1st January 1942 – 8th March 1942 – The Axis – Part II – Desperate Measures
Goering had emphatically placed the blame for the failure at Crete on the Italians, which made his embrace of Operation Herkules rather ironic. Far from having given up on the idea of large-scale glider borne forces to carry out assaults the Luftwaffe was thinking of an attack on an even grander scale than Crete, literally in the case of the Me 321 glider. This immense aircraft had been under development since 1940 and formally entered service in 1941. It was a quite incredible aircraft for the period, able to carry up to 200 equipped troops or 20,000 kg cargo. Compare this to the Ju 52, which had a maximum capacity of 18 troops, or 1845 kg of cargo, while the DFS 230 glider used in Crete could carry 9 equipped troops, plus 270 kg of equipment. The Me 321 was an order of magnitude beyond anything else in service. It was also slow and hard to tow, requiring several aircraft acting in co-ordination, or a single purpose built He 111Z. This towing aircraft had two He 111 fuselages connected by a common centre wing section and had five engines in total. This aircraft was only ever produced in very small numbers and for Operation Herkules the Me 321 would have to depend on the ‘Troika-schlepp’, three Bf 110s towing the glider simultaneously, a hazardous and highly demanding procedure. The Me 321 incredibly vulnerable to attack, though in practice able to absorb a great deal of damage and remain flying. It was originally intended to be used to rapidly bring in reinforcements once landing grounds had been seized, though it was going to be in the front line for Operation Herkules [1].
As far as seizing such landing sites and securing an airborne bridgehead Student believed that what was needed was more support weapons, up to and including airborne armour. The Me 321 opened up the possibility of simply landing regular Wehrmacht Panzers, however the idea of a light tank that could fitted into a smaller glider and deployed in the initial assault was also now being advocated. Goering embraced this idea, taken by the idea of the Luftwaffe having its own independent Panzers. What was envisioned was either an adapted Panzer I or II or an assault gun based on one of these vehicles. Some blueprints of such designs had been put forward during 1941 in response to Hitler’s demand for more such vehicles and dismissed as inadequate for the task of supporting infantry. The Allies did also pursue such ideas, with little more success, they however had the industrial capacity to indulge in exploring this idea, the Third Reich did not. Nonetheless with Goering’s influence on German industry these ideas would be dusted off and a full year would be spent refining a design and even building wooden mock-ups, at a time when airborne assaults were no longer a practical proposition for the Wehrmacht [2].
Amid all these bright ideas the practical issues were all but overlooked. The losses among the Ju 52 fleet meant that bombers would have to be used as tow aircraft for the more conventional gliders. While the modifications were not complicated training crews for this new task was, and the diversion of bombers and fighter escorts from other theatres was unwelcome to those focused on the defence of European airspace and the offensive demands of Case Blue. Even worse was that while there were now more Fallschirmjägers than there had been at the time of the attack on Crete these were overwhelming green recruits, barely more than teenagers and with only a thin scattering of experienced NCOs and officers to organize and lead them. These troops were now to be thrown against an island that the British would not readily surrender, with little hope of achieving air superiority and none of controlling the sea lanes [3].
As the time for the launch of Herkules approached Hitler’s attention was focused on Case Blue and the ‘final’ assault on the USSR, meaning that all efforts to have it cancelled or modified considering what was clearly a deteriorating situation in the Mediterranean were brusquely dismissed. Mussolini was at the same time assuring his cabinet and the king that Herkules would turn the tide and if the British and Americans tried to attack Sicily they would be broken against the island’s invincible defences. Mussolini was in practice staking his political survival on this, indeed his very life if things went badly.
Operation Herkules represented a rare example of Axis co-operation, and one that was probably a net gain for the Allies. At the same time the Japanese were pressing ahead with their plans for fresh assaults in South East Asia and the Pacific, showing a profligate disregard for how the weight of numbers was already tilting against them and continuing to insist on attacking on all fronts at the same time. Despite the practical problems faced by Japan the IJA and IJN could hardly bring themselves to co-operate with one another, let alone their foreign Allies. The two branches of the Japanese developed separate, elaborate, overcomplicated, overambitious, plans that simply assumed their counterparts could be argued into providing the men, aircraft, or ships needed to carry them out. Then when such support was either offered in numbers that fell far short of what was needed or outright denied the plans proceeded anyway, still hoping for the victories that would force the USA, and by extension, the British, to make a peace favourable to Japan. Some in the Japanese hierarchy recognized that the USA had been enraged by Pearl Harbor and was determined to avenge the Day of Infamy, with only the desire to crush Germany first limiting their commitment to that goal. This realistic appraisal of the situation was ignored even by those knew it to be true, planning for the final decisive victory continued apace [4].
At the beginning of 1942 realism was in short supply among the members of the Axis. This was perhaps understandable, to embrace reality would certainly mean humiliation for the likes of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo. Being overthrown was a threat that none of the Axis leaders could dismiss and none of them were likely to be allowed to live in the event in the event of such a coup. That so many of their subordinates continued to support their grand schemes was not simply a matter of fear that they would follow their masters to the gallows or the firing squad. Especially in Germany and Japan some hoped that the same good fortune that had smiled on them in France or at Pearl Harbor would return and give them a chance to end the war, allowing them to emerge as heroes rather than war criminals, history being written by the victors after all [5].
[1] It’s a terrible idea, but the ‘Gigant’ had to make an appearance somewhere.
[2] I have a very rough design for what this would look like, if it ever saw the light of day.
[3] What could possibly go wrong?
[4] And the consequences of this everywhere all at once approach will be the subject of the next few updates.
[5] You can guess the chances of that happening.
And it was seriously considered OTL. Here its a reckless gamble fuelled by the egos of Goering and Mussolini.
