Indeed, despite much pressure from the Allies and the Germans both sides stuck to the pact until the USSR invaded Manchuria in 1945. Basically neither side needed the hassle of opening up another front in the war and neither saw much to gain from their allies in doing so.
Frankly, Soviet Union helped more the WAllies by not fighting Japan but (thanks to the Vladivostok lend-lease) kicking Germany's ass, rather than fighting Japan but losing half of their LL and then having a German victory or draw (or even just German defeat delayed by one year or two) on the Eastern Front.
 
Frankly, Soviet Union helped more the WAllies by not fighting Japan but (thanks to the Vladivostok lend-lease) kicking Germany's ass, rather than fighting Japan but losing half of their LL and then having a German victory or draw (or even just German defeat delayed by one year or two) on the Eastern Front.
I wonder about that.
Hitler threw a large amount of weapons and men at the eastern front trying to stave off defeat, but I think, if victory could have been had with "one more push", with Hitler being a gambler, if he thinks he has an unbeatable 2 pair, aces and kings, would he go all in against Stalin without realising Stalin in holding 3 twos?
 
Almost an offtopic: how Brewster doing? Been still been a "trainwreck" of a company, or did the US managed to save something there?
 
Perhaps the most significant development of the period was the introduction of high frequency direction finding, colloquially known as huff-duff, to escort warships.
IMO, the most significant development of the period was the upgrade of Enigma for U-boat traffic: new machines with a fourth rotor, a new Short Signal Book, and the new TRITON key for U-boat operations only, which took effect in February 1942. Since the previous May, Station X had been reading Kriegsmarine Enigma, including the U-boat traffic, which reduced losses by about 65% compared to the previous 10 months. But starting in February, all operational U-boat traffic went dark. Losses shot up to early 1941 levels until Turing broke TRITON in November. Losses then dropped by about 50%.

ISTM these effects are too large to be obscured by alternate events ITTL.
This technology was particularly valuable for the hunting groups and in combination with sonar and radar, including airborne radar, it brought about a steady increase in U-Boat kills.
There was another factor which brought about a sharp increase in U-boat kills OTL. The "operations research" boffins worked out that how Allied aircraft attacked crash-diving U-boats with depth charges - speed, drop altitude, and depth setting - was largely ineffective, and also developed the right technique. When the new tactics were adopted in summer 1942, the rate of U-boat kills literally doubled in one month.

Again, ISTM that this effect is too large to be obscured.

In both cases: either the effect doesn't happen ITTL (which would have major knock-ons in the narrative), or it does happen, and should be in the narrative.
 
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The Soviets may have been perfectly capable of producing their own highly effective tanks and aircraft, but they still needed every single one they could press into service in 1942, however disdainful they might have been about the quality of some of the hardware they received.​
Some of it. They equipped Guards Tank units with Shermans for breakthrough operations - because they could rely on the Shermans to drive 200-300 km and keep running, unlike the T-34. And 5 of the top 7 Soviet air aces had many or even most of their kills flying P-39s!
When it came to trucks there was no such argument, a large part of the logistics for the Red Army during the war would be delivered in General Motors CCKW Trucks [6].

[6] Carefully airbrushed out of history by the USSR after the war.
Every Soviet kid heard all about the devastation wreaked on Axis troops by the "Katyusha" multiple rocket launcher. But I doubt if any of them knew that nearly all Katyushas were mounted on Studebaker trucks.
 
IMO, the most significant development of the period was the upgrade of Enigma for U-boat traffic: new machines with a fourth rotor, a new Short Signal Book, and the new TRITON key for U-boat operations only, which took effect in February 1942. Since the previous May, Station X had been reading Kriegsmarine Enigma, including the U-boat traffic, which reduced losses by about 65% compared to the previous 10 months. But starting in February, all operational U-boat traffic went dark. Losses shot up to early 1941 levels until Turing broke TRITON in November. Losses then dropped by about 50%.

ISTM these effects are too large to be obscured by alternate events ITTL.

There was another factor which brought about a sharp increase in U-boat kills OTL. The "operations research" boffins worked out that how Allied aircraft attacked crash-diving U-boats with depth charges - speed, drop altitude, and depth setting - was largely ineffective, and also developed the right technique. When the new tactics were adopted in summer 1942, the rate of U-boat kills literally doubled in one month.

Again, ISTM that this effect is too large to be obscured.

In both cases: either the effect doesn't happen ITTL (which would have major knock-ons in the narrative), or it does happen, and should be in the narrative.

Any chance you can elaborate on "the right technique"? Greatly appreciated, Matthew. 🍻
 

Garrison

Donor
IMO, the most significant development of the period was the upgrade of Enigma for U-boat traffic: new machines with a fourth rotor, a new Short Signal Book, and the new TRITON key for U-boat operations only, which took effect in February 1942. Since the previous May, Station X had been reading Kriegsmarine Enigma, including the U-boat traffic, which reduced losses by about 65% compared to the previous 10 months. But starting in February, all operational U-boat traffic went dark. Losses shot up to early 1941 levels until Turing broke TRITON in November. Losses then dropped by about 50%.

ISTM these effects are too large to be obscured by alternate events ITTL.

There was another factor which brought about a sharp increase in U-boat kills OTL. The "operations research" boffins worked out that how Allied aircraft attacked crash-diving U-boats with depth charges - speed, drop altitude, and depth setting - was largely ineffective, and also developed the right technique. When the new tactics were adopted in summer 1942, the rate of U-boat kills literally doubled in one month.

Again, ISTM that this effect is too large to be obscured.

In both cases: either the effect doesn't happen ITTL (which would have major knock-ons in the narrative), or it does happen, and should be in the narrative.
Honestly not everything will appear in the text, but some stuff is still happening in the background.
 
Madagascar is really really far from the farthest Japanese IOTL conquests (ie. Burma, Indonesia or Malaya), let alone Japan itself, and the Japanese are overstretched and have conquered less ITTL, and the Force Z is still there in the way (of any Japanese sortie in the Indian Ocean), so I don't think French authorities in Madagascar would fear any Japanese action. And if they do, it's an absurdly unreasonable fear.

IOTL, there was never a real Japanese threat on Madagascar but with the speed and scope of Japanese initial advance, it looked like Japan could basically carry on advancing as far as it wanted for a few months so, the fear was understandable.
ITTL it's different.
In OTL, the issue was not Japan occupying Madagascar but Japan persuading the Vichy regime to allow Japanese submarines to operate openly or tacitly out of Diego Suarez and other possible submarine bases, thus posing a grave threat to the British convoys to Egypt. This could have become a "real threat" quite quickly. Japanese sub attacks on the convoys might have stressed the Brits too hard at this point, and the Germans might have conquered Egypt and moved on to the Persian Gulf oil fields. In addition, Prime Minister Jan Smuts of South Africa was pressing for solving the Madagascar problem as a matter of his country's vital security interests as well as of war strategy. South Africa was a crucial ally at this stage of the war and Smuts was a close friend of and strategic advisor to Churchill.
 
26th June – 22nd September 1942 – USSR – Case Blue – The Drive for the Caucasus

Garrison

Donor
26th June – 22nd September 1942 – USSR – Case Blue – The Drive for the Caucasus

Case Blue was the pivotal battle of 1942 as far as Hitler was concerned, its success would crush the USSR and bring total victory within his grasp. Many in the General staff were far less convinced, especially given that Hitler had insisted that the Caucasus and its oilfields should be the target rather than a renewed attempt to take Moscow. While gaining control of the oilfields and denying their output to the Soviets would have considerable strategic value the distances involved were daunting, a much further reach than even Barbarossa and if they were reached shipping oil back to Germany would be at least as big a challenge as taking them in the first place. It was then yet another gamble by Hitler, one on which the outcome of the war rested.

The Ostheer was smaller than it had been in 1941, its spearhead forces were however inarguably better equipped than they had been during Barbarossa. The Panzer forces had been fully upgraded, with the Panzer IIIs and Panzer IVs equipped with 50mm and long barrelled 75mm guns respectively. Some SS units had even received the first models of the new Panzer VI Tiger. The Tiger proved to be a fearsome weapon, once the mechanical issues that afflicted the early production vehicles were addressed. There were also large numbers of StuG III and Czech built StuH assault guns as well as the latest models of machine guns and other small arms [1].

These armoured spearheads were impressive, behind them though the bulk of the Ostheer was still moving on foot and depending on horse drawn transport to carry its supplies. To fill out their ranks these divisions were reinforced with fresh cadres drawn from the ranks of teenage boy barely old enough to serve and family men in their thirties, the latter previously having been excluded from service as they were needed in German agriculture and industry. Increasingly these men would be replaced with slave labour, with consequences both for the slaves and the productivity of German industry. It was clear to many in the Wehrmacht that this was the chance for a German victory but still no one seriously questioned Hitler’s leadership even after the setbacks of 1941. For the time being the Wehrmacht would loyally try to deliver on the demands the Fuhrer made of them [2].

The initial phase of the offensive seemed like a repeat of the early days of Barbarossa, a rapid advance that inflicted heavy losses on the Red Army. This was partly because Soviets had assumed the Germans would indeed try once again to seize Moscow and had deployed their forces accordingly. As the Germans advanced the Red Army began to hastily redeploy and regroup, but it would still take months for them to be able to stop the Wehrmacht advance, and longer for them to be able to mount a counter offensive. The initial successes spurred Hitler on, with victory seemingly in his grasp. However, he soon began to fixate on seizing the city that bore the name of the ruler of the USSR, Stalingrad. The fighting in the city swiftly turned into a brutal attritional struggle, where gains were made not so much street by street but floor by floor in individual buildings, with ground lost and retaken multiple times. It was just the sort of attritional battle that Hitler had previously wanted to avoid but Stalingrad rapidly assumed an importance out of all proportion to its strategic value. its fall became an obsession for Hitler and would blind him to the danger to his overextended armies as summer turned to autumn. For the Soviets Stalingrad also became symbolic, though they had the resources to assemble the means for a massive counterattack that would doom the German 6th Army and cement the cities reputation as one of the bitterest battles of the entire war [3].

The drive east may have been the primary focus of German plans for 1942, they could not however ignore the west, where both their allies and enemies were creating problems that would force them to divert resources. Even without these diversions it is unlikely that Case Blue could have achieved the grandiose goals set by Hitler. Perhaps it could have achieved the more limited objective espoused by some of the more realistic members of the Nazi hierarchy, that of persuading the Soviets to make a separate peace and leaving the Reich with ‘only’ the USA and the British Empire to fight. If the Wehrmacht and the SS had not done their level best to show the people of the Soviet Union that this was an existential war this might have been feasible. The Third Reich had however already murdered, starved, and enslaved millions in the east. Stalin may have toyed with the idea of such a move, but in the end, he took it no more seriously than Hitler did, both knowing that their own personal survival was tied to the outcome of the war. Stalin also knew that he could use the threat of the USSR making its own peace to squeeze concessions from the Western Allies [4].

The reality was that for both the Third Reich and the USSR the only outcomes by the Autumn of 1942 were total victory or total destruction and despite the resurgence of optimism created by the victories won during the summer the latter was far more likely than the former for Nazi Germany. The potential consequences for Hitler and his inner circle if the war turned against them were starkly illustrated by what happened in Italy during the tumultuous summer of 1942 [5].

[1] These are the alt vehicles described a few pages back and drawn up by Cortz#9

[2] Any actual plans to overthrow Hitler are still some way off.

[3] It does have that reputation, but I’ve always felt place like the Kokoda trail were at least as bad and both were worse than the supposedly appalling trench warfare of WWI.

[4] So a relatively short update, because there isn’t that much alt happening here. It wouldn’t however have been right to just skip over the largest campaign of 1942.

[5] What the heck is going on in Italy will be discussed soon.
 
While the result of the war is a foregone conclusion, I think those German tanks are going to cause more than one headache to the Allies once they enter the continent.
 

Garrison

Donor
While the result of the war is a foregone conclusion, I think those German tanks are going to cause more than one headache to the Allies once they enter the continent.
They will be an issue, thought the Western Allies can take some comfort in that a lot of the best German armour is deployed in the east and they do have their own next gen armour coming along.
 
The potential consequences for Hitler and his inner circle if the war turned against them were starkly illustrated by what happened in Italy during the tumultuous summer of 1942 [5].

What the heck is going on in Italy will be discussed soon
When you add up the much worse performance of the Italian military with Mussolini's worse relationships with Italian movers and shakers, alt Husky is the straw that breaks the camel's back. I don't imagine the Germans not intervening if Mussolini and co are dead but, they might have a worse time doing it than otl.
 

Garrison

Donor
When you add up the much worse performance of the Italian military with Mussolini's worse relationships with Italian movers and shakers, alt Husky is the straw that breaks the camel's back. I don't imagine the Germans not intervening if Mussolini and co are dead but, they might have a worse time doing it than otl.
There is a two part update on Italy coming on Thursday and Saturday.
 
Side Note: If anyone is looking for a good book, "The War of the Rats" on the battle of Stalingrad was a really good read....
 
It might be able to take a single coastal vessel each night or so, allowing some vital supplies to come via that rather than overland, easing supply issues slightly (very slightly), and thus easing some maintenance and wear/tear on various trucks coming from Benghazi/Tobruk.

Even if only a hundred tonnes of supplies can come through Sirte each day, that would reduce the number of needed trucks by approx 30 each day (if purely using Bedford QL trucks, each carrying 3 tons) on the road between Benghazi and Sirte
Just running a costal tanker with a deck load of cargo or fresh water, each night, will help.
 
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