While there was a disinformation campaign along these lines conducted by the Germans, it isn't the only reason people point to a possible Soviet pre-emptive strike. Meltyukhov for example was drawing heavily on Soviet era sources rather than German sources. Thanks to the idiotic ravings of Vladimir Rezun aka Viktor Suvorov, it's hard get people to discuss the topic any more.This is a persistent one. Am I wrong it was actually fabricated by Heidirch & his boys to justify Germany's attack?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin's_Missed_Chance
From my perspective:
- Stalin didn't trust Hitler, but he thought/hoped that he would be stuck fighting in the West for a long time. He had remarked that he thought that it would be the allies hanging him out to dry. Had he figured out this was not to be the case, I think it's fair to assume he would realise he was last man standing, and fight accordingly.
- Soviet military doctrine was offensive in nature. There was little training for the defensive, and it didn't feature heavily in the manuals in use by the military. Offensive action was seen as a reasonable counter to an opposing offensive... which if you think about the Russian Civil War, fits neatly with the Soviet experience.
- The Soviet army was clearly deployed too far forward in 1941 for a strictly defensive strategy.
- It is believed that Zhukov presented a plan in May 1941 for a pre-emptive strike.
- Stalin's reluctance to prepare for war when all signs pointed to Barbarossa becomes more explicable if you consider the plan was to attack, rather than defend. Aside from his distrust of the sources around him, Stalin would be hesitant to commit to an offensive war against a powerful opponent unless he was completely without doubt. That he probably was hoping for Hitler to stay facing West for a bit longer so that the Red Army could finish regrouping/rearming injected a certain amount of wishful thinking.
Admittedly the evidence is pretty thin and I'm speculating heavily... but this is AH.
What do I think would have happened? I envisage a sort of macro-scale Battle of Moscow but inverted. The Soviets make significant headway (German ill preparation replacing the virtual collapse of the Red Army) but attrition starts to ramp up when the objective is in sight, quite possibly forcing a pause. At this stage the Wehrmacht unleash a counter attack with previously uncommitted reserves, pushing the line back but probably not all the way back. 1941 ends with both sides unsure where the next blow will fall, and things very much up in the air.
Where it might benefit the Soviets is that all of this happened in someone elses backward this time. So fewer civilian casualties, little industrial dislocation and a less critical strategic situation all round. The war would might end a little bit earlier, but not by say a whole year. German supply lines would be a lot better in this scenario and would be fighting for home much sooner without the attrition of fighting for years in the depths of the Soviet Union. The immediacy of the threat might even cause the Nazi leadership to see the situation is serious sooner, so perhaps you see some Speer-like reforms for German industry earlier in the piece.