington is one general with one army. Him being defeated is not the same as the entire Allied position unraveling, and no one who has seen events by 1815 (with the powers having to endure strings of defeat) would treat it as that.

OTL, the lack of cavalry at Bautzen and Lutzen meant Napoleon could not pursue the enemy his infantry had already defeated. A lack of horses would weaken his position, sure, but not fatally so, especially fighting on home ground. And Napoleon seemed to have more than enough artillery at Waterloo, in fact, a hundred more guns than Wellington did.
Cavalry has more functions than just pursuing defeated enemies - and the fact the enemy's cavalry isn't as limited doesn't help his position at all.

As for artillery, the issue is not how much artillery Napoleon had vs. Wellington but vs. the coalition in general.

Napoleon may not lose IN 1815 if things go right initially, but he has to not only win here but keep winning - and that's going to get difficult.

Napoleon was brilliant, sure, but not invincible - or everywhere at once.
 
I can see why someone might have reasons for choosing Britain, US or Austria over Napoleon; but Russia? Don't make me laugh. Russia at the time was a country populated by superstitious serfs (i.e. slaves) ruled by an oppressive oligarchy in the Tsars. What are your reasons for choosing Russia over Napoleon?



Actually, Tsarist Russia and Bonapartist France both had very similar systems of government - despotism tempered by revolution.

This was what Napoleon had in mind when he remarked that legitimate monarchs could lead defeated armies home and yet retain their thrones, but that he "a self made soldier" could not. What he failed to spot, though, was that Tsar Alexander was in an analogous position, and could not remain subservient forever, as this would lead in time to a fatal (quite literally) loss of prestige. Hence 1812 and all that.
 
He ordered the Directory to support his attacks in Italy and Egypt and, when First Consul, caused the breaking of cease fires by using the all-to-common French backed coups to overthrow kingdoms and republics. You may also wish to specify which Coalitions, as motives changed.

All the Coalitions had the same motive: to crush the ideals of the French Revolution. Napoleon came during the 2nd Coalition in which France was attacked first; in the 3rd coalition, Russia and Austria attacked first; in the 4th coalition, Prussia and Russia attacked first; in the 5th coalition Austria attacked first; in the 6th coaltion everyone attacked first; in the 7th coalition everyone attacked first.

and he had been planning constant conquests, including in the Americas, Near East, Middle East, and Far East.

Never heard of that. Do you have a source?
 
In a best case scenario, this is what I see happens. After defeating or driving away the British army at Waterloo, he pays great care to maintain the illusion that the army remains in Belgium, when in fact Napoleon is moving south to meet the Austrian army of Scwarzenberg, still separated by some distance into two 100,000-strong bulks.

When the Austrian right wing (composed mostly of Bavarian troops under Prince Wrede) gets news of Waterloo he halts (as in OTL) at Nancy to wait for the Russian army to arrive - it should be mustered at Kaiserslautern by July 1. Wrede's last encounter with Napoleon was an attempt to block the French retreat from Leipzig in which he managed to lose 9,000 troops. By the time he realises Napoleon's field force is coming for him, it is too late to withdraw safely over the Saar, and the Rhine presents no secure path of retreat as General Rapp still holds Strasbourg (also as in OTL). Scwarzenberg will attempt to send the left wing up north from the Swiss border as quickly as possible but there is little time before the French army reaches the now-outnumbered Austrian right wing. On French soil, surely Napoleon can wage the battle he likes best, cutting the Austrians off from retreat via Saarbrucken, fighting a quick action and forcing the surrender of the bulk of their forces.

The Austrian left wing will attempt to flee back over the Rhine (which they should manage before Napoleon can catch them). The Russians will hesitate by necessity on the French border while the Allies regroup. They will hope to be joined by the remaining undefeated corps (such as Bulow's) of the Prussian army and Schwarzenberg's so-called left column - 100,000 strong. There will definitely be jitters after three such major defeats - Ligny, Waterloo, and perhaps the Battle of Metz. But (as in OTL) the Allies underestimated Napoleon's true strength of numbers. He will be joined by the 25,000 Frenchmen centered at Strasbourg under Rapp and attempt to strike the Russians arrayed along the Saar before they can be reinforced and commence the invasion.

It would be roughly 140,000 French troops against at most 200,000 Russian soldiers under de Tolly. Those are most definitely odds Napoleon can deal with. If he can defeat this force too the Allies must now surely at least consider peace with him, especially if he agrees to the 1792 borders.

This is all wonderfully plausible. Great job. I still think Napoleon would have lost after Elba but it is not ASB for Napoleon to win and your timeline is a plausible way for him to do it.
 
Actually, Tsarist Russia and Bonapartist France both had very similar systems of government - despotism tempered by revolution.

As Wikipedia states: he instituted "lasting reforms, including higher education, a tax code, road and sewer systems, and established the Banque de France (central bank)", the metric system and Napoleonic Code. He emancipated the Jews which caused the Russian Orthodox Church to condemn him as "Antichrist and the Enemy of God".

Napoleonic France (and the Europe he helped create) was miles better than Alexander I's Russia.

This was what Napoleon had in mind when he remarked that legitimate monarchs could lead defeated armies home and yet retain their thrones, but that he "a self made soldier" could not. What he failed to spot, though, was that Tsar Alexander was in an analogous position, and could not remain subservient forever, as this would lead in time to a fatal (quite literally) loss of prestige. Hence 1812 and all that.

I don't get what you're saying here.
 
As Wikipedia states: he instituted "lasting reforms, including higher education, a tax code, road and sewer systems, and established the Banque de France (central bank)", the metric system and Napoleonic Code. He emancipated the Jews which caused the Russian Orthodox Church to condemn him as "Antichrist and the Enemy of God".

Napoleonic France (and the Europe he helped create) was miles better than Alexander I's Russia.

None of which makes the slightest difference to the fact that he held power only as winner of the last coup d'état, and could expect to fall once his run of victories came to an end.



I don't get what you're saying here.

I am saying that Alexander I, like Napoleon, did not wear a secure hereditary crown , but one that had several times changed hands by coup and/or assassination, so that any serious loss of prestige was apt to be at least his political death warrant, and more than likely his actual one. Hence at some point he was going to have to say no to Napoleon, and 1812 would happen.
 
Re. the Treaty of Amiens: In truth, both France and Britain acted in bad faith on multiple occasions during the 1 year the treaty was in effect, to the point where I find it hard to blame any one party for its final breakdown.
 
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