Most "What-Ifs" for Napoleon in 1815 deal with either a victory at the Battle of Waterloo, or some choice of wing commanders instead of Ney/Grouchy.
What is not generally known (only 7 sources cover the French concentration in detail prior to June 15th) is that a far greater opportunity for Napoleon existed.
Napoleon planned for the invasion of Belgium to take place on June 14th, anniversary of Marengo. He planned for 3 columns, the left being I Corps and II Corps, the center being VI Corps and the Guard, and the right being III Corps at Philippeville and IV Corps at Mariembourg. The reserve cavalry would bivouac between the columns. Napoleon expected to easily seize the Nivelles-Namur road, for the allies to fall back, and he would seize Brussels by June 16th. He had proclamations already printed to distribute to the Belgium populace, and he had ordered Flemish speaking guides to be in the vanguard of the columns. Flemish is spoken predominantly north of Brussels, demonstrating again Napoleon's expectations.
Soult, for reasons unknown, mangled Napoleon's plans. On June 7th, Gérard's IV Corps recejived orders that left them a half-days march south (Rocroi) by June 15th, and then on June 12th, Soult removed the entire right column - moving IV and III Corps to Beaumont, and the VI Corps to Beaufort. Napoleon countermanded as much as he could, and the net result was IV Corps alone on the right column, from Florennes (north of Philippeville) to Mariembourg. The Center column was overloaded with III Corps, VI Corps, and the guard. Worse, Napoleon was forced to delay the campaign start to June 15th. Due to IV Corps' new positioning, its 14th division led by Bourmont was in the vanguard at Florennes, just 2 miles from the frontier, and 30 km from Namur, where Blücher had his HQ. On the night of the 14th, Bourmont's staff (possibly Clouet) gave the critical intelligence of the impending invasion to Gneisenau at 11pm (see Lettow-Vorbeck) and the Prussians began concentrating their army at Sombreffe a full 12 hours earlier than it would have had responding to the commencement of hostilities.
Had Napoleon chosen a different Major General, and had his concentration plans been followed, the Campaign in Belgium would have begun on June 14th. Bourmont/staff would have most likely not been able to provide actionable intelligence - though they may have later defected as Gordon/Gaugler/Laderiac did during the campaign. The French army would have seized the Nivelles-Namur road, and the Allied armies would have been successfully separated.
At this point, what happens?
Do Wellington/Blücher try to save Brussels? Can they coordinate south of Brussels?
Would Wellington retreat, and Blücher aggressively attack the rear of Napoleon's advance on Brussels? However, if that happens, does Napoleon bring the weight of the entire Armée du Nord down on the Prussians?
If they simply retreat, Napoleon gains his political victory, galvanizes France, but most importantly preserves the flower of his army - something that a Waterloo victory may not have done. He could not afford to lose heavy cavalry horses, or most importantly the cream of his only mobile infantry.
Would such a thunder-stroke weaken the coalition?
The image shows how at most, only 2 Prussian Corps would be west of Namur by morning of June 15th facing overwhelming strength as the entire French army has advanced north of the Sambre.
I appreciate any opinions as this is a difficult scenario to simulate solo. I feel the Allies have to retreat or risk destruction - but the fact is historically they planned for a concentration along the Nivelles-Namur line and Wellington, understanding the political importance of Ghent/Brussels, tenaciously defended them despite the risks (and despite the claims by modern revisionists that Napoleon had no chance in 1815 - his enemies knew differently.) The King at Ghent was organizing significant royalist activity in France, including the spies in the ministry of War, as well as communications with Bourmont/others. Losing that would have been a blow to the Allied cause.
This image is based on one from Siborne's history of the campaign that is now in the public domain: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File
art_of_Belgium_
engraved_by_J._Kirkwood.jpg
What is not generally known (only 7 sources cover the French concentration in detail prior to June 15th) is that a far greater opportunity for Napoleon existed.
Napoleon planned for the invasion of Belgium to take place on June 14th, anniversary of Marengo. He planned for 3 columns, the left being I Corps and II Corps, the center being VI Corps and the Guard, and the right being III Corps at Philippeville and IV Corps at Mariembourg. The reserve cavalry would bivouac between the columns. Napoleon expected to easily seize the Nivelles-Namur road, for the allies to fall back, and he would seize Brussels by June 16th. He had proclamations already printed to distribute to the Belgium populace, and he had ordered Flemish speaking guides to be in the vanguard of the columns. Flemish is spoken predominantly north of Brussels, demonstrating again Napoleon's expectations.
Soult, for reasons unknown, mangled Napoleon's plans. On June 7th, Gérard's IV Corps recejived orders that left them a half-days march south (Rocroi) by June 15th, and then on June 12th, Soult removed the entire right column - moving IV and III Corps to Beaumont, and the VI Corps to Beaufort. Napoleon countermanded as much as he could, and the net result was IV Corps alone on the right column, from Florennes (north of Philippeville) to Mariembourg. The Center column was overloaded with III Corps, VI Corps, and the guard. Worse, Napoleon was forced to delay the campaign start to June 15th. Due to IV Corps' new positioning, its 14th division led by Bourmont was in the vanguard at Florennes, just 2 miles from the frontier, and 30 km from Namur, where Blücher had his HQ. On the night of the 14th, Bourmont's staff (possibly Clouet) gave the critical intelligence of the impending invasion to Gneisenau at 11pm (see Lettow-Vorbeck) and the Prussians began concentrating their army at Sombreffe a full 12 hours earlier than it would have had responding to the commencement of hostilities.
Had Napoleon chosen a different Major General, and had his concentration plans been followed, the Campaign in Belgium would have begun on June 14th. Bourmont/staff would have most likely not been able to provide actionable intelligence - though they may have later defected as Gordon/Gaugler/Laderiac did during the campaign. The French army would have seized the Nivelles-Namur road, and the Allied armies would have been successfully separated.
At this point, what happens?
Do Wellington/Blücher try to save Brussels? Can they coordinate south of Brussels?
Would Wellington retreat, and Blücher aggressively attack the rear of Napoleon's advance on Brussels? However, if that happens, does Napoleon bring the weight of the entire Armée du Nord down on the Prussians?
If they simply retreat, Napoleon gains his political victory, galvanizes France, but most importantly preserves the flower of his army - something that a Waterloo victory may not have done. He could not afford to lose heavy cavalry horses, or most importantly the cream of his only mobile infantry.
Would such a thunder-stroke weaken the coalition?
The image shows how at most, only 2 Prussian Corps would be west of Namur by morning of June 15th facing overwhelming strength as the entire French army has advanced north of the Sambre.
I appreciate any opinions as this is a difficult scenario to simulate solo. I feel the Allies have to retreat or risk destruction - but the fact is historically they planned for a concentration along the Nivelles-Namur line and Wellington, understanding the political importance of Ghent/Brussels, tenaciously defended them despite the risks (and despite the claims by modern revisionists that Napoleon had no chance in 1815 - his enemies knew differently.) The King at Ghent was organizing significant royalist activity in France, including the spies in the ministry of War, as well as communications with Bourmont/others. Losing that would have been a blow to the Allied cause.
This image is based on one from Siborne's history of the campaign that is now in the public domain: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File
engraved_by_J._Kirkwood.jpg