Next chapter will be quite massive btw, we'll be covering the abbasids, and i'm really considering splitting it off in two updates for convenience.
Those are amazing news, being into the abbasids now and if too big them split it, just to get it early, seems this one will be amazing
 
So.....Is everything alright?
Yeah what happened Talus?
Oh sorry, i forgot to say it here, but the thing is, it happened that exams were announced to happen in the 21-27 of September week, so i couldn't finish the chapter, and this last week i found a new source that after reading gave me new ideas to put on the chapter, so i'm rewriting the second section of it, but it'll be released yet this coming week, but the wait will be worth it, i promise! :biggrin:
 
The Age of Collapse: Chapter 14
Muslim World - The Age of Collapse
Rising but Frictious: The Establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate (I)


Starting Struggles under as-Saffāḥ (745-747)
The first problem for the abbasids after the Fitna's end subsequent to the Battle of Mādinah was literally right there, as some of the arabian tribes were not exactly pleased by the overthrow of the umayyads, and many more wanted to use the opportunity to elevate their own goals. This became an even bigger problem when it came to Southern Arabia, which was unruly in nature even during the rare times of very stable umayyad control.

Initially, the abbasid armies under the command of Uqba and Sulayman enjoyed the support of the followers of Ali, which were considerably numerous in Southwestern Arabia. And it did indeed help to pacify some tribes that refused to swear loyalty to the rebels, putting Yemen under partial control, but after a skirmish against ibadi rebels on Ḥaḍramūt [1], the news of the abbasid claiming to the title of Caliph resulted in the mutiny of the Alids, forcing the abbasids to retreat back to Say'un while the ibadis ended up rounding up the alid troops independently of their revolt.

Sulayman then sent Abu Muslim with a little retinue of troops to update as-Saffāḥ about what was happening, and then commanded his army against the Shi'a tribes on Yemen, that revolted together with the mutining troops, it was supressed easily enough, but time ended up being dried with it, resulting in the winter coming with the ibadi rebels left unpunished, and managing to organize themselves as an imamate based at Qanīʾ [2], under the elected leadership of Ḥamīd ibn al-ʿAmmār al-Ḥakīm. And as soon as the next year's Spring came, Sulayman started campaigning against the ibadis, pushing directly toward their new established center at Qanīʾ. The ibadis didn't refuse the fight, and with an army of 15,200 tribal forces (including very skilled Mehri and Awamir horsemen) opposed the 26,000 abbasid soldiers [3] at the plain east of Wadi Amaqin.

The engagement progressed with a tactical draw as Ḥamīd al-Ḥakīm used the surrounding hillish terrain to flank Sulayman's formation with the Mehri cavalry, but the abbasid levantine infantry managed to hold on sufficiently for the berber cavalrymen to reinforce their position, while the infantry combat in the center didn't gave advantage to neither side despite the abbasid numerical advantage. The key to the battle was the abbasid right flank, nearing Wadi Amaqin, where the persian cavalry was positioned. Although suffering with the uncommon environment, it was still greatly effective, and managed to deal blows against the Kathiri and Awamir contingents located there, compromising the ibadi position and forcing Ḥamīd to withdraw back to the walls of Qanīʾ.

With that, Sulayman decided to deal with it in the faster way, putting siege to the ibadi power-center while convening treaties with the Kathīrī, Awamir and Wahidi tribes (and giving the earlier's ruler the governorship of Ḥaḍramūt). Soon enough, without real support, the siege is finished (but the city is spared by Sulayman's orders) and the ibadi rebels quickly disintegrate after that, even though the Omani tribes would manage to gain an order of autonomy by the Caliph after resisting for long enough while a pro-umayyad revolt rose in Central Arabia [4], extending too much the abbasids for them to even care about Oman (at least as long as they don't damn their legitimacy as caliphs).

While Arabia was secured, things got problematic in the East. As the abbasid army was thrashed by the Tang at the Battle of the Aksu River, and subsequently the Princes of Ferghana and Shash and the Turkic Borderlords north of Talas [5] revolted against the Abbasids and sweared fealty to the Tang Emperor. Soon enough, the Turks and Ferghanis made a concerted effort to siege down the still-loyal city of Talas, after three months of siege, the city fell and it was eventually sacked and razed from existence, as the Ferghanis used the opportunity to force the Silk Road to traverse their way, and even though the Tang Emperor denounced the razing of Talas, nothing could be done about it.

In other way, the Tang army proper continued its march through Transoxiana, submitting the Prince of Ushrusana and nearing Sogdia, putting siege to the caliphal city of Samarkand. The siege ended up being abandoned due to the arriving winter and logistical problems involved with the huge army, but this was a big enough scare for the Abbasid establishment to instantly prepare reinforcements and order the governor at Samarkand to abolish the remaining vassal principalities in the region to avoid further desertion.

All the while, christian peasants in Anatolia rose in revolt against exaggerated taxation by the provincial governor. The problem was that said taxation was being used to supply the abbasid coffers with enough money to pay for the constant military mobilization, so the revolt was necessarily heavily crushed and the taxes restored, with many captured rebels ending up being enslaved. Similar revolts would rise in Syria, though they were far too localized to generate any concern by the abbasid establishment.

Once Abu Muslim reached Kūfah, he would have his position as commander (and eventual governor of Khurasan) contested by many in the abbasid court, but even with the (sometimes fervent) opposition led by the Caliph's brother, but since the situation was pretty delicate, the Khurasani officers [6] were still very influential in the early abbasid court and the Caliph had a considerably close with Abu Muslim, as-Saffāḥ decided to give the command in the end.

Abu Muslim marched out of Kūfah with an initial force of around 12,000 soldiers, composed by Iraqi tribal levies (3,500) and Khurasani hardened troops (6,500) counting with Armenian auxiliaries (2,000). Crossing the Zagros, he met up subsequently with the governors of Ahvāz and Fārs, adding 4,500 persian cavalrymen and 7,000 infantry levies to his force, and then marching up from Yazd, to eventually set camp in Nīshāpūr while getting his governorship over Khurasan established, while also adding further more Khurasanis to his army.

By then the Tang forces already were back at the offensive, now with a lesser army of around 46,000 troops, again putting siege to Samarkand, but this time the city's garrison was much more active, once they already knew reinforcements were coming and were in preparation for a new siege since the abandonment of the last one. This made possible for Abu Muslim to near the city before it fell to the chinese, and then, try to relieve the garrison, by entering battle against the Tang troops commanded by Duan Xiushi (since his superior Gao Xianzhi and fellow officer Li Siye were back at Qiūcí [7]).

The subsequent battle was an important, albeit not heavy, victory for the abbasids, forcing Duan Xiushi to retreat back to Ushrushana and avoiding further losses against the chinese. Although Abu Muslim and the abbasid establishment did good use of the victory for propaganda purposes to promote the new founded dynasty, in the ground nothing really was gained, but the battle had a say on the chinese decision for stopping expansion in abbasid territory, even though its grip in Central Asia would only increase as independent, mostly-mountainous city-states were absorbed by the chinese in the region.

Back home, there was a relief in the abbasid court, and Caliph as-Saffāḥ finally would've some rest, much to the chagrin of the opposition against the khurasanis in the court, especially as the easterners gained even more favor with the Caliph.

Stabilization and Consolidation under as-Saffāḥ (748-760)
The Caliph soon would start to put the abbasid state together in cohesion, starting with the organization of the administrative apparatus, with the consolidation of persians as important part of the new bureaucracy, together with iraqis and egyptians at a lesser scale, christians in general were used as local-level bureaucrats, although you could see some (primarily nestorians) in the caliphal bureaucracy at Kūfah.

Soon was made the appointment of abbasid princes and personal favorites of as-Saffāḥ to the provincial governorships, while military expeditions were made to the westernmost territories in chaos, as the Caliph decided on compromising with local lords to reestablish stability while not losing his own seen authority, an increasing concern due to the ibrahimite uprisings in the same regions. Some protests were made about Abu Muslim's practical dominion of the eastern provinces, but as-Saffāḥ frequently tried to remain along the khurasani, seeing him as way too powerful and prestigious [8] to challenge.

Locally, there were different reactions to the confirmation of abbasid rulership. In Mesopotamia and Persia, it was in general welcomed, especially by the "new muslims" and the local non-arab elites, although a considerable number of iraqi tribes supported whole-heartedly the abbasid establishment. Their newfound political was fully used by Abu Muslim in his eastern maneuvers, permitting him to use the Caliph's unwillingness to go against him as form to increase his political power in the capital, while making a private stronghold in the eastern provinces of the young Caliphate.

In Syria and Arabia there wasn't much joy, although any way too much pro-umayyad movement was crushed very early on. While in Syria the greek christians quickly were swayed to the abbasid side, in Arabia the multitude of groups made the life of local governors pretty hard, with ironically the main abbasid partners in the region ending up being the ibadis. While in al-Anadul [9], the unrest diminished as taxes lowered after the initial abbasid conflicts, although memories of the recent rebellion were still there, and the peasantry remained fiercely anti-muslim due to this, there were also some population movements as result of the byzantine civil war, with refugees populating frontier areas escaping from the conflict.

In Egypt, things were messy, as the local arab tribes tried to get over the provincial government after things were quiet enough, but the berber garrisons left by Uqba fought them successfully and order was restored. The abbasid establishment tried to assert a strong loyal hold over the province but soon the native converts proved to be deadset on wanting representation, forcing the abbasid governors to rely on local deputies [10], although after a considerable time of distrust on them they proved to be fairly reliable, helping to maintain the province's budget stable enough. [11]

The Caucasus would be the most war-ry frontier after the Battle of Samarqand, there the abbasid takeover was met with a hard indifference. During the late 740s and early 750s, the Khazars [12] invaded two times, in the first (748) being fairly successful as the abbasids were distracted, allowing the nomads to conquer the northern part of Arran [13], but when they tried to go further in 752, they were defeated and retreated back to the conquered territories. A year later, as-Saffāḥ launched a campaign under the command of Sulayman to fully reconquer the province, being sucessful on the enterprise and striking a peace deal with the Khazars, Sulayman would then be propped up as the new Emir of Arminiya to reward him for his services to the abbasid cause, while the Emirate of Tbilisi was abolished and incorporated into Sulayman's direct domain.

The Abbasid Caliphate had a fairly prosperous consolidation after a hurry and hard start, this consolidation being considered to have entered its mid-part at the death of Caliph as-Saffāḥ in the winter of 760, resulting on his brother, al-Mansur, rising to the caliphal throne.

[1]: Together with Oman and the Hejaz, Hadramut was one of the early main centers of Ibadism
[2]: Present-day Biʾr ʿAlī, i don't think a mainly ibadi community would've a Ali-referencing placename so i decided to stick with the pre-islamic name (that probably didn't change so fast so i think it's plausible)
[3]: Counting desertion by the majority of Uqba's berbers (since they don't have nothing with it anymore, this can cause problems in the future as now they're simply bunchs of armed people roaming without a clear way, at least a considerable part of them), the Alids' mutiny and obvious combat casualties against tribal irregular tactics
[4]: Being part of many "minor" ibrahimite uprising across abbasid lands, besides Arabia it was also predominately on Egypt and India (by the arab tribes there stationed as garrisons), the earlier was supressed easily, the latter...y'll see
[5]: Following the usual caliphal policy, as the Türgesh collapsed, the Umayyads propped up local turkic nobles as vassals, with a muslim governor overseeing them on the seat at Talas
[6]: As OTL, since the abbasid revolt had its core in Khurasan, muslim khurasanis ended up having a very influential position in the caliphal court, here this influence is a bit curtailed due to the presence of the most notorious of Uqba's Berbers at the court after the campaign (and they tend to rivalize the Khurasani)
[7]: Kucha/Kuçar, Xinjiang, China. It's the capital of Anxi Protectorate
[8]: He has even more prestige now after the conflict in Central Asia, while IOTL he delegated it to his trusted commanders
[9]: Muslim Anatolia, only to let it clear
[10]: Similar to what happened IOTL, the difference being that IOTL the deputies were influential tribal arabs while here are native converts
[11]: IOTL the tribal arabs gradually took over the province and partially made the abbasid lost quite a good chunk of revenue from the economically most important province on the Caliphate
[12]: We'll see more on them in the next chapters
[13]: Azerbaijan kinda
 
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New chapter in the coming weeks since i'm inspired, i just want to know if y'all think it's better an chronological-fitting separate minor Ifriqiya update to be the next one or that i go direct into the Part II of covering the Abbasids and only after that covering North Africa.
 
in the ground nothing really was gained, but the battle had a say on the chinese decision for stopping expansion in abbasid territory, even though its grip in Central Asia would only increase as independent, mostly-mountainous city-states were absorbed by the chinese in the region.
Interesting. Is this hinting that the destructive An Lushan rebellion will be butterflied, allowing China to maintain a presence in Central Asia?

Aside from that, how different is the region from OTL at this point?
 
New chapter in the coming weeks since i'm inspired, i just want to know if y'all think it's better an chronological-fitting separate minor Ifriqiya update to be the next one or that i go direct into the Part II of covering the Abbasids and only after that covering North Africa.
Those are amazing news and show more of the world itself, amazing chapter too of what is happening on the Abbasids Homeland and Inmediate border threats, well worth the wait
 
Interesting. Is this hinting that the destructive An Lushan rebellion will be butterflied, allowing China to maintain a presence in Central Asia?

Aside from that, how different is the region from OTL at this point?
I won't throw my cards just yet...But i can say with security that chinese influence will maintain its presence in Central Asia, if China as a polity will maintain its presence there is anybody's guess :p

The main difference is, quite obviously, the extended chinese presence, but in itself it has some more deep things. Firstly, the Türgesh being extinguished by the umayyads resulted in their tribes now being under chinese direct control (as separate tribes of course), and it probably means that the nomads will be in a non-dominant position in relation to the sogdian urban agriculturalists, so long-term it can have great ethnic and linguistical consequences. Another thing is the fact that Central Asia (and much of the eastern abbasid provinces up to the Zagros) are a giant dominion of Abu Muslim, but this will be contested soon enough, if it will be successful is anybody's guess.
Those are amazing news and show more of the world itself, amazing chapter too of what is happening on the Abbasids Homeland and Inmediate border threats, well worth the wait
Thanks for appreciating!
 
I won't throw my cards just yet...But i can say with security that chinese influence will maintain its presence in Central Asia, if China as a polity will maintain its presence there is anybody's guess :p

The main difference is, quite obviously, the extended chinese presence, but in itself it has some more deep things. Firstly, the Türgesh being extinguished by the umayyads resulted in their tribes now being under chinese direct control (as separate tribes of course), and it probably means that the nomads will be in a non-dominant position in relation to the sogdian urban agriculturalists, so long-term it can have great ethnic and linguistical consequences. Another thing is the fact that Central Asia (and much of the eastern abbasid provinces up to the Zagros) are a giant dominion of Abu Muslim, but this will be contested soon enough, if it will be successful is anybody's guess.
Interesting, show as they Expanded into Europe, they left Central Asia alone and that become more variated with diverse tribes and powergroups influencing the region. That is very unique butterfly too.

Thanks for appreciating!
That is a pleasure, this timeline have been amazing
 
Huzzah! The timeline has been blessed with an update!

The rise of the Abbasids will definitely shape the future of Central Asia, but I'm wondering how will al-Andalus, Faransa, and the distant outposts of muslim Europe react to this consolidation. I seem to recall things being not quite stable in Faransa and Allemania...
 
The rise of the Abbasids will definitely shape the future of Central Asia, but I'm wondering how will al-Andalus, Faransa, and the distant outposts of muslim Europe react to this consolidation. I seem to recall things being not quite stable in Faransa and Allemania...
At first the abbasids thought better to not intervene much as you can see, but if things get too shaky, intervention might be necessary, and this notwithstanding the interests of all involved and how these are affected by the abbasid establishment consolidating.
So we will see a Sinicized central Asia on the scale of of Vietnam and Korea populated by settled agriculture Turks?
Sinicized might be a bit too much to assert right now, but certainly more chinese-influenced than IOTL, and as i said before, in the hypothetical event of the turks settling, they probably would assimilate into the rural sogdian population.
 
At first the abbasids thought better to not intervene much as you can see, but if things get too shaky, intervention might be necessary, and this notwithstanding the interests of all involved and how these are affected by the abbasid establishment consolidating.

Sinicized might be a bit too much to assert right now, but certainly more chinese-influenced than IOTL, and as i said before, in the hypothetical event of the turks settling, they probably would assimilate into the rural sogdian population.
Interesting About that Details about the Abbasadis relationship with their European sub-components... Wonder if certain pirates from the north might motivated an intervention them....

Wonder what is Happening in the ERE too
 
Interesting About that Details about the Abbasadis relationship with their European sub-components... Wonder if certain pirates from the north might motivated an intervention them....

Wonder what is Happening in the ERE too
Before anything, sorry for the late response! I was occupied writing my other TL (finished it literally right now). The Vikings will come soon enough :p although at first you will see them messing up more frequently with the british and the germans, they may make a bid for Faransa sometimes (and later everything is up tbh).

In the ERE is just following the civil war as before, as i already promised quite a bit of times we'll get back to it after my little tour east (although the next chapter will be a maghrebi interlude, we'll finish the abbasids soon after and then China!).
 
Before anything, sorry for the late response! I was occupied writing my other TL (finished it literally right now). The Vikings will come soon enough :p although at first you will see them messing up more frequently with the british and the germans, they may make a bid for Faransa sometimes (and later everything is up tbh).

In the ERE is just following the civil war as before, as i already promised quite a bit of times we'll get back to it after my little tour east (although the next chapter will be a maghrebi interlude, we'll finish the abbasids soon after and then China!).
Are they still going to settlel in Normandy? I am very interested in how they will adapted the names of the Norse settlements. If I remember the correctly the language of the Faransa is Occitan with heavy Arabic influence
 
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