There's something that nobody is touching on here; Napoleon's psychological make-up. He had several opportunities to get what he wanted either through diplomatic channels or dynastic marriage, but didn't take them. The reason for this was because once he started the war, he didn't know how to stop and the reason for that was because he was psychologically incapable of thinking that he could get what he wanted through any other means than war.
As Faeelin says, we have little cear proof. It seems that in his negotiations after Bautzen, Napoleon had every intention of making peace (as did Metternich). Russia and Prussia turned the whole thing into a farce by sending along a commited war-party member and German nationalist, and a commited war-party member and renegade Frenchman, and the Britain turned up late with nothing but bags of money. My Bautzen idea is to put Russia and Prussia in no position to be so flippant, and everybody was pretty worried after Bautzen. If Prussia insisted on defending Berlin, the allies could be split, and Austria would likely shuffle back in France's direction.
I wouldn't forget that the next Emperor of France will be raised by a Habsburg mother as something Metternich was calculating.
Also, while people were worried about France's role in the balance of power, this doesn't mean people were not concerned with Britain. A French Antwerp would help them build a navy powerful enough to at least menace Britain, balancing out that power as well.
Mutual distrust indeed. Good points.
Well actually no... Saxony is not more important than Poland... but it is the Seat of the Wettins, and they were one of the last to leave Nappy's side so I can't see Saxony completely dissappearing under any circumstance if THE AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED...Mind you thats probably more because they had no choice rather than design of their own.
As I said, Napoleon knew he was going to have to sell Poland the moment Prussia joined the war (and hadn't been overly averse to the idea in 1811 either), so I really can't see him, if he's somehow in a temperament to accept that Coalition's overtures, making any fuss about what goes on on the other side of the Rhine. It's not like it's a French strategic interest, since all the German princes are going under the Austro-Prussian umbrella anyway (this was Metternich's schene: Austria, with a Prussian accomplice, dominating "Central Europe", that is Germany, Italy, and the Danube basin while Russia, France, and Britain somehow balanced eachother out).
and on that, as stated to get the agreement, yes Russia would make noise under the suppositions of OTL so that agreement is not possible hence i stated that Alexander would have to be willing to let the Prussians go hang.
I'm not really following. You're saying for peace to be made in 1814, Russia has to ditch Prussia? I simply don't see why. Even if Prussia comes off the worse, which is pretty likely, Russia isn't going to be laughing with glee.
having Napoleon pursue his advantage after Bautzen I suppose would give that impetus, but it makes it less likely that Saxony itself is going to be deminished. after having suffered so much as an ally of Napoleon. \however as \isaid here...NAPOLEON HAS TO BE WILLING TO ADJUST AS WELL...
That means sacrificing at least a part Saxony to Prussian aspirations to get the treaty...
Prussia may not be in much position to demand anything. Napoleon was keen to make peace with Russia but didn't want to make concessions to Prussia as he thought her a traitor, not to mention simply much the weaker of the pair. France and Russia making peace at the expense of everybody else was the greatest fear of... well, everybody else, and advocated by quite a few Russian generals who weren't keen to go gallavanting over Europe and thought that the DoW was price enough for a defensive war. And Berlin may be looking pretty precarious...
so perhaps...Prussia just gets the northern half of Saxony as OTL or, but not both, the east bank of the Rhine (Westphalia/Berg). So if the Prussians opt for the northern terr. Probably would be their choice anyways given its proximity to the core terr., then Saxony can have the east bank as compensation for losing the personal union with Poland and the northern terr.
the allies would probably prefer Prussia on that east bank rather then Saxony of course and the French would probably prefer the Saxons if they have to give direct/indirect control up to a German Prince. As to the Saxons themselves...there probably just wishing for the damn thing to end as soon as possible with their own losses minimised as much as possible.
As I said, Saxony imay not loose anything if Napoleon goes on after Bautzen, but I don't see why any concessions they do make have to be "compensated" at the expense of Napoleon's other sattelites. They weren't that special.
Any thoughts frrom anyone on what France would keep overseas if anything...or would I be correct that it gets stripped and given over to the British and the maritime allies.
Fr. Guiana can go to Portugal (Brasil really) Reunion ( ile de Bourbon) to the Dutch along with the Fr. post at Goree in West Africa. Saint Louis and the W Afr coast northwards to Spain. Enclaves and posts at Albreda and Assinie to the British...
Fr. India split between the British, Portuguese and Dutch.
Sweden does get Guadeloupe and the Fr. dependencies to the north in the Leeward Islands. which leaves Martinique probably Br. with say St. Lucia going to Spain....or better yet Tobago goes to Spain and Trinidad is returned, with Britain keeping St. Lucia as OTL and gains Martinique instead.
That's an interesting question. If France and Russia make peace, Britain will have to come to the table eventually, I should think, but to be honest I'm really not sure what form a deal would take.
Mike, a good point but it is also true that by 1815 Napoleon realized he was no longer the commander he had once been so perhaps, if he takes the deal and it holds just a few years, Napoleon by 1818 or 1820 might realize he just isn't up for the campaigns of his youth and adapt.
Indeed, 1812 Napoleon was already painfully aware that he wasn't 1805 Napoleon, and grumbling about it, to. And I agree with Faeelin: Napoleon is oft-underrated in many resects. And of course, although he wasn't his young self in 1814, he still pulled off the Six Days.