I understand, it's hard to rationalise even though we know these people rationalised it somehow (to themselves).
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
Fair enough, and if I was doing a rewrite I might add more 'colour' by fleshing out the battles between the IJN and its true enemy, the Army. In fact since the sequel TL is in the early stages of planning I might well work more material into there and edit the forthcoming carrier battles to add a bit more background.
I understand, but we know who commanded specific campaigns. I find it easier to immerse into story when I know Yamashita is planning an attack on Montgomery, then when it's just "Japanese".
A lot of people seem to be projecting 1945 Japan onto 1942, the real Victory disease happened after they almost completely dismantled the European empires in East Asia in a few months.
They weren’t all completely insane, they had seen the western powers fall apart when pressured. The Germans has conquered almost all of Europe in 1-2 years (and looked poised to conquer the Soviet Union in six months), Britain had been kicked off the continent twice, embarrassed on Crete and was not covering itself in glory in North Africa and I imagine the Japanese would have also had a idealised German view of how the Atlantic campaign was going.
From their POV they had lost too many men and huge amounts of treasure in China to pull out now. There was also deep resentment towards Britain and the USA for their opposition to Japan’s attempt to control China. From their POV why was it okay for the USA to conquer and colonise the lands of the Native Americans and the British to control India but it was not okay for Japan to control China? Now the Americans were cranking up the economic pressure and pushing the western allies to do the same as conditions for support for the war in Europe. Within a few years the Japanese economy would grind to a halt and potentially see the overthrow of the Japanese government and destruction of their empire.
So Japan’s POV is that it needs resources that the European empires have, France and the Netherlands have been conquered so their empires should be easy pickings (of course they had already occupied Indochina which is what alarmed the Americans so much - this is potentially the worst decision they made and they could have possibly avoided war had they left Indochina alone.) The British don’t have the resources to oppose us as they have they have their hands full in Europe. Whereas the USA is backing the Wallies to the hilt, so the Japanese don’t think they can ignore the USA if they move against the Europeans.
So if they can cripple the US Battlefleet in a surprise attack and conquer the relatively undefended Euro colonies then they expect they can either present the US with a fait accompli or they can force a decisive battle, following which they think the Americans will not have the stomach to continue (I guessing their memories of the Russo-Japanese war played a part in this thinking.) It was a very audacious plan but they felt that the only other option would be the end of Japanese power.
In the end the Japanese were very wrong, and as a consequence their empire was destroyed and they became a satellite of the USA, the very thing they wanted to prevent. Now I’m not saying they were very logical but there there was some logic (which turned out to be incorrect) to their decisions, at least initially. They weren’t all rambling nutters like April 1945 Hitler in the bunker when the decision to go to war was made.
They weren’t all completely insane, they had seen the western powers fall apart when pressured. The Germans has conquered almost all of Europe in 1-2 years (and looked poised to conquer the Soviet Union in six months), Britain had been kicked off the continent twice, embarrassed on Crete and was not covering itself in glory in North Africa and I imagine the Japanese would have also had a idealised German view of how the Atlantic campaign was going.
From their POV they had lost too many men and huge amounts of treasure in China to pull out now. There was also deep resentment towards Britain and the USA for their opposition to Japan’s attempt to control China. From their POV why was it okay for the USA to conquer and colonise the lands of the Native Americans and the British to control India but it was not okay for Japan to control China? Now the Americans were cranking up the economic pressure and pushing the western allies to do the same as conditions for support for the war in Europe. Within a few years the Japanese economy would grind to a halt and potentially see the overthrow of the Japanese government and destruction of their empire.
So Japan’s POV is that it needs resources that the European empires have, France and the Netherlands have been conquered so their empires should be easy pickings (of course they had already occupied Indochina which is what alarmed the Americans so much - this is potentially the worst decision they made and they could have possibly avoided war had they left Indochina alone.) The British don’t have the resources to oppose us as they have they have their hands full in Europe. Whereas the USA is backing the Wallies to the hilt, so the Japanese don’t think they can ignore the USA if they move against the Europeans.
So if they can cripple the US Battlefleet in a surprise attack and conquer the relatively undefended Euro colonies then they expect they can either present the US with a fait accompli or they can force a decisive battle, following which they think the Americans will not have the stomach to continue (I guessing their memories of the Russo-Japanese war played a part in this thinking.) It was a very audacious plan but they felt that the only other option would be the end of Japanese power.
In the end the Japanese were very wrong, and as a consequence their empire was destroyed and they became a satellite of the USA, the very thing they wanted to prevent. Now I’m not saying they were very logical but there there was some logic (which turned out to be incorrect) to their decisions, at least initially. They weren’t all rambling nutters like April 1945 Hitler in the bunker when the decision to go to war was made.
Just from my opinion, I think I understand where you're coming from, but it's probably very hard to write without it being somewhat cumbersome. On a tactical level, @Garrison 's mention of the Japanese commanders demanding a letter from the British justifying their surrender, was a very good example of what was historically an exception in their behaviour. On a strategic level, the only thing I can think of is perhaps a longer segment on Japanese Strategic Planning prior to any actual attacks about the interconnected nature of operations necessitated due the shortage of manpower and the Japanese strategic belief that simply by applying enough pressure the at their points of attack, the arrogant and weak European colonial power's soldiers would run in fear and collapse. The reality being that the Japanese assessment of both their ability to break the Allied Soldiers' will and their ability to daisy-chain operations together with the same troops was largely accurate in OTL and therefore not stupid at all. It's just a matter that the author's butterflies have undermined Japanese strategy as the British changes were designed to specifically target the Japanese "acceptable risks"....with the key takeaway being just how fragile the Japanese strategy really was.
This is not mutually exclusive. By the time monsoon subsides in the autumn and leave the road to Bangkok open for Slim, lot of blood would have been spilled in the DEI I'm sure.
Garrison
Donor
The DEI is going to have to wait until 1943, but is close to the top of my list of updates to write for the sequel, of which I already have a few drafted.
Will you cover ABDA naval forces? Did that command even got formed, I don't think it was mentioned so far?
Given Force Z was not destroyed parts of it will probably join Doorman or his TTL counterpart?
Garrison
Donor
After the narrow escape of Force Z most of what would have been ABDA wound up assigned elsewhere and it didn't exist as such, hence can't really touch on it in the TL. The Dutch component may well be part of the small force of surface ships that wind up operating out of Singapore harassing Japanese communications with the DEI even while the bulk of force Z and the RN reinforcements it receives remain in Ceylon until the summer or autumn of 1942.
Garrison
Donor
They are holding the islands outside of Java, not because their landing was particularly large scale but because most of the available resources were committed elsewhere. Things have bogged down for both sides on Java, waiting for the Allies to be able to relieve the forces on Java and take back the rest of the islands.
Garrison
Donor
They are occupying them, mainly because all the allied resources were focused elsewhere.
1st February– 18th April 1942 – Malaya and Burma - Operation Yari – Part V – The Second Battle of Kuala Lumpur
Garrison
Donor
1st February– 18th April 1942 – Malaya and Burma - Operation Yari – Part V – The Second Battle of Kuala Lumpur
In early versions of Operation Yari the force attack Kuala Lumpur had strictly limited objectives, with a matching force level. It was intended to pin the British defenders in place while the attack in the east broke through and if the opportunity arose to drive them back towards Singapore and prevent the British from establishing a new line of defence. This latter objective was largely included as a sop to the more aggressive elements in the Japanese High Command. The problem arose when this hoped for pursuit was transformed into a requirement of the plan, despite the continued concerns of some planners, who objected to the fact that this heavier weighting for the west of Malaya came at the expense of every other part of Yari. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, was primarily responsible for the demands to increase the weight of the attack in the west, fearing that a mere holding action would give the British too much room to manoeuvre and that they had to be pushed out of the Swettenham Line and kept off balance. Tsuji did express the view that this should not be done at the expense of weakening the attack in the east, however when it became clear that this simply wasn’t possible Tsuji, safely removed from the front line in a comfortable office, reverted to his aggressive instincts and allowed the western arm of the offensive to draw strength away from the other parts of the operation [1].
One item that the western force absorbed almost entirely was armoured support, on the grounds that the additional weight of firepower was best used to break the Swettenham Line and pave the way for a sweep into the British rear, while the attack in the east would use the amphibious assault to achieve the same result. The Japanese were not looking to the kind of sweeping armoured flanking manoeuvre that Manstein and Guderian had embraced, especially as the Japanese could only assemble some 81 tanks for the battle and Montgomery had no intention of offering any open flank to be exploited. The tanks would though be used in a concentrated mass intended to punch a hole in the line and in many cases, they would go into battle with Japanese infantry clinging to them, intended to be swiftly deployed when the Japanese broke into the Swettenham Line. Troops hitching a ride on tanks to reach the front was hardly unusual in WWII, riding on them into the thick of the action was a different matter and few of these troops survived their ride to engage in battle, either unceremoniously thrown from the tanks they were precariously holding onto or victims of enemy fire. The latter would have been less of an issue if the Japanese had maintained better operational security. Instead the British learned where the Japanese had placed their armour and Montgomery adjusted his forces accordingly [2].
The Japanese offensive in the west opened on the 20th of March, with the armoured spearhead leading the way, though as often happened in all theatres it was less a question of leading more of running ahead in the heat of battle and becoming isolated from infantry support as a result, an issue that the infantry riding on them was supposed to address. They were met by a force of 27 Cruiser tanks, largely Cruiser II and Cruiser IV that briefly skirmished with the Japanese spearhead before falling back with the enemy in hot pursuit, which was precisely what Montgomery had planned for. As the Japanese advanced, they came under fire from concealed anti-tank guns and hull down Matilda IIs and Valentines. Most of the infantry tanks were still only equipped with 2pdr guns, these were more than adequate against the available Japanese tanks and the spearhead was cut to pieces with British artillery adding to the carnage [3].
The infantry attacks that were intended to follow up a successful armoured breakthrough went in nonetheless and persisted for three days, making little ground before they were finally called off and a series of small-scale British attacks between the 25th and 26th of March retook what meagre ground they had taken. After this there was a lull in the fighting, with Montgomery resisting calls for a full-scale counterattack on the grounds he had neither the numbers nor the logistics to sustain a meaningful pursuit. Some of the Japanese saw this ‘inertia’ as a sign that they had stretched the British to the breaking point and with the failure of the attacks in the east they cajoled their troops into preparing what was hoped to be the final attack that would break the Swettenham Line and open the road to Singapore. This was fuelled by a sense that the British must have had to create a weak point somewhere in their lines to mount an effective defence in the east and faced with the knowledge that abandoning the attack would essentially mean giving up on conquering Malaya altogether there really was no other option but one last push from the Japanese perspective. This fresh attack was launched on the 30th of March [4].
Certainly, the defenders on the Swettenham line were tired and not as strong as they had been on the 20th, however they were still stronger than the Japanese and their supply lines were secure and able to provide rations and ammunition to the troops, not something the Japanese troops could count on by this stage of the battle. The renewed attack didn’t achieve even the limited gains of the previous assault on the 20th, nevertheless the renewed attack continued for five days this time, with some Japanese units being reduced to mounting bayonet attacks by the 4th of April, whatever else they lacked determination was not in short supply, though it was not nearly enough in the face machine guns and artillery that never quite ran out of ammunition even though the British were running short by the 4th of April. The Japanese did try to vary their tactics, putting in a night attack on the 6th of April that turned into a confused mess with Japanese units running into one another in the dark and alerting the defenders. On the other hand British probes of the Japanese lines were also met with stiff resistance, confirming Montgomery’s decision to remain on the defensive [5].
It was only when reports were received that the attack into Burma had been also repulsed, which was not until the 10th of April after the remnants of the 55th Division finished their retreat, that it was finally conceded that the forces facing the Swettenham Line would have to withdraw and regroup. The theoretical threat of a British attack towards Bangkok from Burma provided a face-saving excuse to withdraw northwards, and the Japanese began pulling out of the forward positions on the 11th, with the entire force in motion by the 13th, hence Montgomery marking this as the end of the battle. For the defending troops this was an immense relief, though as far as Montgomery was concerned the defence of the Swettenham Line was simply a steppingstone to driving the Japanese completely out of South East Asia and the Dutch East Indies, the Pacific he was prepared to leave to the Americans [6].
On the Japanese side there was a very quiet shift in strategy, a reluctant acceptance that for the time being at least they had no choice but to shift to the defensive, not only in Malaya but across the rest of their conquests. This did not spare several senior officers from being dismissed in disgrace, carrying the blame for the overreach that was now handing the initiative to their enemies. This shift in Japanese strategy not only gave the British a secure base of operations, but it also meant that when faming struck Bengal in 1943 the British were able to mount a meaningful relief effort through Burma, countering claims by some nationalists that they were prepared to leave Indians to die of hunger [7].
From this point on Japan would be facing a battle for survival, not conquest The Royal Navy would return to Singapore in due course and from there they would be able to blockade the Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and the need to fight on so many fronts put an ever greater strain on an already overextended IJA and IJN, with the latter facing its own catastrophes in the spring of 1942 [8].
[1] So yes there were some attempts to try and properly balance the forces, but no one was willing to dial things back when it became clear that wasn’t possible.
[2] A big part of the problem for the Japanese is that they don’t have as much room for surprise as they did back in December 1941, and even they telegraphed a lot of their moves, the counters were just poorly handled.
[3] It’s a trick that was used time and again in the war, using armour as bait to draw in the enemy.
[4] Its one last throw of the dice for the Japanese, and such things have worked on occasion, its just the Japanese no longer enjoy that kind of luck.
[5] Both sides are getting close to complete exhaustion at this point.
[6] So Montgomery’s ego is quite unlimited.
[7] So yes, the Bengal famine doesn’t happen.
[8] And those catastrophes will be along in a few updates.
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Well Operation Yari was a bust. Looking forward to the naval battles. I imagine French North Africa is our next stop. Will be interesting to see the total strength of the Free French afterwards.
Garrison
Donor
A slight detour to the north sea for Operation Odin(alt name) v Operation Fuller first.
So With Burma Secure I think Allies can Use Burma Road to send UK and US Army in China to push Japan away from mainland instead of Island hopping? And With Unrestricted Submarine warfare and blockade around DEI I think Japan may not get enough Oil and Rubber to fuel itself and collapse.
Garrison
Donor
It si going to be mostly referred to in passing until the sequel TL. Basically a case of being one of the places where their OTL good fortune didn't desert them.
In theory the Allies could focus on China, for the Americans though there is a significant attachment to the island hopping campaign and some senior figures are not keen on full co-operation with the British in the Pacific.
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