1. In OTL, Napoleon sent Marshal McDonald and Marshal Oudinot to St. Petersburg, but failed because McDonald did not have enough artillery to capture Riga and could not join Oudinot to rescue him from Wittgenstein. In TTL, Davout takes care of that with the expanded and improved Polish army.
2. In this TTL, McDonald defeated the Russians in Saltanovka because he had better numbers than Davout, however when he intercepts the Bagration army he is slowed and cannot prevent his withdrawal. It really was no better result than OTL.
3. Napoleon has more men in this TTL since the forces he sent in the previous point in OTL are mostly Polish in this TTL.
4. I knew this, I wrote it that way because in my notes it was faster than writing General Governance. I will correct it.
5. Napoleon has more forces available than in OTL and the Russian main army was dismantled.
6. I did not know (although I had my doubts about this photo).
7. Alexander asks for peace because St. Petersburg and Moscow were captured while the Russian main Russian army was shattered. He simply cannot do anything else if he wants to keep his throne.
8. You are right on this point, but you do not understand that the text presented only explains that Napoleon promised that he would prevent his army from wreaking havoc on the population, not that he would not wreak havoc on the population. On the dispersion of troops, the French army did not disperse them far from Moscow but in an area where there are enough men to fight guerrillas or unite if necessary.
Don't worry, you don't offend me. You are only giving your opinion and supporting it.
In OTL McDonald’s corps was sent to cover the left flank by advancing toward Riga. Doing noticeably more was not realistic and did not make sense within framework of the overall Napoleonic strategy of putting most of the force on a single direction. Actually, Nappy explicitly formulated this by listing 3 options, Moscow or St. Petersburg or Kiev, but not two of them. Advancing in the diverging directions with no ability to join forces was not Napoleonic. Anyway, greater Polish army comes at the expense of the OTL Prussians and the Polish troops marching with the main force (Poniatovski corps and the units distributed among other troops) so the main force is smaller than in OTL while the left flank is stronger.
How exactly Napoleon without the Polish troops with him would end up having more troops on the main direction escapes me. Ditto for McDonald having the greater numbers than Davout (who would give him a bigger force than OTL 1st corps?). Now, as far as ability to outmaneuver Bagration is involved, Davout
could manage this under the favorable circumstances but McDonald was not in the same “weight category” as Bagration. Look at his record: the guy was a prick with no understanding of strategy but he was a superb tactician with a very impressive record. OTOH, the OTL McDonald’s performance in 1812 was anything but impressive and, anyway, he was made a marshal not for any brilliant maneuvering but for a personal bravery at Wagram.
Now, putting aside the AH part, setting the French troops around Moscow was not practical. Actually, Murat’s cavalry was placed outside the city and it did not work well because it was in such a sorry state that even feeding the horses (we are talking the early fall) was problematic (Zamoyski gives a number of the scary first hand accounts on that subject). Spreading out the infantry would not be much better: it was looting regardless the orders (similar situation existed in Smolensk when commandant pretty much lost control over the situation).
Moscow would be OK if Napoleon could control his own troops but the problem was that he could not: the French contingents had been routinely looting pretty much everywhere in Europe and only very few marshals ever had been trying to stop this. Personally, I can name only two: Bernadotte (absent in OTL and your TL) and Davout (absent in your TL). Why would they
not loot seeing example on the very top? Nappy himself “appropriated” a nice fur coat for a retreat and pretty much everybody was trying to get some trophy because this was a part of the system. Population left the city spontaneously, without any orders (and against the official assurances) so this would be the case anyway. Troops with a low discipline in a pretty much abandoned rich city with a lot of food, drink and loot spells trouble especially taking into an account that Napoleon’s army pretty much lacked a mechanism for the orderly placement of the troops, collecting and distributing the supplies, etc. Not that this would be a trivial task even under the better circumstances. Again, in OTL the only corps commander who managed placement of his troops in a decent order and took care about more or less orderly supply was ... Davout. Even Davout did nothing to prepare the horses for the winter march so the only ones prepared for the task were horses of Naploeon’s household. Knowledge was available but nobody cared.
If the troops are placed in the villages and small towns outside Moscow, even a minimal control is absent and an idea of paying for food with gold simply was not there so, with the very few exceptions, the locals were opposite to happy and the Russian raiding parties had a complete freedom of action. Especially taking into an account that in your TL the Polish cavalry is far away. As a side note, I was greatly surprised with the fact that the Polish cavalry in the 1812 proved to be not better than French (which means
REALLY BAD) in the terms of taking care of their horses both in summer and winter. How could they forget the centuries of a great experience?
Even a greater battlefield success at Borodino changes little because the French army is shrinking at a rather scary rate on the march without any battles, just thanks to the desertions and diseases. Nappy before Borodino was already not an existential threat to Russia (see Clausewitz) and by most of the relevant accounts Russia still had a reserve of between 200 and 250K of the “2nd line” troops (not counting the newly raised troops which needed training and weapons), including 55K on the Danube, and could raise additional 50 - 80k irregulars (out of 117K Cossacks only 20 - 25K had been deployed in 1812). Russian industry was producing up to 1000 cannons and between 46 and 90K muskets annually and could count on the considerable British supplies (as in OTL) so playing for time was OK. Napoleon’s supply bases were far away. The same goes for the uniforms (especially winter clothes) and footwear.
To end on a positive note, photo of the Road Palace in Tver is correct (with the allowances or post 1812 modifications).
