I imagine the Free Thai Movement will be in a stronger position with the defeats of the IJA in Malaya and Burma.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
1st February– 18th April 1942 – Malaya and Burma - Operation Yari – Part IV – The Assault at Kuala Dungun
Garrison
Donor
1st February– 18th April 1942 – Malaya and Burma - Operation Yari – Part IV – The Assault at Kuala Dungun
The amphibious force heading for Kuala Dungun was scheduled to make its landing on the 21st of March, two days after the land force launched their renewed assault on the position at Khota Baru, allowing for the British to mobilize whatever reserves they had in the east of Malaya to reinforce the positions around Khota Baru. This portion of the plan failed well before the amphibious force got anywhere near their destination, because the British were well aware of Japanese intentions and the defences at Khota Baru were far stronger than the Japanese had anticipated and the attack there swiftly bogged down, without Montgomery feeling the need to move any of his reserves north. Those troops instead remained positioned to counter the amphibious force, which would also have to contend with the attentions of the RAF and RAAF bombers that were dispatched to intercept them [1].
Just as in Burma the IJAAF intended to devastate the British aircraft on the ground, and just as in Burma the establishment of radar facilities eliminated the element of surprise, resulting in the IJAAF taking heavy casualties. Combined with the losses over Burma the IJAAF had seen its strength reduced by between a third and a half in the South East Asia theatre, depending on which sets of figures is used as a reference. Japanese sources are contradictory about the number of aircraft and sorties conducted over Burma, Malaya and Java, where small scale air attacks continued even at the height of the fighting around Khota Baru and Kuala Lumpur. The figures on numbers and losses in Japanese archives were almost certainly altered after the events to minimize the embarrassment to the IJA. Regardless of the actual rate of attrition the relative failure of the air attacks allowed the British to mount a large-scale raid with some 73 Blenheims, Bostons, and Beaufighters attacking the amphibious force in three waves. The aircraft were largely carrying bombs, though perhaps half a dozen of the Beaufighter were carrying torpedoes, a variant known as the ‘torbeau’. Most of the available IJAAF fighters had been covering the airfield attacks and the transports, hastily outfitted with a few light artillery pieces and some heavy machine guns as anti-aircraft weapons, could offer little resistance.
Even so the attacks cost the British a dozen aircraft, in exchange the two largest transport ships were sunk out right and another suffered heavy damage that left it with no choice but to retreat and limp back to port, despite the desire of the army officers aboard to press on. That left one transport ship and nine fishing vessels to press on to Kuala Dungun in the hope of getting ashore before any further air attacks could be mounted. The transports also put in an urgent request for more air support, without much success. They were only spared from further air attacks because the bomber crews overestimated the amount of damage they had done and mistakenly concluded that the entire amphibious force was withdrawing. Still, what had been a force of 1100 Japanese troops had been reduced to less than 500, with most of the force’s supplies and heavy equipment lost with the large transports [2].
This mistaken conclusion could have had serious consequences for the defence of Eastern Malaya; Montgomery however had not placed his faith in the idea of destroying the amphibious force at sea, and some 600 British troops were waiting to meet them. These troops had only arrived in Malaya a few weeks before, but they were all veterans of the fighting in the Middle East and they exhibited excellent fire discipline, not opening up until the Japanese troops tried to rush the port facilities, hoping to take control of them and secure a bridgehead for the unloading of their remaining supplies and heavy equipment. Instead, they found themselves advancing into a killing ground of interlocking machine gun nests and mortars. As soon as the machine guns opened up so did the supporting artillery, meaning that both the front and rear of the Japanese force were under fire, pinning them down with little in the way of solid cover. By the time they were able to pull back they had taken over two hundred casualties, dead and wounded, and any hope the situation could be retrieved was lost when the remaining transports pulled out, apparently in response to aircraft sightings. These though were probably Japanese aircraft as the operational reports from the British forces indicate that no RAF or RAAF aircraft were in the vicinity until almost dusk, by which time the Japanese ships had withdrawn. The transports were supposed to return after dark but owing to a final breakdown in communications with the forces ashore this did not take place, or at least the absence of any communication with the troops was the excuse put forward for the decision to completely abandon the landing force [3].
A further attempt to breakout overnight by the remaining Japanese troops was also repulsed and the following morning a delegation of British officers, marching under a white flag, sought the surrender of the cut off Japanese troops, only to find that the Japanese apparently thought the British intended to surrender! After the British officers beat a hasty retreat there was a further Japanese attack on the British position, though this involved less than a hundred Japanese troops and was again repulsed with heavy Japanese losses. The British once more called on the Japanese to surrender and again they were rebuffed, even though by this point the Japanese were down to less than one hundred and fifty effectives, including a number a of walking wounded. It was only after the reappearance of the RAF, this time in the shape of Hurricanes that strafed and bombed the Japanese position, that the by now very junior officers commanding the remnant of the assault force finally chose to lay down their arms, in exchange that for a written assurance from the British that they had fought honourably and had surrendered only to obtain medical aid for their wounded men [4].
The fighting around Khota Baru was far less dramatic, though still costly for the Japanese. The British position had been substantially built up since the fighting in December and while both sides fed reinforcements into the battle in a piecemeal fashion the British and Indian troops received rather more of them than the Japanese side. It was only on the 27th of March that the Japanese commanders finally elected to withdraw ‘to regroup’, admitting to a retreat being far too humiliating. This regrouping amounted to appeals for additional air support, artillery, and tanks, none of which was forthcoming as what little reserves the Japanese possessed had already been committed. Almost everything the Japanese had accumulated in the way of men and equipment during the first months of 1942 had been thrown into the initial assaults and once those had been used up at Khota Baru and Kuala Dungun the eastern arm of Operation Yari in Malaya had to be abandoned, regardless of attempts to rally the Japanese forces fighting spirit to mount fresh assaults with depleted regiments and inadequate ammunition. The only advantage the troops withdrawing from Khota Baru enjoyed was that their supply lines were far shorter than those of the 55th Division in Burma and they were able fall back into Thailand in relatively good order [5].
With the repulse of the offensive in Burma this meant that by the 27th of March three of the four arms of Operation Yari had failed. This did not mean the fighting was over, indeed it would drag on into April, with Montgomery recording in his official account of the defence that the battle finally ended on the 13th.That the second battle of Kuala Lumpur dragged on for so long after the failure of the rest of Operation Yari speaks to the intransigence of the Japanese forces in Western Malaya [6].
[1] They are of course getting no support from IJN.
[2] So yes, the bomber pilots have somewhat exaggerated their success, hardly the only time in the war this happened.
[3] Some people on the Japanese did still understand that sometimes discretion was the better part of valour.
[4] A display of common sense that will not be repeated very often as the Japanese position in the war deteriorates.
[5] Relatively meaning they didn’t actually have men starve to death during the retreat.
[6] And yes there is one more update on the battle in Malaya before we move elsewhere.
The southeast Asia theater will be interesting once the monsoon season would have passed. I mind that by late 1942, Slim should have built his forces strong enough to begin crossing over the Tenasserim hills and directly threaten Bangkok, potentially compelling the Thais to switch sides like the Italians.
Especially as the Thais were (from the start) dragged into the war by Japan under threat...
Garrison
Donor
The focus after the Japanese are finally pushed out of Malaya will switch to the DEI, though Thailand won't be completely ignored.
Well I haven't worked out the hard numbers for both sides, but the Japanese have a faced a series of defeats making frontal attacks on defended positions so much heavier than OTL. Conversely the British side hasn't fallen apart and lost large numbers of troops as POWs, so significantly lower on their side.
Also bear in mind as I think has been mentioned already there are allied forces still fighting in the DEI, including the Canadians who were lost when Hong Kong fell IOTL.
DEI should be priority indeed, as pushing the Japanese away from there means cutting Japan from any (possible) oil supply (except buying from Soviet Sakhalin).
In fact when the Japanese landed in Thailand, the Thais fought them for hours, inflicting hundreds of casualties.
Alternatively, it could be looked on as leaving a Japanese foothold in the DEI extends their supply lines making them exceedingly vulnerable to attack, while flipping the Thai's dramatically changes air coverge over the Gulf of Thailand and begins to badly expose the Japanese flanks in French Indochina. If the allies can find the right mix of incentives, much like the USSR, it could lead to a situation where although the allies provide the bulk of the equipment and supplies, it could result in the Thais providing 3-4 divisions worth of manpower to wear down the Japanese. The politics of Thailand at the time will be a major wild card and complicating factor.
While I don't question that Japanese strategy is pretty much in line with their OTL behaviour, I think timeline would improve if it was described in some more personal manner and not "wow look at those crazy stupid Japanese".
Even if on the whole IJA and IJN were pretty crazy they were not a hive mind and I think timeline would improve with inclusion of actual Japanese officers who make these plans. And then guessing by their OTL actions whether they would blindly charge against all odds or would they reconsider their plans in light of these unexpected difficulties.
I think their actions would probably stay pretty similar, but it would make the story less stupid Japanese, smart British (which honestly kind of feels like now).
And I want to say that I find the story good and plausible, but to me it would be better if it was less ridiculing Japanese and more showing how their position is pretty f....d but they see no other options other then trying to win even with inadequate resources.
Which I think is easier done when Japanese are not a hive mind but specific people making decisions. North Africa was great that way, AK commander (Apfell?) was described and his actions made sense given his character.
Even if on the whole IJA and IJN were pretty crazy they were not a hive mind and I think timeline would improve with inclusion of actual Japanese officers who make these plans. And then guessing by their OTL actions whether they would blindly charge against all odds or would they reconsider their plans in light of these unexpected difficulties.
I think their actions would probably stay pretty similar, but it would make the story less stupid Japanese, smart British (which honestly kind of feels like now).
And I want to say that I find the story good and plausible, but to me it would be better if it was less ridiculing Japanese and more showing how their position is pretty f....d but they see no other options other then trying to win even with inadequate resources.
Which I think is easier done when Japanese are not a hive mind but specific people making decisions. North Africa was great that way, AK commander (Apfell?) was described and his actions made sense given his character.
This is a period were they are actually crazy to modern eyes. The twisting of Bushido meant officers who tried to be more rational got "invited onward" or told to "show the fighting spirit of Nippon" ie some suicidal action to regain honour. They will fight when retreat is the best option, they will chose death rather than surrender and cries of Banzai! rather than more rational options will be common.
Early war , Japanese regulars were indoctrinated to an absurd level, they are frighteningly nihilist. They believe prisoners are less than human and exist only to serve or die at their captors whim. Add in logistics that just did not work, over complex planning , rivalries and utter contempt for their foes and you do get what looks like a dysfunctional hive mind.
Thing is, the problem with Japan far far deeper than just "trying to win with inadequate resources". It was also the honor culture, refusal to retreat or surrender, officers wanting to get glory / avoid shame (and avoid being murdered) above everything else, and lack of cooperation between navy and army...
I know, I am aware of Japanese WW2 history. And I'm not saying the timeline is unrealistic.
I'm just arguing against presentation of Japanese as an amorphous blob/hive mind. We see thought and worries for Slim, Montgomery etc for the British, while the other side is "Japanese planned...".
Not every Japanese officer is completely the same Bushido crazed moron and the story looses nuance when one side is presented exclusively that way. Even if every officer involved in TTL Malaya/Burma is like that, in my opinion the story is better if they are shown (like Apfell was).
I am aware that Garrison probably does not know Japanese officers as well as allied ones, but I think story (which I like) can be improved that way. Just an opinion.
I'm just arguing against presentation of Japanese as an amorphous blob/hive mind. We see thought and worries for Slim, Montgomery etc for the British, while the other side is "Japanese planned...".
Not every Japanese officer is completely the same Bushido crazed moron and the story looses nuance when one side is presented exclusively that way. Even if every officer involved in TTL Malaya/Burma is like that, in my opinion the story is better if they are shown (like Apfell was).
I am aware that Garrison probably does not know Japanese officers as well as allied ones, but I think story (which I like) can be improved that way. Just an opinion.
Well come up with an example/suggestion then. Trouble is all the well known ones are fanatical resistance followed by Seppuku/Banzai Charge rather than surrender.
Examples/suggestions for what?
As I said, "Even if every officer involved in TTL Malaya/Burma is like that, in my opinion the story is better if they are shown (like Apfell was)."
Crux of my argument is not "don't make Japanese stupid", but "don't make Japanese command amorphous blob".
I similarly dislike expressions like "Admiralty wanted", etc. There is no institution with its mind and will (be it Admiralty, RAF, IJA, IJN...), some specific human/comittee/group is making that decision. And if it's comittee/group people in them are making it.
Garrison
Donor
The problem is that where I can sort of get inside the head of someone like Chamberlain or even say von Kleist or god help me Goering, I cannot put myself in the mindset of the Japanese. German strategy was built on a warped world view but within that world view there was a logic. It's like constructing a system of math based on the assumption that 2+2=5. Its completely wrong but it can still have a consistent internal logic. With the Japanese it seemed to be more akin to 2+2=Don't ask or you get run through with a sword.
I read 'Road of Bones' by Fergal Keane about the siege of Kohima and its beyond grim and that seems to have been a pattern throughout the war, reckless strategy, squandering the lives of their troops, a complete inability to adapt that saw them unable to replace losses in naval aviators, officers who suffered defeats expected to die rather than learn, and substituting Banzai charges for well worked out strategy, honestly if any WWII country could be labelled as crazy, rather than warped and malevolent, it is probably Imperial Japan.
Rational officers, its hard not to paint people as one dimensional when the well known OTL record is pretty one dimensional. You don't seem to get the Imperial Japanese mindset/culture , decisions were presented to the Emperor for formal approval as being the result of the group not a specific General/Admiral. So it was, for example, officially the High Commands plan that was being implemented not a specific General and it was referred to that way