Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
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Garrison
Donor
Very much as they did OTL, but facing even worse issues of competition for resources as Hitler's attention diverts from one 'wonder weapon' to the next.
Since this happened pre-war, does that mean this was something that had happened OTL?
In OTL the P-38 was capable of reaching Berlin when the larger drop tanks became available. The first appearance of the Lightning over Berlin being on March 4, 1944 escorting 8th Airforce bombers. I think these planes were also the later model P-38Js with an increased internal fuel capacity. The OTL P-38 had adequate performance to deal with the Luftwaffe despite still having a number of minor and major defects needing fixing. Which was mostly done with the later J and L models in OTL making the P-38 more then sufficient to defeat the Luftwaffe's fighters.
I don't want to derail Garrison's interesting storyline so I'll post this link where any interested readers can read about what the pilots flying the P-38 and other fighters in the ETO thought about their Lightnings compared to the P-47 and P-51. It's an older discussion forum containing postings from when these men where still with us. Their view points are illuminative.
1st March – 8th August 1943 – War in the Air – Part III – The Mediterranean and the Eastern Front
Garrison
Donor
1st March – 8th August 1943 – War in the Air – Part III – The Mediterranean and the Eastern Front
Bombing operations from bases established in Sicily, Egypt and Crete were certainly regarded as secondary to those carried out from Southern England, but they still had plenty of strategic targets in range, with Italy being an obvious one, but not as high on the priority list as it might have been if the Allies had been intent on a landing. The attacks on Italy were focused on forcing the Luftwaffe to defend the rest of the Wehrmacht and on the coastal shipping around Italy. While some industrial targets critical to the Italian war efforts were targeted, others went noticeably untouched. This was because of the ongoing behind the scenes communications with those elements in Italy increasingly unhappy about the German presence on Italian soil. To those determined to find a way for Italy to exit the war the bombing that did take place served as a clear warning of the price that their country would pay for continued support of the Axis. Even in Count Ciano’s inner circle of advisors there were people beginning to wonder which would be worse for Italy, the death and destruction that would inevitably rain down as the Allied air forces grew ever stronger if the nation chose to see things through to the bitter end with Germany or the price that would be paid if they turned against the Reich [1].
For the Allies there was no great rush to come to some arrangement with these parties inside Italy, especially as they assumed that their channels of communication were every bit as compromised as the Vatican efforts of 1942. From their perspective if the Germans feared the Italians defecting, then that would just tie down more Wehrmacht resources and with airbases in Sicily it was far easier to provide fighter support for bombing missions against Italy, meaning that daylight raids were far better protected and the deployment of the P-47 Thunderbolt, as well as newer model Spitfires and Typhoons took their toll on the Luftwaffe fighters protecting Italy. The latter also filled the role of fighter-bomber, replacing the now obsolete Hurribomber, proving highly effective in conducting low level attacks against Axis airfields since the Luftwaffe struggled to establish the integrated fighter control system that proved so effective over Germany [2].
The fact that the RAF and USAAF formations in the Mediterranean were far lower down the priority list for squadrons and aircraft than the forces in Britain was another major constraint on their operations over Italy, exacerbated by the fact that at the same time as targeting Italy they were tasked with attack on targets from Corsica all the way to Romania. The Ploesti oilfields, vital to the continued functioning of the Wehrmacht, were regarded as an important target, though its true strategic value was repeatedly underestimated. Despite large and expensive efforts at developing synthetic fuel plants Germany remained heavily dependent on Ploesti, especially after the invasion of the USSR cut off supplies. Despite this Ploesti had not received the attention from Allied bombers that its importance probably deserved. The fundamental issue was that the Allies failed to appreciate just how vital Ploesti really was to the Third Reich. The British and the Americans were ‘oil rich’, they had huge sources of oil that they had built up reserves that Germany could only dream of. This however distorted their thinking in terms of what constituted acceptable reserves for mounting operations, and they consistently overestimated Germany’s stocks, even in the face of intelligence that painted an accurate picture of the real situation the Allied high command still refused to believe that the Wehrmacht could be conducting major mechanized operations with such thin margins of fuel reserves.
Hitler was acutely aware of the importance of these oilfields and protecting them from any threat was the reason he had been willing to commit so many troops to operations in the Balkans, and in 1943 any suggestion of the Allies strengthening their forces was enough to provoke an anxiety attack. Ploesti, and the entire region around it, was heavily defended by Luftwaffe fighters and anti-aircraft guns. These defences provide a further explanation as to why Ploesti had seen only sporadic attacks, and the distance from many of the airbases capable of supporting Allied strategic bombers was also a factor as it meant they were once again required to operate with limited fighter escort. It was not until November of 1943 that the Allies finally elected to devote the bomber resources needed to seriously disrupt operations at Ploesti. This on top of the crippling of Ruhr Industry after the Dambuster Raid and its follow ups simply added to the chaos that afflicted Germany in the latter half of 1943 [3].
One aspect of air operations that had a crucial impact on the balance of power over France was the fighting on the Eastern front. The Soviet Air Force, Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily (VVS), is often overlooked when it comes to aerial combat, especially given the disaster that overwhelmed it during the opening of Operation Barbarossa, where much of its available strength was destroyed on the ground. Things had not improved much in the months after this since despite the best efforts of Soviet industry the VVS remained outclassed, owing to a lack of trained pilots and obsolete models in production. In 1942 the aircraft that would help redress the balance were either not yet in production or like the IL-2 Sturmovik not yet operating in large numbers and hampered by Luftwaffe fighter superiority [4].
Things began to improve as lend lease provided access to more modern British and American designs, though the Soviets primarily received aircraft that were no long considered suitable for the cutting edge of the Allied fighter forces, or indeed that had never been considered fit for that role in service for the Western Allies. Still the Hurricane, the P-40 Warhawk and the P-39 Airacobra all proved quite effective in Soviet hands, especially in the ground attack role. The P-39 in particular found a place with the VVS that it never enjoyed in US service, racking up more air-to-air kills than any other US fighter model despite seeing limited service with the USAAF [5]. The Soviets were particularly enamoured of the 37mm cannon mounted in the nose of the aircraft, firing through the propellor spinner. This influenced the design of several soviet fighter models, though this was vehemently denied during the war and after.
The reality was that the Lend-Lease aircraft not only fleshed out the ranks of the VVS but provided valuable technical information about airframe and engine design that fed directly into the Soviet aero industry and by 1943 the VVS was producing aircraft that could match the capabilities of their Luftwaffe opponents such as the Lavochkin La-5 and the Yakovlev Yak-9. This shift in the balance of technical capabilities was compounded by a closing of the gap in terms of pilot skill and experience between the Luftwaffe and the VVS. Much of this was due to qualitative in improvements in the abilities of the Soviet pilots, but it also reflected the steady erosion of the standard of the Luftwaffe crews. What had once been the most experienced and tactically sophisticated air force in the world was feeling the effect of too many crew losses and the curtailment of pilot training as limitations on fuel and the pressing need to put men in the air saw the required flight hours for new recruits to enter frontline duties steadily reduced. It did not help that many of the fighter pilots who should by rights have been training these recruits in the tactics of aerial combat were instead still carrying out combat sorties. This would lead to some of them racking up incredible numbers of kills, making them some of history’s leading aces, most though simply died when their luck ran out, taking their skills and knowledge with them [6].
By the spring and summer of 1943, the Luftwaffe was locked into a war of attrition in the East, one that it was slowly losing. With Hitler still determined to resume the offensive even after the failure of Case Blue the Luftwaffe was unable to concentrate its resources against the Allied bombing offensive in Northwestern Europe, and the damage caused by the campaign over the Ruhr impacted the Luftwaffe’s ability to maintain its overall strength, weakening its effort against the Red Army and the VVS, creating a down spiral for the Luftwaffe it couldn’t escape. Being forced to fight on so many fronts simultaneously drained Luftwaffe strength and the situation only became worse in the second half of the year as they faced a new generation of Allied fighter technology [7].
[1] A question that will be answered in due course.
[2] Differences in development cycles mean this isn’t quite the Typhoon of OTL and it’s a reasonably effective fighter.
[3] It’s a very bad summer and autumn for the Germans.
[4] No not every Soviet aircraft was bad, but they seemed to have more than their share of clunkers even when they started producing monoplane fighters in real numbers.
[5] Yes that is an OTL statistic, the P-39 racked up large numbers of kills, mainly because of its longevity and the scale of the fighting on the Eastern Front.
[6] The Japanese likewise kept pilots at the front but refused to reduce training hours until far too late, creating the same shortage of trained pilots and crews.
[7] And this is not a reference to the P-51, there is something far worse for Luftwaffe morale coming in the latter part of 1943.
I knew it. The Brits have finally got the Turret Fighter working!
The A1E1 fighter with one bofors 40mm and four auxiliary turrets with .303"?And it was supposed to be a surprise
I looked this up once, and IIRC 5 of the top 7 Soviet aces had most of their kills in P-39s, with #2 and #3 both having more kills just in P-39s than any US pilot.
Garrison
Donor
The P-39 does seem to be another WWII vehicle whose reputation doesn't match up with its actual performance.
Actually, its reputation does match its performance. It was useless for the combat needs in the West as it had no performance high up, it's the lower altitude fighting in the East that meant it could actually be of use. A bit like the early Mustang except, unlike the Mustang, it never got a decent engine replacing the bad.
Original timeline, the thinking of the Allies could have been coloured by their knowledge of what happened in Coventry: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-coventry-warwickshire-34746691
I wouldn't be surprised if someone (edit: on the Allied side) had been looking at it and saying something like: 'That nearly worked. We have to do it back, and turn it up to eleven.'
Actually there were several suggestions of essentially doing just that: Line up bombers nose-to-tail-to-wingtip and just proceed to reduce a city from one end to the other till the other guy gave up. But others were quick to point out while the local population was stunned in general there ended up being more anger than hopelessness and it fed back into the mood of the nation which didn't break. Several German (and many Japanese) towns were treated to similar bombardments and the populations spirit did not break so it's arguable if it would work in the needed time frame.
The Allies kind of 'prided' themselves on "accurate high altitude bombing" of only "industrial and wartime" targets, so 'switching' would be a stretch.
Randy
Although at times (most of them) the effects of "accurate high altitude bombing" and "city busting" were pretty much indistinguishable.
City busting makes sense as a strategy for WAllies if targeted at the Ruhr industrial cities, though. Sure, it may strengthen German civilian morale.
But it would massively damage German war production (which would cause a downward spiral as then, German aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces would become even more outnumbered, leading to higher losses and so on).
The Reich can't run on high spirits alone. Not when factories are rubble.
But it would massively damage German war production (which would cause a downward spiral as then, German aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces would become even more outnumbered, leading to higher losses and so on).
The Reich can't run on high spirits alone. Not when factories are rubble.
And homeless (dehoused is I think the term used in WW2) workers are less productive. Meanwhile finding new accommodation, reorganising transport, repair and reconstruction all consume time and resources so it can be disruptive even before the effect of casualties is taken into account.
Absenteeism was an issue with some towns taking months to recover from a major attack in terms of productivity