Napoleon defeats Russia (1812)

[alexmilman]

Neveroki wisely retreated, fighting an effective rearguard action, against Murat's Cavalry. Murat refused to let Nay's III Corps to join in the action, which permitted Neveroki to escape, suffering 1,500 casualties. Barclay Tolly, and Bagration only learned of the French move after midnight on the 15th, and beat a hasty retreat toward Smolensk, with General Raveski's VII Corps arriving at dawn to reinforce Bennigsen's garrison. If Neveroki had been crushed on the 14th the French Cavalry could have reached Smolensk on the morning of the 15th, before the main Russian Armies reach it. Napoleon almost inexplicably imposed an operational pause on the 15th, allowing the Russians time to occupy the cities defenses.

OK, let's assume that this happened and Murat arrived to the city before Raevsky. Then what? To the best of my knowledge the horses are not very good at climbing the walls and Smolensk had been surrounded by the high medieval walls. Of course, these fortifications were rather obsolete, however the walls (13 - 9 meters high and 5 - 6 meters thick) were there and Murat did not have any means to scale them or to break through them unless the garrison kept the gates open. Bennigsen was not a military genius but he was a very experienced and competent general so the chances of him being caught hibernating while the French cavalry rides into the city would be extremely slim. In other words, the whole idea of the city being captured by a cavalry charge is preposterous: as was commented by Segur, it belonged to the Prussian War when the fortresses had been capitulating to the few squadrons of the French cavalry.

OTOH, on 15th Raevsky, who was only within 15km from Smolensk, marched through the city, took position 6km South of it and, after joining with retreating Neverosky, marched back to the city.

What Murat could do was to occupy some of the suburbs to the South of the city which is not the same as taking the city.

The battle on the 16th was a near run thing, with the French almost taking the Royal Citadel,

It is better known as Royal Bastion, the earthworks built by Sigismund III to replace part of the wall blown during the siege of Smolensk.

an attack on the 15th would have been much more likely to have succeed.

Except that on the 15th the French would not have the troops needed for the general assault. Ney reached the suburbs on the morning of the 16th and Davout around 4PM. Bagration got to the Northern bank by 5PM and Barclay in the evening. French attack did not start until the next day because the general assault upon a fortified and defended city required the preparations. So, at the very best, the attack could not happen before 16th and Raevsky was already within the city.

Besides, as far as destruction of the Russian army is involved this would not matter too much because their main force was to the North of the city (see the map above).

Better yet it would've been better to mask the city, and move East to cut the Moscow Road.

Which assumes that the Russians are staying near Smolensk no matter what. Which was Napoleon's assumption but not Barclay's intention. On the 16th he sent the 2nd Army to Valutino to protect the line of retreat. After finding this out Napoleon ordered to find the fords so that he could attack the junction of the 1st and 2nd armies but the ford could not be found (Dnieper is a rather big river even at Smolensk) after which he ordered a massive bombardment of the city and a general attack.

The Russians would have been forced to abandon Smolensk, and fight the French in the open, at very poor odds.

The bulk of their forces was not at Smolensk to start with so "abandoning" of the city applies to a single corps and "fight the French in the open" simply irrelevant.

Napoleon was expecting that Smolensk is going to be a decisive battle but Barclay was planning it as exclusively rearguard action (which he made abundantly clear in his description of the 1812 campaign).

Defense of Smolensk was impossible (among many other reasons, because the predominantly wooden city would be on fire as a result of the bombardment) and placing the bulk of the Russian troops inside the city would be plain suicidal so that this argument of yours does not make too much practical sense (admittedly, it is quite popular among those inspired by the French narrative which was picked up by some Anglophonic authors ). Barclay in his description of the campaign made it absolutely clear that a general battle at Smolensk was a very bad idea and that he was not going to indulge Napoleon by making stand there.

The fear of that move caused the Russians to retreat down the Moscow Road on the night of the 17th/18th. As it was the 1st Army was almost cut off, but Junot refused to take the risk of attacking at Prudichevo, and the Russians escaped.

One more popular story that has little to do with a reality. You are talking about the events which happened after Smolensk was abandoned and the Russian armies had been retreating (see the map below) while the bulk of the Napoleon's forces were marching after them from Smolensk. No, the 1st Army was not "almost cut off" and Junot's role in the maneuver was rather modest.

Let's start with Junot and resources he had. At the start of campaign the 8th corps had 18,800 with 34 guns. During July the corps lost 2/3 of its numbers (stragglers and sick). At Orsha it was reinforced by 1,000 infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen. In other words, he had (optimistically) between 10 and 15K. An idea that Junot with his troops could play a critical role is somewhat optimistic and the blame unfair: he was ordered to advance in the unfamiliar swampy area and it took a while for him to accomplish the task; if he was more lucky and decisive, he would find himself in the midst of the 1st Russian Army and most probably destroyed.

The 2nd Army was already 50 km away defending the Dnieper crossing. The 1st army had been retreating by 2 roads (the shortest one was along the Dnieper and exposed to the French artillery fire). The 2nd corps of Baggovut was sent directly through the forest because the road on which the rest of the column marched had been congested. What followed is know as Battle of Valutin Mountain or as a Battle of Lubino. Troops of Major-General Tuchkov the 3rd (not to be confused with Lieutenant-General Tuchkov the 1st, commander of the 1st column) took position in front of the crossing with the Moscow Road to secure the march of the 2nd column moving under command of Dokhturov by the Northern route (the 1st column already passed through). The main goal of Tuchkov the 3rd was to give enough time to the 2nd corps to get to the Moscow Road.

Neither Ney nor Murat operating against the Russians along the main road demonstrated any miracles or excessive aggressiveness. The Russian rearguard of Tuchkov the 3rd was not engaged in any serious fight until the evening of August 19th when the 3rd and 4th Russian corps already arrived. The French also needed time to bring infantry and artillery so Ney's 1st attack happened only at 5PM. With more French troops arriving, the battle continued after a sunset and there were only approximately 30,000 directly engaged on each side.

When you say they could just Simply retreat North, just what route would they take? Toward Inkovo? There were other French forces in that direction to block the road.

The French troops to the North of Smolensk did not have enough numbers to "block" 100 - 120,000 (or even 80,000) with any chance for success.

The Russians were very lucky at Smolensk, that a convergence of French mistakes, along with quick thinking, and hard fighting on their part that saved them. It all could have gone very badly for the Russians.

Of course, it could go badly for them if they were idiots. OTOH, the French did not make too many serious mistakes on the way to Smolensk except for the fact that Napoleon's basic premise was wrong: he counted upon the Russian offensive toward Vitebsk and, indeed, for a while Barclay (under the pressure of Alexander and the "Russian Party") was making moves in that direction. However, these plans were speedily abandoned as soon as the enemy's movements became clear the whole idea was abandoned and the Russians had a shorter distance to march in Smolensk direction: Russian troops arrived to the right (Northern) bank of the Dnieper the day before Napoleon's main force arrived to the South of the city. The whole episode with Junot & Co is post-Smolensk and, again, there was no risk of destruction of the 1st Army.

 

[Belisarius II]

OK, let's assume that this happened and Murat arrived to the city before Raevsky. Then what? To the best of my knowledge the horses are not very good at climbing the walls and Smolensk had been surrounded by the high medieval walls. Of course, these fortifications were rather obsolete, however the walls (13 - 9 meters high and 5 - 6 meters thick) were there and Murat did not have any means to scale them or to break through them unless the garrison kept the gates open. Bennigsen was not a military genius but he was a very experienced and competent general so the chances of him being caught hibernating while the French cavalry rides into the city would be extremely slim. In other words, the whole idea of the city being captured by a cavalry charge is preposterous: as was commented by Segur, it belonged to the Prussian War when the fortresses had been capitulating to the few squadrons of the French cavalry.

OTOH, on 15th Raevsky, who was only within 15km from Smolensk, marched through the city, took position 6km South of it and, after joining with retreating Neverosky, marched back to the city.
View attachment 514368


What Murat could do was to occupy some of the suburbs to the South of the city which is not the same as taking the city.


View attachment 514366



It is better known as Royal Bastion, the earthworks built by Sigismund III to replace part of the wall blown during the siege of Smolensk.



Except that on the 15th the French would not have the troops needed for the general assault. Ney reached the suburbs on the morning of the 16th and Davout around 4PM. Bagration got to the Northern bank by 5PM and Barclay in the evening. French attack did not start until the next day because the general assault upon a fortified and defended city required the preparations. So, at the very best, the attack could not happen before 16th and Raevsky was already within the city.

Besides, as far as destruction of the Russian army is involved this would not matter too much because their main force was to the North of the city (see the map above).



Which assumes that the Russians are staying near Smolensk no matter what. Which was Napoleon's assumption but not Barclay's intention. On the 16th he sent the 2nd Army to Valutino to protect the line of retreat. After finding this out Napoleon ordered to find the fords so that he could attack the junction of the 1st and 2nd armies but the ford could not be found (Dnieper is a rather big river even at Smolensk) after which he ordered a massive bombardment of the city and a general attack.



The bulk of their forces was not at Smolensk to start with so "abandoning" of the city applies to a single corps and "fight the French in the open" simply irrelevant.

Napoleon was expecting that Smolensk is going to be a decisive battle but Barclay was planning it as exclusively rearguard action (which he made abundantly clear in his description of the 1812 campaign).

Defense of Smolensk was impossible (among many other reasons, because the predominantly wooden city would be on fire as a result of the bombardment) and placing the bulk of the Russian troops inside the city would be plain suicidal so that this argument of yours does not make too much practical sense (admittedly, it is quite popular among those inspired by the French narrative which was picked up by some Anglophonic authors ). Barclay in his description of the campaign made it absolutely clear that a general battle at Smolensk was a very bad idea and that he was not going to indulge Napoleon by making stand there.



One more popular story that has little to do with a reality. You are talking about the events which happened after Smolensk was abandoned and the Russian armies had been retreating (see the map below) while the bulk of the Napoleon's forces were marching after them from Smolensk. No, the 1st Army was not "almost cut off" and Junot's role in the maneuver was rather modest.

Let's start with Junot and resources he had. At the start of campaign the 8th corps had 18,800 with 34 guns. During July the corps lost 2/3 of its numbers (stragglers and sick). At Orsha it was reinforced by 1,000 infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen. In other words, he had (optimistically) between 10 and 15K. An idea that Junot with his troops could play a critical role is somewhat optimistic and the blame unfair: he was ordered to advance in the unfamiliar swampy area and it took a while for him to accomplish the task; if he was more lucky and decisive, he would find himself in the midst of the 1st Russian Army and most probably destroyed.

The 2nd Army was already 50 km away defending the Dnieper crossing. The 1st army had been retreating by 2 roads (the shortest one was along the Dnieper and exposed to the French artillery fire). The 2nd corps of Baggovut was sent directly through the forest because the road on which the rest of the column marched had been congested. What followed is know as Battle of Valutin Mountain or as a Battle of Lubino. Troops of Major-General Tuchkov the 3rd (not to be confused with Lieutenant-General Tuchkov the 1st, commander of the 1st column) took position in front of the crossing with the Moscow Road to secure the march of the 2nd column moving under command of Dokhturov by the Northern route (the 1st column already passed through). The main goal of Tuchkov the 3rd was to give enough time to the 2nd corps to get to the Moscow Road.

Neither Ney nor Murat operating against the Russians along the main road demonstrated any miracles or excessive aggressiveness. The Russian rearguard of Tuchkov the 3rd was not engaged in any serious fight until the evening of August 19th when the 3rd and 4th Russian corps already arrived. The French also needed time to bring infantry and artillery so Ney's 1st attack happened only at 5PM. With more French troops arriving, the battle continued after a sunset and there were only approximately 30,000 directly engaged on each side.

View attachment 514374


The French troops to the North of Smolensk did not have enough numbers to "block" 100 - 120,000 (or even 80,000) with any chance for success.



Of course, it could go badly for them if they were idiots. OTOH, the French did not make too many serious mistakes on the way to Smolensk except for the fact that Napoleon's basic premise was wrong: he counted upon the Russian offensive toward Vitebsk and, indeed, for a while Barclay (under the pressure of Alexander and the "Russian Party") was making moves in that direction. However, these plans were speedily abandoned as soon as the enemy's movements became clear the whole idea was abandoned and the Russians had a shorter distance to march in Smolensk direction: Russian troops arrived to the right (Northern) bank of the Dnieper the day before Napoleon's main force arrived to the South of the city. The whole episode with Junot & Co is post-Smolensk and, again, there was no risk of destruction of the 1st Army.

Sorry to have taken so long to respond. Respectfully you analysis of Smolensk is strategically incoherent. The 1st and 2nd armies did move toward Vitebsk, giving the French the opportunity to turn their Left Flank. The Russians didn't know about the move until the predawn hours of the 15th . The French had achieved a strategic surprise, the fruits of which were partly lost by the operational pause of the 15th, which gave the Russians the chance to occupy the defenses of Smolensk. The Russians may not have originally intended to fight a major battle there, but Napoleon's "Maneuver of Smolensk" forced them into one.

Barclay may have written in his account that Smolensk was simply intended as a rearguard action, but that wasn't how it worked out. Both the 1st & 2nd Armies fought a 2 day all out defensive battle, and sustained 12-14,000 casualties. Because the Russians understood that they couldn't hold the city indefinitely doesn't mean Smolensk was just a rearguard action, or that both armies weren't at risk. Both Barclay, and Bagration retreated to Smolensk because they didn't want to be cut off from the Moscow Road, and they abandoned the city for the same reason.

Western Historians aren't taking some kind of French Propaganda line, the actions of both sides clearly show what they were trying to do. Napoleon was attempting a grand envelopment of the Russian 1st & 2nd Armies. His error was losing sight of his own strategic goal, and instead engaging in a bloody assault on a fortified city, while leaving the Russian line of retreat open. Napoleon once said "I may lose battles, but I will never lose a minute." He lost the whole 15th of August, which he should have used to cut the Moscow Road, and envelop the city, which was the whole purpose of the "Maneuver of Smolensk" to begin with.

Now you assert this wouldn't have mattered, because the Russians would have just marched north, and that there were no French Forces to stop them. In fact the French had the Imperial Guard Corps, along with the III, and IV corps available to form the Northern pincer of the trap. It would have been a pretty poor plan for a battle of annihilation to leave the Russians with an obvious, and open line of retreat. The Russians would have been in the unenviable position of facing a major force in front of them, while another force is advancing against their rear. This was Napoleon's favorite tactic, "Manoeuvre de derriere".

As for the aftermath of the real battle, a wide gap had opened between the 1st & 2nd Armies, with Bagration retreating from the city without even informing Barclay. Again Napoleon wasted the 18th in inactivity, not starting the pursuit until the next day. Junot's fresh Corps was in position to interpose it's self between the two armies, but the opportunity was wasted by Napoleon, because he couldn't decide if the Russians were retreating north, or east. The issue of Junot's hesitation on the 19th would have been avoided if he'd been ordered into the gap on the 18th. 1st Army didn't even begin it's retreat till the evening of the 18th, and by then Bagration was already east of Lubino, 18 miles east of Smolensk, and heading for Solovievo.

To suppose that Barclay would have just destroyed Junot's Corps during his retreat assumes Junot was an idiot, incapable of fighting a delaying action, while the main body attacked the Russian Rear, and that no other French Forces would have come to his aid. It also assumes Barclay could have just attacked off the march, and known exactly what was in front of him. Barclay didn't even know Bragration had left him in the lurch, let alone what enemy forces might have interposed themselves between them. On August 19th 1st Army was in grave danger of being cut off, and destroyed. It was Napoleon's indecision on the 18th that saved them.

If the 1st Army had been destroyed Bagration's 2nd Army wasn't strong enough to make a stand at Borodino, or anywhere else. Napoleon might not even have chosen to march on Moscow, but instead chosen to hold at Smolensk, and send envoys to the Czar. Certainly if both the 1st & 2nd Armies had been destroyed in the Maneuver of Smolensk the Czar would have been hard pressed to continue the war. The Russians would have only been left with the 3rd Army in the South, and the forces around Riga. It would have taken many months, or even years to build new armies out of the militia units, and raw recruits they were raising. Russia would have been in desperate need of an extended period of peace.

 

[alexmilman]

Sorry to have taken so long to respond. Respectfully you analysis of Smolensk is strategically incoherent. The 1st and 2nd armies did move toward Vitebsk, giving the French the opportunity to turn their Left Flank. The Russians didn't know about the move until the predawn hours of the 15th . The French had achieved a strategic surprise, the fruits of which were partly lost by the operational pause of the 15th, which gave the Russians the chance to occupy the defenses of Smolensk. The Russians may not have originally intended to fight a major battle there, but Napoleon's "Maneuver of Smolensk" forced them into one.

The main problem with the perception that you are pushing is a fact that you are confusing Napoleon's plans with what really happened. "Maneuver of Smolensk" did not force the Russians to fight a major battle because most of their forces were not engaged.

Barclay may have written in his account that Smolensk was simply intended as a rearguard action, but that wasn't how it worked out.

This is exactly what happened and this was confirmed by Clausewitz. Both are "primary sources" on the Russian side. Anyway, to be precise, Barclay wrote that he was not planning to fight a decisive battle at Smolensk. Which he did not.

Both the 1st & 2nd Armies fought a 2 day all out defensive battle, and sustained 12-14,000 casualties.

There was no "all out defensive battle" in which both Russian armies had been engaged:

On the night of 15th - 16th Raevsky (with 15,000) occupied the suburbs South of the city. On the 16th at 5PM the 2nd Army approached the city (from the North) and Raevsky was reinforced with the 2nd Cuirassier and 2nd Grenadier divisions. Closer to the evening the 1st Army started arriving. During the night of 16th - 17th Raevsky (2nd Army) was replaced by Dokhturov's corps strengthened by the leftovers of Neverovsky division, 3rd division of Konovnitsin and Uvarov's cavalry. On the 17th he was further strengthened by the 4th division of Eugene of Wurtenberg.

The 2nd Army was ordered to march to Valutino during the night of 16th - 17th to cover the retreat.

French bombardment of the city started in the morning of the 17th and a major assault began at 1PM. By that time Napoleon already was aware of Bagration's march and the attempts to find a ford failed.

Because the Russians understood that they couldn't hold the city indefinitely doesn't mean Smolensk was just a rearguard action, or that both armies weren't at risk. Both Barclay, and Bagration retreated to Smolensk because they didn't want to be cut off from the Moscow Road, and they abandoned the city for the same reason.

You are seriously confused and the result is that you are bundling different things together in a complete disregard of the context.

1. The Russian armies had been in danger when they started move to Vitebsk and Napoleon began his maneuver. Degree of the danger is debatable because Barclay stopped the offensive on earlier stage, well before he learned about Napoleon's maneuver: the whole thing was forced upon him by Alexander and the "Russian" party and he had to pretend that he is acting offensively but he was using any excuse for not doing so. While he did not know for a while about details of Napoleon's maneuver, the fact that Neverovsky was left on the Southern bank of the Dnieper to cover the Russian left flank indicates that possibility of attack from that direction was not discounted.

2. Protection of the road to Moscow had little to do with holding Smolensk because the city is on the left bank of the Dnieper and the road (after Smolensk) is on the right bank. So, the only thing that really required was to have the troops to the North of the city by the time the French approached it from the South (and had been on the wrong side of the river). Holding city for a while was providing a safer retreat so this was a rearguard action: a defensive fight engaged by a rear guard to cover retreat of an army. Out of 130,500 only 38,000 had been engaged.

3. You keep talking about defending Smolensk as something meaningful but it never was outside demagoguery of the "Russian Party": it was a relatively small city on a wrong side of the river (as far as retreat to Moscow is involved) lacking the modern fortifications and filled with the wooden buildings which would (and did) catch fire as a result of a bombardment. Not to mention that there was a single bridge across the river. It was possible to keep sending the reinforcements to the city defenders which is not the same as putting the whole army there. But, with the 2nd army securely reaching the crossing (IIRC, something like 50 km from the city) the further holding by the 1st Army became pointless.

As for the 1st and 2nd armies "retreating to Smolensk", look at the map I provided in the earlier post or one below. They retreated toward Smolensk. Smolensk itself was defended by a limited force and what you keep writing about being cut from Moscow does not make sense geographically: to continue retreat they did not need to be in Smolensk because Smolensk was on a wrong side of the Dnieper. Napoleon could cut them off either by passing through the city and crossing the Dnieper before the Russians arrived to the Northern bank of the Dnieper or by crossing the river upstream from Smolensk.

The 1st option did not work because Neverovsky was sent to guard Russian left flank and Raevsky corps was close enough to the city to cross the river, march to Krasnoe, met Neverovsky and then retreat to the city and take a defensive position.

The 2nd option did not work because there was no ford near the city and Napoleon was too obsessed with the idea of fighting a decisive battle there that all his force was engaged on storming the city.

View attachment 515773

Western Historians aren't taking some kind of French Propaganda line,

To start with, there are no uniform "Western Historians" and then you are seemingly confused because I was talking not about the French Propaganda but about the French narratives as the sources which were/are more popular among the Anglophonic authors than the Russian ones. Look at the terminology: you mentioned the Royal Citadel but the Russians are calling it Bastion. The common (in English) name of the Raevsky Battery (at Borodino) is Great Redoubt, which is French name for it (actually, it was not a "redoubt").

the actions of both sides clearly show what they were trying to do. Napoleon was attempting a grand envelopment of the Russian 1st & 2nd Armies. His error was losing sight of his own strategic goal, and instead engaging in a bloody assault on a fortified city, while leaving the Russian line of retreat open. Napoleon once said "I may lose battles, but I will never lose a minute." He lost the whole 15th of August, which he should have used to cut the Moscow Road, and envelop the city, which was the whole purpose of the "Maneuver of Smolensk" to begin with.

The French could not reach Smolensk in force by the 15th AND to launch an assault immediately after their advance units arrived: Raevsky already was in the city with its corps and Ney's 1st attempt to attack it from the march failed. "Enveloping" the city would be a great idea but it involved crossing the Dnieper, which at the level of Smolensk is a rather wide river. So the only practical way to cut off the Russians would be to take city and cross the river by the existing bridges before the Russians reach the city in meaningful numbers. As an option he would have to ignore Smolensk altogether and to march along the left bank of the river, cross it at Prudischevo and then to proceed to the Moscow Road. Which he did not and hardly could because there was no major road and, as Junot has a chance to find, the area was swampy and the crossings difficult to find. Anyway, doing this with a considerable force would be impractical.

It was typical for Napoleon to assemble his separately marching units before a major engagement and he expected that the Russians would be defending Smolensk with all their force so his alleged delay is understandable, especially when he had no idea regarding the enemy's whereabouts.

As for the aftermath of the real battle, a wide gap had opened between the 1st & 2nd Armies, with Bagration retreating from the city without even informing Barclay.

A popular legend not confirmed by the Russians. Barclay ordered Bagration to retreat so that the 2nd army could protect the crossing while securing his army. The gap obviously existed but it was not going to do too much good to the French unless and until they would manage to position themselves in the front of the 1st Army. I wonder if by placing the maps I'm not just wasting my time because you keep ignoring the reality.

Again Napoleon wasted the 18th in inactivity, not starting the pursuit until the next day.

His troops just fought a hot engagement with the considerable losses. They needed to get themselves on the other side of the Dnieper, for which they needed to push out the Russian rearguard , rebuild the destroyed bridge and cross the river. Things like that take time.

Junot's fresh Corps was in position to interpose it's self between the two armies,

I already described in some details that it was too small to interpose itself "between the two armies" without being destroyed. I could try to interpose itself between the 2 columns of the 1st Army in which case he would have to fight against the 2nd, 3rd and 4th infantry corps and the 1st Cavalry corps of the 1st Army. Providing, of course, that he managed to cross Dnieper and to march his corps across a swampy unknown terrain faster than the Russians marched by the road. This was already explained to you in some details with the map attached.

Contrary to what seems to be your idea, even on the major road the French could not fly: it took Ney hours to bring his infantry and artillery to the position held by Tuchkov the 3rd. He was able to start his attack at 5PM by which time all 1st Army except the 2nd corps already was safely at the roads' crossing or past it and the 2nd corps was in a process of arriving. Later, with more French troops arriving, the battle continued into the darkness with no decisive result after which the Russians continued retreat. The French (Ney, Murat, Davout, Eugene) advanced by a single road and could not arrive to the point simultaneously. On each side approximately 30K were engaged.

I'm under the impression that you keep ignoring the numbers and maps I'm providing and simply keep repeating the same stuff time and again.