April 1940 – May 1940 – The Invasion of Norway – Part II - Bergen
Group III consisted of the light cruisers
Köln and
Königsberg, escorted by the artillery training ship
Bremse, the torpedo boats
Leopard and
Wolf and the s-boat tender
Carl Peters, supporting a quintet of s-boats [1]. The group was supposed to be reinforced by the troops and equipment aboard the steamer
MS Rio de Janeiro. Unknown to anyone in Group III the
Rio de Janeiro had been intercepted by the Polish submarine ORP
Orzeł and sunk, with the loss of 200 crew and German soldiers as well as 73 horses and hundreds of tonnes of provisions, animal feed, fuel and ammunition [2]. Survivors from the ship in German uniform provided what was the first clear sign of a German attack and as other action came in throughout the 8th the Norwegians ordered the mobilization of the remaining three field battalions, not however by post!
With the confirmation of the engagement at Trondheim the RAF and Fleet Air Arm had dispatched aircraft to search for German ships headed for Bergen. They also tried to locate other potential targets, but those efforts were largely unsuccessful. At around 17:20 hours a formation of aircraft was spotted overflying Group III. Since the aircraft took no action the commanding officer of Group III, Kapitän zur See Ernst Kratzenberg, assumed that the planes were from the Luftwaffe and did nothing to alter course. Kratzenberg was wrong in this assessment, the aircraft in question were a formation of RAF bombers and they had spotted Group III. Fortunately for Group III they were low on fuel and could not carry out an attack. They did however relay the position of the warships and at 17:30 hours a formation of Fleet Air Arm bombers carried out a successful strike, inflicting damage on the
Köln [3]. Despite this Captain Kratzenberg chose to retain command aboard her rather than transferring to
Königsberg. He did take action to try and evade further attacks and Group III changed course to the south in the hopes of throwing off any other hostile aircraft trying to vector in on them. The tactic succeeded and unbeknownst to Kratzenberg also resulted in the diversion of the
Glasgow and her escorts as they conducted their own search for Group III in the area reported by the aircraft. This avoided a surface engagement, for the time being at least. Group III did not turn back towards Bergen until dusk at approximately 20:45 hours. While they had avoided any further encounters with hostile aircraft or ships they were now considerably behind schedule.
Given this situation Kratzenberg chose to break radio silence and send a brief message. The text of the message that was sent by the ship was later reported as, ‘
Attacked by Norwegian aircraft. Taking evasive action. Will proceed to objective.’ The absence of details of the nature of the evasive action or any time or location information is understandable given the fear of the message being intercepted and read. Less so is the statement that it was Norwegian aircraft that had attacked them. Whether this was what Kratzenberg intended to be sent or if it was accidentally altered while being relayed to the radio operator is unknown. In practical terms it made no difference as there is no record the message was acted up on or indeed received at all. This meant that with the
Theodore Riedel out of contact, she didn’t rendezvous with any other Kriegsmarine ships until the 10th, the German high command remained oblivious to the loss of Group II or the substantial delay to Group III and thus believed their plan was proceeding as scheduled.
Group III approached Bergen at 05:40 on the 9th and it soon became clear that any hope of sneaking in under the cover darkness had gone. Not only were the defenders of Bergen aware of the action off Trondheim but the attack on Oslo had been underway for hours. An unequivocal order had been sent out, ‘
Any ship attempting to enter you harbour under cover of darkness is to be regarded as hostile regardless of flag or signals.’ {4] Thus, when they came into range every gun in the shore batteries opened up on Group III, with the first casualties being the S-Boats. The hope had been that in the confusion of their approach the S-Boats would be able to race in and deliver troops ashore to suppress the defensive fire, instead within a matter of minutes S19 was on fire, S22 Had blown and S24 was adrift and had to be abandoned. S21 ended up running aground as it made evasive manoeuvres and S23 would be abandoned later in the battle with her crew taken aboard the
Carl Peters.
While this was a blow to Group III what happened to the
Köln was far worse. The already damaged ship seemed to be a magnet for the heaviest fire from the shore batteries, and she took hit after hit until at 06:07 hours an explosion rocked the
Köln, ripping out a huge chunk of her deck and destroying most of her superstructure, killing Captain Kratzenberg and the rest of the bridge crew. The
Köln was left adrift and on fire, making her not only a hazard to navigation for the other ships, but also helping to illuminate them for the shore batteries. Captain Heinrich Ruhfus aboard the
Königsberg thus found command falling on him even as the shore batteries started to focus fire on his ship. He faced an invidious situation. Group III had lost the advantage of surprise; he was facing fierce resistance from the shore batteries, and he had no idea how many troops were deployed to defend Bergen (the answer at this point was not very many). To make matters worse dawn would arrive at O6:38, leaving him barely 15 minutes of darkness to work with. Under these circumstance Ruhfus felt he had no choice, and he ordered Group III to withdraw. His hope was that events elsewhere might lead to a Norwegian surrender and the port could be entered unopposed later, or that Group III could be reinforced before staging a second attempt at a landing [5].
At roughly this time the
Köln capsized and extinguished the fire, temporarily restoring the darkness and throwing off the Norwegian gunnery. The darkness proved a double-edged sword as the German ships had no running lights on to avoid drawing fire and during the manoeuvres to reverse course the
Bremse struck the
Leopard. The damage to the
Bremse was relatively minor, the
Leopard however was taking on water, and it was clear she was sinking. She limped on for a little while, trying to get out of range of the shore batteries. Soon though it was clear she was going down, and her crew had to evacuate to the
Wolf before she finally sank at 06:57. At the same time
Bremse had slowed to pick up survivors from the
Köln, which meant the ships of Group III were badly scattered as they made their way through the fjords and back out to the open sea. Still as they left the range of the defences around the port it the crew of the
Königsberg would have been forgiven for thinking the worst was behind them. If any had thought that
HMS Glasgow and her consorts would soon prove them wrong.
The 8th had been a day of frustration for Captain Pegram aboard
Glasgow. They had been searching fruitlessly for Group III for hours and when they finally approached the fjords around Bergen, they swiftly became aware a battle was raging, one they didn’t not dare join for fear of being fired on by the very defenders they wanted to aid. The best they could do was to remain close to Bergen and hope for an opportunity to arise. Their patience was awarded at 10:12 hours when
Königsberg was spotted heading back to sea and a few minutes later the
Carl Peters came into sight.
Glasgow and the destroyers quickly came to action stations.
On the
Königsberg the response was less decisive. The combination of the fact that
Glasgow was approaching bow on, and probably a tired bridge crew, led to Captain Ruhfus considering that the approaching ship might be Kriegsmarine reinforcements. Much to the surprise of Captain Pegram the
Königsberg tried to signal them by lamp. He decided to respond to close the range and sent the single word ‘standby’. The next ‘message’ from the Glasgow was a salvo from her two forward 6” gun turrets. The destroyers
HMS Acasta and
HMS Kimberley soon joined in while the other two,
HMS Eskimo and
HMS Forester, manoeuvred to engage the
Carl Peters [6]
Captain Ruhfus now knew that he was facing yet more hostiles, however
Königsberg had only just started clearing for action when the first shells struck his ship. By the time they were ready to return fire
Königsberg was also taking hits from the destroyers, quickly undoing much of the temporary repairs undertaken after exiting Bergen.
Königsberg scored hits on the
Kimberley in return, she was though taking far more damage than she was inflicting, and the outcome was all but inevitable.
At approximately 11:05 the
Bremse and the
Wolf finally caught up with the rest of Group III and initially it seemed to them that they might be able to tilt the balance of the battle as the
Königsberg was still underway and the
Carl Peters showed only modest signs of damage. The reality was quite different. The
Carl Peters had been struck starboard amidships by a torpedo fired by
Forester just before
Wolf and
Bremse made contact and would be struck portside astern by a second torpedo fired by
Eskimo shortly afterwards.
Königsberg was manoeuvring but she was barely able to maintain 15 knots and all her turrets were out of action. Captain Ruhfus was considering a last desperate attempt to torpedo or ram
Glasgow at the very moment
Bremse and
Wolf were planning to engage.
Trying to support the
Königsberg Wolf engaged the
Glasgow. With
Königsberg no longer able to fire
Glasgow and the
Acasta were able to put all their guns on the torpedo boat.
Wolf did get two torpedoes away, neither of which tracked on their target, even as she was savaged by the Royal Navy ships.
Wolf turned away trailing smoke and still under heavy fire. Even as the
Wolf di her best to protect her the
Königsberg had taken further hits from
Kimberley and now the cruiser was sinking by the stern. She went down at 11:37, with only 49 sailors surviving the sinking, including an injured Captain Ruhfus.
As
Bremse moved to support the
Carl Peters the S-boat tender was beginning to list and was completely out of action, not that she had been well equipped for a gunnery engagement with two Royal Navy destroyers to begin with.
Eskimo and
Forester were therefore able to give
Bremse their undivided attention. The
Bremse was about the same size as a destroyer, but she was purely intended as a gunnery training vessel. She had four 12cm (approximately equivalent to British 4.5”) guns mounted in individual turrets and she had taken damage at Bergen, including the disablement of her rear turret. It was unequal engagement to say the least and by 12:20 hours the whole of Group III was either sinking, burning, or abandoned. Of the Royal Navy ships only the
Forester had taken significant damage, but she remained seaworthy (she stayed in action off Norway and was sunk by Luftwaffe bombers on the 14th of April).
The Norwegians and the Royal Navy had thwarted the attempts to seize Trondheim and Bergen. If this success had been repeated elsewhere the German invasion of Norway would have been an unmitigated disaster. Regrettably things elsewhere were not going in favour of the Norwegian defenders. [7]
[1] That is the OTL composition of Group III
[2] This as per OTL. The Orzel was lost a few weeks later, though no one knows her exact fate.
ORP Orzel
[3] In OTL Koln served until March 1945.
[4] IOTL the message sent warned of the possibility of British or French ships being in the area, creating confusion which greatly aided Group III.
[5] OTL it was Konigsberg that took the damage from the shore batteries, but of course she was undamaged at that point and the defender’s hesitation also helped. She survived the initial assault on Bergen but was sunk by FAA bombers on the 10th.
[6] Again all the Royal Navy ships did, or could have, taken part in operations off Norway.
[7] Which will be the subject of the next update.
