March 19th – May 2nd 1944 – Eastern Europe – The Domino’s Fall – Part II – The Fight for Freedom
With Hitler demanding that the Warsaw uprising be crushed immediately, while of course also insisting that the Soviets and Western Allies be driven back, the General Staff in Berlin was frantically trying to find some reserve from somewhere that could be dispatched to Poland and having little success in doing so. As one staff officer put it, ‘we were reduced to ringing round, begging not for divisions but regiments, regardless of how poor quality or depleted they might be.’ In these circumstances it was no surprise that Germany’s remaining allies would face fresh demands for troops to aid in supressing the uprising. There was little expectation that any of the subordinate nations could deliver on these demands, and if they couldn’t then they would provide a convenient scapegoat to blame for the failure of the Wehrmacht to meet Hitler’s demands. Thus, the call went out for the Slovak Army to prepare men and equipment for dispatch to assist the Wehrmacht, primarily by relieving Heer units that could then be dispatched to assist in Poland. These demands proved to be the breaking point for the Slovaks, treated as vassals since 1938 there was no appetite to try and meet the fresh German demands, nor to bear the consequences of failing to do so. The Slovak army did begin to mobilize, but to fight the Germans rather than aid them [1].
Even as the Allies had been preparing to cross the Rhine, King Michael I had been in secret discussions with the Allies to obtain an armistice, which the Allies were willing to offer in exchange for a ceasefire and a declaration of war against Germany. These demands were acceptable to King Michael, however negotiations had been complicated by the Romanian desire to avoid having Soviet forces entering their country. With the war entering its final phases however and the Soviets driving forward regardless the king felt he could postpone no longer and at the end of February a date was set for the coup of March 12th, thus the timing of the Romanian coup had been established well before the beginning of the Warsaw uprising. Far from encouraging the Romanians the alarm the uprising caused in Berlin created a spasm of anxiety and suggestions that perhaps they should postpone. It fell the Michael I himself to veto this idea and the coup went off as scheduled, with the King’s forces swiftly taking control and some among the Iron Guard rapidly changing sides as they were suddenly persuaded of the merits of siding with the King and the Allied cause, so long as they were protected from the consequences of their prior actions. Needing to secure the country as swiftly as possible this was something King Michael and his supporters had little choice but to accept [2].
Officers in the Slovak army had also been working on plans for an attempt to take over the country and turn against the Reich well before the events in Warsaw, working with the resistance groups that had sprung up in the country, some of whom had contact with the Allies via the SOE. This had allowed the plotters some hope that their coup attempt might be well received and their circle of support inside Slovakia had steadily increased as the military situation for the Axis had worsened in the Autumn of 1943. Now with Warsaw in flames and fresh impossible demands from the Reich they decided the time had come to commit themselves and seek to overthrow the collaborationist government, hoping to achieve true independence for Slovakia, or at the very least save themselves from the wrath of the Allies. On the 14th 100,000 soldiers and partisans rose and launched their attempt to seize control of Slovakia. There were still plenty who opposed them, but many had their eyes on what was happening in Germany and the seemingly imminent collapse of Germany. Supposedly ‘loyal’ army units and politicians who might have been expected to oppose the uprising proved remarkably supine, either completely demoralized, or calculating that their personal survival might be best served by a last minute change of heart to embrace the Allied cause and turning on the Nazis, These Damascene conversions did not spare certain politicians from facing trial for their actions after the war and facing the ultimate penalty when found guilty. The Slovak revolt also did nothing to help those Slovak soldiers who found themselves Soviet prisoners of war, with tens of thousands who were shipped to camps in the USSR not surviving to return to Slovakia [3].
In the absence of the information laid out here it is hardly surprising that the conclusion in Berlin was that they were facing a co-ordinated action by Poles, Slavs and Jews to destroy to fatally undermine the Ostheer, thought what various parties saw as the best response to this conclusion varied wildly. Hitler was angry, indeed in the case the term apoplectic is completely appropriate as documents suggest the Fuhrer suffered some sort of collapse, possibly an actual stroke, though the specifics remain a matter of speculation as medical access to Hitler was extremely restricted at this time and those who did treat were firmly discouraged from making any written notes. Whatever the medical condition may have been Hitler was undisputedly out of action once again between the 22nd and 27th of March, with no meetings, tirades, or orders emanating from Hitler, though several contradictory commands were issued during this time ‘in the name of the Fuhrer’. Von Kleist and the General Staff fell by contrast into a deep gloom, and even among the most cautious of officers there were now comments that the war was over, and Germany should throw itself on the mercy of the Western Allies before the vengeful Red Army stormed into Fatherland [4].
Defeatist sentiments were hardly unique to the Generals, Goering was very quietly putting out peace feelers to the Western Allies, even willing to embrace something akin to unconditional surrender, though of course he did arrogantly insist on two conditions. One was his own personal survival and the other was that Germany would be surrendered only to the British and Americans. In this Goering demonstrated that he was every bit as detached from reality as Hitler. Relations with the Soviets might be turning increasingly frosty, but the Western Allies had no intention of breaking their commitment that they would not make a separate peace, especially when doing so would risk provoking an armed conflict with the USSR. These surreptitious attempts at making peace came to an abrupt halt when Hitler finally began issuing orders on the 28th of March, though it would have been difficult to argue he had regained any semblance of coherence. Now units were to mount immediate counterattacks on all fronts and punish the traitors, driving the Americans and British back over the Rhine while the Ostheer struck for the Ukraine, while of course securing the vital oil supplies from Romania. Warsaw and Bratislava would be dealt with once the Reich was secure and their enemies in full retreat. OKH could only despair at these orders, especially as the Soviets launched an offensive aimed at Romania and Hungary on the 26th of March [5].
The Red Army was operating at full stretch when the uprisings took place. The offensive aimed at Romania had been ready even before the coup. Poland however was a different matter, the intention there was a to launch an offensive in the last part of April and the movement of troops and supplies had been planned accordingly. Now Stalin insisted that the Red Army should launch the offensive no later than end of March. In the end the attack began on the 2nd of April, and it was a distinctly slapdash affair. It was powerful enough that the Germans had to begin falling but it was at no point able to achieve the kind of breakthrough that would have allowed the Red Army to roll up the German forces and have a clear run at the Vistula. It was one of history’s ironies that the Soviet offensive ran out of momentum very close the same demarcation line as they had agreed with the Germans in 1939, with the front stalling along the line of the river Bug. This halt has been interpreted in some quarters, including senior officers of the PHA in 1944, as being a deliberate decision by Stalin, expecting to leave Warsaw at the mercy of the Heer and the SS. Certainly Stalin would have been happy to see the PHA crushed, but the halt on the Bug was the product of the Red Army reaching the limit of its supply lines. It had no choice but to halt and regroup, even though its advance had inflicted heavy losses on the Germans and left them desperately trying to shore up their defensive positions, with nothing to spare to direct against the Poles, or the Allied efforts to aid them [6].
The scale and form of that aid had become a subject of heated debate among the British, Americans, and the Polish formations attached to British army. General Sosabowski proposed that the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade drop its full strength practically on top of Warsaw to link up with the Polish Home Army, being supported by aerial resupply. This plan was generously called courageous, less generously as ‘absurdly reckless’. Given that the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was still regrouping after its operations crossing the Rhine, and gliders were in short supply, this was rejected outright. What the British were prepared to support, being willing to commit elements of 1st and 6th Airborne, was a series of smaller scale drops designed to seize control of landing zones where makeshift airfields could be set up while some of the airborne troops seized and held strategic crossroads and villages to cut German lines of communication. This plan, named Operation Sikorsky, was based on the tactics that had been used with great success in South East Asia and was bolstered by intelligence reports that revealed just how thinly stretched the Wehrmacht was, especially with the ongoing uprising in Slovakia and Romanian coup. The Allies would also seek to airdrop as much as they could in the way of supplies to the fighters in Warsaw, although inevitably a significant amount of these would fall into German hands owing to wind weather and navigational errors. This was far less than the Polish government in exile and some in Whitehall had hoped for, it did however bolster the defenders in Warsaw and create fresh threat for the German troops in Poland that they would be hard pressed to respond to. These operations would expand significantly during April and May as the Allies thrust deeper into Germany. Above all Operation Sikorsky meant that the remnant of the Warsaw Ghetto was also spared from further German attacks, and the Jewish fighters had gained a certain grudging respect from the PHA, which led to a far more equitable distribution of rations and fuel than had previously been the case, saving untold lives among the non-combatants [7].
In contrast to the commitment of men and materiel to Poland support for the Romanians took the form of a rapid recognition of the new government by the British, Americans, and Soviet governments rather than any practical assistance, besides the ongoing Soviet operations. That the Soviet offensive drew off much of the German forces in the area certainly aided the coup, though the steady advance of the Red Army was a source of anxiety to King Michael and his ministers who were under no illusions that a Soviet occupying force would be sympathetic towards a monarchist regime once the Germans were defeated. This led to intensified efforts to obtain guarantees from the Western Allies about Romanian independence, however this was not a discussion the British or Americans were prepared to enter while the situation on the ground remained so fluid, and they were not about to make any commitments that might further antagonize the Soviets. The Soviets, meaning Stalin of course, were in no mood to acquiesce to such guarantees, certainly not when it seemed that the British and Americans were determined that Poland would lie in their sphere of influence [8].
If the Romanians had reason to be disappointed by the response of the Allies the Slovaks were simply left to their own devices, even as they pleaded with the Western Allies for assistance. Patton was still completely focused on the drive to Berlin and was not about to divert men and supplies to aiding the Slovaks and unlike the Poles there was no government in exile or Slovak formations in the Allied forces eager to go to the aid of their countrymen. The attitude towards the Slovaks in Washington and London was cool to say the least, they were seen as ‘backstabbers’ who had first betrayed the Czechs and had now opportunistically turned on the Germans. This didn’t stop encouraging noises about the future of Slovakia being issued from the Allied camp, but these were not backed by any practical action. It would not be unfair to see these pronouncements as a cynical exercise only intended to keep the Slovak army fighting against the Germans and put a further drain on Wehrmacht resources. Many Czechs were equally ambivalent about the Slovak uprising, with resistance groups and SOE operations unwilling or unable to act in support. This was hardly surprising given the Slovak actions in 1938 and 1939 and there was little appetite to simply return to the pre-war status quo as if nothing had happened. Better in the minds of many Czechs, and some in London and Washington, to let the Slovak army bleed out fighting the Germans and those elements who had remained loyal to the pro-Nazi regime, while pressing Patton to prepare a swift strike to seize Prague and secure what would become the Czech Republic [9].
In respect of the success, or otherwise, of the uprising in Eastern Europe historians have rightly credited the heroism of those who fought to liberate their countries but have often been far too eager to lay blame for it falling short of true liberation on the USSR and the Western Allies. The Red Army offensives certainly had a beneficial impact on the uprisings, though their actions after they advanced into Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary for that matter, negates this for many who lived in the Bratislava Pact countries after the war [10]. The Western Allies intervention in Poland is also subject to much criticism, largely because it stands in stark contrast to their actions elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The counter to this is that without the rapid advance of the Allies from Normandy to Berlin the Soviets would potentially have taken control of a swathe of Europe stretching from Helsinki in the North to Turin in the south and possibly as far west as Paris [11].
These arguments however tend to ignore the fact that in many respects the fate of the Poles, Slovaks and Romanians was decided in Berlin. The grim fatalism that took hold after the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and Warsaw rose did not lift as March passed into April and any ideas of the Third Reich surviving or even achieving a negotiated peace were abandoned. Now the only thing left to the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS was a desperate resolve to keep the Red Army off German soil at all costs, whatever mad schemes for victory Hitler put forward. No one in Germany could be in any doubt about what could be expected in any part of Germany that was overrun by the Red Army. Three years of unbridled brutality on the Eastern Front had filled the Red Army with an understandable desire for vengeance and the Germans could expect neither mercy nor restraint if Soviet soldiers had the opportunity to enact that revenge. The Western Allies on the other hand could at least be expected to respect the laws of war and it was one thing to reject a separate peace, quite another to simply hand over territory they had spent lives and treasure to conquer to the USSR. No orders, either written or verbal were issued, but the evidence from the last battles for the Reich is clear, every effort was made to hold back the Red Army, while a decidedly lower priority was given to dispatching what reserves could be scraped up to fight against Anglo-American advance, and none at all was committed to pointless acts like reducing Warsaw to rubble, whatever assurances were given to Hitler [12].
There was a considerable Irony in the fact that much like the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians, the Germans themselves were now reduced to pinning their hopes on the political horse-trading that would take place between the victors once the war was over, an event that was now weeks away rather than months [13].
[1] Similar efforts to extract more manpower were doubtless applied to the Hungarians as well, but with far less dramatic consequences.
[2] The Romanian coup is probably by far the most dangerous of the three uprisings as far the Reich is concerned, threatening to cut off what little oil is reaching Germany.
[3] The Slovak revolt does somewhat better here than OTL, unfortunately this will not do them a lot of good when it comes to carving up Europe.
[4] The uneasy peace between the various factions forged after Valhalla is falling apart, which is good news for certain groups.
[5] The Red Army is overstretching itself, trying to secure as much territory as it can and desperately looking for a breakthrough that will allow them to drive into Germany.
[6] So yes, the Red Army has stalled out a long way short of Warsaw, which leaves the door wide open.
[7] The Allies have been able to help the uprising here, and the PHA only has to hold out until the war in Europe ends, which is not very far away at this point.
[8] Stalin can read a map, his great anxiety now is securing a piece of Germany when it looks like that will depend on the co-operation of the British and Americans.
[9] There isn’t going to be a ‘velvet divorce’ ITTL.
[10] So the Pact is signed in a different city.
[11] Which was a worst case scenario for OTL if D-Day fell short.
[12] The leadership of the Third Reich is being fuelled by deception and delusion at this point.
[13] The countdown to VE-Day is running, but first a trip back to South East Asia, where the Allies will finally try and put an end to the endless French complaining.