For an argument that Najibullah's regime could have survived *even after 1989* and the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops see https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2009-12-10/soviet-victory-never-was?page=show
Some excerpts:
"Could the Soviet Union have won its war in Afghanistan? Today, the
victory of the anti-Soviet mujahideen seems preordained as part of the
West's ultimate triumph in the Cold War. To suggest that an alternative
outcome was possible -- and that the United States has something to learn
from the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan -- may be controversial.
But to avoid being similarly frustrated by the infamous 'graveyard of
empires,' U.S. military planners would be wise to study how the Soviet
Union nearly emerged triumphant from its decade-long war."
Gvosdev notes that many Westerners expected Najibullah's regime to collapse
almost immediately after the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops
in February 1989.
"This did not happen. The regime led by Mohammad Najibullah, whom Moscow
installed as president in 1987, remained in control of the country. For a
moment, it appeared as if the Kremlin had successfully left in power an
Afghan government and army that could withstand the Soviet withdrawal.
"The Najibullah government was able to survive because Najibullah
recognized the futility of the earlier Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.
Afghans, he knew, would not fight and die for the Soviet Union. But, he
realized, Afghans could be co-opted to work with the government to defend
local and clan interests. Najibullah allowed regional leaders -- and, in
some cases, former mujahideen commanders -- to form their own militias
and, with mixed results, to join the regular army. The most successful of
these was the Uzbek militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, which
formed the 53rd infantry division of the Afghan army.
"The departure of Soviet troops -- 'the foreigners' -- weakened ties among
various mujahideen factions. Najibullah's government used long-standing
rivalries, along with selective and generous bribery, to drive wedges
between militant groups and then take advantage of the fighting that broke
out as a result. At the same time, Najibullah received weaponry, food, and
fuel from the Soviets, which gave his forces a significant advantage in
terms of battlefield firepower and resources. The Afghan military flew the
latest Soviet aircraft and had hundreds of Soviet-made Scud missiles in
its arsenal.
"The government in Kabul also dropped many of the more radical social-
engineering programs previously championed by the Afghan communist
leadership. It moved away from Marxist ideology and embraced Islam as the
state religion, making an effort to put many of the country's mullahs on
the government payroll.
"Finally, Najibullah constructed a nationwide patronage network to
dispense the government largesse provided by the Soviet Union. In
particular, he kept open the Salang Road -- a critical supply route
linking Kabul with the country's south -- by striking a series of deals
with local villages and elders, who agreed to prevent mujahideen from
mounting attacks on supply lines in exchange for a percentage of the goods
flowing from the Soviet Union.
"In short, Najibullah relied on time-honored practices of Afghan
statecraft. He resembled a communist version of Mohammad Nadir Shah, who
had ruled the country after the overthrow of King Amanullah Khan in 1929.
Both the shah and Najibullah pushed for quiet modernization rather than
reform from above, placated local interests while using divide-and-rule
techniques to break up the opposition, and focused on strengthening the
state's army and security services.
"The Najibullah regime demonstrated its resilience during the ill-advised
mujahideen assault on the southern city of Jalalabad in March 1989.
Although Pakistani and U.S. military advisers were convinced that much of
the Afghan army would defect and the Najibullah government would quickly
fold, the mujahideen overestimated their own strength and were forced to
retreat. Inflated hopes of success meant the loss rocked the alliance of
anti-Najibullah forces; meanwhile, morale inside the government
skyrocketed, and Najibullah's efforts to convince local leaders to back
his rule began to bear greater fruit..."
Why then did Najibullah ultimately fail? Gvosdev lists three reasons.
First, Pakistan was unalterably opposed to him. "[N]o government in
Kabul is safe without Islamabad's express agreement. As head of the Afghan
secret police in the early 1980s, Najibullah sponsored attempts to subvert
the Pakistani government and tried to foment a rebellion in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. Although Pakistani officials had signaled that
they might allow some members of the communist regime in an Afghan
coalition government, they were completely opposed to Najibullah, a
potentially threatening a figure, remaining in power..."
Second, Pakistani intelligence "found a vulnerability at the heart of
Najibullah's rule: in March 1990, Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai tried
to overthrow Najibullah in cooperation with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whom
Pakistan preferred as the country's leader. The coup failed -- but it
spooked Najibullah, who began to distrust anyone outside of his immediate
circle. Non-Pashtun figures such as Dostum began to fear that they were
vulnerable and could be eliminated."
Third, "in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, taking down with it
the gravy train that had enabled Najibullah to buy loyalties across the
country. A series of defections followed, most notably that of Dostum,
who, in the spring of 1992, joined forces with Ahmed Shah Masoud in an
effort to block a Hekmatyar victory. These shifts in allegiance -- not
superior tactics or greater popular appeal of the mujahideen -- ultimately
brought down Najibullah's government."
So is there any way to save Najibullah? Probably the hostility of Pakistan can't be changed. OTOH, perhaps Tanai's coup attempt could have been avoided; it seems to have been partially motivated by Tanai's belief that Najibullah was favoring his own Parcham faction of the ruling party over Tanai's Khalq faction, so perhaps if Najibullah had been more generous to the Khalq, Tanai would not have attempted the coup. And finally of course we come to the question of whether the Soviet Union could have survived. However, instead of debating that last question again (it has been discussed several times here) I'd like to raise a different one: Even if the USSR had to come to an end in 1991, is it not conceivable that both Russia and the newly independent central Asian republics could *still* give aid to Najibullah, allowing him to survive? They might do so in the fear that a mujahideen victory will encourage Islamists in their own countries. (Of course one problem with this is that when we think "Islamists" we think of the Taliban, who did not yet exist in 1991. Yet that religious extremists might wind up on top if Najibullah fell was foreseeable at least as a possibility even in 1991.) Economic reasons? Yes, Russia was suffering economically, but aid to Najibullah would not have been that big a percentage of Russia's GDP. Anti-communism? If that mattered, Najibullah had already changed the title of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to the Homeland Party and abandoned the party's former Marxist ideology. Does anyone know whether the US made a cutoff of aid to Najibullah a precondition for US aid to Russia?
(I know there's another thread here about stabilizing Communist rule in Afghanistan, but this is a little bit different--it is basically about the survival of Najibullah as a *post*-Communist, not about making Marxism-Leninism acceptable to Afghans.)
Some excerpts:
"Could the Soviet Union have won its war in Afghanistan? Today, the
victory of the anti-Soviet mujahideen seems preordained as part of the
West's ultimate triumph in the Cold War. To suggest that an alternative
outcome was possible -- and that the United States has something to learn
from the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan -- may be controversial.
But to avoid being similarly frustrated by the infamous 'graveyard of
empires,' U.S. military planners would be wise to study how the Soviet
Union nearly emerged triumphant from its decade-long war."
Gvosdev notes that many Westerners expected Najibullah's regime to collapse
almost immediately after the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops
in February 1989.
"This did not happen. The regime led by Mohammad Najibullah, whom Moscow
installed as president in 1987, remained in control of the country. For a
moment, it appeared as if the Kremlin had successfully left in power an
Afghan government and army that could withstand the Soviet withdrawal.
"The Najibullah government was able to survive because Najibullah
recognized the futility of the earlier Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.
Afghans, he knew, would not fight and die for the Soviet Union. But, he
realized, Afghans could be co-opted to work with the government to defend
local and clan interests. Najibullah allowed regional leaders -- and, in
some cases, former mujahideen commanders -- to form their own militias
and, with mixed results, to join the regular army. The most successful of
these was the Uzbek militia led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, which
formed the 53rd infantry division of the Afghan army.
"The departure of Soviet troops -- 'the foreigners' -- weakened ties among
various mujahideen factions. Najibullah's government used long-standing
rivalries, along with selective and generous bribery, to drive wedges
between militant groups and then take advantage of the fighting that broke
out as a result. At the same time, Najibullah received weaponry, food, and
fuel from the Soviets, which gave his forces a significant advantage in
terms of battlefield firepower and resources. The Afghan military flew the
latest Soviet aircraft and had hundreds of Soviet-made Scud missiles in
its arsenal.
"The government in Kabul also dropped many of the more radical social-
engineering programs previously championed by the Afghan communist
leadership. It moved away from Marxist ideology and embraced Islam as the
state religion, making an effort to put many of the country's mullahs on
the government payroll.
"Finally, Najibullah constructed a nationwide patronage network to
dispense the government largesse provided by the Soviet Union. In
particular, he kept open the Salang Road -- a critical supply route
linking Kabul with the country's south -- by striking a series of deals
with local villages and elders, who agreed to prevent mujahideen from
mounting attacks on supply lines in exchange for a percentage of the goods
flowing from the Soviet Union.
"In short, Najibullah relied on time-honored practices of Afghan
statecraft. He resembled a communist version of Mohammad Nadir Shah, who
had ruled the country after the overthrow of King Amanullah Khan in 1929.
Both the shah and Najibullah pushed for quiet modernization rather than
reform from above, placated local interests while using divide-and-rule
techniques to break up the opposition, and focused on strengthening the
state's army and security services.
"The Najibullah regime demonstrated its resilience during the ill-advised
mujahideen assault on the southern city of Jalalabad in March 1989.
Although Pakistani and U.S. military advisers were convinced that much of
the Afghan army would defect and the Najibullah government would quickly
fold, the mujahideen overestimated their own strength and were forced to
retreat. Inflated hopes of success meant the loss rocked the alliance of
anti-Najibullah forces; meanwhile, morale inside the government
skyrocketed, and Najibullah's efforts to convince local leaders to back
his rule began to bear greater fruit..."
Why then did Najibullah ultimately fail? Gvosdev lists three reasons.
First, Pakistan was unalterably opposed to him. "[N]o government in
Kabul is safe without Islamabad's express agreement. As head of the Afghan
secret police in the early 1980s, Najibullah sponsored attempts to subvert
the Pakistani government and tried to foment a rebellion in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. Although Pakistani officials had signaled that
they might allow some members of the communist regime in an Afghan
coalition government, they were completely opposed to Najibullah, a
potentially threatening a figure, remaining in power..."
Second, Pakistani intelligence "found a vulnerability at the heart of
Najibullah's rule: in March 1990, Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tanai tried
to overthrow Najibullah in cooperation with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whom
Pakistan preferred as the country's leader. The coup failed -- but it
spooked Najibullah, who began to distrust anyone outside of his immediate
circle. Non-Pashtun figures such as Dostum began to fear that they were
vulnerable and could be eliminated."
Third, "in December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, taking down with it
the gravy train that had enabled Najibullah to buy loyalties across the
country. A series of defections followed, most notably that of Dostum,
who, in the spring of 1992, joined forces with Ahmed Shah Masoud in an
effort to block a Hekmatyar victory. These shifts in allegiance -- not
superior tactics or greater popular appeal of the mujahideen -- ultimately
brought down Najibullah's government."
So is there any way to save Najibullah? Probably the hostility of Pakistan can't be changed. OTOH, perhaps Tanai's coup attempt could have been avoided; it seems to have been partially motivated by Tanai's belief that Najibullah was favoring his own Parcham faction of the ruling party over Tanai's Khalq faction, so perhaps if Najibullah had been more generous to the Khalq, Tanai would not have attempted the coup. And finally of course we come to the question of whether the Soviet Union could have survived. However, instead of debating that last question again (it has been discussed several times here) I'd like to raise a different one: Even if the USSR had to come to an end in 1991, is it not conceivable that both Russia and the newly independent central Asian republics could *still* give aid to Najibullah, allowing him to survive? They might do so in the fear that a mujahideen victory will encourage Islamists in their own countries. (Of course one problem with this is that when we think "Islamists" we think of the Taliban, who did not yet exist in 1991. Yet that religious extremists might wind up on top if Najibullah fell was foreseeable at least as a possibility even in 1991.) Economic reasons? Yes, Russia was suffering economically, but aid to Najibullah would not have been that big a percentage of Russia's GDP. Anti-communism? If that mattered, Najibullah had already changed the title of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to the Homeland Party and abandoned the party's former Marxist ideology. Does anyone know whether the US made a cutoff of aid to Najibullah a precondition for US aid to Russia?
(I know there's another thread here about stabilizing Communist rule in Afghanistan, but this is a little bit different--it is basically about the survival of Najibullah as a *post*-Communist, not about making Marxism-Leninism acceptable to Afghans.)