Napoleon Defeats British Navy

How plausible was it for Napoleon to defeat the British Navy? Was it a close run thing, or was it very difficult? Did the close blockade of French ports make it impossible to train competent crew?
 
The French did win some significant battles against the Royal Navy, including on the Chesapeake, leading to Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, but most were before Napoleon's time.

Had the plan in 1805 worked, where over 50 ships of the line were to concentrate in Cherbourg, then France may have had a chance.
 
What do you mean by "defeat" ?

If it means having his admirals win one of several naval battles against the Royan Navy, yes he could.

If you mean defeating the RN to the point where the napoleonic Navy gets the upper hand, gets mastery of seas and that the RN becomes unable to oppose a french invasion, I just think he could not.

The gap in number of units and quality of commanders between France and Britain had never been as huge as in these years. The chaos of the revolutionary years caused such a collapse in the french Navy that it needed some 10 to 15 years to rebuild itself. And you can't do it in a satisfactory way when the world number one naval power is at your throat and does not let you breathe and train your crews.

The situation were not at all comparable to the contest between the british and german navies during WW1. In WW1, german units were better and their admirals were great and probably better than the british. And however they were unable to win because of sheer numerical disadvantage.

Under Napoleon the gap was much wider so he could not win on the seas.
 
This was the period of the greatest concentration of Naval talent in Britains history. Collingwood, Duncan, Saumarez, Pellew(s), Cochrane, Troubridge, Hood, Maitland, Smith... Plus some guy on a column.

Against which, Napoloen had men of the caliber of Villeneuve. The French Royal Navy pre 1789 was gutted by the revolution - aristocratic officers became emigres (look at the experience of the captains at 1st of June), the corps of Naval Gunners was disbanded because it was against Egalite. The blockade prevented the French ships gaining any experience sailing their technically superior ships (which the RN captured and commissioned into service - there's a reason so many of the RN ships have French names), leaving them slow to operate sails, slow to fire broadsides and less healthy than the RN. It also prevented squadrons practicing manoeuvre together, hindering tactical operation.

This leaves the Napoleonic navy unable to win a war against the RN. Battles - with a massive superiority in numbers (Trafalgar was c.2:1 and a drubbing for the allied fleet, so likely to need 4:1) it would be possible to win a battle, but I would expect indecisively - the superior seamanship of the RN would enable them to disengage.
 

Redbeard

Banned
If Napoleon is allowed to consolidate his control over Europe, succesful 1812 campaign, Spain subdued etc., he will certainly have the resources to build a navy that can challenge the RN. With an early PoD, like winning at Trafalgar, he might also include some useful continental allies. IIRC Russia and Denmark-Norway together had about 50 SoL before 1807.
 
No.

Let's say that all goes right as you say for Napoleon. He subdues Spain, or crushes Wellington and the spanish armed resistance, or finds any other way to leave this spanish quagmire.

And he wins a triumphant victory in the russian campaign by sticking to the original plan of a 2 year long campaign to re establish greater Poland as a kingdom closely allied/vassalized to France.

So let's say he has indeed crushed any serious opposition in continental Europe for the next 20 or 30 years.

Well, in this situation, he won't favor the strategy of confronting Britain in a naval fight to death. This path would be the most expensive, the most risky and the longest to produced the desired result.

The most probable is that he would resume negotiations to have Britain accept peace. And if Britain can't count on allies on the continent to confront napoleonic Europe, it will come to terms.
 
He can build the navy - but that navy cannot gain sufficient experience at sea to be of serious threat to RN blocking squadrons.

Except you've specified a defeat at Trafalgar, which is one of the biggest turn around a in Naval history, so we can suppose there's no Nelson, or any of the other leaders I mentioned above. And both the French and Spanish navies are able to reach the sea to train, unlike OTL. Which in turn means the RN blockade isn't as strong, so the RN itself is both weaker and has failed to learn any lessons from the American War. In short it requires a completely different naval war in the 1790s
 
A victory at the Nile (I don't know if that's possible to achieve) would do much to preserve French naval force in the mediterranean, maybe avoiding the advent of a close blockade in that theatre, so that crews can eventually be trained to handle their ships in a more proper way.Then you need a better alliance with Spain and to capture Gibraltar, but the most important thing is that Napoleon must not order about his ships like they were regiments on land, and destroy the careers of officers when they cannot do the impossible.
Preserving the danish fleet and denying Britain the naval supplies from the Baltic and Scandinavia would be a plus.

A total victory at sea is however almost impossible, and would need some years of relative peace on the continent to prepare for a "Operation Lion de Mer".
 
He can build the navy - but that navy cannot gain sufficient experience at sea to be of serious threat to RN blocking squadrons.

What about the mediterran? In mean, if he crushes Wellington in Spain he could take Gibraltar and close the mediterran, this way the french navy would be able to train there
 
What about the mediterran? In mean, if he crushes Wellington in Spain he could take Gibraltar and close the mediterran, this way the french navy would be able to train there
Couple of things to note - about 1808 to 1813 Wellingtons forces were based in Portugal and the French could have - and did - attempt to descend on Gibraltar and Cadiz at any point. Neither city fell. Now, you could target one of the Armies that had defeated Wellington (noting that after 1810 the Lines of Torres Vedras pretty much prevented France from expelling the British) at Gib; but Gib doesn't close the Med - it didn't prevent Villeneuve taking the Toulon squadron to its end at Trafalgar for example, and the RN Med squadron could use Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica as bases.
 
I agree that it would not crush their navies, but as you said

and the RN Med squadron could use Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica as bases

Yes, as bases, but they woudln't be able to send more ships there or to build new ships, the french could build a larger navy using the ports of Marselle and Barcelona and crush the british navy there by sheer numbers
 
I agree that it would not crush their navies, but as you said



Yes, as bases, but they woudln't be able to send more ships there or to build new ships, the french could build a larger navy using the ports of Marselle and Barcelona and crush the british navy there by sheer numbers
Gibraltar doesn't close off the Mediterranean though. It didn't stop the French coming out, it won't stop the British coming in.
 
What about the Mediterranean? In mean, if he crushes Wellington in Spain he could take Gibraltar and close the Mediterranean, this way the French navy would be able to train there
You can take over Gibraltar, but without a better navy, how can you hold the straits against a more powerful attack? The straits are relatively thin, but it isn't Thermopylae. You do have to fight the enemy on the open ocean.
 
You can take over Gibraltar, but without a better navy, how can you hold the straits against a more powerful attack? The straits are relatively thin, but it isn't Thermopylae. You do have to fight the enemy on the open ocean.


Well, you are right, i give up
 
The blockade prevented the French ships gaining any experience sailing their technically superior ships (which the RN captured and commissioned into service - there's a reason so many of the RN ships have French names)

This is painfully untrue, French ships were by all accounts greatly inferior to their British built counterparts. Those captured and pressed into service in the Royal Navy required constant repair work and were disliked by their crews for their significantly poorer sea keeping abilities.

There is an article worth reading on the subject of the myth of French warships on Navweaps.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-057.htm
 
This is painfully untrue, French ships were by all accounts greatly inferior to their British built counterparts. Those captured and pressed into service in the Royal Navy required constant repair work and were disliked by their crews for their significantly poorer sea keeping abilities.

There is an article worth reading on the subject of the myth of French warships on Navweaps.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-057.htm
Painfully untrue? The RN of the time believed it - multiple Naval Chronicle reports and articles throughout the period talk about the qualitative superiority of the French 74s, and of the other French vessels.

Examples include On the Mode of Improving the Navy 1801 by Gabriel Snodgrass (which also discoursed on the superiority of the East India Company ships to the RNs) and defined strengthening for British built but not French built ships; the notes to Hoods report on the ships taken from Toulon (which also note unserviceable ships being destroyed; the capture of the Alexander; the retreat of Cornwallis; etc etc etc. The Navweps article calls the officers unreliable - but given they also have to serve on the ships, that prize money went to all ranks, that the sources also show them discounting other nations ships (not least the Dutch 74s, which they noted were designed for Dutch waters and so unsuitable for the blockade work they'd undertake), and it takes the words of the sailors as gospel truth (although sailors moan, there is a well known anti French bias in lower class memoirs, especially military lower class eg rifleman Harris) also the cost of midlife repair and upgrade is subject to a number of elements which don't necessarily tie to ship design.

Sources: The Naval Chronicle 1794 - 1798;Cordingly, David Billy Ruffian; Roger NAM, The Command of the Oceans, Willis, Sam In the Hour of Victory and The Glorious First of June; Woodman Richard The Sea Warriors
 
The Problem was that the Revolution had utterly gutted the French Navy, like way worse than the army. See Naval Officers are traditionally gentlemen, the sons of the nobility and such. Most of the French Admiralty were executed during the reign of terror.

Unlike the army, that's not something you can replace with espirit de corps and conscription. Naval Service takes training. Almost as much as the Artillery Corps.

The best chance the French had to defeat the British and gain ascedancy on the seas was probably during the 7 years war. . .Which ended 2 years before Napoleon was even born. . .
 
They were closer to it during the austrian succession war of the american revolution war.

The french Navy was very strong, threatening, and as food as ever, when the french Revolution turmoil ruined it.

It is very long and costly to build, train and sustain a good Navy. It is very easy to wreck it all.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The British had more ships, proved capable of winning at a disadvantage, and - DK Brown here:


In summary, in fighting at sea, the Royal Navy lost five battleships and sixteen frigates, and the enemy navies lost some 92 battleships and 172 frigates.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 226-228). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.

(The French lost more ships in port than the British did in total, and the total ships lost or captured to the British in harbour come to 57 battleships and 36 frigates.)

Basically, you'd need one monster of a PoD to make this work.




As for captured ships:



There are innumerable accounts by officers of the RN, accepted by historians such as James3 and Brenton, 4 and by later writers, extolling the merits of captured ships and few indeed put a different viewpoint. By 1816 one-ninth of the battleships in commission were prizes, as were about a ninth of smaller vessels. A large proportion of British-built ships were based, to some extent, on the designs of captured enemy vessels. Actual evidence in support of these views is less easy to come by. One may use the subjective impressions of ships’ captains and officers, but even today such evidence is considered unreliable because of the strong emotional bond between a captain and his ship. Unless she breaks his heart, a captain will always swear that his present ship is the best ever. Admiral Nelson, during the brief period in which the San Joseph was his flagship, told Lord Spencer that she was the finest ship in the world, yet he had never been to sea in her at that time.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 250-257). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.




A limited study of contemporary French writing suggests that they had a different view of the performance of their ships vis-à-vis those of the Royal Navy. M Bouvet, writing of French ships, says: They have never, by any chance, taken or preserved any advantage over their adversaries, or succeeded in eluding or flying from a disastrous engagement. Our ships of all rates, whether in company or alone, have rarely escaped pursuit of those of the enemy that have fallen in with them while cruising … The fault may in great measure be attributed to the French ships being too sharp and constricted at their extremities; they are not what is termed good sea-boats; this peculiarity, which has been imagined to lead to superiority in point of swiftness, has produced a contrary effect, at least in rough seas.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 283-290). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.



Brown also notes that several groups had a vested interest in emphasizing the speed of non-British ships - the British shipwrights wanted more study of their field, the British captains wanted more money for their captures, and the French were just glad to have something to boast about!




Gardiner has summed up the practical consequences of the French philosophy as follows: a. Light construction which may have given a slight advantage in speed when new. However, lack of strength led to rapid distortion of the hull, causing a loss of speed. b. A high speed in optimum conditions, usually on one point of sailing only. c. Less stability at large angles of heel and hence able to carry less sail in high winds but able to ‘ghost’ in light breezes. d. Relatively leewardly. e. Lower firepower than British ships of the same size.

Brown , David K. Before the Ironclad: Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 (Kindle Locations 371-381). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.
 
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