Napoleon chooses competent/loyal Major General in 1815 instead of Soult

Most "What-Ifs" for Napoleon in 1815 deal with either a victory at the Battle of Waterloo, or some choice of wing commanders instead of Ney/Grouchy.

What is not generally known (only 7 sources cover the French concentration in detail prior to June 15th) is that a far greater opportunity for Napoleon existed.

Napoleon planned for the invasion of Belgium to take place on June 14th, anniversary of Marengo. He planned for 3 columns, the left being I Corps and II Corps, the center being VI Corps and the Guard, and the right being III Corps at Philippeville and IV Corps at Mariembourg. The reserve cavalry would bivouac between the columns. Napoleon expected to easily seize the Nivelles-Namur road, for the allies to fall back, and he would seize Brussels by June 16th. He had proclamations already printed to distribute to the Belgium populace, and he had ordered Flemish speaking guides to be in the vanguard of the columns. Flemish is spoken predominantly north of Brussels, demonstrating again Napoleon's expectations.

Soult, for reasons unknown, mangled Napoleon's plans. On June 7th, Gérard's IV Corps recejived orders that left them a half-days march south (Rocroi) by June 15th, and then on June 12th, Soult removed the entire right column - moving IV and III Corps to Beaumont, and the VI Corps to Beaufort. Napoleon countermanded as much as he could, and the net result was IV Corps alone on the right column, from Florennes (north of Philippeville) to Mariembourg. The Center column was overloaded with III Corps, VI Corps, and the guard. Worse, Napoleon was forced to delay the campaign start to June 15th. Due to IV Corps' new positioning, its 14th division led by Bourmont was in the vanguard at Florennes, just 2 miles from the frontier, and 30 km from Namur, where Blücher had his HQ. On the night of the 14th, Bourmont's staff (possibly Clouet) gave the critical intelligence of the impending invasion to Gneisenau at 11pm (see Lettow-Vorbeck) and the Prussians began concentrating their army at Sombreffe a full 12 hours earlier than it would have had responding to the commencement of hostilities.

Had Napoleon chosen a different Major General, and had his concentration plans been followed, the Campaign in Belgium would have begun on June 14th. Bourmont/staff would have most likely not been able to provide actionable intelligence - though they may have later defected as Gordon/Gaugler/Laderiac did during the campaign. The French army would have seized the Nivelles-Namur road, and the Allied armies would have been successfully separated.

At this point, what happens?

Do Wellington/Blücher try to save Brussels? Can they coordinate south of Brussels?

Would Wellington retreat, and Blücher aggressively attack the rear of Napoleon's advance on Brussels? However, if that happens, does Napoleon bring the weight of the entire Armée du Nord down on the Prussians?

If they simply retreat, Napoleon gains his political victory, galvanizes France, but most importantly preserves the flower of his army - something that a Waterloo victory may not have done. He could not afford to lose heavy cavalry horses, or most importantly the cream of his only mobile infantry.

Would such a thunder-stroke weaken the coalition?

The image shows how at most, only 2 Prussian Corps would be west of Namur by morning of June 15th facing overwhelming strength as the entire French army has advanced north of the Sambre.

I appreciate any opinions as this is a difficult scenario to simulate solo. I feel the Allies have to retreat or risk destruction - but the fact is historically they planned for a concentration along the Nivelles-Namur line and Wellington, understanding the political importance of Ghent/Brussels, tenaciously defended them despite the risks (and despite the claims by modern revisionists that Napoleon had no chance in 1815 - his enemies knew differently.) The King at Ghent was organizing significant royalist activity in France, including the spies in the ministry of War, as well as communications with Bourmont/others. Losing that would have been a blow to the Allied cause.

This image is based on one from Siborne's history of the campaign that is now in the public domain: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:part_of_Belgium_
engraved_by_J._Kirkwood.jpg

WithoutSoult.jpg
 
The reason Soult mangled Napoleon's plans was that he hadn't done the job in twenty years. He was giving the sort of orders he would give as a field general himself, let the flunkies parse it and transmit it, forgetting that this time that part was his to play.

Too little time on the admin end, with the fatal addition that he had done it once, long ago with smaller armies, so he thought he knew what he was doing but was hopelessly out of touch with best practice as it had evolved and was too senior to listen to advice.

Davout would have been much better in the post, but there were at least three places Napoleon needed to put him and he opted for the wrong one.


Wellington had no intention of losing his lines of communication, but it would have been politically impossible to do a Corunna, so the moves that square the circle are to go back slowly, fight a rearguard action- Waterloo without Prussians, maybe- fight for Brussels but in practice be willing to lose it, play for time and reinforcement.

Blucher was the one willing to take risks for the coalition.
 
The make up of the marshalate during the hundred days is a great what if. Soult wasn't a bad general but was a poor staff officer, hence the problems you describe. Berthier was a genius staff officer, but Napoleon wouldn't trust him with 500 men. Have Berthier survive and remain enamoured with the Emperor and you can remove Soult as Chief of Staff, with its own knock on effects - Soult instead of Grouchy?

From your description, you are expecting a gain of twelve hours over OTL.This would allow Ney to seize Quatre Bras, but Wellington had already at that point identified the field at Mont St Jean as a key battlefield - he can concentrate there and still be reinforced by the Prussians - I don't think the Allies are split by this early move. While the great storm of 17th now doesn't soak the ground, Napoleon is outnumbered approximately 1.5 to 1, the Allies are prepared and can combine at Waterloo. It would be hard fought, but the same eventual outcome - Napoleon held by one of the forces while the other hits his flank
 
The make up of the marshalate during the hundred days is a great what if. Soult wasn't a bad general but was a poor staff officer, hence the problems you describe. Berthier was a genius staff officer, but Napoleon wouldn't trust him with 500 men. Have Berthier survive and remain enamoured with the Emperor and you can remove Soult as Chief of Staff, with its own knock on effects - Soult instead of Grouchy?

From your description, you are expecting a gain of twelve hours over OTL.This would allow Ney to seize Quatre Bras, but Wellington had already at that point identified the field at Mont St Jean as a key battlefield - he can concentrate there and still be reinforced by the Prussians - I don't think the Allies are split by this early move. While the great storm of 17th now doesn't soak the ground, Napoleon is outnumbered approximately 1.5 to 1, the Allies are prepared and can combine at Waterloo. It would be hard fought, but the same eventual outcome - Napoleon held by one of the forces while the other hits his flank

Had Wellington concentrated at Mont St. Jean, where would Blücher concentrated? If Napoleon immediately moves on Wellington, the Prussians are far to the east, too far to support, and Napoleon always planned for his right to shield his advance on Brussels. Unlike history, where Grouchy ended up in the Prussian wake, in this scenario, the right is already between - and the entire French army could not march up the Brussels road anyhow. The only benefit that Prussians receive is that we can assume responding to the actual invasion, Bülow would have received direct orders, and thus is not delayed.

If the Prussians try to hold the Mazy/Gembloux line, Napoleon turns on them and shields Wellington off, which would still be too far west and north.

This is what simulating the movements produces.... and this doesn't even consider that without the Namur-Nivelles road, communications are disrupted. How much will Wellington do? During the actual campaign, the allies were significantly coordinated. With a French light cavalry Corps shooting the gap, there is no guarantee of any communications.

Grouchy was the Reserve Cavalry commander, that wouldn't change - the concept of wing commanders developed late on the 15th early on the 16th. What had Ney not even arrived? This was not guaranteed. Had Davout acted as Major-General, as Berthier had both Minister of War and Major-General roles early in the period, then Soult's role is interesting - though he could have easily been ignored as the army/peers did not trust him.

I would say that Callatay, Lettow-Vorbeck, and other experts do not find any explanation in the rewritten orders of June 12th. It may be why Gourgaud/Bertrand and Mauduit suspected Soult of treason. Many thought that after Napoleon, Louis-Philippe would reign... and look what Soult became during the July monarchy!
 
The reason Soult mangled Napoleon's plans was that he hadn't done the job in twenty years. He was giving the sort of orders he would give as a field general himself, let the flunkies parse it and transmit it, forgetting that this time that part was his to play.

Too little time on the admin end, with the fatal addition that he had done it once, long ago with smaller armies, so he thought he knew what he was doing but was hopelessly out of touch with best practice as it had evolved and was too senior to listen to advice.

Davout would have been much better in the post, but there were at least three places Napoleon needed to put him and he opted for the wrong one.


Wellington had no intention of losing his lines of communication, but it would have been politically impossible to do a Corunna, so the moves that square the circle are to go back slowly, fight a rearguard action- Waterloo without Prussians, maybe- fight for Brussels but in practice be willing to lose it, play for time and reinforcement.

Blucher was the one willing to take risks for the coalition.

Ok - I like this thought, though I fear Wellington does not have sufficient strength to hold very well, but I see the long game. Mont St. Jean has a legendary reputation based on reality, but in this scenario, and with the Prussians now following in the French wake, Wellington knows he can't hold it against a force that is numerically superior to his - but he can certainly delay, and delay at the Forêt de Soignes, delay at Brussels, and unite with the Prussians north of Brussels.

This is what Napoleon said he feared, but I assumed that in this scenario, Wellington would have to retreat quickly. But, it would not take consistent communications to have each army retreat north, and away from Napoleon.

I will try to simulate this - but so many variables that demands a better vehicle. But I will try to see what forces could be brought to bear by both sides. Once the French are concentrated across the Sambre, the Brussels road will be a bottleneck while the Anglo-Dutch will be concentrating over a wide net.

I'll ask my German friends if they know enough to speculate on Blücher/Gneisenau reaction to sporadic communications with Wellington who is clearly falling back. On a boardgame with perfect intelligence, it would be attack attack attack! However, even though Napoleon seemed set on an advance on Brussels, without hindsight, I figure they have to respect Napoleon and not be too aggressive. The same terrain that aides Wellington's retreat aides Napoleon if he desired to swing east against aggressive Prussian action.

Thanks... I really find breaking free of the June 15th-18th Conventional Bowling alley to be more interesting that pondering the d'Erlon at Ligny what-if.
 
Had Wellington concentrated at Mont St. Jean, where would Blücher concentrated? If Napoleon immediately moves on Wellington, the Prussians are far to the east, too far to support, and Napoleon always planned for his right to shield his advance on Brussels. Unlike history, where Grouchy ended up in the Prussian wake, in this scenario, the right is already between - and the entire French army could not march up the Brussels road anyhow. The only benefit that Prussians receive is that we can assume responding to the actual invasion, Bülow would have received direct orders, and thus is not delayed.

If the Prussians try to hold the Mazy/Gembloux line, Napoleon turns on them and shields Wellington off, which would still be too far west and north.

This is what simulating the movements produces.... and this doesn't even consider that without the Namur-Nivelles road, communications are disrupted. How much will Wellington do? During the actual campaign, the allies were significantly coordinated. With a French light cavalry Corps shooting the gap, there is no guarantee of any communications.

Grouchy was the Reserve Cavalry commander, that wouldn't change - the concept of wing commanders developed late on the 15th early on the 16th. What had Ney not even arrived? This was not guaranteed. Had Davout acted as Major-General, as Berthier had both Minister of War and Major-General roles early in the period, then Soult's role is interesting - though he could have easily been ignored as the army/peers did not trust him.

I would say that Callatay, Lettow-Vorbeck, and other experts do not find any explanation in the rewritten orders of June 12th. It may be why Gourgaud/Bertrand and Mauduit suspected Soult of treason. Many thought that after Napoleon, Louis-Philippe would reign... and look what Soult became during the July monarchy!

Thanks, I wasn't aware wings and Ney were so late. I knew they were late, but not that close to the invasion. Im not near my books atm so can't answer on where the Prissians would concentrate, but assume that they could concentrate to reinforce Mont St Jean - that's only an assumption and could be wrong! I'm still not certain that an extra twelve hours gives such a benefit as to split the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies noting that communication continued through the battle on the 18th IOTL via courier.

If it does turn out as you suggest, Wellington will fall back on his base / Lines of communication, with delaying actions as necessary to allow the Prussians to join up. Napoleon needs to give either Allied element such a kicking as to knock them out and I think the Anglo-Dutch are more possible - the fractured nature of the army willakw it more difficult to reconstitute in any size if they can be cracked. Again, I'm not sure this can be done with a twelve hour head start over OTL.

To stand up for Soult, I firmly believe this was cock up not conspiracy - he was a terrible staff officer, Napoleon was poor at providing clear orders (hence why Berthier was vital) and between the two there was a major mix up.

Finally, Davout was kept in Paris to secure the city - he couldn't do that from campaign, and Soult as you say wasn't trusted to do it, nether was Ney... Unfortunately for Napoleon it left the most talented of his Marshals effectively on the bench
 
Thanks, I wasn't aware wings and Ney were so late. I knew they were late, but not that close to the invasion. Im not near my books atm so can't answer on where the Prissians would concentrate, but assume that they could concentrate to reinforce Mont St Jean - that's only an assumption and could be wrong! I'm still not certain that an extra twelve hours gives such a benefit as to split the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies noting that communication continued through the battle on the 18th IOTL via courier.

If it does turn out as you suggest, Wellington will fall back on his base / Lines of communication, with delaying actions as necessary to allow the Prussians to join up. Napoleon needs to give either Allied element such a kicking as to knock them out and I think the Anglo-Dutch are more possible - the fractured nature of the army willakw it more difficult to reconstitute in any size if they can be cracked. Again, I'm not sure this can be done with a twelve hour head start over OTL.

To stand up for Soult, I firmly believe this was cock up not conspiracy - he was a terrible staff officer, Napoleon was poor at providing clear orders (hence why Berthier was vital) and between the two there was a major mix up.

Finally, Davout was kept in Paris to secure the city - he couldn't do that from campaign, and Soult as you say wasn't trusted to do it, nether was Ney... Unfortunately for Napoleon it left the most talented of his Marshals effectively on the bench

Davout himself said, paraphrasing, that Paris did not matter if Napoleon lost. The campaign was only days from Paris.

What evidence exists that Soult was a terrible staff officer? It is repeated, without substantiation, in hundreds of publications. His hard work (Guizot described him as indefatigable 20 years after Waterloo) was legendary.

His rewriting of orders was precise and executed to perfection.

Here is Napoleon's message to Soult on June 3rd:
Give me a plan of movement for the Corps of Général Gérard or
Corps of the Moselle, concealing it as much as possible from the enemy,
because this corps is to march on Philippeville. It should arrive there
on the 12th, marching as quickly as possible. Inform me about who
will then command at Metz and Nancy. You will give the order at
once to suspend the communications, and all of the posts, Thionville,
Longwy, Metz, etc. must be strengthened.

Yet the June 5th order Soult sent ordered Gérard to march to Rocroi in 7 stages and arrive by June 13th. That is both a day later and a day's march further south.

As with the inexplicable rewriting of the June 10th order (see Callatay, Lettow-Vorbeck, de Wit for their collective astonishment), the above is not easily explained by competence. It is an absolute change to Napoleon's clear intent.

On June 17th and June 18th, the Prussians were massed around Wavre communicating due west with Wellington. In the scenario outlined, there is at least a days march between the Prussians and Wavre. Consider that has the French march north, the right flank will have the benefit of the Dyle all the way to Louvain.

The initial concentration orders for the Prussians on an advance via Charleroi would have been I Corps to fall back on Fleurus/Sombreffe, II Corps to Mazy, III Corps to Namur (they begin south/east of the Meuse) and IV Corps to Hanut. Those 12 hours give French absolute tempo against the Prussians
 
The Campaign of Belgium wasn't its invasion, it was about taking control of the whole country (the France that was left to Louis XVIII in 1814 had Savoy, Nice and Belgium) against the return of the Coalition.
This being said, i haven't read all the thread.
 
The Campaign of Belgium wasn't its invasion, it was about taking control of the whole country (the France that was left to Louis XVIII in 1814 had Savoy, Nice and Belgium) against the return of the Coalition.
This being said, i haven't read all the thread.

Actually Belgium or rather the Southern Netherlands wasn't French any more after 1814. It would either return to Austria or be united with the Northern Netherlands.
They did control bits of Belgium, which after 1815 would go the kingdom of the United Netherlands instead. France was also only allowed to keep a share of Savoy, not all of it.
 
Actually Belgium or rather the Southern Netherlands wasn't French any more after 1814. It would either return to Austria or be united with the Northern Netherlands.
They did control bits of Belgium, which after 1815 would go the kingdom of the United Netherlands instead. France was also only allowed to keep a share of Savoy, not all of it.
Savoy is here counted as the Present-Day Savoie and Haute-Savoie départements.
The map in my history textbook (a French 2nde textbook) shows 1814 France still had all of Belgium and the Savoyard départements. Plus the county of Nice. Basically present-day France + Belgium.
 
The map in my history textbook (a French 2nde textbook) shows 1814 France still had all of Belgium and the Savoyard départements. Plus the county of Nice. Basically present-day France + Belgium.

Then they got it wrong (how surprising, French textbooks have their lot of crappy maps). France after the First Treaty of Paris actually looked like this : some parts of Savoy and Belgium, but certainly not all of these.

I'd rather advise you the Atlas de l'Empire napoléonien, 1799-1815, edited by Autrement. They usually make a much more precise work.
 
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