If the RAF don't got no radar , they are toast in BoB , as are the RN toast in Channel. As it was, it was only the Radar that allowed RAF 'Ground Controlled Intercept' to occur ,thus avoiding costly CAP missions that would have cut the available fighter force at least in half. With ½ the RAF fighter force you get ½ the kills so the Germans average 2:1 kill ratio through the start of BoB. There will be no 'big wing', if there is not a hour's warning through radar, to build up such a wing, thus no shift from 1:1 to 2:1 in the RAF favor. Instead as the RAF fighter losses mount the Luftwaffe kill ratio would climb above 2:1 in their favor.
As it was ,after just one week of Stuka bombings at Dunkirk in 'Operation Dynamo', at most only 1/3 of the RN destroyers were still operational.... and that was with just 200 Stuka and the beginning effects of ‘fatigue’ from continuous sortie, was just starting to kicking in.
Over a ten day period around ‘Operation Dynamo’, the RN/Allies lost 23 Destroyers crippled or sunk and another 22 damaged and out of operations for at least a week. In addition they lost 42 trawlers/MS/Steamers crippled or sunk and another 16 damage. All from only 200 Stuka. The RAF fought to protect their fleet but lost 177 planes to the Germans loss of only 132 planes.
In the actual Sealion plan , the invasion was to be launched only after 8-10 days of bombing of RN fleets and ports. Given how freely the Luftwaffe pushed such deadlines around in the actual BoB, its likely the same would occur with Sealion. Since it took 3-4 weeks to actually assemble the Wehrmacht barge fleet, there should be time for 3-4 weeks of aerial bombardment of the RN fleets & Ports . Precious few operational RN warships SHould be left in the channel by the end of this phase. In fact they probably would have abandoned ‘The Channel’ to the Germans.
Otherwise the Luftwaffe could easily have more than tripled those 'Dunkirk' figures, due to the 3-4 weeks of dive bombing from 300 Stuka on channel targets . That could translate into 225-300 Minesweepers/Armed Trawlers/Destroyers sunk or crippled [gone for months] & another 58 damaged and out of operations for a week. Out of a force of 640 , that’s about ½ of the entire operational ‘anti invasion fleet’ covering the entire UK coast lines. If the RN dash the remaining 280-340 Armed trawlers/Minesweepers/Destroyers to the Channel , then operation "Autumn Journey" could easily have been turned from a faint, into a flanking invasion, since there would be nothing to stop them
If they do try to rush the channel, they still have to cut through the 'English Channel mine barrier' , which could never really be swept, since only 1/3 of the reserved mines would have been deployed in multiple barriers with special designed ‘EMG tidal mines 30-40m apart [Gezeitenmine]’. These would not be easy to sweep since they rose and fell with the tide , and were not exposed by the tidal surges. Further more hundreds of new mines could be deployed every day by minelayer or air drop to re-mined the already swept corridors.
During clear day light hours these EMG tidal mines were easier to detect due to the small buoy they leave , but that would also make those prime areas for Stuka patrols. The Germans erected extensive super gun emplacements along the Channel coast. While they had little chance of hitting anything on a good day, there mere presence would be one more layer for exhausted RN crews to negotiate and those Gun turrets had highly effective Radars allowing Schnellboote & Stuka squadrons to be vectored in to intercept would be minesweepers/blockade runners.
Generally RAF radar didn’t extend sufficiently over the channel to detect the Stuka formations prior to their striking targets even along the English side of the channel. At best RAF fighters would arrive ¼ of an hour after the Stuka left. RAF bomber command was useless at hitting naval shipping , during the war . At that time, coastal command was sinking one ship for every 160 sortie. During dynamo the Germans registered one enemy ship sunk for every 47 sortie flown.
In the week before the expected Sealion invasion, the RAF coastal command bombed the invasion fleet , but only destroyed 65 barges/ships/boats and lightly damaged 160 more [return in a week]. However, after these strikes , the assembled German invasion fleet still counted 1580 converted landing barges [ ½ motorized & the rest towed], 820 Tugs/Leader boats and 100 merchant ships, escorted by 180 MBoot, RBoot & VBoot , which was more than enough to launch the first wave.
In reserve the Germans had another 50 MBoot/RBoot/VBoot plus 44-75 more merchant ships, another 600 converted landing barges and another 200-300 older barges to warehouse supplies. In addition they had another 25 tankers and 75 fuel lighters to effect re supply. At this rate of destruction, it would take the RAF bomber command months to sink the invasion fleet.
At this point in the Sealion plan, each towed barge was also tethered to a motorized barge, for the last run into , and extraction from the beaches, while a tug towed the entire entourage @ ~ 4knts in a 300-400m strung out group. There was supposed to be a ‘leader boat’ for every three tugs. These were command boats with communications & navigating gear to lead the barges independently if needed. Combined, this was enough to lift over ¼ million tons in the first wave alone. That was enough to deploy the first echelon of each infantry division , which were all reinforced to the level of a ‘semi motorized infantry division’ .
Each of 9 divisions could put ashore a divisional Gruppe of roughly 7000 troops, with 600 vehicles/motorcycles plus 1900 bicycles & 340 horses . These were spread over two complete ‘1940 Infantry Regiment’ armed with 47mm PAK instead of 37mm PAK, and reinforced with
a Flak battery [12 x 20mm Flak]
a tank battalion [49 x Pz-II/III/IV & 9 halftracks]
a Nebelwerfer battery [8 MRL]
a Panzer Jaeger company
and a mountain gun battalion [8 x 15cm guns]
plus an entire recon battalion on bicycles.
Each army had an additional Recon battalion; two additional engineering battalions and an additional 10cm Gun battalion to supplement the Armies artillery battalions and flak Regiment.
Each of the approximately 80 barges transporting the Gruppe, had a twin AAMg mounted and manned. In addition most of the barges also had a deck gun platform on which the Gruppe 14 x 75mm infantry guns , 12 x 20mm Flak ,27 x 47mm PAK & 8 x Gebirgskannoe 15cm mountain guns, were all mounted. These guns could be manned during the crossing ,especially in the last run into the beach. Weapons on the gun platforms were primarily for beach fire support and were to be supplemented by the 35 'gun coasters', mostly armed with several light flak & 3 x captured 75mm Guns each. Each tug and “Leader boat” , were armed with a couple of AAMg . So every leader group should have a minimum of ~14 x AAMg as self defense plus. The entire Barge transport Gruppe should be able to amass almost 200 AAMg in self defense.
While the RN anti invasion plan put much faith in near sideswiping of barges at high speed by destroyers or dumping Depth Charges by Minesweepers/Armed Trawlers in similar passes, each barge and/or adjacent barge could very well unload a couple of shell into said passing warship. The accumulated effect could cripple minesweepers and Armed trawlers while damage Destroyers, ensuring they’ll not come back for at least another week. Historically the success of such close clashes were not encouraging, with each Destroyer/Cruiser sortie netting only one enemy barge/boat sunk each time.
Since an average of 5 minesweepers would lead each Barge transport Gruppe , they could each contribute two 4" naval guns and a couple light flak, plus ASW & Minesweeping gear. These would be followed by about 4 auxiliary Gun Coasters each with a couple of light flak and 3 x 3” guns. In addition at least 6-8 VBoot would escort each Gruppe, patrolling the flanks, also equipped with ASW gear, a pair of 88L45 guns and several light flak .About 8 smaller RBoot should provide close in protection with both Minesweeping & ASW gear plus several light flak. Combined these could bring 36 x 3-4”guns to bare on any attacking flotillas , while shore bombardment could climb to 80-90 x 3-4” guns. These escorting groups, should also be covered by at least 80 ship mounted light flak per Barge Gruppe, each putting out a practical ROF of ~100 shells per minute.
Following these barge fleets, would be up to 100 merchants escorted by about two dozen Sperrbrecher mine clearing ships. Its reported all the WW-I Torpedoboot and FBoot were to be used so that’s ~10 more warships available to escort these merchant ships too. Each merchant group should have 11 merchant ships , four with gun decks mounting Army 4” howitzers plus a couple of light flak. Each group would be escorted by ~ 3 Sperrbrecher mine clearing ships plus a Torpedoboot. Each group should be able to amass roughly a dozen 4” guns and 4 torpedos, plus up to 100 Light Flak, each putting out a practical ROF or ~ 100 shells per minute.
During WW-II very effective convoy defensive tactics were established when the convoy conducting defensive turns under cover of smoke screens between the convoy and attacking flotilla. Meanwhile some of the convoy escorts counter attack the attacking enemy flotilla . These escorts tried to distract the attacking enemy flotilla with gunfire and deploying smoke between them and the convoy, long enough for the convoys to escape. Historically such counter attacking escorts came off poorly against enemy Cruiser/Destroyer flotillas, but usually the counter attack of a few of the escorts inflicted serious damage on some of the attacking warships, before they themselves succumbed to fire. Some times however if the counterattacking escort warship was able to launch torpedos, they could make good their own escape after having diverted the enemy attacking flotilla . Since few warships had radar at that time these worked well and should work in the Channel in 1940. Even if they are radar equipped warships, this defensive tactic was shown to work most of the time.
It was planned, the close escorting of the barge groups, was to be done through small coastal RBoot , each equipped with several light flak, ASW gear and smoke dispensing machines, that could generate 1 to 8 hours of smoke, to cover barge fleets, while squadrons of specially equipped planes [ ~ 70] carried numerous smoke bombes to provide instantaneous smoke barrages during specific enemy destroyer sweeps.
Prior to even reaching the convoys these enemy destroyer sweeps would have to navigate mine infested waters dodging submarines in the process and fighting off German destroyer/Schnellboote flotillas of there own. Those German groups counted 3-4 x Destroyer/Torpedoboot flotillas covering the western approaches to the invasion corridor. These included 7 x Z-1934/36 heavy destroyers and 15 x Torpedoboot 1923/24/35, operating in flotillas of up to ½ dozen each, to engage RN flotillas coming through the Western Channel. To bolster this force, a dozen coastal & ½ dozen Atlantic Uboats would patrol the major RN ports and mine barriers . As the fatigue of the RN fleet mounted, these measures could be expected to become more and more effective. Covering the extensive mine barrier approaching the Eastern Channel entrance were two dozen Schnell boot reinforced by another up to ½ dozen coastal Uboats. In addition ‘Scapa Flow’ and the ‘Firth of Forth’ were each to be covered by a flotilla of up to ½ dozen coastal Uboats.
Historically when such flotilla clashed , the Germans sunk or crippled twice as many allied warships as they lost themselves, but rarely more than one warship was sunk on each side per flotilla vs flotilla clash. The only exception out of 18-20 such clashes in the early war years, was the Narvik incident in Norway , which pointed to an opposite result.. So the Germans under no circumstance should fight RN destroyer flotillas lead by a Battleship, in a Fiord/Harbor .
The German Schnellboote flotilla’s covering the eastern mouth of the channel , should also do very well statistically sinking or crippling an enemy warships per day while making good escapes most of the time. Like wise the Uboats should statistically cripple/sink an enemy ship every day also making good an escape most of the time. Over all these German warships could inflict 5-6 enemy sunk/crippled warships per day losing a couple of warships in exchange.
The German warship fleet included 3-4 light cruisers and the heavy cruiser Hipper with the pocket battle cruiser Scheer operational later that month. Both Hipper and Scheer were tasked to sortie ahead of the invasion in order to draw out the RN home fleet. With replenishment at sea , the Scheer could remain operational for at least a month at sea , so it should be deployed weeks before S Day. In contrast the Hipper had only a 2 week endurance with replenishment at sea, so it should sortie a couple of days before S Day to ensure Home fleet cruisers and Battleships are exhausted, when they return to Scapa Flow. The movements of these raiders should be coordinated with 10 long range Uboats surging into the North Atlantic. The aim would be for the surface raiders to hunt down convoys and brake them up while the Uboats move in to pick off the remains, putting a severe strain on the Convoy escort system. If sufficient ,the RN Admiral Forbes demand to strip the ‘Anti Invasion Fleet’ from 90 down to 60 DD/CL would probably have been followed.
The 4 Light Cruisers plus several training ships, escorted by a dozen WW-I/captured Torpedoboot, were to sortie across the North Sea, leading a dozen merchants with thousands of troops in an attempted faint, to fix the RN/RAF east coast forces for days starting with S Day. It was felt this could buy the Channel defenses several days of respite before the Destroyer sweeps come.