Napoleon stays master of Europe, potential for Frankish Empire 2.0

And now, if I may, some thoughts from another thread:

IBlameCommunism said:
I'm rather fond of Napoleon winning as a PoD to start benefitting Russia, myself: The good ole' no-Spanish-ulcer-no-1809-war-Russia-less-bold-stays-quiet-another-year-Britain-forced-to-make-uneasy-peace jazz. This leaves a Russia without Congress Poland, which is good news for the Russian state: no constant revolts, no PR troubles complicating some alliances, no fears of Polish revolution for any *Bismarcks to exploit in using Russia for their own ends, and perhaps a somewhat more credible position as big brother of Slavic peoples; and for giving up what? Poland wasn't of any economic importance to Russia until after industrialisation, and without it, the capital will still exist, but will go to Donbas and other less vulnerable centres.

This scenario also leaves Alexander I in a better position to realise some of his liberal ideas. As Eurofed suggests, you might want to adjust his personality as well - which is not really difficult, since he was so disordered in the attic, and no war of 1812 by itself divests him of the troublesome messiah complex.

Then, without the influence of Metternich, soften the swing into reactionary authoritarianism. Wilno university stays open, and *Decembrists can discuss their ideas relatively openly as long as they don't do anything too silly.

When Alexander I dies/runs away to Taganrog, Constantine will not have discredited himself by advocating peace with France, and more importantly will have had no opportunity to become a pseudo-Pole; you might want to throw Nicholas I under a carriage, just to be sure, however. Tsar Constantine, though rather eccentric, could maintain a cautiously liberal Russia. For convenience, lets give him a long life, because after him we may have to start making Tsars up.

Building on the work of a somewhat more energetic Alexander I, he could give Russia clearer nudges in the direction of abolishing serfdom - it's hard to do this so much earlier because of the enormous power of the aristocratic interest, but a more gradual process starting earlier can only help. First, bring the serfs more under state rather than noble control - what Paul tried to do - so that the plaster coming off isn't so painful later.

The end of it is that, with luck and consistantly liberal politics, Alexander II's sketches of a duma may come into existance in the latter 19th century. It will be a body representing the aristocracy and miniscule middle class, of course, but it's some sort of pressure valve for a state where, historically, throwing bombs was just about the only protest you could lodge with the general state of things.

Meanwhile, differant intellectual development in the more liberal climate: I would hope to see a little bit more equality and integration for Jews. Alexander II's policy was contradictory: he wanted to make the Russian Jews as Russian as German Jews were German or French Jews French, but he shrank from anything that would require letting them take jobs or school-places from Christians. Ther's no real way around this, but we can avoid actual state-sponsored pogroms and start to let some more Jews into the respectable middle classes.

Also, differant development of the Ukrainian movement: for one thing, the climate will in general be more liberal and tolerant. For another, pan-Slavism will probably remain a more airy-fairy ideal. For a third, rather than 1863, which made the authorities paranoid about supposed Polish stalking-horse nationalisms, you have no Poland in which to have a Polish revolt, but lots of Polish aristocrats all over Lithuania, Belarus, and half Ukraine. In other words, the dastardly Franco-Catholic fifth column!!:eek:!

Without an 1831 rising, there is no definite moment when Greek Catholicism in Russia come under state attack, but the Uniate church was already splitting by itself between senior clergy who retreated to the Latin rite and congregations returning to Orthodoxy: let's say this trend continues gradually until the state gives it a nudge. We may end up with a situation where intellectuals from Kiev university (originally (re-)founded partly in order to de-Polonise the intelligentsia of the region) who go out to study and cultivate the East Slav vernacular of Ancient Little Russia are considered to be doing the regime good service. We may create the climate of later Soviet Ukraine - you can absolutely speak and publish Ukrainian (Little Russian) and celebrate the Ukrainian (Little Russian) way, but seperatism will not be tolerated and you do need to have Russian because, you know, everybody needs a job - and then the problems of Ukrainians and with it Belarussian nationalism largely evaporate.

When industrialisation starts, fuelled by foreign [ITTL, quite possibly British and not French] capital, we've created a state in which the developing middle-classes can have their voices heard, the nationalities are more appeased, the Jews are less subject to persecution, and the landowning interest is marginally less powerful. We'll still want to avoid losing any wars for a bit, but such a state can avoid revolution and survive its social strains, and by the WW2 timeframe, it can put a respectable army in the field.
 
Even further thoughts:

Napoleon reached a new concordat with the Pope, allowing him to return to French Rome, shortly after the 1812 campaign. The issue of the exiled Pope would have to have been addressed eventually, and Napoleon would be in an even stronger position, obviously, so it will be sooner or later. But what are the consequences of a Pope living in the Vatican at French suffrance? Bad ones, I think, for Polish nobles in Belarus, and for the people of Ireland.

Sicily will very likely stay a British protectorate. The British commissioner there, exasperated with the king, had forced a limited constitution on him in 1812 which he is now in no position to revoke. Said commissioner, however, was also sympathetic to Italian nationalism. If it comes to a battle between France and Britain to win the Italian nationalist movement, France would almost certainly prevail; could Britain foster a Sicilian nationalism?

And what of the Ionians? We took all of them except Corfu, and might well want the French off these strategic sites in the peace-treaty. If we set up something like the OTL United States, things may get interesting if we find ourselves more immediately and actively backing the revolt in the Morea.
 
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Eurofed

Banned
-Napoleon is more tactful in Spain. Secondary PoDs may include Wellington falling off his horse etcetera. Spain stays a French ally, Portugal is conquered, Britain driven off the peninsula (except Gibraltar, obviously, which never had much part in the Peninsular War, but was at this point bleedin' impossible to take from the landward side).

-Without the Cadiz Junta, Spanish South America has a lot more vitality in it. Britain will move in attempting to support independence movements, and the whole thing will turn into a godawful mess.

-Britain, closed off from South American markets for longer on top of everything, finds the economic situation even tighter.

-Napoleon doesn't go to Spain, so Austria backs down at the last minute and doesn't launch the abortive war for Germany in 1809. It was take British subsidies or else send the troops home by that point, as the money was up: they had to melt down all the gold plates in the Hofburg OTL. Metternich wanted to dismiss the army for the time being and make the most of a bad situation as Napoleon's #2; ITTL, he gets his way.

-The 1809 war did a lot to embolden the Russians: it showed that a reformed army really was as good as the French in everything but numbers, shook Napoleon's personal myth, and brought the issue of Poland back to the fore. Without an 1809 war, Russia soldiers on under the CoSys for a year or two more, consoling itself by beating on the Ottomans.

-So, by 1812, Britain is low on cash and markets, stuck in South America to no immediate benefit (and this probably isn't going anything for relations with the US of A), out of Europe, and without immediate prospect of a Russian ally. Add Luddites and stir, serve with sweetened Napoleon, and you have Amiens 2.

This is certainly a plausible historical trajectory for the success of Napoleon. For various reasons, I happen to prefer another one, which builds a more organic imperial "Frankish" federal unity of France, Germany, and Italy than OTL " plus vassals" one and totally destroys Austria and Prussia (IMO it is a more stable framework in the long term) and still brings Napoleon to Iberia (which leads to the destabilization of the Latin American colonial empires).

So:

-in 1805-06, Napoleon dismantles Austria and Prussia, restructures German and Italian territories in political entities in federal unity with France, sets Poland and Hungayr up as vassal kingdoms.

-in 1807-08, Russia keeps fighting Napoleon for a while, then repeated defeats lead it to sign *Tilsit peace.

-in 1809-10, Napoleon invades Spain and Portugal. After the first setbacks, he personally leads a campaign there, wins some victories and learns some valuable lessons about the importance of logistics and counterinsurgency, but is forced to cut short his Iberian campaign because...

-of course, there is no Austria anymore, but it is possible that the ConSys may push some other vassal to rebel. A good candidate is Denmark, in a temporary alliance with Sweden. The Northern War ensues in 1810, which Nappy wins, with the help of Russia. Russia gets Finland, Napoleon recreates the crown of Scandinavia, which he offers to one of his generals (might well be Bernadotte, the estrangement with Bonaparte is butterflied away).

-The experience of the Northern War pushes Napoleon to take steps to mitigate the effects of the ConSys. He creates a customs union of the Empire and its vassal states.

-in 1812-13, Russia breaks ranks with the Napoleonic system, pretty much for the same reasons as OTL. Due to the lessons of the Iberian campaign, Napoleon shuns an invasion of the Russian mainland, he first picks a defensive strategy in Eastern Europe, where he destroys several Russian armies. In the last phase of the campaign, he marches through the Baltic states, with the cooperation of Scandinavia, up to seize St.Petersburg. Last-ditch Russian attempt to prevent the fall of the capital leads to a decisive battle, which Russia loses. Peace with Russia.

-in 1813-14, Napoleon turns to Iberia, crushes Welligton's expeditionary corps, pacifies Iberia with generous amounts of scorched earth. Peace with Britain.

How the state will develop domestically, though, is an interesting question. Napoleon made some hints of moving towards constitutionalism during the Hundred Days. His capacity for personal rule was going away. Would it be replaced by stronger representative institutions, by a clique of ministers behind the throne, or both?

I agree that late Napoleon is in all likelihood going to move back towards liberal constitutionalism. It's not just that he shall be losing taste for full-fledged personal rule, it's also that it shall be less necessary with the end of the wars.

One thing's for sure: even simply having Belgium and the Rhine, leaving everything else aside, makes France a much bigger industrial power. Belgian industrial output in the mid-19th century was something like a third that of France, which compared to the population sizes was ginormous.

It's not just that. Economic and political unity of western and central continental Europe under a liberal regime is going to boost and accelerate the industrialization of France, Germany, and Italy considerably.

I'd think an alliance of convenience with the Ottoman Empire would make more sense. Russia freed from CoSys has no urgent need to defy Napoleon, but they don't like his Polish state. They want to expand southward, something Napoleon was never keen on: look at the exploits of Sebastiani.

I think that without the looming Grand Army, the Russians could go further against the then-ragged Ottoman regime in 1812 and get concessions which took them until 1828 OTL: all the Ottoman stations around the Black Sea, some sorts on the Anatolian frontier, a somewhat plumper Serbia under Russian guarantee, and most importantly the dismantling of Ottoman Danube bridgeheads and a Russian right to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia just whenever.

After this, Napoleon doesn't want them to come roaring into the Med. The Russian fleet was pretty serious business at this point (Nelson certainly thought so), and if Napoleon wants to establish a credible French bluewater fleet, he doesn't need the Russians passing the straits.

(Britain will quickly lose our qualms about the Straits, which were always somewhat symbolic, when we face an ambitious naval programme just across home waters: happened when the Germans tried it).

So, French engineers, advisors, and what-have-you in Constantinople, greencoats massed along the frontiers, and then the Greek situation goes to hell... oh, dear. I expect this to be the dominant issue of the 1820s (a more unquiet decade than ours, no doubt) and the starting gun for any situation of *cold war.

I think that in broad strokes, this is a reasonable scenario. :D

The naval race is going to interesting. What's often forgotten is that Britain got through large stretches off the 19th century with fancy reviews, gunboats, and museum pieces: we didn't need a cutting-edge battle fleet with a serious strategic plan, because who else could build one? Cue Tirpitz, and hence Fisher.

Speaking of Fisher, the emergence of armoured steamers at some point might prove somewhat analogous to the launch of the Dreadnought: everybody's naval counter is suddenly back at either 0 or 1, causing an outbreak of battleship-fever.

Exactly. :cool:

Now, Britain is industrial power #1, but control of Antwerp, Belgium, and half Europe is something Herr Tirpitz could only dream of. And then there's the dark-horse candidate, Russia-sans-Sevastopol'-siege. Fun times...

Correct about Russia, but Britain is not going to be industrial power #1 for long, with a neo-Frankish empire around and quickly industrializing.

But I still have to question your spheres of French influence: my point was that nobody particularly minded French moves on these corners or the world OTL, with Britain being vaguely benevolent towards the adventures of Napoleon III.

North Africa, for instance. Going to Algeria was a domestic decision of Charles X, arising from the brief respite his terminally unpopular government had got after Navarino, and the Orleanists would have liked to ditch the place if they could have. Invading these "wild mountains" is not necessarily an attractive prospect for a France that is hunkering down and building up Europe; and there was a state there that was able to put up serious and protracted resistance to French colonialism without any help from a great power.

If France did go to Algeria (another thought: as sponsor of the Ottomans, might France engage in Syria-style informal imperialism there instead?), then you can bet Britain would become patron of Morocco. We pretty much were, for a while. And the British pseudo-colony of Sicily (which will be an interesting corner of the world) may start to cast its glances at Tunisia, too...

As for SE Asia, that was the initiative of local officers and Napoleon III's search for prestige at a time when he was rather happy with the settlement of Europe, taking advantage of missionary presence going back to the Ancien Regime. Nobody objected to this sideshow, but once again, the Vietnamese (as rulers of Cochinchina) and Thais (as overlords of Cambodia) had established states, and if Britain does object, they might find help coming their way. Britain will probably be a bigger power in SE Asia, having divested the Dutch of more than Raffles managed OTL. I wonder if this can be butterflied into a more independant development for some of the Indonesian states, without such a hegemonic local power.

And the Middle East? As I said, I see France in a sort of 20th C German roll when it comes to the Ottomans while Britain and Russia act as saboteurs. That will be a very interesting corner of the world, but fought by proxy, for the most part.

Your reasoning is apt as it concerns the Middle East and North Africa. However I would expect that in the long term, Italian nationalism leads to the reabsorption of Sicily and Sardinia in Napoleonic Italy, and Tunisia may follow.

As it concerns SE Asia, it is quite possible that ITTL Britain would claim a bigger slice of Indonesia. But I doubt that the Empire would concede the whole region to British hegemony.

I think an interesting field is the western hemisphere. Assuming Britain is on the ropes in South America by 1812-13, Napoleon might get something back for his Spanish friends. There were royalists in Bolivia, and attempts to invade Mexico, right into the 1820s. So, who knows? An Argentine state in Britain's economic orbit, and a Spanish empire in the Andes? What of Mexico?

I dunno. I have my own TL plans about the region, so I took much more time speculating to fulfill them within the scenarion than on what happens in their absence.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Napoleon reached a new concordat with the Pope, allowing him to return to French Rome, shortly after the 1812 campaign. The issue of the exiled Pope would have to have been addressed eventually, and Napoleon would be in an even stronger position, obviously, so it will be sooner or later. But what are the consequences of a Pope living in the Vatican at French suffrance? Bad ones, I think, for Polish nobles in Belarus, and for the people of Ireland.

Yep for Ireland and eastern (Russian) Poles, unless Napoleonic control of the Papacy leads to a schism in the Catholic Church.

Sicily will very likely stay a British protectorate. The British commissioner there, exasperated with the king, had forced a limited constitution on him in 1812 which he is now in no position to revoke. Said commissioner, however, was also sympathetic to Italian nationalism. If it comes to a battle between France and Britain to win the Italian nationalist movement, France would almost certainly prevail; could Britain foster a Sicilian nationalism?

Yep, Italian nationalism would almost surely prevail, and as I said, Napoleonic Italy is going to industrialized much faster than OTL, which shall further enahance its appeal to progressist Sicilian elites and middle classes.
 
Yep, Italian nationalism would almost surely prevail, and as I said, Napoleonic Italy is going to industrialized much faster than OTL, which shall further enahance its appeal to progressist Sicilian elites and middle classes.

Why? There is less capital and expertise available (remember that the Netherlands and Belgiums initial take-offs were very much connected to British examples and cash, and they then invested the profits deeper into europe) and there is going to be far less and more expensive coal if they can't buy from Britain (as german coal will be taken by Germans and France, is harder to develop, and will have to be brought to the sea/over the alps before it can be transported to italy) which provided 80-90% of Italys OTL needs.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Why? There is less capital and expertise available (remember that the Netherlands and Belgiums initial take-offs were very much connected to British examples and cash, and they then invested the profits deeper into europe) and there is going to be far less and more expensive coal if they can't buy from Britain (as german coal will be taken by Germans and France, is harder to develop, and will have to be brought to the sea/over the alps before it can be transported to italy) which provided 80-90% of Italys OTL needs.

Britain and the neo-Frankish Empire are not going to stay in a state of hot war for decades on end, so the Empire shall be perfectly able to transport German and Belgian coal, which is plentiful enough for all of the Empire's growing industry, to Italy by sea, and in due time, railroads shall be built across the Alps, too. And the Empire shall be developed by French capital.
 
Even further thoughts:

Smashing good thoughts, and very interesting.

But what are the consequences of a Pope living in the Vatican at French suffrance? Bad ones, I think, for Polish nobles in Belarus, and for the people of Ireland.

On the other hand, the response to 1798 was the Act of Union. It depends on what happens in Britain, but it's possible that the need to reduce pressures on Catholic could propel the movement for reform.

Besides, it's not like the Empire didn't have Protestant subjects, in France, in Holland, Switzerland, and northern Germany. I can't see the Pope becoming a French puppet, no matter what.

Said commissioner, however, was also sympathetic to Italian nationalism. If it comes to a battle between France and Britain to win the Italian nationalist movement, France would almost certainly prevail;

Will it? France has northern Italy, sure. And a quasi-police state. I do no think a Garibaldi analogue would find fertile ground here.
 
Why? There is less capital and expertise available (remember that the Netherlands and Belgiums initial take-offs were very much connected to British examples and cash, and they then invested the profits deeper into europe) and there is going to be far less and more expensive coal if they can't buy from Britain (as german coal will be taken by Germans and France, is harder to develop, and will have to be brought to the sea/over the alps before it can be transported to italy) which provided 80-90% of Italys OTL needs.

A few thoughts.

First, there doesn't seem to be any reason Britain wouldn't want to trade with Europe, even if the Bonapartes rule in Rotterdam. And Belgium did boom as part of the Empire.

Finally, thee is the question of whether the Napoleonic continent is maintained as a colonial market for France, or whether Napoleon liberalizes it to promote the freer flow of goods and trade.

I don't think it's impossible; the man had an eye towards how he'd be remembered in world history, and he had pretensions of being a liberal. Moreover, the Continental System was very much a sporadic, unplanned development. So if there is freer trade across Europe, then more economic growth is likely.
 
This is certainly a plausible historical trajectory for the success of Napoleon. For various reasons, I happen to prefer another one, which builds a more organic imperial "Frankish" federal unity of France, Germany, and Italy than OTL " plus vassals" one and totally destroys Austria and Prussia (IMO it is a more stable framework in the long term) and still brings Napoleon to Iberia (which leads to the destabilization of the Latin American colonial empires).

But the short term is more important when you're the one who actually has to build this state, and abolishing states is almost as tricky as creating them. Putting ourselves in Napoleon's shoes after Austerlitz: he's won the greatest victory, he's transformed the strategic situation, he's made Austria come grovelling for peace terms. Vienna is already his. But as he so often complained himself, a state as old as Austria just staid up.

And what could he do? Announce after Austerlitz "there is no more Hapsburg monarchy"? That doesn't instantly depose any governors or disband any regiments out in Transylvania and the Frontier. Who knows what they'll do? They could declare just anything and align with just everyone (as the Entente powers, of course, found out to their cost in 1919: Why have the Croats fouled up our treaty by letting the Serbs in? Who gave Ukraine permission to exist? Why must everything be so bloody complicated!?); much better to keep all the threads in his hand, at Vienna.

If he has to march off to Transylvania to make his dissolution of the monarchy into a fact, he's further from home, losing more men to the march, Prussians in his rear, Russians getting ready for round two... "abolishing Austria" is not something one does with a stroke of the pen in the Hofburg. It's effectively a new war. It's a gigantic risk.

Risktaker Napoleon certainly was, but he knew a thing or two about quitting when he was ahead.

(The Prussians, who did lose pretty much their whole territory and army, would be a much more realistic choice for being abolished or utterly castrated - the problem was that their was no obvious alternative.)

So:

-in 1805-06, Napoleon dismantles Austria and Prussia, restructures German and Italian territories in political entities in federal unity with France, sets Poland and Hungayr up as vassal kingdoms.

That's another thing: Hungary doesn't come in a boxed set at this point. Who do you make king, and what's ensuring the loyalty of the Germans who run everything? State-building is hard. Humboldt and Stein, for instance, had enough of a job modernising and harmonising Prussia, and they were Prussians. Imagine what a job it would be for Napoleon to modernise and harmonise gigantic tracts of Europe. A gradual process seems more realistic to me. Germany, Italy, and France can concievably come to grow in a cluster, but we can't prevent the French from being French. Not after 1792. By a process of exclusion, the French necessitate the existence of the Germans and then everything gets messier and messier.

-in 1809-10, Napoleon invades Spain and Portugal. After the first setbacks, he personally leads a campaign there, wins some victories and learns some valuable lessons about the importance of logistics and counterinsurgency, but is forced to cut short his Iberian campaign because...

Speaking of logistics and counterinsurgency, about the hole in the map that was formerly Austria...? :p;)

-of course, there is no Austria anymore, but it is possible that the ConSys may push some other vassal to rebel. A good candidate is Denmark, in a temporary alliance with Sweden. The Northern War ensues in 1810, which Nappy wins, with the help of Russia. Russia gets Finland, Napoleon recreates the crown of Scandinavia, which he offers to one of his generals (might well be Bernadotte, the estrangement with Bonaparte is butterflied away).

...Why Denmark? :confused:

Austria was Austria. It wanted to break out of its status as Napoleon's bitch, and needed to fight or fall in line. Denmark isn't a traditional great power, and has come to terms with being someone's vassal - and Britain wasn't popular over there.

-The experience of the Northern War pushes Napoleon to take steps to mitigate the effects of the ConSys. He creates a customs union of the Empire and its vassal states.

I'm actually pretty damn weak about the economic organisation of the Empire, but it swept plenty of barriers away as it was. But sweeping any number of barriers away doesn't restore cheap sugar and tobacco to a Russian aristocrat, for one example.

-in 1812-13, Russia breaks ranks with the Napoleonic system, pretty much for the same reasons as OTL.

So the proximate cause is essentially the defeat of Austria? Wait... :p

Due to the lessons of the Iberian campaign, Napoleon shuns an invasion of the Russian mainland, he first picks a defensive strategy in Eastern Europe, where he destroys several Russian armies. In the last phase of the campaign, he marches through the Baltic states, with the cooperation of Scandinavia, up to seize St.Petersburg. Last-ditch Russian attempt to prevent the fall of the capital leads to a decisive battle, which Russia loses. Peace with Russia.

Spain doesn't really have much to do with Russia, honestly. The problem in Spain was basically limited resources, a miserable supply situation created by endemic guerilla, and finally an effective enemy force-in-being.

In 1812, Russia wasn't swarming with guerillas (do remember that every subsequent Russian nationalist has mapped his struggle onto the Patriotic War, not least the Stalinist propaganda machine, which was fighting a war full of partisans): serfs make awful guerillas. The defeat was created by Napoleon's failure to destroy or outmaneuvre the Russian army. It's existence forced him to retreat through bare country, destroying his supply system.

-in 1813-14, Napoleon turns to Iberia, crushes Welligton's expeditionary corps, pacifies Iberia with generous amounts of scorched earth. Peace with Britain.

Generous scorched earth was the French modus operandi, and in the sparser country of Spain it had more-or-less created the guerilla situation.

I agree that late Napoleon is in all likelihood going to move back towards liberal constitutionalism. It's not just that he shall be losing taste for full-fledged personal rule, it's also that it shall be less necessary with the end of the wars.

Well, there's liberal and there's liberal. Napoleon's regime always had lots of secret police kicking around.

It's not just that. Economic and political unity of western and central continental Europe under a liberal regime is going to boost and accelerate the industrialization of France, Germany, and Italy considerably.

I think it's more complicated. People have to want to invest in a place. Take, for instance, your German coal going to Italy - why? Industry usually goes where the coal is. And a total lack of protection means it's harder to compete with the first industrial centres that spring up.

I think that in broad strokes, this is a reasonable scenario. :D

To consider that: the initial Greek master-plan bet a lot on the support of Orthodox brothers - Russians, Romanians, and Yugoslavs - that failed to materialise. Even when the Russians did fight the Ottomans, they did it for their own ends, taking advantage of Greek PR.

If the Russians actually were in cahoots with the Friendly Society right from the word go, the situation for Romania gets pretty whacky, if Greek conspirators with Russians guns and British money are able to keep themselves on the thrones for any length of time.

Correct about Russia, but Britain is not going to be industrial power #1 for long, with a neo-Frankish empire around and quickly industrializing.

But this naval competition can hardly be deferred, if Greece goes off - and we staid on top for a pretty long time OTL.

Your reasoning is apt as it concerns the Middle East and North Africa. However I would expect that in the long term, Italian nationalism leads to the reabsorption of Sicily and Sardinia in Napoleonic Italy, and Tunisia may follow.

See some thoughts below about Sicily.

As it concerns SE Asia, it is quite possible that ITTL Britain would claim a bigger slice of Indonesia. But I doubt that the Empire would concede the whole region to British hegemony.

That's what I suggested: an expanded British sphere (Raffles and the Dutch were still drawing their lines over the place in the 1820s), more active competition, and hence the possibility for some states like Aceh to walk a tightrope.

I dunno. I have my own TL plans about the region, so I took much more time speculating to fulfill them within the scenarion than on what happens in their absence.

Do they involve America taking over everything, mayhaps? :p:D
 
On the other hand, the response to 1798 was the Act of Union. It depends on what happens in Britain, but it's possible that the need to reduce pressures on Catholic could propel the movement for reform.

True - but the Union was supposed to be followed shortly by emancipation, and wasn't. Emancipation had to wait for several factors, and if people think the Pope is in the pocket of France, I predict a less friendly climate for Mr.O'Connel.

Besides, it's not like the Empire didn't have Protestant subjects, in France, in Holland, Switzerland, and northern Germany. I can't see the Pope becoming a French puppet, no matter what.

Certainly - but it's a matter of motives and perceptions in foreign countries as much as realities in Rome. Russia, for instance, was getting more Orthodox and had an obvious interest in getting rid of the Uniates: an imagined French control of the Pope can serve as a handy excuse for them to persecute it. But you're quite right that it's too late for the Pope to become anybody's pensioner.

Will it? France has northern Italy, sure. And a quasi-police state. I do no think a Garibaldi analogue would find fertile ground here.

Here's how my thoughts are running:

In southern Italy and especially on Sicily, you had the kind of peasant or mountaineer up-with-the-true-faith-down-with-the-landlord "nationalism" that you got from Ireland to Macedonia; and Macedonia is the ideal place to illustrate how such popular sentiment can be appropriated, even fought over, by rival ideologies of the middle-class intellectuals.

OTL, the Sicilians were appropriated by the middle-class romantic nationalism of northern Italians - specifically, by the person of Garibaldi and his redshirts, turning up and taking advantage of the volatile situation on the farms (as well as the mere existence of the Sardinian army, and his ample balls). And even then, as soon as it became clear that the King of Italy wasn't going to abolish any landlords, agricultural disturbance in the south turned against the Italian state.

A Sicily under constitutional rule is a very differant story, and I'm wondering whether Britain could try to foster feelings of alienation in the intellectual classes - weeny, of course, but constitutional rule expands their role. Simply being in a seperate state does help, of course. Would Sicilian peasants and Italian national identity ever even intersect at all?

But you're right: that's a seperate question from whether middle-class romantic nationalism likes the French overlord.
 
Eurofed seems to focus on the idea of Napoleon creating logical national borders and creating actual federalism.

I think if such a federation happened French nationalism would still dominate things. With the Rhine Border and Piedmonte in the French part of the Empire.
( Rome too perhaps with Nap's fetish for it )

So I have 2 questions, how do these areas frenchify over the next 50-100 years? And how much does French control of these regions upset the Italian and German parts of the Empire?
 

Eurofed

Banned
If he has to march off to Transylvania to make his dissolution of the monarchy into a fact, he's further from home, losing more men to the march, Prussians in his rear, Russians getting ready for round two... "abolishing Austria" is not something one does with a stroke of the pen in the Hofburg. It's effectively a new war. It's a gigantic risk.

I won't deny the difficulties, but IMO a very important, close to necessary, precondition for the long-term success of the Napoleonic order in Central Europe is the utter destruction of the rival power centers of Austria and Prussia. And as your sef are often rightfully pointing out, it would be rather easier for Napoleon to destroy Austria in 1805-06 than in 1809. Plus, after Austerlitz, Austria would be another major defeat away from losing its army. Another war is kinda exaggerating at most another campaign. You may, however, have a good point that strategically it might be better for Napoleon to accomplish the "march to Transylvania" (more likely a march to Budapest would suffice) after he has wiped out Prussia and beaten down the Russians in round Two.

Risktaker Napoleon certainly was, but he knew a thing or two about quitting when he was ahead.

That's another thing: Hungary doesn't come in a boxed set at this point. Who do you make king, and what's ensuring the loyalty of the Germans who run everything? State-building is hard. Humboldt and Stein, for instance, had enough of a job modernising and harmonising Prussia, and they were Prussians. Imagine what a job it would be for Napoleon to modernise and harmonise gigantic tracts of Europe. A gradual process seems more realistic to me. Germany, Italy, and France can concievably come to grow in a cluster, but we can't prevent the French from being French. Not after 1792. By a process of exclusion, the French necessitate the existence of the Germans and then everything gets messier and messier.

As I see it, in the early 1800s, the progressist landed elites and middle classes of Germany and Italy would be willing to accept a neo-Carolingian federal union with France if they are given national unity and sensible national borders by Napoleon. No doubt, such a vast state-building project would keep Napoleon busy for the rest of his life. But national consciousness was in its budding formative stage in Europe at this point, and could be steered away from its OTL path of reciprocally antagonist ethnic-linguistic nationalisms. As for Hungary, I do not see the big difficulty with the Magyar elites accepting an independent kingdom.

Speaking of logistics and counterinsurgency, about the hole in the map that was formerly Austria...? :p;)

And why German Austria should necessarily behave differently from Westphalia or Bavaria, or Hungary differently from Poland ?

Austria was Austria. It wanted to break out of its status as Napoleon's bitch, and needed to fight or fall in line.

Hence my persuasion that for Napoleon to triumph, it needs to be destroyed while its strength is at nadir.

Denmark isn't a traditional great power, and has come to terms with being someone's vassal - and Britain wasn't popular over there.

It's a butterfly I've thought of, not a necessity. But I was thinking of a backlash of the ConSys.

I'm actually pretty damn weak about the economic organisation of the Empire, but it swept plenty of barriers away as it was.

More could be done, by uniting France, Germany, and Italy into an economic space.

But sweeping any number of barriers away doesn't restore cheap sugar and tobacco to a Russian aristocrat, for one example.

True. But I was talking about the loyalty of the Empire. Russia is indeed a different issue.

Spain doesn't really have much to do with Russia, honestly. The problem in Spain was basically limited resources, a miserable supply situation created by endemic guerilla, and finally an effective enemy force-in-being.

In 1812, Russia wasn't swarming with guerillas (do remember that every subsequent Russian nationalist has mapped his struggle onto the Patriotic War, not least the Stalinist propaganda machine, which was fighting a war full of partisans): serfs make awful guerillas. The defeat was created by Napoleon's failure to destroy or outmaneuvre the Russian army. It's existence forced him to retreat through bare country, destroying his supply system.

Oh, it seems like I misexplained my point. I didn't mean that a basically non-existent Russian guerrilla was a significant factor of the 1812 defeat. Quite the contrary. I was saying that a different Napoleonic strategy that avoids the in-depth offensive towards Moscow, and instead focuses on a more defensive stance in Eastern Europe, and/or an offensive towards St. Petersburg, would have much better chances of defeating Russia.

Well, there's liberal and there's liberal. Napoleon's regime always had lots of secret police kicking around.

True, but I meant "liberal" in a socio-economic, non-ancient-regime sense. Political liberalization would have to wait for Napoleon's late years at the least.

I think it's more complicated. People have to want to invest in a place. Take, for instance, your German coal going to Italy - why? Industry usually goes where the coal is. And a total lack of protection means it's harder to compete with the first industrial centres that spring up.

Industry also tends to spread around, esp. in very large states with several regional economic centers.

But this naval competition can hardly be deferred, if Greece goes off - and we staid on top for a pretty long time OTL.

But the British Empire never had to face such a strong naval competitor as a united continental Europe would be.

That's what I suggested: an expanded British sphere (Raffles and the Dutch were still drawing their lines over the place in the 1820s), more active competition, and hence the possibility for some states like Aceh to walk a tightrope.

More ore less.

Do they involve America taking over everything, mayhaps? :p:D

Quite likely. :D;):cool:
 

Eurofed

Banned
Eurofed seems to focus on the idea of Napoleon creating logical national borders and creating actual federalism.

I think if such a federation happened French nationalism would still dominate things. With the Rhine Border and Piedmonte in the French part of the Empire.
( Rome too perhaps with Nap's fetish for it )

I focus on the idea because IMO it offers much better long-term chances for the Empire to weather the age of nationalism successfully. And if France, Germany, and Italy share a political unity, there is much less motive for French expansionism on areas like Rhineland, Piedmont, or Netherlands, that in the long-term spell unnecessary domestic trouble for the Empire. A French imperial subunit that includes Savoy, Nice, Wallonia, and western Switzerland already gets a satisfying deal. As for Rome, it is a natural component of a neo-Carolingian Empire, bit it works just as well as part of the Italian subunit.
 
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