Mussolini does not invade France, but invades Malta and Tunisia instead.

[MattII]

The likelihood of this force holding off the nine battleships and battle cruisers which the British had plus scores of cruisers and destroyers do not strike me as being very favorable.

And not all of those ships would have been coming from Scapa either, so the Germans get into a duking match almost immediately, before they have a chance to lay mines, possibly delaying that operation long enough for the Battleships to get there.

 

[elkarlo]

That equipment isn't as critical in an amphibious invasion of Malta as in the desert.

Unless, of course, we assume their naval artillery shells don't work because they are Italian made, their pilots can't fly their bombers and their ground soldiers shoot themselves in the foot before landing.

True. I doubt, that land based artillery would be much use here. Maybe a bit, but mortars and ships/planes would do most of the work.

 

[Mike]

I'm afraid I'm not familiar with the term "homer" in any context other than torpedoes, pigeons or ancient Greece, none of which seem very appropriate here.

"Homer" in the context I put it means "biased". It is a word frequently used in sports to refer to commentators that uncritically talk up and praise their favourite sports team which is often the one playing at home and hosting the opponent. It is also used to criticize sports officials suspected of bias in favour of a team also usually playing at home in front of a intimidating crowd.

However, out of curiosity, why do you feel British historians are so much more unreliable than those of other nations?

My experience with British authors is that they tend to eschew facts against their side and glorify their side. John Keegan, for example has said that he doesn't consider foreign sources because they are too emotional and that British sources can be trusted because the British people are detached and objective and therefore are more reliable. The fact that this guy is considered a professional historian whose books are often required readings in British school classes says a lot about the quality of British historians.

I'm sure that there are good British historians out there just like there are homer historians in other countries but they are hard to find. I try not to read any history books from British historians in which Britain is involved, but like I said, I keep an open mind.

 

[Mike]

I apologize to Archytas and others for hijacking this thread into a discussiion about Sea Lion. This is my last post about Sea Lion in this thread.

Thank you for providing that link, I've finally had a chance to read the document.

I'm glad you like it

While it's interesting I'm not convinced by the arguments made in it. For one thing it assumes the unified employment of German, Italian, Spanish and French forces could be arranged. It also says that the invasion of Britain would have be envisaged before the Battle of France, in order for the army to capture the BEF.

What is wrong with that statement?

While it is true that more German allies would have helped, it is not necessary since the article makes it clear that German air superiority was the most important part. See below for the last paragraph the report made with the important keyword "ultimately".

Most grievous, in my eyes, are two major flaws:
First, on page 25, is the bald statement that "Without the BEF, German landings could have safely occurred on a narrow front. The Kriegsmarine could then adequately defend and support it against the Royal Navy."
There is literally no mention made of how the Kriegsmarine is supposed to accomplish this feat, or of how the forces are supposed to be supported once they are in England, despite earlier stating that the Germans started WW2 with an insignificant navy and it became more so after Norway. Presumably we all agree that these are important aspects of the operation, and the failure to address them seems a remarkable oversight.

Did you read the last paragraph?

"*Ultimately,* Operation SEA LION was lost over the skies of England. The British center of gravity was clearly the RAF, and a sustained air campaign against aircraft factories, radar and sector stations, airfields, and other support facilities could have led to the defeat of Fighter Command and paved the way for a German invasion from the sea. As it was, German numerical superiority was such that by mid-September 1940 command of the air was within grasp. Had Hitler and the Luftwaffe remained focused on these targets instead of redirecting the effort to a militarily insignificant terror bombing of London, the outcome of the Battle of Britain, and consequently also Operation SEA LION, might well have been very different."

They are saying that German air superiority was the most important part and that it could be achieved. If they get it, then Sea Lion would be a success. The Kriegsmarine is to be used to transport and protect the forces across while the Luftwaffe keeps the Royal Navy away. British ships were vulnerable to air attack. I keep having to say this.

Secondly, also on page 25, the claim is made that a sustained campaign against the RAF could have led to the defeat of Fighter Command. It might be possible for the Luftwaffe to prevent the RAF from using any of their bases in south-east England, and for the sake of argument we can assume that this also means 11 Group is unable to take any part in the battle. But this does nothing to prevent 10 and 12 Groups contributing, nor does it prevent the use of bases in the north of England (from which aircraft would still be able to interdict the landing zones). It seems the authors believed that the entirety of Fighter Command's assets were in the south of England and fully committed, which does not match the history I'm familiar with.

And yet, according to Churchill and the high ranking officials of the British air force, Fighter Command was a few days away from being wiped out. It was the switching of tactics from bombing airfields to bombing cities that was the critical error that the Luftwaffe made. Churchill and the high officials have agreed.

A more sustained air attack from airfields operating from the Continent and Norway could have achieved this if the Nazis were really serious about invading Britain and getting bloody about it.

While it is certainly interesting to read a paper by officers attending a staff course on joint operations, I don't think we can use this as evidence that many military historians believe Sealion would have succeeded.

What other military historians can you name that claim that Sealion was unworkable compared to those 3 authors who actually are in the miltary or compared to Churchill and other miltary officials of the time who all thought the same thing?

 

[Archytas]

Hi Mike,
The whole reason for this thread is that attacking Britain, with extremely well organized Radar detection and plane control systems, Spitfires (superior to any German plane) and Hurricanes (superior to all German planes other than the Bf-109, including the Bf-110) and large numbers of AA is suicidal and pointless and is exactly what Churchill wants. British fighters get to spend a lot more time aloft in battle than the German fighters, which spend a few minutes escorting the bombers or trying to destroy the fighters. British fighters can refuel and reload and return to the fray much faster than German ones. British pilots bailing out are much more likely to survive and return to battle than German pilots, which are captured or often down in the Channel. The loss of German pilots, crews and planes woudl cripple irreparably the LW.
At this time Britain is producing more planes than Germany, despite bombing the British factories with the tiny two engine bombers that carry a ridiculous ton of bombs at a huge cost in fuel and lost crews and planes)
On the other hand Britain cannot fight or survive without imported oil from Persia, men from India, Australia, SA and NZ, food from Australia and NZ, rubber and tin from Indonesia, etc, Britain in bankrup and cannot buy oil, etc from America, which at the time requires cash (no L-L yet) and depends completely on the colonies to continue the fight. While Britain has hundreds of fighters in Britain and extremely efficient defense and repair systems and is receiving more planes from the factories every day, Britain has a hundred obsolete fighters in the mediterranean, where it makes a lot more sense to reinforce the hundreds of Italian planes and the large Italian army tand navy o deal Britain a deadly blow by capturing Persia and forcing Britain to go around the Cape to get Indian troops, Australian products, etc, which requires a lor more fuel and ship time (it is equivalent to sinking a large part of the shipping fleet, since a lot more ships are required to move the same amount of goods).

 

[Incognitia]

Archytas, I imagine you are unaware, then, that a large part of the carrying trade DID go around the Cape, rather than through the Med?

Due to the threat of the Regia Marina, only heavily escorted convoys, usually supplying military needs within the Mediterranean, went past Gibraltar and into the Med.

Key point is, yes the route around the Cape takes longer - but the threat is much, much lower. So you don't need nearly as much of a convoy escort. And guess what was in shortest supply? Not merchant ships, but convoy escorts.

Losing control of the Med would have been a heavy blow to British morale, however it would not have made a particular impact against the convoy system, unless the Italians managed to slip submarines or surface raiders out past Gibraltar.

 

[Cockroach]

To get back to the main topic:

Assuming that Mussolini uses his brain, listens to his generals and coordinates better with Hitler:
On May 1, 1940 Mussolini orders his navy and air force to prepare for the imminent invasion of Malta and Tunisia. He informs Hitler of his intentions and requests 200 German planes and pilots, Trucks, cannon, etc, to assist him in his attack.

With the clash about to come in France Hitler will be very reluctant to release any forces. If he does the allies will probably read it for what it is: the imminant threat of war. And will prepear as much as they can... even while limited severaly limit by the oncoming Germans, there's responces that'll cause the Italians quite a few head aches e.g. an extra two or three battalions to Malta would seriously complicate any invasion.

Mussolini also expalins to Hitler that without Radar, his ships are useless at night, so that if the Italian fleet is to defeat the British fleet, Hitler must provide it with Radar.

Let's put it this way: blatant hindsight. IIRC by mid-1940 naval radar was still in fairly limited deployment on both sides and had not yet been vital for any naval battles. So, the Italians do not (yet) have any great driver to get radar, and are unlikely to be able to get any off the Germans for quite awhile.

On July 1, he receives more German planes, troops, etc, and launches the invasion of Egypt.

So, a matter of days after bringing the French to the table Hitler will move half his army across the Med? Problems... well, logistics (it'll take) and the units are worn down, in need of time to refit and recuperate after France.

So, what can be said? The actual scenario proposed in your opening post is fairly resonable. The expected outcomes in later posts get absurd.

... a deadly blow by capturing Persia and forcing Britain to go around the Cape to get Indian troops, Australian products, etc, which requires a lor more fuel and ship time....

Even if we assume taking the Middle East and Iran is just a matter of marching (which it wasn't), it isn't going to put the poms' out of the war in and of itself, simply Middle Eastern oil wasn't that significant to the oil supply of the British Isles (enough came from the US and Carribean in OTL that the near closure of the Med wasn't an issue). Now, the moral implications of the collapse required for the axis to reach that far may be a different matter.

As for, the second point, well, the Med was largelly closed to Merchant traffic 1940-43 in OTL... so, that doesn't change much in and of itself. If the Italians take the Suez Canal without too many blockships scuttled in it and so can get their fleet out into the Indian Ocean, things become more difficult.

 

[elkarlo]

Indeed about naval radar in 1940. Even in late 42, it wasn't super reliable. Both(I think) the USS BB Washington and SD lost their radars in fighting with the Japanese near Guadalcanal. Radar in 1940 wasn7t very reliable, and could be damaged in a fire fight fairly easily.

 

[CalBear]

Indeed about naval radar in 1940. Even in late 42, it wasn't super reliable. Both(I think) the USS BB Washington and SD lost their radars in fighting with the Japanese near Guadalcanal. Radar in 1940 wasn7t very reliable, and could be damaged in a fire fight fairly easily.

South Dakota suffered a massive electrical short during the Battle of Guadalcanal that took down just about anything that ran on electricity. Washington's radar operated quite nicely throughout the battle, as her IJN opponents could attest.

 

[elkarlo]

South Dakota suffered a massive electrical short during the Battle of Guadalcanal that took down just about anything that ran on electricity. Washington's radar operated quite nicely throughout the battle, as her IJN opponents could attest.

Ok, was wondering which one lost it's radar. thought it was both. Anyhow, my point is, that even on an Iowa class battleship, the Radar can fail. Though there were other cases of the radar being knocked out? As in the early parts of the war, radar systems were fairly large, making them more vulnerable when in action.

edit, as others were saying in 1940, naval radar wasn't the bee knees that it would become.

 

[Archytas]

Naval Radar was very useful in 1940 and it was a major mistake of the Germans not to share it with their allies. However, the faster Italian ships could have avoided night encounters.

 

[MattII]

Though there were other cases of the radar being knocked out?

Scharnhorst lost hers to an 8" shell at the Battle of the North Cape, and returned the favour on HMS Norfolk with an 11" shell about three hours later.

 

[elkarlo]

Scharnhorst lost hers to an 8" shell at the Battle of the North Cape, and returned the favour on HMS Norfolk with an 11" shell about three hours later.

True that. Forgot about that incident. Radar in 1940, wasn't a little radar dish. But was a series of wires spanned together inside a kite type of box. Shrapnel, or fragments torn out from a shell could easily mangle these early devices. Plus in 1940, many radar units were directional. Which is to say that they were bow leading radars, and when the ships came about, they were useless.

 

[Rubicon]

Naval Radar was very useful in 1940 and it was a major mistake of the Germans not to share it with their allies. However, the faster Italian ships could have avoided night encounters.

Why would they?

Besides the Italians had their own Radar development program and had a basic prototype built in 1936.

 

[Archytas]

To defeat the British.

Sure the Germans were working on the atomic bomb too.

 

[sharlin]

Oh this ought to be good.

C'mon then, lets hear your vast knowledge about the Nazi nuclear bomb programme. I am sure you belive they were just this close to making a working device and that they had no problems at all with their weapon but for perfidious Albion and those dirty mongrels from across the sea right Archytas?

 

[Brasidas]

Oh this ought to be good.

C'mon then, lets hear your vast knowledge about the Nazi nuclear bomb programme. I am sure you belive they were just this close to making a working device and that they had no problems at all with their weapon but for perfidious Albion and those dirty mongrels from across the sea right Archytas?

Not that I'm trying to put words in his mouth, but my read on his German bomb reference was that "yes, the Italians were developing radar, but..." that didn't mean it was a short stretch to it being fully operational and deployed to all frontline units.

German aid, if a PoD justified it, could make that happen.

 

[iddt3]

Not that I'm trying to put words in his mouth, but my read on his German bomb reference was that "yes, the Italians were developing radar, but..." that didn't mean it was a short stretch to it being fully operational and deployed to all frontline units.

German aid, if a PoD justified it, could make that happen.

The problem with German aid is it requires Italy to admit it has problems, rather then being a full equal in the alliance. To get the Italians to accept German aid, they have to feel weak enough to need it, and if they feel that weak, they aren't going to war in the first place, at least not a war anything like OTL.