Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942

[Garrison]

October 20th – November 4th 1938 – Germany - Kristallnacht​

Late October spelt the end for the dismal crowd of conspirators plotting the overthrow of Hitler. The postponement of military action against the Czechs had robbed them of much of their momentum and with time to contemplate the potential consequences of failure many of the plotters were doing their level best to backpedal on whatever commitments they might have made. The final straw for the potential coup came when a remark by Hitler was passed to one of the prime movers in the conspiracy, General Halder, ‘I know the spirit of Zossen, and I will crush it once and for all’. Hitler was referring to what he saw as the defeatist attitudes of the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) the Army High Command. To Halder it was obvious Hitler knew something and he panicked and destroyed all his documents on or around the 25th of October. Even had Halder not panicked at this moment it is questionable whether the military officers, who had sworn an oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer, would really have had the will to do what would have been required to overthrow Hitler.

Those outside the circles of the plotters who had been warning of a premature war had been relieved at the postponement of hostilities brought about by Chamberlain’s plea and with fresh negotiations not due to take place until mid-November the argument was being put forward that the winter weather would probably hinder Luftwaffe operations and military action against the Czechs might have to be postponed until Spring. This would also allow time for further efforts to persuade the Poles to support an attack in pursuit of their own territorial claims and to exploit the ethnic divisions inside Czechoslovakia. Hitler remained unwaveringly belligerent; he would brook no delays beyond those necessitated by the final round of negotiations unless they fulfilled all his demands.

This led to some of those opposed to immediate war to try a different approach, or rather return to a well-worn one, blaming the Jews. Specifically in this case the proponents of this line of argument claimed that it was the Jews who were inciting the British and French into a more belligerent stance to provoke war [1]. It was a transparent ploy that had been tried before, but in the aftermath of Hendon and the rumours about sabotage now swirling around Berlin a new variant was put forward. The mysterious saboteurs were part of a Jewish cabal who intended to assassinate Chamberlain, blame Germany for it, and precipitate war when the Reich’s preparations were incomplete. This argument did nothing to sway Hitler from his pursuit of war, instead it provoked a horrifying tragedy by providing Hitler with an excuse to vent his pent-up frustration and anger at the continual delays to his plans for the Czechs. On the 1st of November he made the speech that ignited the horrors of Kristallnacht [2]. Between the 1st and 3rd of November hundreds of Jews were murdered and businesses laid waste. In the aftermath Goering would express his distaste for the whole event, not because of the death toll but because of the cost of making good the damage to properties that the Nazi’s had planned to confiscate.

The British embassy in Berlin was inundated with reports of murder, assault, arson, and rape from every corner of Germany. These reports were easily confirmed as the Nazi’s revelled in their barbarism, they wanted everyone to see how the ‘treacherous Jews’ were dealt with. The reports made their way to London by diplomatic dispatch and were soon in the hands of the Cabinet. By this point Chamberlain had been transferred to a convalescent home in the Kent countryside. He had made a steady recovery and seemed to be adjusting well though not without some periods of despondency, which was hardly unexpected in the circumstances, and it had been decided that the best therapy for this was allowing a gradual return to his responsibilities as PM. This took the form of visits from his staff and cabinet members to brief him and relay his wishes to London. The number of memos and notes emanating from Kent was in fact becoming a source of exasperation in Whitehall, though it did help to quell any ongoing speculation about his fitness to continue in office.

On the evening of the 3rd a hastily convened party was dispatched to meet with Chamberlain, trying to get to him before he learned of events in Germany through press reports. This group included several members of the diplomatic and intelligence services, though not Halifax who seems to have been bypassed in this instance. Chamberlain’s reaction to the awful accounts of what had been unleashed seemed to be one of sadness rather than anger, almost as if he were in mourning. He gave no hint that evening of how he intended to respond to what seemed unequivocal proof that Adolf Hitler was not a ‘man of sound character’ and that the German people seemed to have eagerly embraced his call to violence. The only certainty on the evening of the 3rd was that with the rearranged meeting with Hitler barely three weeks away Chamberlain would have to respond, and quickly.

[1] Yes, they really did try that in OTL, here they just work in the accident to give the appearance of more substance.

[2] |You can assume that with minor changes for the inciting event this is pretty much the same speech as OTL.

 

[roachbeef]

Watched. If war does start early, it would be interesting to see two drunk blind boxers attempt to fight it out. Even in 1939, none of the countries, Axis or Allied, had completed their war preparations.

 

[Lexijag]

On board

 

[Garrison]

Watched. If war does start early, it would be interesting to see two drunk blind boxers attempt to fight it out. Even in 1939, none of the countries, Axis or Allied, had completed their war preparations.

Well the idea is more the British will be better prepared for war and able to exploit some butterflies. The problem with an earlier war over the Sudetenland is that unless you can somehow light a fire under the French to attack Germany then you are depending on the USSR sending troops via Poland into Czech territory, which begs the question what happens if the Soviets beat the Germans but then don't withdraw?

 

[spkaca]

I like this fresh take on events. My first thought is how this will affect dynamics in Paris. M. Daladier was relatively bellicose but I think felt insecure both about London and the domestic French position. I note he promoted M. Reynaud from Justice to Finance in November 1938 - presumably that will still happen? That in turn might mean the French government's financial position is more stable before the renewed negotiations.

 

[jolou]

French foreign policy at that time could be resumed : If the brits are in, go in, if they are out don't go. That what happened in Spain for instance (Blum wanted to help the republicans, the british didn't) and OTL Munich (Daladier wasn't that keen on the deal and he thought that he would get lynched when he returned to France but since the british didn't want war, we didn't either).

After WW1, it was shown that France couldn't win without the British and thus we needed them in to go in.

 

[weasel_airlift]

Interesting start. Followed.

 

[Garrison]

I like this fresh take on events. My first thought is how this will affect dynamics in Paris. M. Daladier was relatively bellicose but I think felt insecure both about London and the domestic French position. I note he promoted M. Reynaud from Justice to Finance in November 1938 - presumably that will still happen? That in turn might mean the French government's financial position is more stable before the renewed negotiations.

French foreign policy at that time could be resumed : If the brits are in, go in, if they are out don't go. That what happened in Spain for instance (Blum wanted to help the republicans, the british didn't) and OTL Munich (Daladier wasn't that keen on the deal and he thought that he would get lynched when he returned to France but since the british didn't want war, we didn't either).

After WW1, it was shown that France couldn't win without the British and thus we needed them in to go in.

Well obviously you will have to await tomorrow's update to see what Chamberlain does in response to recent events and how that might impact the French. My general impression is that Daladier faced an uphill battle with a fractious collection of politicians and a moribund Military leadership that seemed remarkably reluctant to think in any offensive terms even if only to consider what the next step was after they were to successfully halt a German attack in the west. Of course if someone wanted to write a similar thread to this one focused on France I can guarantee them one subscriber.

 

[DracoLazarus]

Interesting indeed.
France's rearmament took place limited to what it could afford until war was declared. France would be able to start rearming on credit earlier if Germany declares war... and Germany wouldn't have the Czech factories and equipment either.
I think it's likely they wouldn't be able to put the 20 divisions on the Westwall they OTL had.

 

[Bougnas]

Interesting indeed.
France's rearmament took place limited to what it could afford until war was declared. France would be able to start rearming on credit earlier if Germany declares war... and Germany wouldn't have the Czech factories and equipment either.
I think it's likely they wouldn't be able to put the 20 divisions on the Westwall they OTL had.

They were already investing like crazy since 1936, the problem wasn't money, but the social situation in the industry. Mobilisation would allow them to get the industry actually running.

 

[Garrison]

November 4th – November 12th 1938 – Britain - A change of Heart or a Change of Tactics?​

Halifax had risen early on the 4th, there had been an avalanche of diplomatic traffic in response to grim events in Germany, with Prague, Rome, Paris, Washington, and of course Berlin all attempting to put their own imprint on the appropriate response to Kristallnacht. Only Moscow remained silent on the matter, putting out not so much as a communique. The Czech government naturally felt this display of butchery should put an end to any negotiations with berlin over their territory. They had not been formally briefed on the concessions offered to Hitler thus far, however they were hardly a secret by this point. Berlin’s messages were full of bravado and threats, there was no attempt to downplay or dismiss what had happened, they characterized Kristallnacht as, ‘an outpouring of righteous anger by the German people against the Jews who have greedily sought to exploit them and sabotage the recovery of the nation’ [1]. The notes also made it clear that the British should not use this outpouring as an excuse to delay the resolution of the Sudeten matter. There had also been any number of messages from domestic sources offering wholly unsolicited advice. These ranged from messages that could best be summed up as ‘I told you so’ to those insisting that not one drop of British blood should be shed in the name of protecting the Jews.

Faced with all of this Halifax’s intent was to try and catch up with the existing messages before any fresh waves arrived. His plans were disrupted by a completely unexpected phone call, direct from the Prime Minister himself. Chamberlain cut through the usual pleasantries, he would be leaving hospital that day and expected to hold a cabinet meeting in the evening at Downing Street. Chamberlain refused to provide any details of what the agenda of this meeting would be. That Chamberlain had bypassed the usual channels to speak with Halifax, and several other senior members of the cabinet as Halifax was soon able to establish, spoke volumes.

After the call ended Halifax later admitted he was on the verge of panic, for it was not only in Berlin that people had been plotting behind their leaders back. In London the plotting had been done in the smoky backrooms of Westminster and had been aimed at constraining Chamberlain’s freedom of action over the Sudetenland rather than removing him from office. The opportunity for replacing Chamberlain seemed to have passed and Halifax knew the party would not reward anyone seen to have plunged the knife into the Prime Minister’s back. Many backbenchers had proven sympathetic to the idea that Chamberlain had already gone far enough in offer, but almost universally raised the issue of whether the country was really prepared to go to war for the Czechs? And what would the French do?

This was an excellent question. Despite condemning German actions publicly, they had made it very clear privately that they were simply going to follow Chamberlain’s lead. His absence had already offered them the chance to take the lead and they had done nothing, except dodge the attempts of the Czechs to pin them down to their treaty commitments. The reality was that whatever Prime Minister Daladier might feel personally about taking harder line with Germany in the absence of a firm commitment to action by the British he would not be able to rally the political support to do so.

It was hardly surprising in the circumstance that Halifax approached the cabinet meeting with trepidation, fearing that perhaps the Prime Minister had learned of his action and intended to use the meeting to demand resignations from those who had proven disloyal. Chamberlain arrived with little fanfare, waving away the inevitable congratulations at his swift recovery. Seated at the table Chamberlain further eschewed any preliminaries and went to the heart of the matter, Britain’s policy towards Nazi Germany and the state of the nation’s defences. He spoke at length but the gist of it could be summed up by Chamberlain’s remark based on his earlier telegrams, “Recent events in Germany have demonstrated that Herr Hitler is not a man of sound character and our hopes for peace cannot rest on his goodwill.” [1] In essence the violence of Kristallnacht had proven that what had been assumed to be overblown rhetoric on the part of Hitler must be taken as matters of fact. Even if an understanding were reached over the Sudetenland, Chamberlain now conceded, it seemed all but inevitable that Hitler would continue his demands over Poland and Alsace-Lorraine. “I have been driven by the desire to spare this country from the terrible consequences of war, to avoid any repeat of the horrors of the Great War. However, I am now compelled to remember that when war came in 1914 British soldiers were dispatched to Europe without the means necessary to meet the enemy on an equal footing. We must continue to work for peace, but we must extend our preparations beyond the aerial defence of the realm and control of the seas. We shall have to disburse more funds than we had previously planned and consult with the services on the most immediate priorities, especially those of the army.” [1]

Winston Churchill was of course not privy to the meeting, but when details of it nonetheless reached him, he shook his head solemnly and said, “I consider myself a student of history, and yet I was not aware that the road to Damascus passed through Hendon Aerodrome.” [1]

Halifax was both bemused and pleased by this ‘conversion’. However, he made no immediate response to Chamberlain’s announcement, “I said nothing, I was not displeased at this apparent change of heart, but I feared that there would be a price to be paid for it.” [1]

The Foreign Secretary was right to be apprehensive as Chamberlain pressed on, “The one commodity I can guarantee the military will demand is the one that no increase in budget can provide, and that is time. Enough time to make good whatever deficits they may identify and make ready should all else fail and only the naked threat of force is left to us. There is only one way to procure that commodity. With a heavy heart I have concluded I must attend the talks with Herr Hitler and make whatever concessions are necessary to quiet his appetite, at least for long enough to strengthen our military powers both defensive and offensive.” [1]

Halifax’s diaries recounted the dilemma that faced him, “I could have railed against the time already wasted, I could have resigned in protest at offering to ‘feed the beast’. The problem was that none of that would have changed the reality that if the Prime Minister was now committed to using the negotiations in Munich to buy us the opportunity to arm ourselves against the potential threat to peace from the regime in Berlin how could I refuse to support him?” [1]

This sentiment seems to have been broadly shared in the cabinet, with a few notable exceptions who still clung to the notion that appeasement alone could win the day. Their position was adamantly rejected by Chamberlain, who after all had been the man who had done all he could to pursue that policy and had now clearly concluded it had reached its limit. And so the price for Chamberlain abandoning his grand ambitions for European peace and preparing the nation for the possibility of dispatching a British army to the continent for the second time in 20 years would be paid by the people of Czechoslovakia.

Even as the politicians were acquiescing to the doom of Czechoslovakia others were working to save at least rescue some from the tyranny of the Nazi’s. The Kindertransport was a plan to evacuate thousands, if not tens of thousands of Jewish children to the UK and place them with British families. It would be a terrible thing for the families faced with giving up their children, given the choices facing them however many were willing to accept. The plan was embraced with enthusiasm in Britain and the first child refugees were arriving within weeks of Kristallnacht. This bright moment of decency was perhaps only a small thing compared to the grubby politics that was being discussed, but it would play an indirect role in hardening Chamberlain’s newfound belligerence.

[1] Invented quotes

 

[traveller76]

Are the British going to notify the French about this? Will the Soviets and other intelligence services pick up the changes in the British military?

 

[Garrison]

Are the British going to notify the French about this? Will the Soviets and other intelligence services pick up the changes in the British military?

Well bear in mind most of the changes to be put in place will be a matter of public record and discussed in parliament so the Soviets will definitely know about the accelerated rearmament. Also while the military plans will be on a larger scale than OTL, with the Army being the main beneficiary as implied in the post this is really just an overt confirmation of the 'playing for time' interpretation of Munich IOTL. I suspect the French will be deeply unimpressed given there's no guarantee any of these new forces will actually set foot in Europe should war break out.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

"...With a heavy heart I have concluded I must attend the talks with Herr Hitler and make whatever concessions are necessary to quiet his appetite, at least for long enough to strengthen our military powers both defensive and offensive."

IOW, the effect of the PoD is that Chamberlain decides on immediate full-out rearmament for Britain.

He's going to go to Munich and make the same concessions as OTL. But when he returns, instead of proclaiming "Peace in our time", he'll ask Parliament for huge increases in military and naval funding, because war is imminent. OTL, Chamberlain could spin Munich as a war-avoiding compromise. TTL, it's an unambiguous surrender.

As such, it represents acknowledgement of disastrous failure of British defense policy under Chamberlain and Baldwin. Demands for Chamberlain's resignation would follow.

 

[Garrison]

IOW, the effect of the PoD is that Chamberlain decides on immediate full-out rearmament for Britain.

He's going to go to Munich and make the same concessions as OTL. But when he returns, instead of proclaiming "Peace in our time", he'll ask Parliament for huge increases in military and naval funding, because war is imminent. OTL, Chamberlain could spin Munich as a war-avoiding compromise. TTL, it's an unambiguous surrender.

As such, it represents acknowledgement of disastrous failure of British defense policy under Chamberlain and Baldwin. Demands for Chamberlain's resignation would follow.

Possibly, except he's still going to be popular with the public and most of the potential replacements at this point are just as associated with appeasement as he is. He has rather made the cabinet complicit with his plan for that matter and he will still be doing his best to put the right spin on it to parliament.

 

[PMN1]

IOW, the effect of the PoD is that Chamberlain decides on immediate full-out rearmament for Britain.

He's going to go to Munich and make the same concessions as OTL. But when he returns, instead of proclaiming "Peace in our time", he'll ask Parliament for huge increases in military and naval funding, because war is imminent. OTL, Chamberlain could spin Munich as a war-avoiding compromise. TTL, it's an unambiguous surrender.

As such, it represents acknowledgement of disastrous failure of British defense policy under Chamberlain and Baldwin. Demands for Chamberlain's resignation would follow.

I think the money already allocated will save him on this, there is no point in bankrupting the country if there is a hope of avoiding war.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Possibly, except he's still going to be popular with the public and most of the potential replacements at this point are just as associated with appeasement as he is. He has rather made the cabinet complicit with his plan for that matter and he will still be doing his best to put the right spin on it to parliament.

What possible spin can put lipstick on this pig?

Five and a half years earlier, Germany was a military nullity. Now Germany can dictate terms to Britain. Baldwin and Chamberlain let that happen.

Furthermore - if Britain is unable to challenge Germany now, how can Britain expect to catch up? Munich will delete the Czech armed forces and give their arms to Germany..

The moral character of Hitler and his regime was no great secret, but they allowed that regime to build up power Britain cannot oppose.

OTL, once the character of the Nazi regime was exposed, Chamberlain refused any further concessions, ITTL, he is making forced concessions to a recognized bad actor that could have been stopped. IMO, Chamberlain actually thought Munich could succeed in preventing war. If he had not thought so, he would have acted as he did on OTL 1939.

Also, ISTM that before deciding on his course for alt-Munich, Chamberlain must meet with the service chiefs and assess what could be done to re-arm in perhaps a year. Then Chamberlain must meet with Daladier (who should also consult his service chiefs). If Chamberlain now thinks war is practically inevitable, then he should call on the other Allied leaders to start planning for war. The first step must be to assess whether what could be done in the time gained by the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia would outweigh what will be lost.

I note that no one is asking whether Germany is prepared for war.

 

[cortz#9]

I note that no one is asking whether Germany is prepared for war.

Germany isn’t, not enough tanks, not men in arms, not enough of everything.
Hell I read somewhere once that Germany didn’t have enough boots for it’s army in 1939 but they still went to war anyway.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Germany isn’t, not enough tanks, not men in arms, not enough of everything.
Hell I read somewhere once that Germany didn’t have enough boots for it’s army in 1939 but they still went to war anyway.

What I meant was that no one in the Allied leadership was thinking about German weaknesses; they were too intimidated.

I've been playing a lot of on-line poker (for chips only). One thing I've realized is that if you think too much about what the other player could have, you talk yourself into folding winning hands; you become a target for bluffs.

I think that's what happened to Britain and France in 1938.

Of course it's still necessary to "read" your adversary if possible, because there's always a chance that he does have a big hand. One has to watch, and learn to imagine the story: what is the fellow holding that he would bet this way?

AFAICT, Britain and France never did that.

 

[cortz#9]

What I meant was that no one in the Allied leadership was thinking about German weaknesses; they were too intimidated.

I've been playing a lot of on-line poker (for chips only). One thing I've realized is that if you think too much about what the other player could have, you talk yourself into folding winning hands; you become a target for bluffs.

I think that's what happened to Britain and France in 1938.

Of course it's still necessary to "read" your adversary if possible, because there's always a chance that he does have a big hand. One has to watch, and learn to imagine the story: what is the fellow holding that he would bet this way?

AFAICT, Britain and France never did that.

Oh I agree with you wholeheartedly, Hitler pulled one of the biggest bluffs in history at Munich, partly I think because he himself believed his own bullshit.