Napoleon does a Cannae on the Allies at Waterloo

I believe under ordinary conditions if Napoleon had routed the Allies at Waterloo they would just raise more troops especially from Austria and Russia and Napoleon would be very lucky to win even one more battle.

But suppose Napoleon pulls a Cannae on the allies at Waterloo? Kills or captures almost all of them?

Do they at least agree to let him keep what he has?
 
OTL Waterloo has a British force (at least a division, I thiink more) that took no part in the battle, as it was defending from a potential encircling move, and a Prussian Corps that fought at Wavre, so there's a cadre of troops that would remain to stiffen resolve, as well as entire Russian and Austrian armies descending on France.

It's also difficult, if not impossible to totally destroy both Prussian and Anglo-Durch forces. Difficult enough to do it to one, to be fair. But say that D'Elerons attack is entirely successful, Wellington is killed and his army chopped up by cavalry as it streams to the rear, the Guards, KGL and Rifles surrounded and destroyed in Hougamont and La Haye Sainte, (this is a massive stretch for me, btw - while D'Eleron was having initial success there remained infantry reserves, let alone the cavalry charge that actually did for him). If this happens, then the Prusian liaison officer (Muffling?) rides over to Gneisenau and tells him the 'English have been destroyed' - the Prussians turn around and brush past Grouchy, saving their army to attack again with the other continental powers. Britain mourns its loss of prestige, brings more veteran troops back from America, reactivates more ships and decides to write off Waterloo as yet another cock up in Belgium (a la Walcheren).
 
Whatever the result at Watetloo, it is too late for Napoleon and France to change the balance of powers.

The whole of Europe is going to Gall on their back and France no longer has interest in restarting a long and now hopeless war.

If you want some Cannae-like victory, you can have it in the 1813 campaign at Lutzen, Bautzen or Dresden, maybe Leipzig of the tsar is captured.

After the final failure of the german campaign, it's too late : the game is over.
 
It's not possible at Waterloo for Napoloen to "pull a Cannae". Wellington's chosen the field, he's chosen the dispositions and thus he's dictated where he must be attacked for Napoleon to win the day, and with Blucher marching in support with his Prussians Napoleon has too small a widow of opportunity to succeed. Too many factors have been left in Wellington's hands for Napoleon to have any chance of a crushing victory.
 
It's not possible at Waterloo for Napoloen to "pull a Cannae". Wellington's chosen the field, he's chosen the dispositions and thus he's dictated where he must be attacked for Napoleon to win the day, and with Blucher marching in support with his Prussians Napoleon has too small a widow of opportunity to succeed. Too many factors have been left in Wellington's hands for Napoleon to have any chance of a crushing victory.

i don't think there'll be a complete destruction of the Anglo-Dutch, but there are a couple of PoDs which may cause a significant French victory. i think the most likely are Jerome not sucking in reserves to assault Hougamont and not using the cavalry to push D'Eleron back - either of these could result in Wellingtons centre being pushed back and possibly shattered, maybe to the degree that reserves can't fix and so forcing a retreat from the field - such a retreat could be turned into rout, although this is mitigated against by the heavy cavalry still being intact.

However, after D'Elerons attack there are limited opportunities to make changes that will break the Anglo-Dutch before the Prussians can become involved.
 
either of these could result in Wellingtons centre being pushed back and possibly shattered, maybe to the degree that reserves can't fix and so forcing a retreat from the field - such a retreat could be turned into rout

Wellington picked out the field of Waterloo a year before the battle happened, and not without reason:

"Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the centre and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? ...the infantry and cavalry and a great part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest- this statement being made upon the supposition that there are two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating enemy at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the centre; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads." (Jomini, The Art of War)

He's also a master of handling a retreat, whether strategically or tactically. At the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, the Light Division retreats from the outlying village of Poco Velho across two miles of open plain, under attack from three divisions of French infantry and three brigades of cavalry, with fewer than 100 casualties. Given how successfully he disengaged from the French army on the 17th, retreating down a single road with no cover, it seems unlikely that he'd be unable to do so on the 18th with three roads and a forest to use.
 
Wellington picked out the field of Waterloo a year before the battle happened, and not without reason:

"Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the centre and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? ...the infantry and cavalry and a great part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest- this statement being made upon the supposition that there are two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating enemy at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the centre; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads." (Jomini, The Art of War)

He's also a master of handling a retreat, whether strategically or tactically. At the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro, the Light Division retreats from the outlying village of Poco Velho across two miles of open plain, under attack from three divisions of French infantry and three brigades of cavalry, with fewer than 100 casualties. Given how successfully he disengaged from the French army on the 17th, retreating down a single road with no cover, it seems unlikely that he'd be unable to do so on the 18th with three roads and a forest to use.

As I say, I don't think this is very likely at all... But neither Fuentes or the 17th are exactly the same as they aren't the result of the line being shattered. The Light were also - especially during your command, general :) - some of the best drilled and trained troops in the British army, unlike the Waterloo army, which is of somewhat lesser quality. Should Pictoms division be broken by D'Eleron, it's possible that it shocks the remaining army into retreat which could be turned into at least some form of rout by the French cavalry... BUT this is ifs and buts and depends upon the Anglo-Dutch reacting in the worst way every time. Hugely, hugely unlikely. Not impossible, but highly improbable.
 
Assuming he pulls it off (a large if) his only real option if he hopes to stay in power is to put himself in a position where retaking France would be a blood bath of epic proportions for the collation. Then he'd need to exploit the divisions between the collation members that were apparent in Vienna. If he can pull that off (another large if) he might be able to stay in power.
 
some of the best drilled and trained troops in the British army, unlike the Waterloo army, which is of somewhat lesser quality.
Though the massive French losses between 1811 and 1815 mean they've suffered a similar decline in quality. There are sufficient solid and unengaged troops to act as a rearguard among the better Netherlands and British troops. This is particularly true given we're talking about d'Erlon's attack, which occurred around two hours into the battle: none of the reserves have been committed yet.

Should Pictoms division be broken by D'Eleron, it's possible that it shocks the remaining army into retreat which could be turned into at least some form of rout by the French cavalry...
It is extremely improbable, though. The point of holding Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte, and the cluster of farms on the left was to limit the French attacks into two narrow channels. This makes manoeuvring a large body of cavalry to take advantage of a French infantry breakthrough almost impossible, particularly when coupled with the wet ground early in the day. Furthermore, the Anglo-Allied army has its own cavalry in position to counter-attack (as you've indicated that one of the POD's is them not repelling d'Erlon's attack) thereby delaying any French pursuit.

In the event that the French are able to move their cavalry up, the Anglo-Allied force has just under a mile to retreat to reach the forest at which point they are more or less safe. The entire right wing would be retiring in order, since d'Erlon's force is attacking the left centre and Hougoumont hasn't fallen (Jerome not having committed reserves), and the left wing is protected by cavalry counter-charges. The losses of Halkett's brigade at Quatre Bras go to show how much it's the moral effect of cavalry rather than their ability to cause casualties that counts, and how effective forming square or reaching cover can be in counteracting them:

69th (caught in the open; 37 killed, 137 wounded)
30th (formed square and retired to the forest; 5 killed, 34 wounded)
33rd (reached the forest; 19 killed, 101 wounded)
2/73rd (reached the forest; 4 killed, 31 wounded)

neither Fuentes or the 17th are exactly the same as they aren't the result of the line being shattered.
Though the overwhelming probability is that the line isn't shattered. The most likely outcome if d'Erlon's attack is dramatically more successful is that Wellington decides it's time to go. Hidden behind the ridge, he disengages his troops and leaves a rearguard behind as he did on the 17th: most of his strength is gone before the French realise he's moving.
 
Though the massive French losses between 1811 and 1815 mean they've suffered a similar decline in quality. There are sufficient solid and unengaged troops to act as a rearguard among the better Netherlands and British troops. This is particularly true given we're talking about d'Erlon's attack, which occurred around two hours into the battle: none of the reserves have been committed yet.


It is extremely improbable, though. The point of holding Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte, and the cluster of farms on the left was to limit the French attacks into two narrow channels. This makes manoeuvring a large body of cavalry to take advantage of a French infantry breakthrough almost impossible, particularly when coupled with the wet ground early in the day. Furthermore, the Anglo-Allied army has its own cavalry in position to counter-attack (as you've indicated that one of the POD's is them not repelling d'Erlon's attack) thereby delaying any French pursuit.

In the event that the French are able to move their cavalry up, the Anglo-Allied force has just under a mile to retreat to reach the forest at which point they are more or less safe. The entire right wing would be retiring in order, since d'Erlon's force is attacking the left centre and Hougoumont hasn't fallen (Jerome not having committed reserves), and the left wing is protected by cavalry counter-charges. The losses of Halkett's brigade at Quatre Bras go to show how much it's the moral effect of cavalry rather than their ability to cause casualties that counts, and how effective forming square or reaching cover can be in counteracting them:

69th (caught in the open; 37 killed, 137 wounded)
30th (formed square and retired to the forest; 5 killed, 34 wounded)
33rd (reached the forest; 19 killed, 101 wounded)
2/73rd (reached the forest; 4 killed, 31 wounded)


Though the overwhelming probability is that the line isn't shattered. The most likely outcome if d'Erlon's attack is dramatically more successful is that Wellington decides it's time to go. Hidden behind the ridge, he disengages his troops and leaves a rearguard behind as he did on the 17th: most of his strength is gone before the French realise he's moving.

I think we're talking very similar points - I've mentioned a few of the things you've said (the availability of reserves, the cavalry being present), and have said that I thnk it highly unlikely - hugely improbable. But possible, because shock has funny effects on a battlefield - especially when the troops are inexperienced.

As a coda - which doesn't increase the probability from very improbable - Wellington couldn't disengage unseen at Waterloo - indeed, it was Neys ability to see the wounded and stragglers falling back into the forest in OTL that led to the stupid cavalry charges that wasted so many hours, men and horses. He'd be able to see divisions falling back as well - though it may not have helped, too much.
 
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