May 14th – May 18th – 1940 – The Battle of Belgium – Part II – Retreat to the Escault Line
The first requirement for the withdrawal was to slow the advance of the Germans and allow the main body of the Franco-British forces to disengage and fall back in a relatively orderly fashion. To achieve this would require some units to engage the German forces and check their progress before withdraw through a series of what were referred to as layback positions, temporary defensive positions built around points the Germans couldn’t simply bypass. These units would, in theory leapfrog one another as they withdrew to further layback positions before finally joining up with the main body at the Escault, holding up the Germans at each position. This was simple in principle and anything but easy in practice. In several instances troops either waited too long to withdraw or simply found themselves flanked regardless of the position they held. Some of these isolated units gave in quickly, often because some particularly charismatic leader had fallen, while others fought until they ran out of ammunition before surrendering. Both groups should naturally have received identical treatment as POWs, those who fought to the end however were subjected to much rough treatment from soldiers and officers frustrated by the delays they had caused and angry at the casualties they had inflicted. This mistreatment included beatings, refusal to provide medical aid to the wounded and on at least two occasions outright refusing to recognize the Allied units in question had surrendered and continuing attacks until the positions were destroyed along with most of the defenders. It must be noted that this ill-treatment was largely carried out by ordinary units of the Heer and not SS units despite later claims to the contrary [1].
Possibly of even greater importance in delaying the Wehrmacht was to bomb the long lines of supply vehicles moving through Belgium. The Germans had done their best to disperse these columns, there only so many roads they could use though, and some very tempting targets presented themselves, if the RAF could be cajoled into attacking them, which was no easy feat since as far as the RAF were concerned their role was strategic, not tactical. There had been plans to bomb bridges to disrupt German movements, but many of the targets in question were now either too far back to matter or lay in Belgium and the Belgian government fiercely resisted any plan to target their own infrastructure, much to the detriment of the retreat Allied forces. While the RAF’s fighters based in France were doing an admirable job of demonstrating that the Luftwaffe was not unstoppable, the RAF bomber force was sat largely idle, much to the frustration of the crews.
The impasse was settled early on the 14th when Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peirse, then acting as C in C Bomber Command found himself on the receiving end of a phone call from Churchill himself, stating that either he would instruct the bomber squadrons to carry out the attacks on the supply columns or his successor would be expected to do so. The first attacks went in the early afternoon of the 14th and were almost unopposed as after days of inactivity the Luftwaffe fighters patrolling over the columns had largely been reassigned to support the bombers attacking the Allied troops by keeping the RAF fighters at bay. Further attacks on the 15th and 16th caused further damage, but the RAF faced increasing resistance as they continued the attacks, with the losses on the 16th forcing the suspension of further operations. The RAF and their French counterparts had done their job though by then. The German logistics chain teetered on the brink of collapse; it was not just the loss of materiel that hurt the Wehrmacht but the destruction of so many trucks that the Reich could not easily replace, creating substantial difficulties getting supplies to the front-line units. Only the energetic efforts on the part of certain officers in the Panzer Divisions restored some semblance of order and somehow kept things moving [2].
It would take several days for the full effect of the air attacks to become clear and even as the Allied air attacks were at their height on the 14th the Luftwaffe was focusing its medium bombers in a raid on Rotterdam, deliberately bombing the civilian areas of the city to break the Dutch will to fight. This raid was carried out after an ultimatum from the Germans that the city’s garrison must surrender, or the Luftwaffe would destroy the city. The commander of the garrison had no choice but seek permission from the Dutch Commander in Chief Henri Winkelman to surrender the city. This was granted, though too late to stop the bombing. With a similar ultimatum being issued against Utrecht General Winkelman felt he had no choice but to order all his forces to lay down their arms. The formal surrender of the Netherlands took place on the 15th of May [3].
This surrender had been regarded as almost inevitable once the Germans were across the Dyle. Of more immediate concern to the British and French was the situation with the Belgians. Their morale had been shaken by the swift fall of Eben Emael and the rapid German advance. Even more damaging to their will to fight was the decision to fall back to the Escault Line, which provoked much resentment as the Belgians felt they had been handed an ultimatum about the withdrawal rather than being consulted and were simply expected to conform their troops movements to that of the Allies. The Belgian King Leopold III, egged on by his aide-de-camp Major-General Van Overstraeten, complained bitterly to the British and French on this subject, and much else besides. On several occasions the Belgians dragged their feet over complying with the deployments assigned to them under the revised Escault Plan. This led to three divisions of French reserves being called up to cover potential gaps in the line, further depleting the reserves that had already been reduced by the need to replace units that had taken heavy losses fighting the German advance the German advance.
Fortunately for the Allies the Germans were not able to exploit these potential vulnerabilities. By the 16th the leading Panzer formations were encountering serious problems as they tried to reach the Escault Line and prevent the Allies from digging in there. The Heer was certainly being affected by the disruption to the supply lines and they had taken to ‘living off the land’ to some degree, using civilian fuel supplies to keep the tanks moving [4]. The primary issue at this point however was the fact already alluded to that the defenders at the layback positions were proving far more resilient than the Wehrmacht had assumed they would be in their initial planning and based on the experience of their initial swift advance and the routing of the light units Gamelin had dispatched to counter the supposed reconnaissance forces.
Panzers might be able to go off country, at a considerable penalty in speed, but much of their support was bound to the roads. In some places Luftwaffe attacks supported by the Panzers were enough to force British and French troops to break and run. Many though were learning the simple lesson that troops were at their most vulnerable when they broke and ran, and it was better to fight and try and withdraw in good order. This left the German forces in the position of having to call up infantry and put in prepared attacks to clear the defenders time and again. This slowed the advance, much the frustration of the Panzer crews, who could feel what had seemed like imminent victory slipping away.
A further source of frustration was what was seen by some crews as the poor performance of the Panzer III. This was the vehicle the Wehrmacht was counting on for tank-to-tank engagements and all too often it was coming off second best as it was forced to engage enemy armour of far greater fighting power than the light tanks they had initially engaged. The French medium and heavy tanks were proving difficult to knock out with the Panzer III’s 37mm main armament, as were the British Matilda II and Valentine. The crews manning the towed AT gun version were faring even worse as they didn’t have any armour to protect them from return fires directed their way by the enemy tanks their rounds repeatedly bounced off. That the Panzers were eventually able to achieve dramatic victories despite these problems reinforces the conclusion that the superiority of the Panzer Divisions lay in tactics and co-ordination, including the close air support the Luftwaffe regularly provided which was sadly lacking on the Allied side well after 1940. The Panzers were still advancing, largely because as their pace slowed more of the following infantry formations were able to catch up and reinforce the attacks. Nonetheless thanks to the bombing of the supply convoys and the stubborn resistance of British and French rear-guards the Allies had finished the retreat to the Escault by the 18th and consolidated this new line of defence. This though was nothing but a temporary breathing space [5].
[1] Obviously invented but in character with events that happened elsewhere in the war and in WWI. Troops tended to resent those who kept fighting and then just put their hands up and expected to be accorded the rights due to them as POWs.
[2] In OTL the RAF were resistant to any ideas of ground support and when they were committed, they attacked bridges along the Meuse to no great effect, essentially ignoring the supply columns. Another example of the phenomenal luck of the Wehrmacht in 1940.
[3] As per OTL since this part of Case Yellow isn’t affected by the changes in the timeline. Bombing and the threat of bombing brought swift capitulation from the Czechs and the Dutch in OTL and arguably played a part in the French willingness to sue for peace. Given the tactic worked so well for them it’s hardly surprising Hitler had such faith in the Luftwaffe’s ability to bring the British to their knees. Of course, Fighter Command was a different order of magnitude compared to the defenders of the Luftwaffe’s previous targets.
[4] Filling up at any available petrol station siphoning fuel from vehicles and all the other tricks they used to keep moving in OTL, though obviously this is harder in Belgium than it was in France.
[5] So this is a stronger position than OTL, problem is that there is still a myriad of issues with Franco-British co-operation, not to mention getting the different service branches to co-ordinate. Even worse this fighting is drawing in awful lot of the French reserves and there’s still those Panzer Divisions the Wehrmacht hasn’t committed yet.