Errolwi
Monthly Donor
The New Zealand Division as well. It was a minor miracle OTL that the NZ Parliament didn't call them home, with less need ITTL they will be sent East.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
A lot of troops will, greatly assisting in the defence of Malaya and Burma and other places as well.
or if its in a supply wagon and not distributed to the troops as happened to the British on a certain occassion
Indeed
The QM hadn't received the right forms so couldn't release the screwdrivers to open them. (Joke)
ETA probably untrue but YNK
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I've heard credible arguments [1] that the Isandlwana example of QM bone-headedness was either exaggerated or fabricated. But then again, perhaps the QM team was just following the example set by the expedition's senior commanders.
[1] not a period I know much about, so 'sounds reasonable to me' doesn't mean it's right.
[1] not a period I know much about, so 'sounds reasonable to me' doesn't mean it's right.
1st January 1942 – 8th March 1942 – The Anglo-American Alliance – Part I
Garrison
Donor
1st January 1942 – 8th March 1942 – The Anglo-American Alliance – Part I
Given that there had been informal contacts between the political and military leaderships of the United States and Britain for two years and the unofficial discussion about war plans an optimist might imagine that after Pearl Harbor formalizing strategic plans and the basis of the alliance would have been a relatively straightforward matter, this optimism would soon be dashed by the awkward realities of balancing the conflicting strategic interests of the USA and Britain. Both wanted to see Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan crushed, how this was to be achieved was the source of the problems, made even more complicated by the question of who would have the final say on matters of strategy?
Given the basic statistics of manpower and industry the USA was obviously destined to be the senior partner among the Western Allies, but as they entered the war only the United States Navy could claim to be remotely combat ready, and it had been grievously wounded at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack also opened a new and unwanted theatre of war, with many of those who had opposed intervention in Europe now insisting that the USA should focus its efforts on the Pacific. Roosevelt was firmly committed to a Germany First strategy, but he had to make some concessions to the Pacific war. The British certainly supported the idea of focusing on Nazi Germany, this did not mean that there weren’t many issues to be resolved.
The entry of the USA into the war essentially guaranteed victory for the Allies, at some uncertain point in the future. However, given the military situation at the end of 1941 the war cabinet and Parliament in general were determined that when Churchill travelled to the USA aboard the newly commissioned battleship HMS Anson in late December Britain should not been seen as simply ‘going cap in hand’ to the Americans. US supplies and equipment had played an important role in the war effort to date and were much appreciated. This did not blind Whitehall to the fact that the US had done so because it was in their own strategic interest and indeed until the advent of Lend-Lease Britain had bought much of this materiel out of their own treasury, almost being brought to the point of financial exhaustion in doing so. Some felt this had been deliberate and remembered the way that Britain had been indebted to the USA after WWI [1].
Final victory in Libya, and the promising developments with Vichy North Africa, meant that Britain’s strategic position was vastly different from what it had been in the dark days of 1940. There was no longer any threat of invasion, the Kriegsmarine was being steadily being beaten back in the Atlantic, and with the Suez Canal secure the flow of raw materials, equipment, and manpower from the Empire was steadily increasing Britain’s fighting power. Certainly, the situation in South East Asia was serious, though even there the defence of Malaya had served as a morale booster and many in London looked askance at the steadily deteriorating situation in the Philippines. This became one of the early sources of tension between the USA and Britain, alongside the response to Operation Drumbeat, Doenitz’s plan to unleash his U-Boats in US coastal waters.
Operation Drumbeat was Doenitz’s cherished plan to restore the fortunes of his U-Boat force and for the first several months of 1942 it succeeded beyond his expectations, creating carnage among shipping along the Atlantic coast. This was not the result of new technology or tactics being deployed by the Kriegsmarine, the blame can almost exclusively be laid at the door of Admiral Ernest King, in overall command of the US Navy and a man who made no secret of his antipathy towards the British. Ships operating in US coastal waters were not escorted or organized into convoys, this had been reasonable prior to December 7th but by January its was resulting in heavy losses, especially as no blackouts had been imposed on US coastal cities. U-Boat commanders were astonished to discover their targets perfectly silhouetted against the lights of the ports they were leaving. King adamantly refused to introduce convoy procedures at first, rebuffing all offers of advice and assistance from the Royal Navy. Only increasing discontent in Washington over the mounting losses forced King’s hand, finally accepting the need to enact a convoy system and put an end to what the U-Boat commanders called ‘The happy time’. King still remained resolutely opposed to taking British advice or co-operating with the Royal Navy. This extended to operations in the Pacific, where the arrival of Admiral Cunningham to take command of what became the British Pacific Fleet marked a clear intent on the part of the British to take a more aggressive posture against the IJN and the Royal Navy was not about to accept being frozen out of US plans, especially where those plans involved countering threats to the security of Australia, the supply lines to Malaya and Burma and the desperate attempts to retain a foothold in the Dutch East Indies [2].
King may have created the most problems behind the scenes, in public it fell to another US officer to create a small political crisis. General Douglas MacArthur, in overall command of the defence of the Philippines had managed to earn the ire of the Australian press and the Prime Minister John Curtin thanks to a series of ‘off the record’ remarks to the American press. The Australian contribution in the defence of Malaya had been the subject of much morale boosting press reports in both Britain and Australia, and even US news agencies had picked up on the stories, which some could not help contrasting with what seemed to be an endless stream of bad news from the Philippines. It was inevitable that MacArthur’s performance would be contrasted with that of Montgomery, a man who was not shy about seeking publicity himself, and with those of the Imperial forces who made up his command. MacArthur was not about to take these criticisms lying down and he was anything but discrete about who he informed about his views. The remarks that turned up in US newspapers, and soon reached British and Australian diplomats, voiced the opinion that the ‘English’ had been able to hold in Malaya because the best of the Japanese troops had been committed to the Philippines and that the Japanese attack against Malaya had been a half-hearted effort with second rate troops, and in addition the defenders had been gifted with far more luck than he had experienced in the Philippines. MacArthur was also convinced that if the Philippines fell then Malaya would not be far behind once the Japanese could give it their full attention [3].
While there was no hard proof they had originated from MacArthur, no one was in any doubt of their origin and there was a furious response when the claims found their way to Australia. The Australian PM John Curtin was adamant that whatever Allied command structure was adopted in the Pacific Australia would not except any of their troops being placed under the overall command of MacArthur, under any circumstances. The reaction in London was one of exasperation, and some concern that a US General had felt entitled to make so free with his opinions in a public forum. The British government was already having to apply all its persuasive powers to ensure that Australian troops returning to the Pacific from the Middle East were sent to Malaya and Burma and not retained in Australia for home defence as some Australian politicians wanted. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor it seemed as if Japanese forces might appear anywhere and the briefings from MacArthur’s command were making matters distinctly more complicated.
Raising this matter with the Americans posed a thorny diplomatic issue as Churchill did not want what was essentially a subsidiary matter to derail the more important strategic discussions. He needn’t have worried however, the difference between the performance of Montgomery in Malaya and MacArthur in the Philippines had provoked a great deal of unhappiness in Washington and what were seen as crass attempts to avoid blame didn’t help. When the MacArthur departed from the Philippines and made his infamous ‘I shall return’ comment it was regarded as risible in Australia and only served to reinforce unhappiness at his performance. MacArthur was swiftly recalled to the United States and kept far from the Pacific theatre for the duration of the war, finding himself with an important sounding desk job in Washington to kept out of the way of the running of the war [4].
[1] So with no life or death struggle ATM some in London are daring to look at the post war world and Britain’s place in it.
[2] With Britain retaining control of Singapore and Malaya they are a lot less willing to just follow the US lead in the Pacific.
[3] So MacArthur is being a pompous ass whose wounded ego is causing trouble that no one needs.
[4] So Rommel and MacArthur taken care of, whose next on the list? 😊
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Curious to see what the Pacific campaign will be like now that MacArthur isn't in charge and Britain actually able to do more, I'd imagine the USA will avoid the Philippines and concentrate on going for Japan. Would Operation Market Garden happen without Montgomery in charge? and I guess your not going to cover it but I am curious how the Korean War will go without MacArthur in charge.
Interesting. Drumbeat and King’s intransigence sound OTL, hopefully they can get the mid Atlantic gap closed faster in this timeline.
One too, missing a word here:
One too, missing a word here:
Garrison
Donor
Things will be quite different but much of the 1943-44 ideas are still in flux. Somewhere in the future there will hopefully be some post war summary updates, but that is some way off.
Edited and there will be a couple of further updates discussing the progress of the war in the Atlantic.
My instincts say Halsey. He may be a bold commander who sets about getting his men up to crack-troop status but he's a bit too mercurial in strategic terms.
Garrison
Donor
Well Halsey will make an appearance later. His reputation was bolstered by his involvement at Wake Island.
Would the USA and Britain be able to invade Italy in the summer/autumn of 42 ? With essentially the forces devoted to Torch and the 42-43 Western Desert front essentially.
Also, it looks like Britain won't be a US sidekick in the ITTL post-war.
Especially if the British aren't locked out of nuclear research and have nukes by 45...
Also, it looks like Britain won't be a US sidekick in the ITTL post-war.
Especially if the British aren't locked out of nuclear research and have nukes by 45...
Garrison
Donor
The thing is you have to remember the US weren't fans of the Italian campaign and wanted an earlier invasion of France. I do have updates covering the Sicily landings but they will be happening against the backdrop of other events in Italy.
Correct, but if you do the specialist shipping needed for a force big enough for France calculation then, as they did/will find, even the US going fully postal cannot build enough in time. So its Sicily or do almost nothing for at least a year in Europe land wise.
