Not so, they where used in Norway, the Mediterranean Sea, the Channel, the Balticmostly used in the fighting against the soviets on the eastern front.
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Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
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Norway wasn't a tank-heavy campaign, so the limited port facilities weren't such a big bottleneck.
I thought OTL the idea of Mulberry was at least partly spurred by lessons from Dieppe (harbours are nice, but hard to get control of). Even if there is a successful Dieppe,a major naval power could easily realise that it would be useful to bring one along asit provids extra capacity even if all the ports are undefended and fully functional.
As I understand it, PLUTO was even more important than Mulberry, so it will be interesting to see how that progresses.
I thought OTL the idea of Mulberry was at least partly spurred by lessons from Dieppe (harbours are nice, but hard to get control of). Even if there is a successful Dieppe,a major naval power could easily realise that it would be useful to bring one along asit provids extra capacity even if all the ports are undefended and fully functional.
As I understand it, PLUTO was even more important than Mulberry, so it will be interesting to see how that progresses.
the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic I have heard of.
They were too late for the invasion of Norway.
Garrison
Donor
It was for the Allies as was the attack on Dieppe and there were also lessons to be learned from the Pacific.
My recollection was the Germans chose to use fast destroyers to carry smaller numbers of amphibious troops (rather than slower but higher capacity barges) due to their assessment that speed was the critical factor in the initial phase of the operation. That being said I don't ever remember reading how they disembarked those troops off the destroyers - If they just pulled up to docks in Norwegian ports without any defensive fire taking place, or if they used some sort of light craft to ferry their troops to landing beaches,l to then flank established defensive positions, etc.?
Garrison
Donor
They used S-boats to try and rush troops ashore to suppress the defences and allow the main transports to dock. Worked IOTL not so well in ITTL.
Any idea what the breakdown of troops was?
I didn't think the S-Boats would have the range to get any further north than Stavenger....and even if they did, how many troops could they hold? 25? or 30? It just seems like a very small invasion force.
Probably enough to hold a wharf or pier in a country which was at peace until a few minutes before they arrived for at least long enough for support to arrive.
Garrison
Donor
I will take a look at some point in the near future but if you like alt tanks check out
Alternative History Armoured Fighting Vehicles Part 3
...and here we go for Part 3 of this thread. Same rules apply as always. We are looking for viable and realistic Alternative History AFVs, ideally with a suitable developmental backstory to explain and justify your idea/creations. Please keep things realistic and I might even get round to...
www.alternatehistory.com
1st January 1943 – The Turning of the Tide – Part III – The USA
Garrison
Donor
1st January 1943 – The Turning of the Tide – Part III – The USA
The USA entered 1943 with the arguments over the balance of resources to be allocated to the Pacific and Europe still not settled and compounded by the somewhat different strategic priorities of their allies. That the USA had been seen as the junior partner in the Sicily and Dieppe operations did aid those determined to ensure that Germany first remained the cornerstone of American strategy. There was a determination that in future major operations the US must take the leading role and that those operations had be mounted sooner rather than later, meaning that if anything the share of military resources being allocated to the European theatre should not simply be maintained, but increased. In Europe the prospect of outright Nazi victory had receded dramatically, that however opened the door for what many saw as an equally undesirable prospect, of Stalin sending the Red Army sweeping west and imposing a ‘Pax Sovietica’ across the whole of Eurasia. Whatever warm words might emanate from the Whitehouse in the name of Allied solidarity there still a great deal of fear about Communism in Washington and its potential to spread to the Americas. The USSR was a crucial ally for the time being, but once Nazi Germany was defeated the Soviets could not be allowed to dictate the future of Europe, the USA had to be in position to protect its own interests and ensure that as much of the continent as possible was ‘made safe for democracy’.
This desire to shape the post war world according to American desires was also a source of tension with the British. It would be wrong to say there was any danger of an open rift between the two major Western Allies, there was however a clear sense that the British were pushing back against ideas that might weaken their position in the world, they needed the support of the USA to be sure but they were no longer in a position where they were prepared to ‘sell the family silver’, as one British politician put it, to obtain that support [1]. A particular source of friction was the conduct of the war in the Pacific and South East Asia. This was show most clearly by the arguments over plans for retaking the Dutch East Indies, where elements in the State Department were raising concerns about the prospect of returning the islands to their colonial masters. Although US troops had been dispatched after the relief of Wake Island the Allied forces on Java were still mainly composed of the Australian, British, Dutch and Canadian troops (ABCD) [2].
The resistance to co-operation could be largely traced back to Admiral King, whose Anglophobic tendencies had become harder and harder to ignore as 1942 had worn on and this reached a head with the planning for the liberation of the DEI. Questions about restoring it to colonial rule were, in the eyes of the British, completely secondary to its importance as the sole potential source of oil for the Japanese war machine and in truth most of the military leadership outside of Admiral King agreed with them. The efforts of Allied submarines and Royal Navy warships might have all but cut off what oil was flowing from the DEI, but the trickle that got through was still helping to keep Japan going and the British were also determined to relieve the troops who were maintaining the Allied foothold on Java. The obvious place from which to stage such an assault was Singapore and the British were prepared to fully commit to the DEI and they expected the Americans would do the same, and it was his refusal to embrace this logic that marked the end of the road for Admiral King.
King pointed to ongoing operations on Guadalcanal and several other targets that should in his opinion be of higher priority for the USN as reasons to postpone or deny an American involvement in an attack on the DEI, he was even willing to consider the idea being vigorously put forward by Douglas MacArthur for an immediate drive towards the Philippines, MacArthur being desperate to escape his Washington ‘imprisonment’ and redeem his reputation. Siding with MacArthur was an ill-advised move and King should have probably been more concerned with ensuring his counterarguments were going to be supported by the senior USN commander in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz. While he wasn’t inclined to badmouth his superior Nimitz felt that the DEI was the next logical target for a major operation, and he didn’t try to hide his views. This falling out, however polite meant that at the beginning of March 1943 King was given the choice to either quietly stand down or be fired. He chose the former and the navy grandly promoted him to the rank of Fleet Admiral, before promptly retiring him though he technically remained a serving officer. His replacement as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet was none other than Chester Nimitz, which lead to some bitter recriminations and unfair accusations of disloyalty on Nimitz’s part [3].
Despite the internal politicking the USN was continuing to make progress on increasing the quantity and quality of hardware available to it. The Essex Class carriers were entering frontline service alongside an increasing number of Escort Carriers. There were also new fighter aircraft such as the F6F Hellcat that would be able to meet the Japanese Zero on more than even terms, especially given the loss of so many experienced Japanese naval aviators. For the other branches there was arguably far more work to do as they faced the challenges of 1943 and not all of those challenges were fully apparent yet.
The USAAF were confident that the self-defence abilities of the B17 would allow them to operate in daylight, carrying out precision bombing raids deep into Germany. Finding out that they were wrong in their assumptions would cost the lives of many bomber crews and it would take time to embrace the need for escort fighters, though the aircraft that could fulfil that need already existed. The P 51 Mustang had been designed and built to meet the needs of the RAF in the dark days of 1940. Built around the Allison V-1710 engine, the same powerplant as the P-40, it had acceptable low-level performance but was subpar at altitude and somewhat lacking in range. When the Allison engine was replaced by a Packard built Merlin engine the performance of the fighter was transformed, as was its operational range. Escorted by squadrons of P-51s the bombers of 8th Air Force would be able to fully co-ordinate in the goal of bombing Germany ‘around the clock’, but not for many months as the USAAF stuck to its guns and continued with unescorted bombing missions long after it should have accepted the inevitable [4].
If the USAAF would eventually realize the importance of escort fighters, they were far more stubborn about jet engine technology. They were well aware of British work in the field; however the British had suggested that their designs should be provided to the USA under commercial terms, that is US industry would produce engines under license from the UK and respect certain patent rights. This idea was greeted with horror in the US aero-engine industry, even Packard who were building their own version of the Merlin baulked, unconvinced by the merits of what was still seen as exotic technology of uncertain usefulness. This dubiousness about the value of jets extended into the hierarchy of the USAAF where even among those who felt the technology had merit there was a bullish belief that Germany would be bombed into submission long before jets could be made useful. This explains why the US jet engine program proceeded in parallel to the British rather in co-operation with them lagged behind until after the first Gloster Comet began seeing service and reports reached the USA of new and even more exotic designs being pressed into service by the Luftwaffe. Once they were fully committed the USA was able to catch up quickly, though not without many in the British aerospace industry suggesting that the US had engaged in espionage against its ally to speed up its own program [5].
For the US Army the most contentious issue was almost inevitably tanks. By the beginning of 1943 the A24 Churchill was entering service with the British and they had been only too happy to show it off to the Americans, alongside the prototypes of the new cruiser tank the A27 Centaur. Both would be equipped with a 75mm gun, though there was 77mm High Velocity weapon in the pipeline and plans to install a 17pdr on the A24 as well as possibly the A22 Black Prince, which was proving a solid workhorse for the British. To add insult to injury for the Americans the Canadians had once again chosen to build their own designs, including a vehicle based on the A22, revised with a far more powerful engine and a modified turret as well as considering an assault gun based on the now obsolete Wolverine/Valentine chassis. The M4 Sherman had acquitted itself well in Sicily and the tales of it being prone to fires that circulated were largely a result of selective memory, that is the spectacular and horrifying occasions when one did catch fire stuck in the mind while the far more numerous times when the Sherman either survived a damaging hit or was simply knocked out tended not to make for good stories.
There were though some genuine anxieties as while there had been few Tigers assigned to the defence of Sicily those that had been encountered had proven formidable opponents, whose successes had been enhanced by the relative inexperience of American tank crews. The StuG and the Hetzer had also proven dangerous opponents when able to operate from concealment and it was clear that the latest generation of 75mm guns mounted by the Panzer IV was fully capable of penetrating even the thickest armour of the current models of Sherman There were newer revisions of the Sherman in the pipeline, these though did not satisfy everyone. Suggestions that the US Army needed a heavy tank ran into a formidable obstacle in the shape of General Leslie McNair and the ‘tank destroyer doctrine’. McNair firmly believed that the role of tanks was to rapidly exploit breakthroughs and that tank-on-tank engagements were unlikely. The role of killing enemy armour would primarily fall on towed anti-tank guns and tank destroyers, relatively light armoured vehicles with powerful guns, somewhat akin to the StuG but mostly designed with fully rotating turrets, many of which were open topped, leaving the crew vulnerable to shrapnel and HE shells. This doctrine raised more than a few eyebrows in the British camp, but their views were ignored given what was perceived as the very different roles they used their armour for [6].
In fact the Tank Destroyer doctrine was simply a version of the same strategy the British and Germans had used of baiting the enemy on to a gun line with an armoured force that attacked and then withdrew. The limitations of this strategy became apparent when either the attacker was advancing rapidly and the anti-tank guns had to try and keep up, or the defender declined to counterattack and were able to turn the tables. The highly mobile Tank Destroyers supposedly addressed this issue but, they magnified the issues the British had encountered in their early Cruiser Tanks, that is they had inadequate protection and were highly vulnerable if caught in a direct engagement with enemy armour. This happened far too often as American Tank Destroyers were pressed into service as frontline armour to counter German forces.
McNair’s influence was so entrenched that multiple tank projects were delayed as he threw up one argument after another as to why new models such as the M6, T20 and the M26 Pershing Heavy Tank, with one favourite being that they were too large and would limit the number of tanks that could be shipped. With the Sherman also having plenty of supporters a compromise was reached, or rather a plan was hatched to get a more powerful tank while working around McNair’s objections. This plan became the M4A5 ‘Thomas’, named after yet another Union general of the American Civil War. This design adapted elements of the M6 Heavy Tank project for incorporation into a Sherman with a significantly modified turret to accommodate a larger gun and an enlarged hull, hence the new designation. Suggestions of using a British 17pdr were rejected in favour of a US 90mm gun and while the Thomas would not arrive in time for D-Day it was deployed by September 1943 to provide a powerful counter to the German Panther and Tigers, though the ranks of the US Armoured Divisions would continue to be dominated by the Sherman [7].
Despite all these political and technical issues the US priorities for the spring and summer of 1943 were finally clear, the DEI would be the main target in the Pacific as Normandy would be in the European theatre of war and the success or failure of the latter would determine the course of the war [8].
[1] The USA isn’t a fan of Soviet Communism or European colonialism. There are some idealistic notions of freedom and self-determination being advanced in Washington, but they are somewhat tarnished by the need to secure the USA’s economic interests.
[2] The butterflied equivalent of ABDA in our history.
[3] Names keep getting crossed off that little list.
[4] Each major bomber force seemed to have a particular fixation, for the USAAF it was making unescorted raids work.
[5] The British are not as inclined to just give their tech away ITTL and the USAAF is being a pain, so US jet fighters are going to be delayed.
[6] No McNair isn’t going anywhere; they will have to work round him.
[7] This was based on a discussion about the M4X and the name came from a discussion with @marathag.
[8] And of course both will be the subject of multiple updates.
What effect does this have on the post-war race to Mach 1? Enough for Winkle Brown to be the first?
Nice to see King paying for his anti-Britishness. We all have biases, but King appears to have allowed his to cloud his professional judgement and should pay for this.
On some level I agree with the idea of tank destroyers as a smart way to get AT guns where needed in a hurry, but McNair's fault was that he failed to adapt. Here at least the move is being made to CS tanks (standard Shermans or 105mm armed firing HE with reasonable AT ability) supported by TD tanks (Thomas or Firefly Shermans with better AT capability but inferior HE usefulness). Assuming similar hull designs and protection and mostly differing in turret detailing sounds a good plan. I've mentioned elsewhere that something like a Jumbo with a 105mm gun (or a Churchill with a 25 pounder) is my idea of an infantry tank, but the Thomas is a good addition to the Sherman family.
Garrison
Donor
Many things are still possible and that is definitely one I have in mind.
King painted himself into a corner since the British were in a stronger position than OTL and the DEI was just a logical move even if it meant working with the Royal Navy. The Thomas is of course a medium tank, at least when anyone is presenting it to McNair...
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
Personally, I would have called the power plant of the tank Thomas.
Then you could have a headline: Thomas the Tank Engine.
The tank destroyer doctrine was a logical reaction to the problem of Blitzkrieg
That the US army used it properly just once in WW2 is more down to the German lack of real opportunity and capability to deliver such an attack against the American Army than any real fault in the doctrine.
And when we look at how the NATO armies planned to defeat massed armour attacks it was via a modern version of the Tank Destroyer Doctrine - that is concentration of Anti tank assets in the path of the main thrust often in the form of light vehicles with ATGW teams and helicopters also equipped with ATGW.
That the US army used it properly just once in WW2 is more down to the German lack of real opportunity and capability to deliver such an attack against the American Army than any real fault in the doctrine.
And when we look at how the NATO armies planned to defeat massed armour attacks it was via a modern version of the Tank Destroyer Doctrine - that is concentration of Anti tank assets in the path of the main thrust often in the form of light vehicles with ATGW teams and helicopters also equipped with ATGW.
marathag
Banned
This is what Aberdeen came up for the next step of tank evolution with as the M4 was still brand new, going thru trials
Higher power radial from M6, along with early HVSS suspension it used, still Cletrac differential, but there was to be power assist for the steering, that was trialed in the early M3 Lee/Grant.
It was thought that casting would take too long to develop, so all welded hull.
Larger turret, so could use any of the current planned Tank guns, from the 75mm, 3 inch or 105mm Howitzer, by changing mount and mantlet.
So takes care many of the initial M4 issues, like low power to weight ratio and high ground pressure.
Still not perfect, as later use of the M4 showed the real need for a loader's hatch in the turret, and for TC to have a MG for ground or aerial targets. Also the elimination of the direct vision slots in the hull.
This was all possible to do in 1942, but the success of the M4 in Libya put those plans on the back burner, and the slow effort on the T20 series took hold.
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Garrison
Donor
Thanks, was trying to find that pic and couldn't find it. Without the experience in Libya this development gets aa bit more room to progress and the fact that the British and German tanks have developed faster/earlier also helps.