Mussolini Flies & Dies With Hitler. What Would Göring and Italy Do ?

Starvation will continue wether Goring wants it to or not. This is because there simply is not enough food to go around in blockaded Europe in war time. Maybe years later after recovery from the devastation the eastern territories of Ukraine could produce enough food, but definately not while the war is still going on.

Göring fully supported the Hunger Plan and literally bragged about the planned starvation of 30 million Slavs in a meeting with Count Ciano.

Moreover, the policy was devised by people in his bailiwick. He was on very good terms with Herbert Backe. And other top planners included General Georg Thomas, the OKW's economics expert, and General Eduard Wagner, top logistician of the OKH who cooperated with Heydrich on facilitating cooperation between the army and the einsatzgruppen. The Economic Leadership Staff East (Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost) which was set up to coordinate economic policy in the occupied Soviet territories with the Four-Year-Plan, was run by Göring's people.

Göring himself was chairman, with his friend and minion Paul Körner as deputy, and Luftwaffe general Wilhelm Schubert doing most of the practical work. Other members included Friedrich Alpers, a Göring crony from the Reich Forestry Office, General Hermann von Hanneken, who'd taken charge of steel and iron in the Four-Year-Plan, Erich Neumann from the Four-Year-Plan (who would also later represent Göring at the Wannsee Conference), Thomas and Backe. It was this organisation that produced the so called Green Folder, which envisaged brutal economic exploitation of the occupied territories in the east. Hitler himself granted Göring extensive powers in regards to the plundering and exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories.

The SS and Party apparatus, while supportive, had little role in devising the hunger policy. The PoW camps where Soviet prisoners were deliberately starved en masse were mostly controlled by the army. The notoriously brutal Erich Koch was his pal and Göring supported his appointment as Reichskommissar of Ukraine.

He was also supportive of the Commissar Order, the Einsatzgruppen and other terror measures. Shortly before the invasion, he literally asked Heydrich to prepare a small booklet so that the fighting troops would know 'who to put up against the wall'. Göring was an incredibly brutal man and proud of it. And he was a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi - literally a member of the old guard from 1920. He just didn't have grand 'visions' like Himmler or Rosenberg.

(Actually this was probably close to the truth although everyone marvelled about how a crazy Hess could fly an airplane, undetected by either Germany or Britain, from Augsburg in southern Bavaria, Germany to near Strathaven in South Lanarkshire, in south central Scotland.)

The doctors who examined Hess in Britain and before the Nuremberg Trials found that he wasn't insane. As for why he was able to fly a plane, it's due to his military experience in WW1. He was a pilot in the later stages of the war and retained a keen interest in aviation post-war. Indeed, after being released from jail in 1925 he toyed with the idea of carrying out a cross-Atlantic flight from Europe to America. Hitler talked him out of it because he needed Hess to work as his secretary.

The idea that Hess was crazy was simply made up by the Nazi regime because it was uncomfortable to admit that the Deputy Führer secretly doubted Hitler's infallible genius (Hess was fully on board with the Nazi programme, but feared that a two-front war would put everything they'd achieved in jeopardy, there are signs that he was nervous about Hitler's incredibly risky moves since the Sudeten Crisis).

Also worth noting that it wasn't Goebbels who suggested they say Hess had gone crazy, but his rival Otto Dietrich, who was Reich Press Chief (it was an awkward relationship. Technically Dietrich was Goebbels' subordinate, but they were also equals in the Party hierarchy and Goebbels couldn't get rid of him until 1945). Goebbels went along with it but was critical of the decision since it implied no one had noticed that one of Hitler's closest confidantes for 15 years was crazy.
 
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I'm assuming the details of how Hitler and Mussolini died would be suppressed because that is just straight up embarrassing. One flew the other into a mountain? How do you spin that without presenting Mussolini as a total idiot. How does that affect the relationship between Rome and Berlin, both of which are probably dealing with quite a bit of chaos.

They can spin any story they want to as no one will be around to tell them what really happened. If the plane flies into a mountain then they will assume that the assigned pilot was at the controls and therefore depending on if they want a scapegoat or not they can put it down to instrument failure rather than pilot error. As far as anyone can tell it was a tragic accident, that's all.

Randy
 
They can spin any story they want to as no one will be around to tell them what really happened. If the plane flies into a mountain then they will assume that the assigned pilot was at the controls and therefore depending on if they want a scapegoat or not they can put it down to instrument failure rather than pilot error. As far as anyone can tell it was a tragic accident, that's all.

Randy
More than likely the nest of vipers in Berlin will blame each other and their enemies and rivals (and whichever minority they can think of) for sabotage, incompetence or terrorism.
Who needs facts when you have targets?
 
Göring was one of those “nastiest, most ambitious nutters imaginable” as you, Alex1guy, put it. And, according to acclaimed German historian Joachim C. Fest’s book”The Face of the Third Reich”, he was also popular and had been essential to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor on January 30, 1933 in the first place :

At the time of this ATL plane crash in August 1941, Göring had not yet lost his status nor sunk into drugs as he was to do later in the war. And don’t forget, at the Nuremberg Trials, a now drug-free, rather fit Göring was almost his old self in terms of tenacity and sparring with the Allied lawyers. Suddenly thrust into power by Hitler’s death in August 1941, I’ve no doubt that Göring could have also risen to that occasion as well. Check out his words from Fest’s book “The Face of the Third Reich” :


Ruthless much ?
I have no doubt that he would rise to the occasion and be ruthless thats just par for the course, I just don't think he'd be very competent and he doesn't have Hitler's aura that held the entire thing together when things go wrong. Also I question that his status hasn't diminished at this point because he had the first big black splotch on his record, the Battle of Britain which showed he didn't really understand strategy and other German commanders and military leaders blamed him for the campaign's failure (which to be fair was a joint affair).

Point is, I don't see the Soviet front being managed any better under Goering, the Germans had deeply underestimated their opponents (something they tended to do) and by the time of the POD, it looks like they are winning, so why deviate from the strategy at hand? The Soviets have just seen the arbiter of their attempted destruction die suddenly, which would be a boost to morale so I don't see Stalin suddenly striking a deal just because Hitler is dead. Also Mussolini is also dead, the head of your enemy just got cut off, for the Soviets this looks like a miracle. If he cant win the Eastern Front his record is now, botched the battle of Britain, and now he botched the Eastern front too (again its a joint affair, but he's in charge). I feel like this would trigger more stress and possibly kick the drug habit in earlier, but not entirely sure.

The Nazi government and military was built on Hitler's Darwinist style of management which creates an atmosphere of separating oneself from failure as quickly as possible and Goering was an expert in this environment. What I wonder is how does he react when shit hits the fan, when the Eastern Front stalls, and then turns against Germany how do the rest of the Nazi military apparatchiks react? I feel like the Generals would start blaming Goering, who in turn probably blames them turns into a big old cycle of blame.


They can spin any story they want to as no one will be around to tell them what really happened. If the plane flies into a mountain then they will assume that the assigned pilot was at the controls and therefore depending on if they want a scapegoat or not they can put it down to instrument failure rather than pilot error. As far as anyone can tell it was a tragic accident, that's all.

Randy
As I said, the true nature will be suppressed because everyone looks stupid. I'm sure the Germans and Italians would blame everything and everyone, and spin some tragic narrative about their plane being sabotaged or something.
 
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As I said, the true nature will be suppressed because everyone looks stupid. I'm sure the Germans and Italians would blame everything and everyone, and spin some tragic narrative about their plane being sabotaged or something.

Well the Italians, (with cause) will blame the Germans because it was a German plane and pilot (assumed, see next bit) with no actual living witness' or records to show differently. Likely the Germans will blame weather and/or equipment failures and possibly the Pilot (but since it's Hitlers regular pilot, maybe not) but no one actually KNOWS what happened because no one survived the crash to tell them, That's my point. No one knows Mussolini took the controls as it was certainly not announced over the radio or anything so there would be no way of accurately gauging what really happened. Tragic accident maybe caused by some malfunction (most likely route they take) or maybe pilot error (very low second possibility) but all in all just a tragic accident.

I didn't see anything in any of the posted background but was there a fighter escort? That wouldn't be unusual under the circumstances but not having one is also possibility. In that case it's not likely they were told who was flying but they might have been (and to give the "amateur" pilot some space to maneuver) so they could say the plane suddenly did "this" and went down at which point there might be a way it was reported that Mussolini was flying but as the regular pilot is right there the assumption would be he took over and whatever the 'problem' was (because no one will want to blame it on Mussolini doing something the regular pilot could not overcome) was too much for the pilot to correct for. Hence the statement is that the plane went down due to mechanical issues.

Essentially the truth of what happened and who might have caused it is really beside the point as the main issue will be the struggle of subordinates for both dictators looking to establish who's going to be in charge not that the headman is gone.

Randy
 
Göring fully supported the Hunger Plan and literally bragged about the planned starvation of 30 million Slavs in a meeting with Count Ciano.

Moreover, the policy was devised by people in his bailiwick. He was on very good terms with Herbert Backe. And other top planners included General Georg Thomas, the OKW's economics expert, and General Eduard Wagner, top logistician of the OKH who cooperated with Heydrich on facilitating cooperation between the army and the einsatzgruppen. The Economic Leadership Staff East (Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost) which was set up to coordinate economic policy in the occupied Soviet territories with the Four-Year-Plan, was run by Göring's people.

Göring himself was chairman, with his friend and minion Paul Körner as deputy, and Luftwaffe general Wilhelm Schubert doing most of the practical work. Other members included Friedrich Alpers, a Göring crony from the Reich Forestry Office, General Hermann von Hanneken, who'd taken charge of steel and iron in the Four-Year-Plan, Erich Neumann from the Four-Year-Plan (who would also later represent Göring at the Wannsee Conference), Thomas and Backe. It was this organisation that produced the so called Green Folder, which envisaged brutal economic exploitation of the occupied territories in the east. Hitler himself granted Göring extensive powers in regards to the plundering and exploitation of the occupied Soviet territories.

The SS and Party apparatus, while supportive, had little role in devising the hunger policy. The PoW camps where Soviet prisoners were deliberately starved en masse were mostly controlled by the army. The notoriously brutal Erich Koch was his pal and Göring supported his appointment as Reichskommissar of Ukraine.

He was also supportive of the Commissar Order, the Einsatzgruppen and other terror measures. Shortly before the invasion, he literally asked Heydrich to prepare a small booklet so that the fighting troops would know 'who to put up against the wall'. Göring was an incredibly brutal man and proud of it. And he was a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi - literally a member of the old guard from 1920. He just didn't have grand 'visions' like Himmler or Rosenberg.



The doctors who examined Hess in Britain and before the Nuremberg Trials found that he wasn't insane. As for why he was able to fly a plane, it's due to his military experience in WW1. He was a pilot in the later stages of the war and retained a keen interest in aviation post-war. Indeed, after being released from jail in 1925 he toyed with the idea of carrying out a cross-Atlantic flight from Europe to America. Hitler talked him out of it because he needed Hess to work as his secretary.

The idea that Hess was crazy was simply made up by the Nazi regime because it was uncomfortable to admit that the Deputy Führer secretly doubted Hitler's infallible genius (Hess was fully on board with the Nazi programme, but feared that a two-front war would put everything they'd achieved in jeopardy, there are signs that he was nervous about Hitler's incredibly risky moves since the Sudeten Crisis).

Also worth noting that it wasn't Goebbels who suggested they say Hess had gone crazy, but his rival Otto Dietrich, who was Reich Press Chief (it was an awkward relationship. Technically Dietrich was Goebbels' subordinate, but they were also equals in the Party hierarchy and Goebbels couldn't get rid of him until 1945). Goebbels went along with it but was critical of the decision since it implied no one had noticed that one of Hitler's closest confidantes for 15 years was crazy.
But there's a profound difference in carrying out orders for personal advancement, as opposed to the orders one might give out if they were in the position of power. So while Goring was happy to go along with it, I'm not so sure he would dole out the exact same orders as Hitler. Again he was against the invasion of Russia. He sat Hitler down a month or so before the invasion, and over the course of a four hour meeting, laid plain and bare all his reservations regarding Barbarossa, and the reasons behind his doubt. He then went on to present his own plan for 1941, involving a mediterranean strategy. Therefore I think its safe to assume that he wouldn't be giving the same orders as Hitler.

Now in the scenario he's aleady up to his ass in russia, but he doesn't have to demand the aa or ural line. There would be plenty of flexibility there and I'm sure he would run with that.
 
I have no doubt that he would rise to the occasion and be ruthless thats just par for the course, I just don't think he'd be very competent and he doesn't have Hitler's aura that held the entire thing together when things go wrong. Also I question that his status hasn't diminished at this point because he had the first big black splotch on his record, the Battle of Britain which showed he didn't really understand strategy and other German commanders and military leaders blamed him for the campaign's failure (which to be fair was a joint affair).

Point is, I don't see the Soviet front being managed any better under Goering, the Germans had deeply underestimated their opponents (something they tended to do) and by the time of the POD, it looks like they are winning, so why deviate from the strategy at hand? The Soviets have just seen the arbiter of their attempted destruction die suddenly, which would be a boost to morale so I don't see Stalin suddenly striking a deal just because Hitler is dead. Also Mussolini is also dead, the head of your enemy just got cut off, for the Soviets this looks like a miracle. If he cant win the Eastern Front his record is now, botched the battle of Britain, and now he botched the Eastern front too (again its a joint affair, but he's in charge). I feel like this would trigger more stress and possibly kick the drug habit in earlier, but not entirely sure.

The Nazi government and military was built on Hitler's Darwinist style of management which creates an atmosphere of separating oneself from failure as quickly as possible and Goering was an expert in this environment. What I wonder is how does he react when shit hits the fan, when the Eastern Front stalls, and then turns against Germany how do the rest of the Nazi military apparatchiks react? I feel like the Generals would start blaming Goering, who in turn probably blames them turns into a big old cycle of blame.



As I said, the true nature will be suppressed because everyone looks stupid. I'm sure the Germans and Italians would blame everything and everyone, and spin some tragic narrative about their plane being sabotaged or something.
Well he very well might perform better, as he was against war with the United States. If he can keep the americans at bay he has already created a far more favorable set of conditions for the Wehrmacht than would've existed under Hitler's reign. Another positive for Goring is he in all probabliltiy would not enact the no retreat orders, and therefore the Generals wouldn't end up waisting hundreds of thousands of men and untold sums of materals, pointlessly dying to hold an undefendable position. What the exact results of the war are can be debated, but this would surely be a bonus to the german war effort.

One more point that I'd love to see further discuessed is his war cabinet meetings held during the invasion of Poland. While Hitler was at the front, there are those who wrote after the war that the most organized and professional the Wehermacht ever was, was during the days of those meetings organized and chaired by Goring. I cannot vouch for the validity of these claims, but I think its a very interesting, and often overlooked point of history.

How do you think the war would progress if those cabinet meetings were revived under Goring?
 
But there's a profound difference in carrying out orders for personal advancement, as opposed to the orders one might give out if they were in the position of power. So while Goring was happy to go along with it, I'm not so sure he would dole out the exact same orders as Hitler. Again he was against the invasion of Russia. He sat Hitler down a month or so before the invasion, and over the course of a four hour meeting, laid plain and bare all his reservations regarding Barbarossa, and the reasons behind his doubt. He then went on to present his own plan for 1941, involving a mediterranean strategy. Therefore I think its safe to assume that he wouldn't be giving the same orders as Hitler.

Göring fully bought into Nazism. He literally joined the Party at a time when it was an irrelevant fringe movement, and no one could predict that one day Hitler would be supreme leader of the German Reich. Hitler named him his heir for a reason. The whole idea that he was the 'rational, unideological moderate' one is a deceptive myth. One that he actively employed when it suited him since he was a talented, mendacious manipulator. Which is why hist post-war statements during the Nuremberg Trials must be treated with a serious amount of caution. They were about making himself look good and preserve his 'legacy'. And none of his concerns in regards to the Soviet campaign had anything to do with the methods being employed to subdue and exploit the local population.

One more point that I'd love to see further discuessed is his war cabinet meetings held during the invasion of Poland. While Hitler was at the front, there are those who wrote after the war that the most organized and professional the Wehermacht ever was, was during the days of those meetings organized and chaired by Goring.

I assume you mean the meetings of the Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich), since that body was chaired by Göring and met a couple during the Polish campaign in 1939 while Hitler was away. That body didn't run the Wehrmacht, it made decisions on domestic policy, which obviously also included mobilisation and the economy. The council seems to have worked decently while it was active, but the thing about Göring is that he was inconsistent and soon lost interest in things. Goebbels tried to revive the council in 1943, with the aim of himself being made Göring's deputy and its de facto leader but that attempt went nowhere before it could even get off ground.

When Göring set up the Four-Year-Plan, he made sure to include all relevant agencies and authorities. All ministries were represented on the General Council via their state secretaries (which also seriously weakened their ministers...who were nominally their bosses), and even when Göring was there the meetings were chaired by Körner. Göring openly admitted that he knew nothing about economics, and thus brought in economists and industrialists to handle the details.

At the same time, his management of the Aviation Ministry and the Luftwaffe was less then stellar. He put Udet in charge of crucial portfolios even though he knew that his friend was wholly out of his depth because he was a reliable crony and it would help contain the competent, but ambitious Milch. It's no accident that both Udet and Jeschonnek were driven to suicide when Göring scapegoated them for the Luftwaffe's failures.
 
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I didn't see anything in any of the posted background but was there a fighter escort?
In the first post in this thread, under the paragraph beginning with “(3)”, a quote from the “Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine” article entitled “Despots Aloft” had the answer to your question. (To see the website article itself, from which I reposted it, just Google "Despots Aloft Smithsonian" .

Smithsonian Air & Space Magazine said:
“… The Soviet air force had been nearly destroyed, so it posed no real threat; still, the Luftwaffe deployed an escort of Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters to ensure the Führer’s safety.”
 
Göring fully bought into Nazism. He literally joined the Party at a time when it was an irrelevant fringe movement, and no one could predict that one day Hitler would be supreme leader of the German Reich. Hitler named him his heir for a reason. The whole idea that he was the 'rational, unideological moderate' one is a deceptive myth. One that he actively employed when it suited him since he was a talented, mendacious manipulator. Which is why hist post-war statements during the Nuremberg Trials must be treated with a serious amount of caution. They were about making himself look good and preserve his 'legacy'. And none of his concerns in regards to the Soviet campaign had anything to do with the methods being employed to subdue and exploit the local population.



I assume you mean the meetings of the Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich), since that body was chaired by Göring and met a couple during the Polish campaign in 1939 while Hitler was away. That body didn't run the Wehrmacht, it made decisions on domestic policy, which obviously also included mobilisation and the economy. The council seems to have worked decently while it was active, but the thing about Göring is that he was inconsistent and soon lost interest in things. Goebbels tried to revive the council in 1943, with the aim of himself being made Göring's deputy and its de facto leader but that attempt went nowhere before it could even get off ground.

When Göring set up the Four-Year-Plan, he made sure to include all relevant agencies and authorities. All ministries were represented on the General Council via their state secretaries (which also seriously weakened their ministers...who were nominally their bosses), and even when Göring was there the meetings were chaired by Körner. Göring openly admitted that he knew nothing about economics, and thus brought in economists and industrialists to handle the details.

At the same time, his management of the Aviation Ministry and the Luftwaffe was less then stellar. He put Udet in charge of crucial portfolios even though he knew that his friend was wholly out of his depth because he was a reliable crony and it would help contain the competent, but ambitious Milch. It's no accident that both Udet and Jeschonnek were driven to suicide when Göring scapegoated them for the Luftwaffe's failures.
I never claimed he was an "un idealogical moderate" just that he was less wedded to the ideology than other in the upper ranks of the reich. Again he had advocated against the war with Russia, and was more interested in taking jewish fianances prior to forced deportation as opposed to lebensraum to the Urals, and death camps.

As far as the "Ministerrat fur die Reichsverteidigung" it was my understanding that the meetings only ceased at Hitlers insistence after his return from the Polish front. The 1943 council was not envisioned as a ressurection of the original, but rather a new entity with different members and duties. Goring was against that purely out of jealousy from what I can tell.
 
As far as the "Ministerrat fur die Reichsverteidigung" it was my understanding that the meetings only ceased at Hitlers insistence after his return from the Polish front. The 1943 council was not envisioned as a ressurection of the original, but rather a new entity with different members and duties. Goring was against that purely out of jealousy from what I can tell.

It was meant to be the same body, but with an expanded membership, such as Goebbels and Himmler. That's clear from Goebbels' diary entries on the matter. It was part of his power struggle with the 'Committee of Three', since he'd been excluded from that body, and his attempt to take control of domestic affairs. Hence his meetings with Funk, Ley, Speer and Göring. Goebbels (once again overestimating himself) imagined himself as deputy chairman and the man actually running things.

However, the effort faltered. Not the least because it was a bad idea to push for what would nominally be a strengthening of Göring's authority while Hitler was mad at him for the Luftwaffe's failure to prevent allied bombings of German cities. Plus Bormann was well-positioned to use his position at Hitler's court to block such initiatives. And Göring didn't push the point when he was supposed to, given his damaged standing at court. Plus the idea of just being the figurehead probably didn't play well with his ego.
 
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