Napoleon as a nation-builder instead if marching on Moscow

Could Napoleon have been more successful if he had, instead of going to Moscow, decided on nation-building in Eastern Europe. What if he installed a White Russian national govt in Minsk and set up the Napoleon Code, freed the Jews (which he had done elsewhere such as the Ghetto of Rome), and encouraged nationalism in future Belarus, did the same in Lithuania, then as winter approached moved to Kiev and encouraged Ruthenian/Little Russian/Ukrainian nationalism etc and wintered near the Black Sea. Then when campaign season resumed see him help these states continue to consolidate and expand as buffers to Russia, and do the same with Lavonia and Estonia, and maybe even lend a hand in Finland rebelling against Sweden if the Swedes refuse to support him, or even making peace with the Russians and giving them Estonia back and a free hand in Finland against Sweden in return for peace.
At all possible or a better alternative for Napoleon?
 
I always wanted this idea of a smarter Napoleon. He'd have done far better rather than just plunging into Russia headfirst.
 
Well, it had worked so well before! You would need a good reason for him to actually do that. But yes, the butterflies would certainly be interesting, even if he's actually defeated in the end.
 
By the time napoleon invaded Russia Russia and Sweden had already gone to war with each other back in 1809 which saw Russia take Finland from Sweden
 

tenthring

Banned
Napoleon was already setting his relatives up as the petty despots of all Europe. He had gone into Spain and conquered his ally. The guy was in terminal egomaniac phase by then.
 
It's important to remember 3 things:

1) at no point was Napoleon's intent to conquer or annex Russia.
2) he didn't even plan to go into Russia proper, his intention was to force a decisive battle in NE Poland/Lithuania or at worst Belarus, and the objective was to force Akeksander to not violate the treaty he'd agreed to the last time Napoleon had fought a decisive battle against him.

Which brings me to 3) re: his terminal egomania, you need to remember the pattern;

1) France's UN-monarchy constitutes existential threat to surrounding states, who almost universally support it's terminal nation.
2) A surrounded Napoleon fights to prevent 1, somehow wins, and treaties are agreed upon.
3) As soon as they can, usually meaning as soon as Britain can fund enough of them to again surround France with a Coalition, the monarchies violate the treaties and invade/try to invade France.
4) repeat steps 2/3 ad infinitum.

It had become that, at least so long as he could not invade Britain and therefore break their bank, there was never going to be a permanent peace. The existence of France itself was a constant threat to monarchies worried it would inspire similar movements in their nations. In many cases it did. So what, exactly, was Napoleon supposed to do? His thinking was always along the lines of problem-solving, and IMO his coronation and appointment of familial potentates was simply one way to try and resolve the inherent casus belli his government represented to its neighbours while trying to preserve what he thought were the essentials of the revolution.

We see that in the brief periods of peace his victories afforded, unlike a Hitler or Alexander or w/e with whom he is concerned, he did not bide his time building up the military and when ready, attack. Rather he'd immediately focus his attention on domestic concerns like the Civil Code, sanitation, education, law, etc. Especially towards the end, he was exhausted with war...he knew his talent at war was the key to his power and France's security, but he absolutely did not want war, nor fought for conquest. He'd fight in defense, to force peace. He was not annexing huge swaths of land or w/e.

Portrayed as a war-monger by his enemies, it's interesting to note how many times he actually declared war rather than the reverse.

His Russian campaign was a failure along many lines...IMO most notably he fell victim to strategic tunnel vision once the Russians slipped his grasp early on (horrible subordinate fuck-up, btw) and I think Borodino is by far his...laziest? Most brutal? Most selfish? Most exhausted?...worst battle ever by far. But the 2 failures he's most often credited with, ie wanting to vaingloriously conquer Russia and fighting the Russian winter are misplaced. He wanted Aleksander to abide by their alliance/treaty re:Continental system, not French Russia, and there was no precedent for the scorched earth Russian withdrawal that took place...it wasn't even a Russian strategy, it kinda evolved as it went along, amidst much argument in the Russian high command. He maybe stayed in Moscow too long, too. That'scat least where he later thinks his mistake was made. And btw, the Russian summer had about as much effect as the winter.

In my own view it was not one moment...it was that once his decisive battle was avoided early on, he kept pushing for it, thinking maybe today, maybe tomorrow. It was reasonable to expect that at some point the czar would have to fight or lose political agency...and in fact that proved true. But by then I think he'd acquired tunnel vision and wasn't himself. Some of his generals did advocate turning back to Vilnius or his planned winter quarters at Smolensk, so it wasn't impossible to see.
 
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The existence of France itself was a constant threat to monarchies worried it would inspire similar movements in their nations. In many cases it did..

When exactly?

The only uprisings I know of between 1799 and 1815 - Haiti, Spain, Tyrol - were against Napoleon, not for him.



Portrayed as a war-monger by his enemies, it's interesting to note how many times he actually declared war rather than the reverse.

When did Spain declare war on him?


But the 2 failures he's most often credited with, ie wanting to vaingloriously conquer Russia and fighting the Russian winter are misplaced. He wanted Aleksander to abide by their alliance/treaty re:Continental system, not French Russia.

So he didn't want to annex Russia, just to ruin its economy by cutting off its foreign trade (ships stores were Russia's principal export, and the RN by far its biggest customer), and the Tsar was supposed to be OK with that?

BTW, the Grand Armee set off into Russia wearing thousands of boots and greatcoats smuggled in from Britain. So if breaking the Continental System was a ground for war, then in strict logic Napoleon should also have declared war on himself<g>. Britain was the big manufacturer of the day, and it just wasn't possible to cut yourself off from it.



In my own view it was not one moment...it was that once his decisive battle was avoided early on, he kept pushing for it, thinking maybe today, maybe tomorrow. It was reasonable to expect that at some point the czar would have to fight or lose political agency...and in fact that proved true. But by then I think he'd acquired tunnel vision and wasn't himself. Some of his generals did advocate turning back to Vilnius or his planned winter quarters at Smolensk, so it wasn't impossible to see.

And then what?

If Napoleon just sits down in one place, the Russian can lay waste the land all around it, and use cavalry to kill or capture French foraging parties, so that he must either keep moving or condemn his army to slow starvation.

BTW hadn't he already lost quite a lot of his men and horses by the time he got to Smolensk, never mind Moscow?
 
James XI presents something of an apology for Napoleon, but its a well argued one. And its true -and noted by the Durants- that after Napoleon took power it was his opponents who first attacked him or his allies in just about all his wars.

Napoleon was a gambler as well as a problem solver, its how he got to the height of his power in the first place. After 1807, or at the latest 1810, what was needed was a purely defensive strategy. Use the resources gained from controlling the core of Western Europe to keep fending off attacks until its your enemies that grow tired and make peace. Britain on its island is a problem, but after awhile maybe the continental countries realize that taking the British money just leads to wars where their countries get devastated and start tuning them out.

As noted elsewhere on the board, something like this really required Napoleon dying around 1808 and someone line Joseph (Lucien or Louis, or even Jerome would be better, but it could still probably work with Joseph) succeeding him.

This offers some light on "what if Alexander the Great had lived longer" timelines, because as contemporaries of Napoleon noted there were alot of similarities between Napoleon and Alexander, great generals, highly intelligent (and both quite well educated), lots of energy, very aggressive problem solvers who had a tendency to gamble. Eventually Alexander would have over-extended his empire if he had lived as many years as Napoleon lived.
 
This offers some light on "what if Alexander the Great had lived longer" timelines, because as contemporaries of Napoleon noted there were alot of similarities between Napoleon and Alexander, great generals, highly intelligent (and both quite well educated), lots of energy, very aggressive problem solvers who had a tendency to gamble. Eventually Alexander would have over-extended his empire if he had lived as many years as Napoleon lived.


With the crucial difference that Alexander knocked out his principal opponent first, before looking around for new worlds to conquer. Napoleon didn't.

With Persia conquered (and the invasion of India called off [1] there was little or nothing left with which Alexander couldn't cope. Rome was still a tiny city-state, and even Carthage was a second-class power compared with Persia. He might have had to spend a couple of years besieging it, but the final outcome would never have been in doubt.

Napoleon, OTOH, flitted from one enemy to another without ever really eliminating any of them, and even sometimes wantonly picking fights with countries like Spain which weren't his enemies at all, whilst his most important enemy, Britain, lay eternally beyond his reach. If he's got a classical analogue, imho it was Pyrrhus rather than Alexander.


[1] Alexander, for all his power, never forgot that he was the creation of the Macedonian army and could not ignore its views. So he could defer to his soldiers' wishes and turn back from India while still retaining his crown. One wonders how European history might have gone had the Grand Armee been able and willing to turn round at the Niemen and say "OK, that's far enough" to Napoleon.
 
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tenthring

Banned
The Continental System was just a bad idea. We know the stated goal, but was there ever any realistic chance of it working? People like, and often need to, trade. It's practically impossible to avoid.

If Napoleon hadn't tried the Continental system, or had cut his losses when it was obvious invading everyone in sight was the only way to enforce it, then eventually either Britain would get tired of war or the continental powers would get tired of fighting Napoleon even if the British were offering a sack of gold.
 
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