Napoleon invades Britain instead of Russia

Nice cuttoff dates. If you said "since the Tudors" I would have pointed out the Spanish Armada heavily outgunned the rag-tag English navy at that time.

Not quite that early. France had an opportunity to invade after the battle of Beachy Head but did not take advantage.

Well I just figure I'd use the dates from the last successful invasion of Britain, to the last threatened one. By and large Britain still had the naval muscle to deter invasion in the period.

The Old Pretender might have had a better shot. At the time, a lot of the naval crews were indifferent about the whole Hannover Stuart thing. A plurality of Scottish Protestants (logic bomb) actually welcomed the idea. The 15 caught the government flat footed and were one battle away from having no Hannvoeran-British forces between them and London.

I'm NOT saying Jacobites outnumbered Georgites. In the eyes of the English as a whole, he's a filthy Catholic, not to be let on the throne. While the Jacobites had both Catholic supporters (duh) and Protestant ones (in Lancaster, Scotland, and Cornwall... the logic bomb of a Catholic leading the Church of England never seemed to occur to these people who clearly didn't think this through), the British were a protastant majority and as a whole didn't want him. Taking Scotland would be possible. England was only possible because the government forces were off foot, it was not possible due to popular support or anything like that.

The '45 Rising is a pretty fascinating read TBH.

This is why they avoided a pitched fight over the decades. Yorktown only happened because a unit that could have demolished the French navy was repairing storm damage and didn't know Cornwallis needed evacuation ASAP not "eh... anytime next month"

The navy really dropped the ball on that one it has to be said. They had the chance to turn the campaign around, but they did screw up more than a little when it came to preventing the French from interfering in North America.
 
First of all Napoleon didn't dial back spending on the navy. The First Republic build barely any ships compared to the kings before or Napoleon after, furthermore the ships that they did build were all just continuations of decades old designs. Under Napoleon France didn't just start building much more ships than the Republic had, but under Napoleon old models were either improved upon or even completely replaced with new models. For example the Republic only build 2 first-rates (both of them after Napoleon became consul), once Napoleon was Emperor he build 12 more.

Let me rephrase, the French Navy went through cycles of expansion and retrenchment throughout the Wars with a peak in the run up to Trafalgar and there was a definite reduction in spending towards the end of the period.

Furthermore you're talking as if Napoleon was planning on prolonged engagement with the Royal Navy, which he did not. Napoleon was counting on a breakout, ferrying the army over and then returning to port. The army could feed, resupply and rearm itself in Great Britain (unless the British would have gone full Russia) and he'd probably send further supplies through with blockade runners.... But I don't consider "being a naval power", and "a quick victory and ferrying troops over" to be equivalents.

While most of the post Glorious Revolution invasion plans assumed a quick descent on the South Coast before the Royal Navy could recapture control of the Channel that doesn't mean it was a good idea. I can't think of a single post 1700 example of a large scale* amphibious invasion of an entirely hostile land that succeeded without maintaining naval superiority. It's one thing to launch a raid on a Caribbean island or sneak a troop convoy through to French Canada and another thing entirely to invade Great Britain complete with it's population of 10 million and 400,000 men under arms and just "live off the land". While it suited everyone to play up the plausibility of such an attack (the RN to maintain it's budget, the British Militia to justify it's existence and the French to maintain hope of a complete victory) I think it would have been a disaster.


* i.e. 10,000 troops plus
 
While most of the post Glorious Revolution invasion plans assumed a quick descent on the South Coast before the Royal Navy could recapture control of the Channel that doesn't mean it was a good idea. I can't think of a single post 1700 example of a large scale* amphibious invasion of an entirely hostile land that succeeded without maintaining naval superiority. It's one thing to launch a raid on a Caribbean island or sneak a troop convoy through to French Canada and another thing entirely to invade Great Britain complete with it's population of 10 million and 400,000 men under arms and just "live off the land". While it suited everyone to play up the plausibility of such an attack (the RN to maintain it's budget, the British Militia to justify it's existence and the French to maintain hope of a complete victory) I think it would have been a disaster.

So we're just going to ignore that Napoleon invaded places more populous than Britain, often living more densely together than in Britain and that it barely ever was a problem to Napoleon? We're going to ignore that he quickly crushed civilian resistance almost every time it occurred (g.e. Cairo)?

We're going to ignore that Napoleon fought and won entire campaigns at times France was pretty much bankrupt and could barely rely on supply trains, if not at all? In Italy he didn't have massive supply trains rolling behind him to feed his army. He campaigned in Egypt and the Levant for an entire year after all French naval support had been wiped out, and with considerable successes too.

We're going to ignore the mobility of Napoleon's army, how he campaigned faster than anyone else and outmanoeuvred his opponents?
What about distances? If his army lands in Kent he'll be sooner in London than any armies from northern England ever could, uninterrupted you could walk from Folkstone to London in 24 hours, it's just 70 miles. with an army that'd be 3 to 4 days, a week at most. Now let's remind ourselves of how he campaigned in Egypt and Syria for an entire year. A week doesn't seem so bad compared to that. It's not that the British government could just pack its bags within a day and flee like how governments did in WW2, happens to be planes, steamships and cars don't exist yet.

And you pulled that "400.000 men under arms" number out of your a-hole I presume? Because the only numbers I'm finding show that the British army only ever reached half that number during the Napoleonic Wars. And of the army they actually had there were tens of thousands who were anywhere but in Britain.
 
I admittedly don't know lots about the Napoleonic Wars, but this argument always seems a little flawed to me. There's seven years between Trafalgar in 1805 and the Invasion of Russia in 1812 - using that later date for the sake of argument. Ample time for Napoleon to build a new fleet should he be so inclined surely? I mean, the ships of the line that France lost in the 1790s and early 1800s, for example, didn't take seven years to build. Something like the 118 gun L'Orient that was lost at the Nile only took three years from being laid down to commission. Trafalgar was a blow, no doubt, but are we really confident in saying that it was a blow that the French Empire couldn't recover from for at least a decade?
Napoleon knew they couldn't invade Britain so the Continental system formed, a continental embargo of Britain
 
So we're just going to ignore that Napoleon invaded places more populous than Britain, often living more densely together than in Britain and that it barely ever was a problem to Napoleon? We're going to ignore that he quickly crushed civilian resistance almost every time it occurred (g.e. Cairo)?
Comparing Britain to Egypt is completely ridiculous. For starters, the Southern coast of England during this time period was far more fortified than the Northern coast of Egypt - see the Martello Towers across Kent and Sussex, and the Redoubts at Dover and Eastbourne. Your mention of 'civilian resistance' is also a non-starter - the local forces in Egypt, the Mamluks, were poorly equipped and had to rely on the main Ottoman Army for reinforcements. By contrast, the local civilian resistance in any Napoleonic landing of Britain would have been the Yeomanry Regiments, whose ranks were huge and had the same amount of equipment as the main British Army, and that's without mentioning the fact that the people of Britain were determined to push back the French at all costs. Whereas in Egypt the local population's resistance to the French was half-hearted at best, any British resistance would have bee determined and with high morale from the very beginning.

We're going to ignore the mobility of Napoleon's army, how he campaigned faster than anyone else and outmanoeuvred his opponents?
What about distances? If his army lands in Kent he'll be sooner in London than any armies from northern England ever could, uninterrupted you could walk from Folkstone to London in 24 hours, it's just 70 miles. with an army that'd be 3 to 4 days, a week at most. Now let's remind ourselves of how he campaigned in Egypt and Syria for an entire year. A week doesn't seem so bad compared to that. It's not that the British government could just pack its bags within a day and flee like how governments did in WW2, happens to be planes, steamships and cars don't exist yet.
The problem with this assessment is that, to first land in Kent, Napoleon would have had to passed the Martello Towers, or the Dover or Eastbourne Redoubts. These were continually manned by British soldiers, and had enough equipment and supplies to withstand a long siege. Any invasion force approaching the English coast would face immediate bombardment from these defences, which would significantly slow down Napoleon's forces, deplete his numbers before a single land engagement has taken place, and provide the British Government with time to evacuate London. And that's without mentioning how it would provide time for the British Army inland to move to the coast to mount a defence by the time Napoleon neutralised the Martellos (which would be a while given how many there were).

And you pulled that "400.000 men under arms" number out of your a-hole I presume? Because the only numbers I'm finding show that the British army only ever reached half that number during the Napoleonic Wars. And of the army they actually had there were tens of thousands who were anywhere but in Britain.
The professional British Army numbered roughly 130,000 men (if I recall correctly) - yet this does not show the full force of the British forces in the Home Islands.
On top of the professional soldiers, you also had the well-trained and well-equipped Militia, which consisted of tens of thousands of men recruited via a ballot (essentially an early form of conscription).
And then you have the largest force in the defence of Britain - the Yeomanry Regiments. This is where the real numbers in the British Army are - by 1804, these Regiments had roughly 480,000 men within their ranks, who, although not as professional as the main army or the militia, were nonetheless determined to repulse any French invasion. If I recall correctly, during the period when an invasion of Britain seemed likely, William Wilberforce stated that over one million men would have joined the Yeomanry Regiments if they could.
So no, Thoresby did not pull the 400,000 number 'out of his a-hole'. In fact, that number is an underestimation of the number of troops Britain could have used in the event of an invasion.
 
You're gravely overestimating the strength of those Martello towers. They often only carried one or two guns each and held 24 men. That's way too small and the British had proven that themselves when John Moore captured such a tower in just 2 days, and it was exactly that lack of proper artillery that helped him capture the damn thing. Also the French already knew those towers, the originals came from Corsica which they owned. And the redoubts are completely irrelevant, none of them finished construction before 1810 (except maybe Eastbourne, can't find the date for that one). And even those were only poorly armed imo. They only carry around 10 guns and their circular shape leaves massive gaps in between their lines of fire, there's a reason why Star fortresses were the norm.
Overall they might delay the French a bit in the beginning, but it's not gonna stop them long enough to make their victory impossible.

Furthermore Napoleon doesn't have to take out every single one of those towers like you seem to think, literally the only towers he needs to get past are those near his landing site. He also doesn't need to take them out one by one. After that you just march inland and you're rid of them for the rest of the campaign. I mean why would he deliberately march to Harwich? To give the English some more time? He managed to avoid fortresses when campaigning in places with tons of modern fortresses, I suppose he'll be able to avoid them too in England where there are a lot less of them.

The only fortress I can find that'd be an actual danger is at Dover but even Dover can be avoided, unless Napoleon threw a tantrum and absolutely wanted to land at Dover itself. He's got no obligation with capturing a large port early if he isn't planning on relying heavily on supplies from France.

I wasn't comparing Cairo to England, I was using Cairo (the second largest city of the Ottoman Empire) to show that Napoleon had no problem with quelling any civil unrest. The Mamluks weren't civil resistance, those were soldiers and completely irrelevant here.

The Yeomanry isn't a form of civilian resistance, they aren't going to stop Napoleon's troops from living of the land as the former comment implied. They're just extra 2nd-class regiments to bolster the British ranks who'd otherwise be heavily outnumbered. The militia sounds like more of the same. Either way to stop Napoleon from plundering the fields the British would still need to either burn their own fields down like the Russians or they should fight a guerrilla war (which might've been efficient in Spanish mountains, but wouldn't go as well in England).

And you think there wouldn't be a high morale for the French? "70 miles to London" sound pretty encouraging to me. Furthermore morale won't make them win battles, they might be more resilient but won't magically be more efficient because of it. And how would those yeomanry stand up when they realise they're about to get a supersized serving of cannonballs à la Napoleon?
And just because one guy, who wasn't even a notable figure for warfare, said a million men would join doesn't mean that's what'll actually happen.
 
You're gravely overestimating the strength of those Martello towers. They often only carried one or two guns each and held 24 men. That's way too small and the British had proven that themselves when John Moore captured such a tower in just 2 days,
Overall they might delay the French a bit in the beginning, but it's not gonna stop them long enough to make their victory impossible.

And again we are back to the conceptual gap between you and the people you are debating. Fortifications are not intended to halt an invading army by themselves, delay is precisely the effect that is looked for. 33 men stood requiring a siege battery to subdue is them is a very good trade off for most prospective defenders. Nor did land fortifications require large numbers of weapons to interdict shipping attempting to land within their zone of control as they could house ovens for hot shot. Hot shot was dangerous enough to warships but think about having to unload a break bulk cargo from a merchantman under fire, difficult enough under normal circumstances with a typical cargo taking several days normally but of course in this case it might literally be on fire after an hour or two.



Furthermore Napoleon doesn't have to take out every single one of those towers like you seem to think, literally the only towers he needs to get past are those near his landing site. He also doesn't need to take them out one by one. After that you just march inland and you're rid of them for the rest of the campaign. I mean why would he deliberately march to Harwich? To give the English some more time? He managed to avoid fortresses when campaigning in places with tons of modern fortresses, I suppose he'll be able to avoid them too in England where there are a lot less of them.

The problem is the size of the landing site limits the amount of troops, equipment, animals and supplies that can be landed in a given time frame. The narrower the landing zone the greater the exposure not merely to intervention by the Royal Navy but by the elements.

The only fortress I can find that'd be an actual danger is at Dover but even Dover can be avoided, unless Napoleon threw a tantrum and absolutely wanted to land at Dover itself. He's got no obligation with capturing a large port early if he isn't planning on relying heavily on supplies from France.

Without supplies from France he is not going to be subduing the rather large forces available to the British. Napoleon's customary operational paradigm was an invasion by multiple corps de armee marching on parallel roads so that they could converge to overwhelm either an enemy's field armies (for preference) or his fortresses. However the need to transport an army by water already likely limits the number of troops Napoleon can convey in a single lift so he either holds a port and supplies the in country troops while bringing across reinforcements or he watches while an inadequate force is whittled away by superior numbers.

I wasn't comparing Cairo to England, I was using Cairo (the second largest city of the Ottoman Empire) to show that Napoleon had no problem with quelling any civil unrest. The Mamluks weren't civil resistance, those were soldiers and completely irrelevant here.

The Yeomanry isn't a form of civilian resistance, they aren't going to stop Napoleon's troops from living of the land as the former comment implied.

Yes there are. The Yeomanry represents the citizen cavalry equivalent to the infantry of the Militia. In addition to these were regiments of Fencibles who were full time professional soldiers who had only volunteered for home service (i.e in the British Isles). The simple fact is that splitting up an army into small foraging bands in the face of cavalry is rarely a good idea let alone when facing large numbers of infantry in many case backed by professional artillery and of course professional infantry and cavalry.

They're just extra 2nd-class regiments to bolster the British ranks who'd otherwise be heavily outnumbered. The militia sounds like more of the same. Either way to stop Napoleon from plundering the fields the British would still need to either burn their own fields down like the Russians or they should fight a guerrilla war (which might've been efficient in Spanish mountains, but wouldn't go as well in England).

I realise you are very out of your depth here but how many ships do you think Napoleon has? Now answer this question how many ships does Napoleon need to transport A) 40,000 men, B) 100,000 men or C) 450,000 men (this last seems to be the kind of invasion army you have in mind)

And you think there wouldn't be a high morale for the French? "70 miles to London" sound pretty encouraging to me. Furthermore morale won't make them win battles, they might be more resilient but won't magically be more efficient because of it. And how would those yeomanry stand up when they realise they're about to get a supersized serving of cannonballs à la Napoleon?
And just because one guy, who wasn't even a notable figure for warfare, said a million men would join doesn't mean that's what'll actually happen.

Lots of things sound pretty encouraging to you but why not look up a few near contemporary invasions of the period so you have a better idea of the numbers of ships involved and then get back to us. Then we can start to discuss perhaps what actually goes into moving an army in hostile territory.
 
And again you all don't understand what I'm saying. The towers might delay Napoleon in the beginning, but that doesn't rule out his victory. They do not have the power to do notable damage to Napoleon's forces to impact his campaign later on, and they can only ever delay him and half a week at most which, again, isn't enough because Napoleon's 70 miles from London while regulars, yeomanry and militia from Leeds, York, Manchechester, etc. are all 3x further and'd need at least a week to come even close. Furthermore you're talking about furnaces, but nowhere do I find evidence that Martello towers actually had those already.
Furthermore you do realise that he can just land at a number of locations? What I was saying is that only the towers at his landing sites need to be taken out, and that (as long as the landing itself is relatively successful) the forces at said sites are sufficient to take them out.

Again, you're acting as if yeomanry is something unique. You think the Russians, Austrians, Prussians, Italians, Egyptians, etc. all didn't have light cavalry? Trying to raid foraging parties isn't something uniquely British, Napoleon survived it in the rest of Europe so why would suddenly the British Cavalry prove too much for him and his methods?
Furthermore "inadequate force withered down by superior numbers"? Napoleon has faced bigger armies than the British could ever bring up. He spend over a decade continuously fighting numerically superior forces (usually at least 2 major continental powers at once), and winning. And just like anywhere else in Europe, the British aren't going to come down upon Napoleon with 100.000 regulars and 400.000 cavalry all at once, that's literally impossible.

"let alone when facing large numbers of infantry in many case backed by professional artillery and of course professional infantry and cavalry" You got men, now that's something Napoleon's never seen before, aight. Especially artillery, man the French don't even know what that is and they certainly didn't have the best artillery in all of Europe at the time.
And no, yeomanry is not civilian resistance, they are an actual branch of the British armed forces and serve next to the professionals. They are not civilian resistance, civilian resistance is rebellions, uprising, espionage, sabotage and guerrilla war in occupied territories, mostly carried out by regular civilians. I don't know what you define as "civilian" but in my dictionary is doesn't mean "people who have been trained like the rest of the soldiers, who are armed like the rest of the soldiers, and are organised like the rest of the soldiers.", that's called the reserves or something similar to them.
That brings me to something else, you people act like Britain had a massive reserve of manpower to use, reality is that that of the French was twice as large (excluding all their puppet states, allies, etc.) and that they'd automatically have to invest less in the navy than the British, and didn't have to be as spread out as the British.

I realise you're really out of depth here, but how do you think large-scale naval invasions were carried out in this period? Because it wasn't on warships, warships only served to protect the crossing soldiers. And the vessels used were capable of also transporting horses and artillery. Napoleon could have literally everything he needs from the moment he arrives. At the very least for the earliest part of the campaign he doesn't need a constant supply line from France. If he really has too then he can still attempt to captured a city, at that time there was no need for a massive port to bring in supplies and move troops, furthermore he can get his supplies from the British, Napoleon often used captured enemy artillery and other equipment along the French equipment. That's one more of the many reasons why he campaigned so quickly, he just let the supplies come when they come, his army was pretty much self-sufficient anyway.

Honestly I'm done with this discussion, I don't even care anymore.
 
Honestly I'm done with this discussion, I don't even care anymore.

I am beginning to doubt you were ever engaged in this discussion. However we have plenty of examples where you could have, if you wished to draw instances of invasions of the kind of information I asked. For example when the future William III invaded England he transported some 40,000 troops on 76 vessels described as Fluyts which was the Dutch style of dedicated merchantman, he needed over a hundred more transports for his horses and utilised fishing boats as ship to shore transport. Fluyt is worth noting as despite what you seem to think warships were often used as transports, the French term for a warship with reduced armament to increase its troop capacity is en flûte from the Dutch vessel according to etymologists.

So the reality is the French manpower resource is dependent on their sea transport resource.

A point that has been crystal clear to everyone else in this debate from the beginning.
 
I've argued in the past that a French naval victory in the Napoleonic Wars is hardly "ASB" in the long term. While it is true that the French navy is very poorly equipped for fighting a straight-up battle with the English on the high seas, Mahanian naval strategy as the British were fond of is only one particular naval strategy among many. Now saying that, is that enough for the French to be able to conduct a naval invasion in the OTL 1812 situation? Pretty clearly no, the French fleet was insufficiently strong in numerical terms, had inferior crew, and it was scattered in a variety of bases without the ability to unify its forces. But the French are a lot closer than people realize, and with some admittedly major modifications to the course of the war over the previous years, they could be even closer.

I think that the French navy is being sold too short, concerning at least their long term capabilities to build up a force to defeat the United Kingdom. Generally their early opportunities are pretty limited; maybe they could have had a shot around the Trafalgar period if they had better concentrated their fleets, at least enough to keep them in a better position for later, but they're facing a superior number of enemy ships from a position of qualitative inferiority at that time. However, I am of the opinion that if the Peninsula and Russian campaigns are won, then the French fleet will be able to in time outbuild the Royal Navy to the extent than quantitative superiority will be able to defeat whatever elements of qualitative inferiority it has, and that its qualitative inferiority will be reduced.

Under the Ancien Régime, the French were able to finance and support a fleet of 80 ships of the line during the decade. This was generally near the maximum of their capabilities, and there were at times difficulties reaching the number, but this did represent what they aimed for. The British by 1810 had 152, which was probably near the maximum amount that could be supported. Given that France under the Ancien Régime could support 80 SOTLs, given their serious financial system problems and taxation issues, then Napoleonic France, which had achieved significant advances in regards to the financial system - with a stability of bonds that outmatched their predecessors, the end of the parasitical noble class' tax exemptions, significant direct territorial expansion, and an unprecedented expansion of French power in Europe, should be able to support far more. I vaguely remembered that there was a 150 ship of the line plan, but I'm unsure if this is just my memory confusing it with the number of ships the British had, or otherwise just pulling the number out of the air. Regardless, the French Navy was undergoing an expansion during the last few years, and if that was correct, then they'll be able to achieve numerical parity with the United Kingdom for the first time in a long time. The British, given financial difficulties - the Continental Blockade will become tighter and the remaining nations that aren't part of it are removed, and will be less often willingly skirted by the French themselves, as French power is solidified - as well as the number of sailors they have, which must be limited, will have severe difficulty further expanding their fleet. Of course, they can make up trade with non-European countries, but that can only go so far.

Not everything is rosy for the French Navy of course, in that unless if the campaign in Spain went much better and decisively won quickly, then the Spanish contribution to the French navy will be much reduced. According to Wikipedia at the time of Trafalgar they had around 45 ships of the line, a reasonable force. This had disintegrated to 28 by 1810 and 16 by 1815. If Napoleonic France is able to win the Peninsula campaign, then the Spanish government might be able to be brought onboard, which even if they are badly deteriorated should add a few dozen ships of the line to the French fleet. I'm reading fleet strengths for this off of a post on History Stack Exchange btw and I'm not sure if the 1810 numbers for the Dutch reflect being annexed in that year by France or not, but I'll assume that is their pre-annexation numbers. So that too, should add on additional ships of the line, and the French were building ships of the line in Dutch shipyards post-annexation. While I presume that the Russian fleet wouldn't be utilized on the French side, it also presumably would be denied to the British side, and while Denmark's fleet had been destroyed by the British attacking it when they tried to defend freedom of the seas or because the Danes refused to simply give it up to them, they were playing an important role with lighter ships such as gunboats.

In addition to the problems of finance, a major problem faced by the Ancien Régime was acquiring sufficient timber and naval supplies. These came from the Baltic for the French Navy. While the question of transport remains, there should be much better control over the sources of supply, as well as their denial to the British (the British can go elsewhere such as to North America and India - which seemed to have a surprisingly good shipbuilding capacity and in addition good forests - but its still worth something). So, building the ships shouldn't be possible, in addition to all of the shipyards that the French have throughout their possessions. This was generally a success of the Royalists, who had done impressive infrastructure work on Toulon, Brest, and Marseille, as well as started on Cherbourg - a project continued by Napoleon.

The French officers corp was generally well trained (the French Navy pioneered its officer training during its 17th century build up), and the horrible social battles of the late Ancien Régime navy were, so far as I know, settled by the Revolution. The Royalist navy was suffering from a conflict between common officers and professional ones, and also between sea-going officers and administrative officers. As with any bureaucracy, the iron law had come into effect by the end, where the bureaucracy exists to serve the bureaucracy. Instead of the small and efficient administration established by Richelieu and Colbert, the French Navy's administration was being buried under clouds of parasitic noblemen who never went to sea, and who never even had to leave Paris. Sea-going officers (Officers of the sword) felt they were under the control of idiots on land who didn't know what they were doing, while land-based officers (Officers of the pen) felt that the sea going officers were unprofessionals. After the Seven Year's War there was an attempt to promote promotion from personal merit (actually long established in the French navy), but this was badly conducted and often elevated people without regard for the officer corp's chain of command. This led to acts of insubordination and a growth in discontent among the navy's officers. Meanwhile, the influx of commoners from the merchant marine led to its own conflicts in the officer corps.

I haven't read much about the social history of the Republican and Napoleonic navies, but while it is obviously clear that the Republican period saw a general deterioration of the Navy's standards, it also would have logically solved the conundrums by eliminating the nobles, pressing affairs solidly in favor of the commoners, and wiping the fleet out and enabling things to get started from a clean slate. Its hard to have a long-running dispute between commoners and nobles when all the nobles are dead and the noble pen-pushers have had their heads chopped off. Thus, the French Napoleonic Navy may be starting from a lower level, but it has much greater potential than the Royalist fleet, the same story as in the French Army.

Sailors is definitely the weak point for any French fleet, this can't be ignored. The loss of so many ships, the confinement of the remainder to harbor, the blockade on French shipping, all will do a lot to prevent the French Navy from being able to reach the same standards of seamanship as the British. Still, they can do a lot to improve. For example, one of the primary problems with French gunnery vis a vis British gunnery, as far as I understand, was slower rate of fire. A continual problem faced by the French was insufficient powder reserves - although the genius of French chemistry had enabled them to have sufficient domestic saltpeter production to avoid having to import from India or run out, although that has its negative aspects for fertilizer production - which I presume had far more to do with the French not drilling their troops more for firing than any inherent superior British training desire. If the wars on land have ended, presumably it won't be hard to allocate enough powder to the navy to be able to improve gunnery standards, something that can be accomplished without spending too much time at sea. They'll also have access to Dutch sailors after the annexation of the Netherlands. If the French can reach a number of ships close to the Royal Navy's fleet size, then given the problems of maintaing a blockade (is it either 3 ships or 5 ships needed to maintain a fleet on station? I think its 3, you have 1 at home overhauling, 1 in transit or something similar, and 1 on station, but I'm not sure; regardless only a fraction of the fleet can be continually at sea), they'll start to be able to put their fleet to sea much more aggressively, which will give them chances to train their fleet. They won't be able to soon match the Royal Navy seamanship wise, but as the quantitive gap will start to narrow.

In general I think the entire debate over how good each side's ships were isn't very important, and resembles the pointless discussions about making modifications to some obscure airplane or tank on Post-1900. Sure, equipment superiority gives its advantages, and whether one's ships are faster and better sailors has its important points, but its always the morale, training, experience, logistics, doctrine, and command that plays the vital role, not equipment. There exists enough arguments over which side is better that the difference can't have been too large after all; if it was a one sided issue and the French navy was clearly inferior, then we wouldn't be arguing it. Furthermore, for the scenarios that I've outlined concerning brief expeditions outside French ports with massive naval superiority to train, given that the French can choose what weather to operate in, the quoted lighter build of their ships and better blue-skies seakeeping superiority would come to the fore compared to presumed more rugged build of British ships - if this is true, concerning stated British naval construction superiority regarding such strengths.

Finally, while losses were clearly in the favor of the British throughout the entire endeavor, as on land the defeated party tends to suffer disproportionally heavy casualties due to resistance breaking down and getting captured, no? This is further compounded since ships sunk during the period are limited in number and most casualties come as a result of one side capturing the other; since the British generally won the naval engagements, their enemies thus "lost" more ships than the actual combat conditions would necessarily pertain to.

So no, I don't think that the French building up in time a navy capable of matching and defeating the Royal Navy, given a continental victory, is impossible. Of course, the question may be asked why they haven't come to terms by then; if the French have achieved total and complete domination of the content, and the British don't have any allies there, and the French navy is carrying out its naval construction program, well peace would presumably have come long before the French navy had to actually be put to use.
 
The only fortress I can find that'd be an actual danger is at Dover but even Dover can be avoided, unless Napoleon threw a tantrum and absolutely wanted to land at Dover itself. He's got no obligation with capturing a large port early if he isn't planning on relying heavily on supplies from France.
But Napoleon NEEDS a large port early on, as, sooner or later, Royal Navy ships would return to the English Channel and cut the French invasion force off from the Continent. Therefore, the French will need to transport as many supplies, equipment and reinforcements across the Channel before their supremacy at sea comes to an end.

And of these ports, Dover is both the largest, and most strategically valuable, being the closest to the Continent. Yet if the French land here, then Napoleon will immediately face problems - first, the French will have to scale the White Cliffs of Dover. Then, they will have to disarm the nearby Martello Towers, even if the Redoubts are not finished at this point. And then they must besiege Dover Castle, where a large amount of well-equipped British soldiers will be stationed. It will be a huge blood-letting and time-wasting exercise on Napoleon's behalf, yet he will have no choice, due to the prior mentioned need for a port.

So it is, in essence, a Catch 22 scenario - to invade Britain, Napoleon must avoid Dover, but to invade Britain, he must capture Dover.
 
RodentRevolution Your own example doesn't even fit what you asked yourself. You asked for a post 1700 example, the Glorious Revolution isn't one like you asked, furthermore that's not even the kind of naval invasion we're talking about. It's a completely different context, and is in a completely different scenario. Furthermore William III's plans and Napoleon I's tactics are completely non-compatible. There is not a single example of a naval invasion in the style or on the scale of what Napoleon had planned. The French had plans for one in the mid 18th century but that was cancelled because of recent naval defeats in the Channel. What Napoleon had planned has no OTL equivalent anywhere.

And how would Napoleon capturing Dover help him get as many supplies in as possible as quickly as possible Britannicus? It's literally the opposite of that, of all the ports in the region Dover is the best fortified. Capturing Dover would take at least a month on its own so why would he waste his time on it if he can ship in supplies through smaller ports from day one? By the time Dover falls the Royal Navy would be back in control of the Channel anyway and he'd still be on the coasts of Kent. Also you mention yourself that most of Dover's coast are cliffs so why would he want to land at dover if a bit more to the west you got coastal plains where a landing is so much quicker and easier?
 
While I'm no expert on anything here the amount of condescension in the thread is starting to become ridiculous. This argument seems to be due to a difference of goals. For @SrgtButterscotch, Napoleon's goal would be to land a sizable invasion force and take London with the British government enforcing a surrender without having to deal with the rest of the island. For @RodentRevolution and Co. you guys seem to be assuming Nap is going to have to constantly fight off major British resistance even after taking London with or without the government and conquer all or majority of the island make his own surrender. The problem seems to stem from when would the British yield especially if the government and King are captured and also whether the Royal Navy afterwards accepts this surrender. So a question of whether Britain resists like Russia or resists like the German states. I suggest for this discussion to remain amicable you first sort out your end goals. Is Nap only needing to take London or will he need more than that?
 
I've argued in the past that a French naval victory in the Napoleonic Wars is hardly "ASB" in the long term. While it is true that the French navy is very poorly equipped for fighting a straight-up battle with the English on the high seas, Mahanian naval strategy as the British were fond of is only one particular naval strategy among many. Now saying that, is that enough for the French to be able to conduct a naval invasion in the OTL 1812 situation? Pretty clearly no, the French fleet was insufficiently strong in numerical terms, had inferior crew, and it was scattered in a variety of bases without the ability to unify its forces. But the French are a lot closer than people realize, and with some admittedly major modifications to the course of the war over the previous years, they could be even closer.

I don't really have anything to disagree with what you said in the post you quoted other than to say it's an excellent description of the scale of the challenges the French Navy faced and the amount of time and money that would be needed to fix them. So long as Napoleon was fighting on land and he couldn't devote enough resources to the Navy to beat the RN and if he had supremacy on the continent and the Continental system was working Britain would be forced to make peace even without the RN being defeated in battle.

While I'm no expert on anything here the amount of condescension in the thread is starting to become ridiculous. This argument seems to be due to a difference of goals. For @SrgtButterscotch, Napoleon's goal would be to land a sizable invasion force and take London with the British government enforcing a surrender without having to deal with the rest of the island. For @RodentRevolution and Co. you guys seem to be assuming Nap is going to have to constantly fight off major British resistance even after taking London with or without the government and conquer all or majority of the island make his own surrender. The problem seems to stem from when would the British yield especially if the government and King are captured and also whether the Royal Navy afterwards accepts this surrender. So a question of whether Britain resists like Russia or resists like the German states. I suggest for this discussion to remain amicable you first sort out your end goals. Is Nap only needing to take London or will he need more than that?

The Cabinet and Civil Service (which is tiny at this point) will retreat out of London and continue the fight. Britain is not a continental absolute monarchy with limited public support and involvement in politics and losing London (which @SrgtButterscotch is portraying as much easier than it actually would be) would impact but not end the British war effort.
 
RodentRevolution Your own example doesn't even fit what you asked yourself. You asked for a post 1700 example, the Glorious Revolution isn't one like you asked, furthermore that's not even the kind of naval invasion we're talking about. It's a completely different context, and is in a completely different scenario. Furthermore William III's plans and Napoleon I's tactics are completely non-compatible. There is not a single example of a naval invasion in the style or on the scale of what Napoleon had planned. The French had plans for one in the mid 18th century but that was cancelled because of recent naval defeats in the Channel. What Napoleon had planned has no OTL equivalent anywhere.

And how would Napoleon capturing Dover help him get as many supplies in as possible as quickly as possible Britannicus? It's literally the opposite of that, of all the ports in the region Dover is the best fortified. Capturing Dover would take at least a month on its own so why would he waste his time on it if he can ship in supplies through smaller ports from day one? By the time Dover falls the Royal Navy would be back in control of the Channel anyway and he'd still be on the coasts of Kent. Also you mention yourself that most of Dover's coast are cliffs so why would he want to land at dover if a bit more to the west you got coastal plains where a landing is so much quicker and easier?

No I was careful not to tie you down to anything like a specific date as while there are a range of actions to choose from no approached the scale of enterprise Napoleon proposed, however when you look at the resources involved in enabling smaller scale operations like say the descent on the Walcheren you might begin to understand why people are so sceptical.

As to Brittanicus's point are you even aware what a Napoleonic army in the field requires to operate? An eight pounder French gun (the standard field piece equivalent to the British nine pounder) required a six horse team if IIRC. A battery which likely also includes at least one howitzer requires limbers for each gun, these do not require separate horses being attached in transit mode but do require shipping space and do need to be landed. In addition all arms require at least one wagon per tonne of supplies, each wagon will require at least a two horse team. Off loading horses from sea going transport is much and away easier at a port for starter and horses are crucial if an army wants to actually have its supplies with it when it marches anywhere.

While I'm no expert on anything here the amount of condescension in the thread is starting to become ridiculous. This argument seems to be due to a difference of goals. For @SrgtButterscotch, Napoleon's goal would be to land a sizable invasion force and take London with the British government enforcing a surrender without having to deal with the rest of the island. For @RodentRevolution and Co. you guys seem to be assuming Nap is going to have to constantly fight off major British resistance even after taking London with or without the government and conquer all or majority of the island make his own surrender. The problem seems to stem from when would the British yield especially if the government and King are captured and also whether the Royal Navy afterwards accepts this surrender. So a question of whether Britain resists like Russia or resists like the German states. I suggest for this discussion to remain amicable you first sort out your end goals. Is Nap only needing to take London or will he need more than that?

An invading army is going to have to fight long before reaching London, this was the era in which the Royal Military Canal had been recently constructed part of a network of layered defences around the capital that in concert inflict not merely delay on an invader but force him to bring along siege equipment with its consequent additional burden on the logistic train. As pointed out above even the fall of London...which, the point being made requires a hefty investment in resources merely to invest...does not automatically equate to a cessation of resistance or even the fall of HM Government. It is also worth remembering this was the era of the Admiralty Telegraph which while reliant on clear days can deliver a message in minutes to London. The odds of a field army with limited avenues of advance, all of which would be contested, outrunning the King and Government are faint.

As to amicability I would think it has been remarkably amicable seeing as SrgtButterscotch's assertion about Thoresby's 400,000 militia approximation was couched in terms that experience teaches could have seen him spending a week away from us if someone had been mean minded enough to report that post. If people wanted to just get rid of him, could have been done. Instead people have been trying to illustrate the problems in ever greater detail in the hope he might begin to understand.
 
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While I'm no expert on anything here the amount of condescension in the thread is starting to become ridiculous. This argument seems to be due to a difference of goals. For @SrgtButterscotch, Napoleon's goal would be to land a sizable invasion force and take London with the British government enforcing a surrender without having to deal with the rest of the island. For @RodentRevolution and Co. you guys seem to be assuming Nap is going to have to constantly fight off major British resistance even after taking London with or without the government and conquer all or majority of the island make his own surrender. The problem seems to stem from when would the British yield especially if the government and King are captured and also whether the Royal Navy afterwards accepts this surrender. So a question of whether Britain resists like Russia or resists like the German states. I suggest for this discussion to remain amicable you first sort out your end goals. Is Nap only needing to take London or will he need more than that?

While it is all speculation, I think it is likely that a French occupation of London means a peace deal. That is generally what happened back then. The British government probably does not want to be on the run, having to taking refuge in other cities. More likely, I think, is that it reluctantly accepts an unfavorable peace that causes the French to withdraw (while they get most/all of what they want on the Continent) and then makes preparations for a new war. A Napoleonic occupation of London probably means Amiens part II.
 
While it is all speculation, I think it is likely that a French occupation of London means a peace deal. That is generally what happened back then. The British government probably does not want to be on the run, having to taking refuge in other cities. More likely, I think, is that it reluctantly accepts an unfavorable peace that causes the French to withdraw (while they get most/all of what they want on the Continent) and then makes preparations for a new war. A Napoleonic occupation of London probably means Amiens part II.

The Austrians, Spanish and Russians all fought on after the loss of their Capital. Generally it took the loss of both the Capital and the main field army to force a surrender and others have said throughout the thread in the absence of French naval superiority a successful landing (difficult but not ASB) and a swift capture of an unprepared London (unlikely but not ASB, people mess up and while London could be defended that doesn't mean it would be) would simply result in the Royal Navy sealing the coast and the vastly outnumbered French being starved of vital and locally unobtainable supplies (gunpowder and ammunition) and then defeated. Now such an attack would have an enormous impact on the war. While the French have lost an Army those can be replaced, even a temporary capture of London and the resulting disruption of the financial markets would damage Britain's war making capacity enormously. Though if Napoleon accompanies his Army and is captured that might not matter.
 
It's not because you people keep making up more and more vague arguements that you're right. You brought up the Martolle towers, they were proven to be only a minor delay. You brought up the Redoubts, they weren't operational yet in our timeframe. You talk about the Telegraph and the Canal (which were also only finished in 1808 and 1809 respectively and thus won't necessarily be a factor). You bring up yeomanry and militia, but ignore that those from northern England would only arrive late and those from the rest of the British Isles might not even arrive at all. You talk about the British army as if they were the only army in the world with "professional infantry and artillery", lmao. You make an argument about Napoleon had to capture Dover, in the same argument you prove why trying to take Dover would be a dumb idea and unnecessary. Furthermore you ignore a ton of things about Napoleon, everything from the proven effectiveness of Napoleon's foraging to his tactics, way of campaigning, military organisation, development of equipment, the capture and usage of enemy equipment, etc.

Literally the only thing you people brought up that was half decent was the militia and yeomanry, that's the only thing that will have a guaranteed major influence in every single scenario, but of the actual impact it will have none of us can be certain about because we don't know how efficient they actual were in this role. All the rest rely on factors including an Invasion years later than originally planned, completely absurd locations for landings, etc.

You say you try to make me understand, what you're actually doing is pointing out more and more things showing that Britain wasn't fully prepared yet for a large invasion.
And even IF the government can flee in time and never gets captured they can only refuse surrender for a while. Eventually Napoleon can have such a negative effect the war effort as well as on life in Britain that they have no other choice left. The more he rampages around England the more of their own equipment, rations, etc. the British will be forced to destroy or let it fall into Napoleon's hands. The longer he successfully campaigns around England the better his own army gets and the worse the British get. The longer they refuse the greater the chance other forces, both inside and outside, intervene (the USA, the Irish, Mysore, etc.). You cannot just ignore a successful invading force. IN THE SCANRIO that the English government flees north that still doesn't make Napoleon disappear. Most of the Royal navy's bases are in the south, if Napoleon gets a crushing victory over the British army (like he had against the Prussians in 1806) or even if he just has reasonable successes he'll gain more and more ground, eventually he'll capture Dover, Southampton, Plymouth and the Royal Navy will have too few bases to control the Channel, maybe even to harbour all of its ships so what then? Bring them all to Canada and India where they aren't a threat to Napoleon?
 
The Austrians, Spanish and Russians all fought on after the loss of their Capital.

None of those was quite the same.

Spain's monarch had been taken hostage and Napoleon's brother was on the throne. If Napoleon does that with George III, then yeah, the British probably fight on but that is doubtful.

Russia's capital (St. Petersburg) was not occupied but rather Moscow was. Alexander was still comfortably in the Winter Palace. Whether things are different if Napoleon occupies St. Petersburg is an interesting question.

Austria fought on with the knowledge that the Russians would soon come to their aid (Austerlitz) - which would not likely be the case in Britain.

I think it is more likely that Britain simply cuts its losses and makes peace, and then plots revenge after the French are gone.
 
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