Not yet.... but any moment now... just wait... it's coming, real soon... No really...
Randy
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Not yet.... but any moment now... just wait... it's coming, real soon... No really...
Randy
Garrison
Donor
As the situation grows worse Hitler's twin obsessions of destroying the Jews and Communism are blinding him to the reality of what's happening in the west and most of his generals aren't inclined to correct him as they are pretty sure they will be better off with the British and Americans in Berlin than the Soviets.Not yet.... but any moment now... just wait... it's coming, real soon... No really...
Randy
March 19th – May 2nd 1944 – Eastern Europe – The Domino’s Fall – Part I – Warsaw in Flames
Garrison
Donor
March 19th – May 2nd 1944 – Eastern Europe – The Domino’s Fall – Part I – Warsaw in Flames
The idea that the evolution of events in Eastern Europe in the Spring of 1944 has been characterised as an example of the ‘domino effect’, implying that one even led directly to the next and then the next. While there is certainly some justification in this interpretation, and it has proven especially popular among some Polish historians, plans had been progressing in Poland, Slovakia and Romania in parallel for many months, with nothing in the way of co-ordination or indeed awareness of what the others were planning. In terms of the timing of events the key catalyst was the Allies successfully crossing the Rhine. In Berlin this created a fresh outbreak of panic, in Warsaw, Bratislava and Bucharest on the other hand this was seen as the moment to strike back against the Reich and regain their freedom, preferably before the Red Army came storming into those cities [1].
Czechoslovakia and Poland had been the earliest conquests of the Wehrmacht and even as the Germans were driven from France and Belgium both nations, or at least the successor states they had been broken up into, were still firmly in the grip of the Reich and being ruthless exploited to prop it up. The Slovaks might have been spared some of the deprivations inflicted on what the Nazis called the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, but any idea that they had achieved real independence with the declaration of the Slovak Republic had been dispelled as the government in Bratislava enacted Nazi anti-Jewish policies and faced increasing demands for manpower and resources that Slovakia had to try and meet despite the hardships this inflicted on their own people. They had also seen the treatment meted out to other supposed allies of the Reich and as the war had turned against the Axis this had fuelled the existence of a resistance movement and widespread discontent in the Slovakian military [2].
Romania had followed a rather different trajectory, being somewhat inclined towards the British and French during much of the 1930s and able to extract favourable terms for the sale of its oil to the Reich. This had changed significantly in 1938, beginning with the imposition of the ‘royal dictatorship’ by King Carol II and being significantly accelerated by the Anglo-French acquiescence to the Munich Agreement, which was seen as clear proof that neither country would do anything to defend the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In the aftermath of the Fall of France Romania had little choice but to acquiesce in the loss of territory to both the USSR and Hungary, while seeing the output of its oilfields reserved for the exclusive use of the Reich. The government that assumed power in 1940 was increasingly dominated by the Iron Guard movement and it became a wholehearted supporter of Nazi Germany and collaborated fully in the Holocaust, sending as many as 150,000 Jews to their death. By the latter part of 1943 it was clear that the war was lost and this considerably dimmed the enthusiasm of the Iron Guard and its supporters in addition to creating a groundswell of opposition to the regime. This allowed the new king Michael I to make rapid headway in co-opting military and civilian leaders to his plans for a coup to not only overthrow the fascist regime controlling Romania but to declare war on the Reich into the bargain [3].
While Romania had suffered despite its position as an ally of the Reich and the Czechs had seen their country dismantled at the hands of the Nazis, the Poles had fared considerably worse, with not only their nation but their entire people marked for elimination. The Germans had been denied the opportunity to carry out their plans for the Polish people to their fullest, nonetheless their interim plans for Poland had been bad enough. The country had been carved up with the intention of taking its best lands for colonization and exploitation of German settlers, with the Polish population to be relegated to the resource poor lands of the Central Government. The destruction of most of the Polish population might have been postponed but the Jewish citizens of Poland had enjoyed few such reprieve. The Nazi grand plan to relocate the entirety of the Polish population to the Central Government had foundered in the face of the limitations of the available resources and the growth of resistance to the German plans. This did not mean that the Reich didn’t find ways to brutalize and destroy the people who were herded into the Central Government. Up until 1942 the Central Government had been a net importer of food, however in response to the food crisis in Western Europe and Germany the Central Government was suddenly expected to export foodstuffs and it was only a good summer and bumper harvest that prevented immediate catastrophe, though again the Jews in the ghettos found their rations slashed even further than the rest of the Poles. This was largely academic as the Jews struggled to find any food regardless of the official rations that were set. In the face of this it was hardly surprising the city of Warsaw had become a hotbed of resistance, with the both the Polish Home Army and the Jews in the ghetto preparing to rise against their occupiers [4].
There was little co-ordination between the Polish Home Army and the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto, not surprising given that antisemitism was hardly the exclusive purview of the Nazis. Despite this the Jewish Resistance had acquired weapons to fight with and while some of their fellow Jews might have clung to the hope that those being sent further east were being resettled many had drawn more realistic conclusions and accepted the grim conclusion that the only hope of survival lay in fighting back. The threat of a final dissolution had hung over the Ghetto throughout 1943 and after a period in the early part of the year where deportations had ceased, the liquidation of the Ghetto had seemed imminent. However Allied landings in France, the attempted assassination of Hitler and the diversion of resources from the death camps to the needs of the Wehrmacht led to the continual postponement of the final destruction of the Ghetto as in the absence of Himmler the upper echelons of the Reich debated whether it would be better to work the remaining Jewish population to death rather than simply murdering them more quickly in the gas chambers. This temporary reprieve had allowed the resistance in the Ghetto to acquire more arms and improve their plans for when the Germans finally made up their mind and decided to put them death. On February 18th 1944 Hitler finally grew tired of all the arguments to ‘spare’ the Jews and insisted that their extermination must once again be given the highest priority. This insistence may have been driven by a sense that the Reich’s days were numbered and that if the ‘great task’ were not finished soon it would never be finished. The destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto now became an urgent task for the German garrison in Warsaw, though one they where they expected the challenges to be organizational rather than military [5].
The German preparations for the dissolution of the Ghetto were hardly secretive, a fresh series of proclamations were posted and the Judenrat, the committee of Jews charged with running the Ghetto, was issued with orders that left no doubt that there would be no further delays in evacuating the population ‘for resettlement’. Even now there were many who were prepared to comply with these orders, either too broken to resist or believing there was no hope of fighting back. Those who felt otherwise put their own plans into effect and when the Germans launched their operation on the 19th of March they were taken completely by surprise as they found themselves drawn into street fighting with the determined and desperate Jewish resistance. The garrison forces in Warsaw had been drawn down by the needs of the fighting in the east and west and no reinforcements had been forthcoming to aid with the destruction of the Ghetto, which was after all simply a matter of rounding up the starving and helpless population, the Jews would simply let themselves be meekly marched away to their doom as had happened in the past. That the resistance confounded this expectation with their fierce attacks left the Germans stunned and initial calls for reinforcements were dismissed as an overreaction to a few local scuffles. Only on the third day of the uprising was there any meaningful response and this largely involved pulling troops out of other parts of Warsaw and its environs. This would set off the chain reaction that turned the relatively small-scale battle in the Ghetto into a disaster for the Wehrmacht and the SS [6].
The Polish Home Army was every bit as surprised as the Germans at the ferocity of the Jewish resistance and whatever the feelings about the Jews among some in their ranks the PHA could hardly ignore the opportunity that the fighting in the Ghetto presented. The Polish Home Army and other resistance elements had been hoping to time their own actions to take advantage of the next major thrust by the Red Army. They had no desire to see the Soviets in Warsaw, but taking advantage of them pinning down the Ostheer was another matter. There were still bitter memories of what the Soviets had done in September of 1939 and while the Western Allies were largely dismissive of German claims about Soviet atrocities the Poles knew that the Katyn massacre and other crimes had been carried out by the Soviets, not the Nazis. The panic that settled over the German garrison in Warsaw after the rising in the Ghetto encouraged the Polish Home Army to believe that now was the time to act, not to mention reports that the Soviets were on the brink of launching a fresh offensive whose ultimate objective was Poland, this offered the hope that whatever reserves the Wehrmacht and the SS could muster would be sent somewhere other than Warsaw. With the Anglo-Americans also driving swiftly eastwards through Germany the word went out, carefully horded arms were distributed, and on the 23rd of March the Germans suffered a further massive shock as the remainder of the city of Warsaw rose up against them [7].
German troops being organized to move into the Ghetto found themselves under fierce attacks, leaving the garrison forces increasingly disorganized and General Reiner Stahel, in overall command of the Warsaw garrison, had no choice but to start withdrawing his forces towards the outskirts of the city to regroup on the 25th of March and await reinforcements, whenever those might appear. Some SS detachments remained in the Ghetto, and it is unclear whether Stahel simply chose to leave them in place, or they failed to receive word of the withdrawal, or if in fact they simply chose to ignore the orders to abandon their mission to destroy the Ghetto. One reason that Stahel used to justify his withdrawal to Berlin was that he had called for the Luftwaffe to carry out attacks on the city, hoping that as in 1939 Warsaw would capitulate under the weight of German airpower. On the 26th and 27th Luftwaffe bombers did attack, with Stukas and medium bombers inflicting considerable civilian casualties, however they fell far short of what Stahel had wanted and far from capitulating the resistance forces simply dug in deeper and the rubble from bombed buildings was used to build more barricades [8].
Despite promises to the contrary Luftwaffe operations against Warsaw petered out after the 27th, the product of the fact that the Luftwaffe was close to complete collapse, with its airfields under near constant attack and fuel and trained pilots in short supply, though ironically there were still plenty of airframes available, stacked in underground factories awaiting engines and other components that would never arrive. Faced with demands elsewhere the Luftwaffe had little choice but to leave Warsaw to the Heer and the SS. The latter were certainly eager to move against the Ghetto in particular, but they had no reserves to deploy as the Waffen SS was heavily committed fighting on the eastern front, exactly as the Polish Home Army had hoped, and the formations in Warsaw had already suffered badly because of the failure to withdraw in concert with the Wehrmacht troops [9].
Stahel was under substantial pressure to retake control of the city and complete the liquidation of the Ghetto. He in turn insisted that he needed more troops, regardless of where they were drawn from. The response to this plea was the trigger for the Slovak Army to turn on the puppet government of their country and their German allies [10].
[1] It’s now or never, for some groups more than others.
[2] Safe to say that the Czechs and the Slovaks will not be the best of friends after the war.
[3] Romania is following similar trajectory to OTL, with the exceptions that fewer Jews will be sent to the camps and coup plot takes shape more rapidly.
[4] Of course the Ghetto suffered a far worse fate IOTL.
[5] The German forces are thinking of this as a messy chore rather than a proper military operation, this is serious error of judgement.
[6] Because its not like the Poles are planning anything in the rest of the city…
[7] And so the entire city has risen against the Nazis.
[8] The Luftwaffe falling short once again.
[9] There just aren’t any German troops available to deploy, so they will have to turn to their allies…
[10] …which is a terrible idea.
Hm, I wonder if the Germans might then try to crackdown on all their 'allied' armies in response to this. They couldn't be that dumb...
Oh boy looks like the whole east is rising against the Huns! This is so delicious!
Wow; this will probably result in the total collapse of the German war effort in the East; hope this doesn't let the Soviets sink their claws into Poland, Romania, Slovakia, ect...
Hopefully the Wallies, Poles, Slovakians, Romanians, ect. will be able to meet the Soviets at the pre-war Polish border (+ Bessarabia)...
Would be great if Soviet gains in Europe post-war were restricted to the Baltic States (probably impossible to keep them free), East Prussia, the small bits of Finland, and maybe a few slight border adjustments in Poland...
Hopefully the Wallies, Poles, Slovakians, Romanians, ect. will be able to meet the Soviets at the pre-war Polish border (+ Bessarabia)...
Would be great if Soviet gains in Europe post-war were restricted to the Baltic States (probably impossible to keep them free), East Prussia, the small bits of Finland, and maybe a few slight border adjustments in Poland...
Garrison
Donor
Some will be saved and some won't as the realpolitik of coming to workable settlement with the Soviets remains important, even there are some in the Western Allies who think they should keep going east after Berlin and head for Moscow.
March 19th – May 2nd 1944 – Eastern Europe – The Domino’s Fall – Part II – The Fight for Freedom
Garrison
Donor
March 19th – May 2nd 1944 – Eastern Europe – The Domino’s Fall – Part II – The Fight for Freedom
With Hitler demanding that the Warsaw uprising be crushed immediately, while of course also insisting that the Soviets and Western Allies be driven back, the General Staff in Berlin was frantically trying to find some reserve from somewhere that could be dispatched to Poland and having little success in doing so. As one staff officer put it, ‘we were reduced to ringing round, begging not for divisions but regiments, regardless of how poor quality or depleted they might be.’ In these circumstances it was no surprise that Germany’s remaining allies would face fresh demands for troops to aid in supressing the uprising. There was little expectation that any of the subordinate nations could deliver on these demands, and if they couldn’t then they would provide a convenient scapegoat to blame for the failure of the Wehrmacht to meet Hitler’s demands. Thus, the call went out for the Slovak Army to prepare men and equipment for dispatch to assist the Wehrmacht, primarily by relieving Heer units that could then be dispatched to assist in Poland. These demands proved to be the breaking point for the Slovaks, treated as vassals since 1938 there was no appetite to try and meet the fresh German demands, nor to bear the consequences of failing to do so. The Slovak army did begin to mobilize, but to fight the Germans rather than aid them [1].
Even as the Allies had been preparing to cross the Rhine, King Michael I had been in secret discussions with the Allies to obtain an armistice, which the Allies were willing to offer in exchange for a ceasefire and a declaration of war against Germany. These demands were acceptable to King Michael, however negotiations had been complicated by the Romanian desire to avoid having Soviet forces entering their country. With the war entering its final phases however and the Soviets driving forward regardless the king felt he could postpone no longer and at the end of February a date was set for the coup of March 12th, thus the timing of the Romanian coup had been established well before the beginning of the Warsaw uprising. Far from encouraging the Romanians the alarm the uprising caused in Berlin created a spasm of anxiety and suggestions that perhaps they should postpone. It fell the Michael I himself to veto this idea and the coup went off as scheduled, with the King’s forces swiftly taking control and some among the Iron Guard rapidly changing sides as they were suddenly persuaded of the merits of siding with the King and the Allied cause, so long as they were protected from the consequences of their prior actions. Needing to secure the country as swiftly as possible this was something King Michael and his supporters had little choice but to accept [2].
Officers in the Slovak army had also been working on plans for an attempt to take over the country and turn against the Reich well before the events in Warsaw, working with the resistance groups that had sprung up in the country, some of whom had contact with the Allies via the SOE. This had allowed the plotters some hope that their coup attempt might be well received and their circle of support inside Slovakia had steadily increased as the military situation for the Axis had worsened in the Autumn of 1943. Now with Warsaw in flames and fresh impossible demands from the Reich they decided the time had come to commit themselves and seek to overthrow the collaborationist government, hoping to achieve true independence for Slovakia, or at the very least save themselves from the wrath of the Allies. On the 14th 100,000 soldiers and partisans rose and launched their attempt to seize control of Slovakia. There were still plenty who opposed them, but many had their eyes on what was happening in Germany and the seemingly imminent collapse of Germany. Supposedly ‘loyal’ army units and politicians who might have been expected to oppose the uprising proved remarkably supine, either completely demoralized, or calculating that their personal survival might be best served by a last minute change of heart to embrace the Allied cause and turning on the Nazis, These Damascene conversions did not spare certain politicians from facing trial for their actions after the war and facing the ultimate penalty when found guilty. The Slovak revolt also did nothing to help those Slovak soldiers who found themselves Soviet prisoners of war, with tens of thousands who were shipped to camps in the USSR not surviving to return to Slovakia [3].
In the absence of the information laid out here it is hardly surprising that the conclusion in Berlin was that they were facing a co-ordinated action by Poles, Slavs and Jews to destroy to fatally undermine the Ostheer, thought what various parties saw as the best response to this conclusion varied wildly. Hitler was angry, indeed in the case the term apoplectic is completely appropriate as documents suggest the Fuhrer suffered some sort of collapse, possibly an actual stroke, though the specifics remain a matter of speculation as medical access to Hitler was extremely restricted at this time and those who did treat were firmly discouraged from making any written notes. Whatever the medical condition may have been Hitler was undisputedly out of action once again between the 22nd and 27th of March, with no meetings, tirades, or orders emanating from Hitler, though several contradictory commands were issued during this time ‘in the name of the Fuhrer’. Von Kleist and the General Staff fell by contrast into a deep gloom, and even among the most cautious of officers there were now comments that the war was over, and Germany should throw itself on the mercy of the Western Allies before the vengeful Red Army stormed into Fatherland [4].
Defeatist sentiments were hardly unique to the Generals, Goering was very quietly putting out peace feelers to the Western Allies, even willing to embrace something akin to unconditional surrender, though of course he did arrogantly insist on two conditions. One was his own personal survival and the other was that Germany would be surrendered only to the British and Americans. In this Goering demonstrated that he was every bit as detached from reality as Hitler. Relations with the Soviets might be turning increasingly frosty, but the Western Allies had no intention of breaking their commitment that they would not make a separate peace, especially when doing so would risk provoking an armed conflict with the USSR. These surreptitious attempts at making peace came to an abrupt halt when Hitler finally began issuing orders on the 28th of March, though it would have been difficult to argue he had regained any semblance of coherence. Now units were to mount immediate counterattacks on all fronts and punish the traitors, driving the Americans and British back over the Rhine while the Ostheer struck for the Ukraine, while of course securing the vital oil supplies from Romania. Warsaw and Bratislava would be dealt with once the Reich was secure and their enemies in full retreat. OKH could only despair at these orders, especially as the Soviets launched an offensive aimed at Romania and Hungary on the 26th of March [5].
The Red Army was operating at full stretch when the uprisings took place. The offensive aimed at Romania had been ready even before the coup. Poland however was a different matter, the intention there was a to launch an offensive in the last part of April and the movement of troops and supplies had been planned accordingly. Now Stalin insisted that the Red Army should launch the offensive no later than end of March. In the end the attack began on the 2nd of April, and it was a distinctly slapdash affair. It was powerful enough that the Germans had to begin falling but it was at no point able to achieve the kind of breakthrough that would have allowed the Red Army to roll up the German forces and have a clear run at the Vistula. It was one of history’s ironies that the Soviet offensive ran out of momentum very close the same demarcation line as they had agreed with the Germans in 1939, with the front stalling along the line of the river Bug. This halt has been interpreted in some quarters, including senior officers of the PHA in 1944, as being a deliberate decision by Stalin, expecting to leave Warsaw at the mercy of the Heer and the SS. Certainly Stalin would have been happy to see the PHA crushed, but the halt on the Bug was the product of the Red Army reaching the limit of its supply lines. It had no choice but to halt and regroup, even though its advance had inflicted heavy losses on the Germans and left them desperately trying to shore up their defensive positions, with nothing to spare to direct against the Poles, or the Allied efforts to aid them [6].
The scale and form of that aid had become a subject of heated debate among the British, Americans, and the Polish formations attached to British army. General Sosabowski proposed that the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade drop its full strength practically on top of Warsaw to link up with the Polish Home Army, being supported by aerial resupply. This plan was generously called courageous, less generously as ‘absurdly reckless’. Given that the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was still regrouping after its operations crossing the Rhine, and gliders were in short supply, this was rejected outright. What the British were prepared to support, being willing to commit elements of 1st and 6th Airborne, was a series of smaller scale drops designed to seize control of landing zones where makeshift airfields could be set up while some of the airborne troops seized and held strategic crossroads and villages to cut German lines of communication. This plan, named Operation Sikorsky, was based on the tactics that had been used with great success in South East Asia and was bolstered by intelligence reports that revealed just how thinly stretched the Wehrmacht was, especially with the ongoing uprising in Slovakia and Romanian coup. The Allies would also seek to airdrop as much as they could in the way of supplies to the fighters in Warsaw, although inevitably a significant amount of these would fall into German hands owing to wind weather and navigational errors. This was far less than the Polish government in exile and some in Whitehall had hoped for, it did however bolster the defenders in Warsaw and create fresh threat for the German troops in Poland that they would be hard pressed to respond to. These operations would expand significantly during April and May as the Allies thrust deeper into Germany. Above all Operation Sikorsky meant that the remnant of the Warsaw Ghetto was also spared from further German attacks, and the Jewish fighters had gained a certain grudging respect from the PHA, which led to a far more equitable distribution of rations and fuel than had previously been the case, saving untold lives among the non-combatants [7].
In contrast to the commitment of men and materiel to Poland support for the Romanians took the form of a rapid recognition of the new government by the British, Americans, and Soviet governments rather than any practical assistance, besides the ongoing Soviet operations. That the Soviet offensive drew off much of the German forces in the area certainly aided the coup, though the steady advance of the Red Army was a source of anxiety to King Michael and his ministers who were under no illusions that a Soviet occupying force would be sympathetic towards a monarchist regime once the Germans were defeated. This led to intensified efforts to obtain guarantees from the Western Allies about Romanian independence, however this was not a discussion the British or Americans were prepared to enter while the situation on the ground remained so fluid, and they were not about to make any commitments that might further antagonize the Soviets. The Soviets, meaning Stalin of course, were in no mood to acquiesce to such guarantees, certainly not when it seemed that the British and Americans were determined that Poland would lie in their sphere of influence [8].
If the Romanians had reason to be disappointed by the response of the Allies the Slovaks were simply left to their own devices, even as they pleaded with the Western Allies for assistance. Patton was still completely focused on the drive to Berlin and was not about to divert men and supplies to aiding the Slovaks and unlike the Poles there was no government in exile or Slovak formations in the Allied forces eager to go to the aid of their countrymen. The attitude towards the Slovaks in Washington and London was cool to say the least, they were seen as ‘backstabbers’ who had first betrayed the Czechs and had now opportunistically turned on the Germans. This didn’t stop encouraging noises about the future of Slovakia being issued from the Allied camp, but these were not backed by any practical action. It would not be unfair to see these pronouncements as a cynical exercise only intended to keep the Slovak army fighting against the Germans and put a further drain on Wehrmacht resources. Many Czechs were equally ambivalent about the Slovak uprising, with resistance groups and SOE operations unwilling or unable to act in support. This was hardly surprising given the Slovak actions in 1938 and 1939 and there was little appetite to simply return to the pre-war status quo as if nothing had happened. Better in the minds of many Czechs, and some in London and Washington, to let the Slovak army bleed out fighting the Germans and those elements who had remained loyal to the pro-Nazi regime, while pressing Patton to prepare a swift strike to seize Prague and secure what would become the Czech Republic [9].
In respect of the success, or otherwise, of the uprising in Eastern Europe historians have rightly credited the heroism of those who fought to liberate their countries but have often been far too eager to lay blame for it falling short of true liberation on the USSR and the Western Allies. The Red Army offensives certainly had a beneficial impact on the uprisings, though their actions after they advanced into Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary for that matter, negates this for many who lived in the Bratislava Pact countries after the war [10]. The Western Allies intervention in Poland is also subject to much criticism, largely because it stands in stark contrast to their actions elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The counter to this is that without the rapid advance of the Allies from Normandy to Berlin the Soviets would potentially have taken control of a swathe of Europe stretching from Helsinki in the North to Turin in the south and possibly as far west as Paris [11].
These arguments however tend to ignore the fact that in many respects the fate of the Poles, Slovaks and Romanians was decided in Berlin. The grim fatalism that took hold after the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and Warsaw rose did not lift as March passed into April and any ideas of the Third Reich surviving or even achieving a negotiated peace were abandoned. Now the only thing left to the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS was a desperate resolve to keep the Red Army off German soil at all costs, whatever mad schemes for victory Hitler put forward. No one in Germany could be in any doubt about what could be expected in any part of Germany that was overrun by the Red Army. Three years of unbridled brutality on the Eastern Front had filled the Red Army with an understandable desire for vengeance and the Germans could expect neither mercy nor restraint if Soviet soldiers had the opportunity to enact that revenge. The Western Allies on the other hand could at least be expected to respect the laws of war and it was one thing to reject a separate peace, quite another to simply hand over territory they had spent lives and treasure to conquer to the USSR. No orders, either written or verbal were issued, but the evidence from the last battles for the Reich is clear, every effort was made to hold back the Red Army, while a decidedly lower priority was given to dispatching what reserves could be scraped up to fight against Anglo-American advance, and none at all was committed to pointless acts like reducing Warsaw to rubble, whatever assurances were given to Hitler [12].
There was a considerable Irony in the fact that much like the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and Romanians, the Germans themselves were now reduced to pinning their hopes on the political horse-trading that would take place between the victors once the war was over, an event that was now weeks away rather than months [13].
[1] Similar efforts to extract more manpower were doubtless applied to the Hungarians as well, but with far less dramatic consequences.
[2] The Romanian coup is probably by far the most dangerous of the three uprisings as far the Reich is concerned, threatening to cut off what little oil is reaching Germany.
[3] The Slovak revolt does somewhat better here than OTL, unfortunately this will not do them a lot of good when it comes to carving up Europe.
[4] The uneasy peace between the various factions forged after Valhalla is falling apart, which is good news for certain groups.
[5] The Red Army is overstretching itself, trying to secure as much territory as it can and desperately looking for a breakthrough that will allow them to drive into Germany.
[6] So yes, the Red Army has stalled out a long way short of Warsaw, which leaves the door wide open.
[7] The Allies have been able to help the uprising here, and the PHA only has to hold out until the war in Europe ends, which is not very far away at this point.
[8] Stalin can read a map, his great anxiety now is securing a piece of Germany when it looks like that will depend on the co-operation of the British and Americans.
[9] There isn’t going to be a ‘velvet divorce’ ITTL.
[10] So the Pact is signed in a different city.
[11] Which was a worst case scenario for OTL if D-Day fell short.
[12] The leadership of the Third Reich is being fuelled by deception and delusion at this point.
[13] The countdown to VE-Day is running, but first a trip back to South East Asia, where the Allies will finally try and put an end to the endless French complaining.
Just (finally) managed to get hold of a copy of https://www.amazon.co.uk/Third-Axis-Fourth-Ally-Romanian/dp/1854092677 from the library - used copies are going for north of £230. Given the premise that the Romanians had the third largest Axis military, this will have a major impact.
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part I – A Battle for French Honour
Garrison
Donor
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part I – A Battle for French Honour
The Japanese had not wholly abandoned their positions in Thailand after the fall of Bangkok, and almost inevitably instead of trying to consolidate they had launched futile counterattacks as the British moved east to secure their control of the Thai capital. These attacks had no impact on the British timetable and by February of 1944 they were already beginning to prepare for their next major action, a thrust into Indochina. The main aims of this campaign would be to secure Cambodia and seize the port at Saigon in Vietnam greatly facilitating any further drives to the north. The island of Hainan and of course Hong Kong were potential targets for such future operations, and there were already suggestions, though not well received ones, about a move to seize a base of operations in Korea. Taking Saigon would also help US operations in the Philippines by removing it as jumping off point for supply runs to the beleaguered Japanese garrisons, though the existing interdiction efforts conducted by the Royal Navy and US Navy had all but completely cut off this lifeline and the disparity in resources between the two sides was emphasised by the fact that the Americans were preparing Operation Forager, the invasion of the Marianas and Palau islands even as they were still winding up operations in the Philippines. Forager would be launched two weeks after Douaumont on the 19th of April and the US forces had secured their objectives by the end of August 1944 and worked swiftly to build a network of airfields, including bases to support the new B-29 Superfortress, to carry out bombing missions against the Japanese Home Islands [1].
This two-pronged assault was not the product of any grand strategic agreement on the part of the Allies and more an expression of the extent to which the British and Americans were conducting their own separate wars in the Pacific. Though in this case the British were arguably fighting a French war. As British and American forces drew ever closer to Japan this situation would have to be addressed. No one was interested in engaging in that discussion while Forager and Douaumont were being prepared this dual track approach, sarcastically referred to as ‘separate but equal’ by some in the American camp, would continue well into the Autumn of 1944, fortunately without any negative consequences for the fighting in Indochina and the Marianas [2].
For the French leadership, now having firmly re-established themselves in Paris none of these larger strategic concerns really mattered, as far as they were concerned the invasion of Indochina was a long overdue operation to clear the Japanese from French territory though they did their best to present their plan in terms of a critical stepping stone towards the defeat of Japan, though this attempt to frame the retaking of Indochina in larger strategic terms fooled no one in Whitehall or the Imperial General Staff. Relations between the French military leaders, who had ceased referring to themselves as Free French after the liberation of Paris, and the British had been strained for quite some time as it seemed to the French every other objective in South East Asia had a higher priority than Indochina, especially if they happened to be British colonial possessions. The French were also unhappy with the cavalier way the British and Americans were willing to arm and encourage the resistance movements in the region, many of whom would be just as willing to resist a return to French rule as they were the Japanese occupation. The response to such concerns from Washington and London can be summarized as the French needing to be prepared to offer some sort of concessions to the nationalists, in the same way that the British were negotiating in India over the country’s future relationship with the empire. De Gaulle rejected such ideas, he was determined to restore France to its pre-war position as a great power, meaning the return of all its colonial possessions regardless of the aspirations of the indigenous peoples [3].
From the British perspective the only positive in this French determination was that they were final willing to commit large numbers of troops to the operation, though with the caveat that the French wanted to deploy at least part of their forces in an amphibious landing near Vũng Tàu in Vietnam to facilitate the swift capture of Saigon. Even with D-Day over and operations in the Philippines coming to a close there was still considerable reluctance on the part of the Americans to release large numbers of landing craft for Douaumont, but in the end an agreement was reached to provide enough sea lift capacity to land an infantry division with armoured support. The naval bombardment force and carrier support would still largely be provided by the Royal Navy, again though with some assistance from the Marine Nationale [4]. The overall French contribution would be two Infantry Divisions, the 1st and 3rd Light Divisions and one Armoured regiment, the 12e Régiment de Cuirassiers, with many of the soldiers being hastily redeployed from liberated France to the considerable displeasure of many of the men who had been enjoying their return home and were far from eager about having to take part in a battle half a world away. There was also grumbling in the ranks of the British Empire troops as the sense that the war was coming to a close spread, but it never rose above the traditional desire of the British squaddie to find something to complain about and their officers did their best to emphasize that there was still a job to do and the sooner it was finished the sooner everyone could go home. Given this it was somewhat ironic that the 2nd New Zealand Division, withdrawn to for recovery and refit after its extended service, was replaced in the order of battle by 6th Australian. After some heated political debates, the Australian government had decided to release the 6th for overseas duties once more, creating confusion as well as resentment at the change of heart [5].
The arrival of the 6th Australian was nonetheless welcomed by Montgomery, now promoted and in overall command of operations in South East Asia. Slim was in charge of all the British forces involved in Operation Douaumont, meaning he had overall command of I Burma Corps, IX British Corps, with 2nd Infantry Division replacing the 70th and the Australians now attached, and XXXIII Indian Corps, minus the New Zealanders but with 9th Indian Infantry Division returning after their time in the rear area. Naturally the French had wanted one of their Generals placed in overall command of the operation, but the British had firmly drawn the line at this, citing the fact that any French commander would be unfamiliar with the bulk of the troops under their command and the peculiarities of conducting campaigns in South East Asia. In the end General Philippe François Marie Leclerc de Hauteclocque, still commonly known by his Free French nom de guerre General LeClerc, was dispatched from France to command the newly constituted Corps Expéditionaire Français en Extrème-Orient, or CEFEO to the British. De Hauteclocque was a highly regarded officer who had shown that he could work well with the British and Americans, and so he was a reasonable choice to command the CEFEO, though the more cynical felt that he was being removed from France in case he might have become an alternate that those who were not happy with De Gaulle could rally around, though it does not seem likely that LeClerc would have been comfortable in such a role and was relatively happy to escape the politicking [6].
The plan as finalised included the French amphibious assault, while the British Corps would launch two spearheads, one aiming to take Phnom Penh and push south to establish lines of communication with the French forces pushing north while the second would advance north towards Vientiane before cutting across Laos to reach the coast on the Gulf of Tonkin. The intent was to break up and isolate the Japanese garrisons in Cambodia and Vietnam, cutting off their supplies and allowing them to suffer the inevitable attrition this would bring before they were eliminated by the Allied forces. This was supplemented by a series of naval raids along the coast along of Indochina, referred to by the Royal Navy as ‘grouse shoots’. These reached as far north as the port of Haiphong and the attacks destroyed shipping, carried out the bombardment of defensive positions and shore facilities, and drew out the remnants of Japanese airpower to engage the strikes launched by the carriers covering the other warships. These raids also drew the attention of the Japanese submarines operating in the area, which could not resist the opportunity to attack Royal navy warships, even in the face of the sophisticated anti-submarine warfare equipment and tactics deployed by their opponents [7].
The Japanese had marched into Indochina practically unopposed in 1940, with the then Vichy administration in charge having no means with which to oppose them and their master in Paris forced to reluctantly accede to what amounted to annexation. In the years since the area had been well behind the lines and it was only with the collapse of the Japanese position in South East Asia and the Pacific in 1943 that serious planning for its defence been put into place, though the ambition of the plans far exceeded the available resources and the situation was not helped by some questionable assumptions about the ability of the British and their Allies to mount fresh offensives after the liberation of Bangkok. The high command in Tokyo believed that the fighting in Thailand had exhausted the supplies and manpower available to the British and the commitments of the fighting in Europe would prevent them being replenished for many months. In this they both underestimated the ability of the British to regroup and overestimated the German ability to resist the Allied advance into Germany. They had also pinned their hopes on inflicting a major defeat on the Americans off Leyte, creating breathing room for the Japanese forces all across the region. With the devasting losses off the Philippines effectively removing the IJN surface fleet as a threat to the Allies such hopes were dashed and the Japanese forces in Indochina were left with little more than what materiel they could squeeze out of Indochina itself, which was inadequate to the task of mounting an effective defence. The length of coastline that had to be covered in addition to the long border with Thailand meant that any concept of defence in depth was out of the question. The best that could be done was to cover the most likely landing zones for an amphibious assault and deploy a screening force to slow down the British advance and allow what reserves the Japanese could muster to be moved to wherever the critical danger points were, a ‘firefighting’ approach that could only hope to delay the inevitable [8].
[1] Not going to cover the Marianas in detail as it will basically follow the same outline as OTL. Suffice to say the USAAF wants to get B-29s flying out of Tinian ASAP.
[2] The British and Americans have enough resources in the Pacific have enough resources to go their own ways for now.
[3] The major difference between the French and the British ITTL is of course that the British don’t have the same sense of wounded pride the French do and when it comes to dealing with aspirations of their colonial possessions they are operating from a position of strength.
[4] You can expect some survivors from Mers el Kebir to show up.
[5] The Australian government is going to be accused of doing the ‘hokey-cokey’ with its troops.
[6] Apologies if I have mangled the name of the CEFA but it seems like the right format.
[7] The Royal Navy is out in force ‘beating the bushes’.
[8] The Japanese are experiencing the problem they feared in 1941, with their lines of communication being interdicted by the RN and the USN.
Last edited:
This already works to convey the idea, but in practice France referred to the region as the Extrème-Orient (Far East), thus the name of the corps sent to Indochina was the CEFEO.