August 15th 1940 – January 6th 1941 – Italy Goes to War– Part I – Disappointment and Delay
When the Italians launched their attack into the French Alps they were hoping for a swift victory against a crumbling French army, instead it met stubborn resistance and made no gains while taking significant losses, which can be seen as microcosm of Italy’s war. Mussolini’s opportunistic entry into the war in August was done in the expectation that as a combatant Italy would be granted a share of the spoils from the fall of France, specifically control of some or all of the French North African colonies. Hitler was more interested in ending the fighting in France and squeezing all he could out of France’s economy, France’s North African colonies remained firmly in the hands of the Vichy regime, though it seems to have largely been the potential threat from Italian Libya that kept them loyal rather than any love for Vichy, and this sentiment was particularly strong in Tunisia. Far from gaining themselves a seat at the negotiating table Mussolini’s actions simply irritated the Germans and the performance of the Italian troops only bred contempt for them in the Wehrmacht [1].
Even after this setback Mussolini still entertained hopes that the British would either make peace or be invaded by the Wehrmacht, allowing Italy to seize Egypt and the vital Suez Canal, or at least make enough of a showing of trying to do so that they would be rewarded at the inevitable peace conference. It fell to the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano who also happened to be Mussolini’s son-in-law, to pour cold water on such plans. Despite effusive assurances coming from Berlin that the Luftwaffe would bring Britain to its knees within weeks he had been sceptical and those independent sources he was able to obtain information from painted a rather different picture. Ciano concluded that the British had escaped France with far more men and equipment than the Germans were willing to admit, and at the same time the Wehrmacht was utterly exhausted by months of fighting. Ciano also pointed out that Goering had claimed he would crush the BEF at Dunkirk and yet the Royal navy had spirited them away. Goering’s promises might still carry weight with Hitler, they cut no ice with Ciano. While there was some scepticism about Ciano’s views in Rome his assessment of current state of the Wehrmacht was largely accurate.
Overall, German losses in manpower during the offensives in the west had not been as high as many in Berlin had feared; when it came to vehicles, equipment, and most especially munitions, it was a different story. The Heer’s stockpiles of artillery and small arms ammunition were badly run down, mortar bombs and 37mm rounds in particular were in critically short supply. Had the war in France dragged on for even a few more weeks the Heer would have potentially faced a crisis with its motorized transportation owing to combat losses, lack of spare parts and a looming fuel shortage. This had been no small part of the reason for the imposition of such harsh terms on the French, Germany needed French stocks of fuel and industrial raw materials to meet Hitler’s immediate production demands, the long-term impact on the productivity of the industries of western Europe was simply ignored even as increasingly extravagant demands were made for French goods. Despite Goering’s bombast the Luftwaffe was hardly any better off, aircraft losses and the demands of supporting the Heer offensive for four months meant the bomber force was struggling to achieve the sortie rate that Goering was demanding for the bombing campaign against the RAF. Ciano may not have had the full picture, but he was rightly adamant that there was little prospect of the British making peace or the German mounting an invasion in 1940 [2].
These concerns were largely dismissed by Mussolini, who was determined that Italy must match the Germans triumphs in Europe by expanding the Italian empire in Africa and the Balkans. That the Italian armed forces were far from ready for such operations was largely down to Mussolini, both in terms of his longer-term decision making and his vacillation during the fighting in Europe. In May when it seemed as if the Germans might sweep all before them Mussolini ordered that an attack through the Alps had to be mounted immediately, leading to much confusion as the Italian transport system struggled to accommodate this demand. This redirection and reallocation of men and supplies had barely been started when the situation stabilized on the Escault, at which point Mussolini postponed the attack on France and tore up his planned declaration of war. Convinced that the stalemate on the Escault was occupying all of Britain and France’s attention Mussolini turned his attention back to Africa and Greece [3].
In Africa Mussolini had not only set his sights set on the British possessions Egypt, but also British Somaliland. This British colony is often overlooked in histories of the war and yet it had considerable strategic importance for the British, with a coast facing on to the Gulf of Aden and surrounded by Italian Somaliland and Italian occupied Ethiopia on land. Its position was precarious to say the least and from Mussolini’s office in Rome it seemed an easy target for Italian takeover, and it was hardly the end of his ambitions in East Africa. The attack on British Somaliland was to be accompanied by thrusts into Kenya and Sudan. Though Mussolini was warned that these would stretch Italian resources in the area to the limit, he preferred to listen to those who promised him an easy victory [4].
On paper the balance of forces between the Italians in Libya and the British in Egypt heavily favoured the Italians, if one ignored the questions of logistics and leadership that hung over the Italian 10th Army which would be expected to carry out any invasion. General Mario Berti who had taken charge of 10th Army that summer had previously been Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, only to be demoted for pointing out that Italy was far from ready to fight a major war. He established a reasonable working relationship with Marshall Italo Balbo, the Governor General of Libya. Both men agreed that Italian forces in Libya were far from ready to carry out the sort of major operation Mussolini had in mind and did their best to plead their case to Rome for more supplies and motorized transport, their pleas went largely unanswered [5].
The occupation of Greece was the logical extension of Italian desires to control the Balkans, while at the same time being something that the Germans were less than enthusiastic about. The Italians already held Albania and Greece had after all been a province of the first Roman Empire. It was also the last potential ally for the British in continental Europe and control of Greece would in turn allow pressure to be applied to Yugoslavia to fall in line with Italian desires. There was an underlying assumption in Italian planning that Greece was the weakest of their potential opponents and offered the opportunity for a ‘short victorious war’ [6].
One issue that plagued Italian planning was that the politicization of the military meant that there was little co-ordination between the various operational schemes being put forward. Resources were allocated and then reallocated as priorities changed, which happened all too often, depending on who had spoken to Mussolini last, or the changing fortunes of the Wehrmacht in France. The Germans did not brief anyone in Rome about Operation Baccarat and so Mussolini was taken by surprise every bit as much as Gamelin or Gort by the Manstein Sweep.
Mussolini’s response was to suspend preparations for operations in Africa, though not in Greece, and order the previously postponed attack in the Alps to go ahead. Little progress had been made in organizing the forces for this despite the weeks of delay, so the outcome of Mussolini’s demand was all but inevitable and once it was clear that the armistice with the French would offer no concessions to Italy, and that the British had no interest in a swift peace on Axis terms Mussolini’s attention once again shifted to East Africa and Egypt with Marshal Badoglio, Supreme Chief of the Italian General Staff, now being expected to mount simultaneous operations in both theatres of operations and Greece as well.
It was a massive task and where Mussolini had been convinced, for the moment, that Greece was the priority Badoglio saw Egypt as the lynchpin. If the British decided to reinforce the Greeks or their East African forces, then they would almost certainly do so from Egypt. If Egypt were taken, then everything else would fall into place relatively easily. Even if the British managed to hold Egypt, temporarily, then regardless of Ciano’s warnings they would have no means to reinforce the other fronts and once those were secured the full weight of the Italian armed forces would be available to concentrate on Egypt. There was also the unspoken assumption that by the time 10th Army was ready to attack the Wehrmacht would be ready to mount an amphibious assault on the British mainland if the Luftwaffe hadn’t already brought them to their knees.
There were two main problems with Badoglio’ scheme. The first was that the British were every bit as aware of the importance of Egypt as the Italians and had already ‘scraped up’ some reinforcements to dispatch. The other issue was that the 10th Army in Egypt was far from ready to mount an offensive. They still had a long list of supplies and equipment necessary to be able to strike decisively and needed several more months of preparation. By Badoglio’s logic this meant it would be unlikely that offensive operations could be mounted on any front in 1940. This line of reasoning did not impress Mussolini, especially as there were officers eyeing up Badoglio’s position and only too happy to suggest that what Badoglio was really proposing was to wait for the Germans to beat the British and hope that this time some token offensive might gain concessions in the peace talks [7].
Badoglio did his best to defend his position, the logistics for such simultaneous operations were complex and would take time to prepare, better to take that time than risk failure. At some point it seems Badoglio may have gotten sufficiently frustrated with Mussolini’s insistence that the operations go ahead immediately that he suggested that part of the problem was Il Duce’s own prevarication, this would certainly explain Badoglio’s sudden dismissal. His successor Marshal Ugo Cavallero was perfectly capable of taking the hint and concurred with Mussolini’s priorities. Ironically Mussolini was now willing to accept a postponement of operations in Egypt, so long as the schedule for Greece and East Africa suffered no further delays. His reasoning seems to have been that the mere threat of an attack on Egypt would suffice to pin the British down and Cavallero was happy to comply. Operations in East Africa to begin on the 13th of October, with the invasion of Greece now scheduled for the 29th.
Badoglio found himself unceremoniously dispatched to oversee preparations for the offensive in East Africa. Badoglio’s reports that the British were reinforcing their positions in Kenya, Sudan and British Somaliland were dismissed as signs he had lost his nerve by Marshal Cavallero, who had no intention of assisting his predecessor. He would find himself released from this hardship posting and restored to his former position only a few months later, though this was hardly a happy turn of affairs either for Badoglio or Italy. The attack on Greece would prove that Badoglio’s worst fears about Italy being unprepared and overstretched had fallen far short of reality [9].
[1] So the Vichy territories in North Africa remained loyal despite Mers-el-Kebir, at least as long as they have to worry about the Italians in Libya.
[2] So the German decision not to start invasion preparations is generating its own butterflies now.
[3] Mussolini is an opportunist at heart, he wants a quick easy triumph, hence the constant prevarication as the fortunes of the Allies and the Germans shift.
[4] The campaign in East Africa really does tend to get overlooked, it will get its fair share of attention ITTL.
[5] Balbo doesn’t die in the friendly fire incident and will be in charge in Libya for the foreseeable future, for good or bad.
[6] The Italians will face many setbacks, a large British army in Greece will not however be one of them, just mentioning that to manage expectations.
[7] So overall the British are stronger, doing rather more than ‘scraping up’ some reinforcements. The Italians that little bit more disorganized, and a more united front of complaints from Libya has got Badoglio wanting to postpone operations until they can coordinate their attacks properly…
[8] …And Badoglio pays the price while the British get time to reinforce their position in Egypt. Oddly though Mussolini is partially right about pinning the British down, though not with the results he was hoping for.
