Ernie King is still alive ITTL as far as I'm aware, so I wouldn't get your hopes up.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
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Ernie King is still alive ITTL as far as I'm aware, so I wouldn't get your hopes up.
How are the financial and domestic fronts so far?
I feel these are often overlooked in favor of more military industrial oriented topics. I mean, it would be interesting to learn of how the British financed the war effort, or such details of who produced what for domestic consumptions (for instance, what the Canadian agriculture produced for export to Europe), anecdotic details like milk powder and cheese to replace milk in shipments to spare volumes, or white flour banned to improve nutritional quality (as I read of)...
I feel these are often overlooked in favor of more military industrial oriented topics. I mean, it would be interesting to learn of how the British financed the war effort, or such details of who produced what for domestic consumptions (for instance, what the Canadian agriculture produced for export to Europe), anecdotic details like milk powder and cheese to replace milk in shipments to spare volumes, or white flour banned to improve nutritional quality (as I read of)...
1st November 1941 - 7th December 1941 - 7th December 1941 – Global War – Part II – The British and the Far East
Garrison
Donor
1st November 1941 - 7th December 1941 - 7th December 1941 – Global War – Part II – The British and the Far East
That more equipment and manpower had been allocated to Southeast Asia might have been expected to reduce the volume of requests and complaints coming from that corner, in Malaya however the opposite happened. Some RAF fighter and bomber units had been allocated to Malaya to modernize the available air power, which had been largely dependent on the Brewster Buffalo as their main fighter, but the bulk came from the RAAF, equipped with P40s (called the Tomahawk by the Australians) and DB7 bombers (named the Boston), which both proved to be quite serviceable aircraft. The problem in Malaya was that many that had been shipped by sea were still sat in crates and their crews and ground staff were living under canvas as the process of constructing airfields and barracks was hamstrung by arguments with local landowners. The same issues applied for many freshly arrived troops and there was a sense among many that they had been dumped in Malaya, which did nothing to build morale.
The man who would ultimately carry much of the blame for this state of affairs was General Arthur Percival, GOC of Malaya command. Percival has been marginalized in the history of the war in the Far East, but when serving as Chief of Staff to the previous GOC he had explored the question of how an attack on Malaya might be conducted and his analysis correctly identified much of the strategy the Japanese later used in their campaign. As the forces under him grew Percival prepared a training manual, ‘Tactical Notes on Malaya’ that was distributed to all troops and was especially appreciated by the officers of the Indian army formations that had arrived in Malaya as even where the officers were possessed of experience the troops under their command were almost completely green.
On the other side of the equation Percival had never commanded at the Corps level previously and he may have lacked a certain force of personality, which did little to bolster confidence in his decision making at the personal level and he seemed to raise the hackles of the Australians whenever he had to deal with them. He also appeared reluctant to override the objections of local dignitaries to even the most modest inconveniences in the pursuit of reinforcing the defences of Malaya. His skills in diplomacy had served the army well during peaceful times, it was less suited to the hard decisions that needed to be taken in 1941 to make best use of the fresh infusion of men and machines provided by London. The planter class in the country were by and large an entitled lot, disdainful of the idea of a Japanese attack and more than willing to direct complaints towards London about the unwarranted disruption to their lives [1]. At the same time the Australian government responded to the complaints made by its forces about their treatment, and these were also forcefully relayed to Whitehall. By August it was clear to Alanbrooke that Percival would have to be replaced by someone who could get a grip on the situation, and he had just the man in mind.
General Bernard Montgomery had distinguished himself in the fighting in France and when assigned to duties in Britain he had proved energetic in organizing defensive measures and unwilling to put up with any nonsense from outraged local officials and landowners. By the summer of 1941 he was getting restless being so far from any battle front and had been lobbying his old boss Alanbrooke for a new assignment. Montgomery might have preferred to have been sent to the Middle East as part of the plan to reinforce the Western Desert command as it became 8th Army, however he would be in overall charge in Malaya and not forced to subordinate himself to others. He took the offer up happily and he arrived in Malaya on the 30th of September. The decision to send him raised some eyebrows in Whitehall as he had only briefly held a Corps command in France, however Alanbrooke stuck by his guns, insisting that based on Montgomery’s record in France and in organizing defensive measures on the home front meant that he was well suited to taking matters in hand. Better to brevet Montgomery in rank than send someone who would suffer the same battering Percival had.
Percival was formally relieved the following day, but he was not shipped back to Britain. Montgomery read his training manual and his analysis of the defence of Malaya and asked that he remain in place, essentially reverting to the staff role he had previously held. This had to be personally humiliating for Percival, who was after all technically senior to Montgomery. However he proved to be a consummate professional and relieved of the burden of command he performed well in his new role until he finally returned to London in the spring of 1942 [2].
Some have suggested that Montgomery’s greater success in the role had more to do with his connections in London and being able to acquire greater resources from Britain than his innate abilities. In point of fact the only major addition to the forces available in Malaya was the arrival of some thirty-four Matilda II tanks at the beginning of November. What made the real difference in the performance in the defence of Malaya was Montgomery’s energy and drive, he visited units and did his best to address any practical issues they faced. He did his absolute best to bolster the morale of the troops under his command and dispel any notions that they were a ‘forgotten army’. He had some success in this and made sure that they were training full time and that the officers under his command fully understood his plans for dealing with any Japanese attack, which seemed an increasing threat as Japan became mor belligerent with every passing month. By December 7th the situation in Malaya was far from perfect, but at least the troops there were ready and willing to fight [3].
[1] More manpower and materiel than OTL, hamstrung by the colonials who don’t believe in a Japanese attack and resent any disruption to their cushy lives.
[2] Honestly It was always going to be him or Slim, and Slim will turn up later.
[3] Its not the extra machinery that is going to make a difference, it’s the morale of the troops, Montgomery is reinvigorating the troops in Malaya in the same way he did in Egypt OTL. The details of his strategy will be explained later when we return to Malaya.
Much lower. OTL, Allied shipping losses averaged over 500,000 tons/month for the first half of 1941. In May/June 1941, the RN made a systematic effort to capture Enigma material. This enabled Station X to start reading HYDRA, the main Kriegsmarine cipher key, from July onward. For the next five months (July-November) losses averaged around 170,000 tons/month. This was because the Admiralty now knew where U-boat scouting lines were deployed, and could route convoys around them. Without knowing where any convoys were the U-boats could not concentrate for "wolfpack" attacks.
One may suppose that the cipher breach happens as OTL, and it's mentioned that escort carriers and additional VLR aircraft are deployed in 1941. But what checks the U-boats in early 1941? And 25,000 tons/months is about what the rate was in 1944-1945, when the Allies had a lot of additional advantages.
Garrison
Donor
I have to say I was surprised at how badly the U-Boats did in the last months of 1941 but it seems the winter and ULTRA intercepts drastically impacted their performance.
Slim is too junior at this point
He has only just become a divisional commander - he needs time to grow
Monty on the other hand has commanded a crack Division as well as stepping up to Corps command and also ran the staff college course before WW2
I imagine that London will soon be chock full of people and angry telegrams telling anyone who will listen what an awful little shit that horrible Monty is given his 'Zero Fucks given' approach when people 'feelings' are concerned
After all as far as he is concerned people should be happy to be told that they are useless.....before they get found out in battle
I wonder if he is going to make use of Col Ian Stewarts 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - the Colonel trained the hell out of his battalion with regards to jungle warfare
Monty would love him - and I could see him turning the Highlanders into a jungle training school and rotate cadres from other battalions through it ASAP
He has only just become a divisional commander - he needs time to grow
Monty on the other hand has commanded a crack Division as well as stepping up to Corps command and also ran the staff college course before WW2
I imagine that London will soon be chock full of people and angry telegrams telling anyone who will listen what an awful little shit that horrible Monty is given his 'Zero Fucks given' approach when people 'feelings' are concerned
After all as far as he is concerned people should be happy to be told that they are useless.....before they get found out in battle
I wonder if he is going to make use of Col Ian Stewarts 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - the Colonel trained the hell out of his battalion with regards to jungle warfare
Monty would love him - and I could see him turning the Highlanders into a jungle training school and rotate cadres from other battalions through it ASAP
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.........................well done...............for spotting....deliberate mistake..........."also ran the staff collage course before WW2"....
I didn't realize he was that artistic.
If I remember Nigel Hamilton's 'Monty' biography correctly, Montgomery and Percival might have known of one another when they were both in the army in Ireland...
I can't recall if they met, though.
Garrison
Donor
Yeah I felt Montgomery was a good fit precisely because he isn't the diplomat that Percival was and Percival seems to me to have been almost the perfect peacetime officer for Malaya. Knew the country well, excellent at staff work and able to play nice with the local bigwigs. With the threat of war you need someone with a bit more drive and energy and given that things have been going better in the Middle East and North Africa there isn't the revolving door of officer being sent out, sacked and replacements sent out so there are more opportunities to pay attention to 'secondary' theatres like Malaya. the more you look at Percival the more you feel he was rather hard done by. ITTL he will be remembered as a good staff officer who made a solid contribution, though of course most of the histories of the fighting will be focused on Monty, no chance of a 'forgotten army' with his knack for PR.
Could it be that Monty's presence will give the Japanese commanders a feeling of being up against a worth opponent?
Garrison
Donor
Not given their general attitude, they are absolutely convinced of their superiority and the only western battle they really paid attention to was Taranto.
IIRC Percival replaced Montgomery, who was very happy to get out of Ireland.
Garrison
Donor
Almost certainly, his birthplace falling to the British when it did will have disrupted his parents lives significantly.
1st November 1941 - 7th December 1941 – Global War – Part III – Japan’s Gamble
Garrison
Donor
1st November 1941 - 7th December 1941 – Global War – Part III – Japan’s Gamble
In WWI Japan was noted for its humanitarian treatment of POWs, it was a nation that respected the Geneva Convention and the accepted laws of war. The Japan of 1941 had been transformed into a state dominated by militarists who were beyond the control of any civilian government, indeed anyone who tried to rein in the excesses of the army faced the very real prospect of assassination by outraged officers. The reasons for this transformation are too complex to go into here, but the nation that had once been an ally of the British Empire was now looking at Malaya and Burma as targets for future expansion, especially with Britain preoccupied with the threat to it homelands and the other colonial powers occupied and helpless to thwart Japanese ambitions. The militarists had led Japan into seemingly endless war in China, that had progressively soured relations with the United States. Matters grew worse when Japan took control in Indochina after the Fall of France, which led to imposition of an embargo by the USA that cut Japanese supplies of oil and scrap metal, the latter being critical to the Japanese steel industry. The embargo also cut Japanese access to foreign loans, which hampered Japanese industry in general. Far from backing down in the face of these sanctions the Japanese leadership decided that the solution to their problems was to seize direct control of the resources they needed, which meant striking south and taking the European colonies [1].
Such a move was all but guaranteed to provoke a confrontation with the USA. Isolationism might have dominated policy towards Europe but there was far less resistance to taking strong action against the Japanese. There was undoubtedly an element of racism at work in this different approach as well as strategic concerns, which led both to a belligerent US policy and a grave underestimation of the capabilities of the Japanese military, this was a recipe for disaster. The Americans, and others were contemptuous of everything from the physique of Japanese soldiers to the performance of their ships and aircraft. This contempt would come with a high price when war came to the Pacific.
As reprehensible as such attitudes seem today, it must be borne in mind that racism went both ways. The Japanese convinced themselves that the USA was weak and its people inferior, a single powerful blow against their Pacific Fleet in port at Pearl Harbor would force them to accept peace on Japan’s terms. The obvious question that should have been asked was what would happen if the USA refused to simply capitulate? The answer, which many in the Japanese high command were well aware of, was that in such circumstances Japan would have little hope of victory and at best could hope to create defensive perimeter that the USA would pay such a price to break through that they would then seek peace. Even this ‘optimistic’ scenario was not believed by many, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto the architect of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto had lived in the USA for a time and was aware of that nation’s industrial might and the character of its people. He entertained few illusions about what would happen if Japan’s opening moves did not bring the USA to the negotiating table, and yet even with such a clear sense of what Japan’s fate might be in those circumstances he proceeded to lay the groundwork to bring them about. With such senior figures committed to the road to war its unsurprising that no one dared object [2].
Should anyone have been so foolish as to suggest a more restrained foreign policy then as already pointed out they were apt to draw the attentions of the more zealous elements of the Japanese officer corps, assassination was not unknown and this had a chilling effect on political debate in Japan, all in the name of the divine Emperor and Japan taking its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia. The code of Bushido that dominated so much of Japanese military doctrine was used to justify this behaviour, as well as driving officers who were seen to have failed in battle or otherwise dishonoured themselves to commit ritual suicide. Trying to avoid such disgrace and the belief that martial spirit could overcome material inferiority was the driving force behind what the Allies referred to as the Banzai charge. Given the limited assets of manpower and experienced officers Japan had at its disposal both these factors explain why the effectiveness of Japanese army deteriorated so quickly in the face of even modest setbacks [3].
The Japanese sense of racial superiority was reflected most clearly in the treatment of other Asian peoples. The Japanese occupation of Korea had long been conducted with appalling cruelty, and the behaviour of Japanese forces in China was in most respects worse. The Rape of Nanking was the most infamous incident but lurking in the background was the sinister presence of Unit 731, also known as the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army. Epidemic prevention was the last thing Unit 731 was interested in, they were engaged in biological warfare experiments, looking to deploy diseases such as the Bubonic Plague against vulnerable civilian populations. They conducted a number of ‘field tests’ in occupied China, which were passed off as natural outbreaks and the truth was only revealed after the war.
Overall then Japan was preparing for a war it had no realistic hope of winning and with no clear strategy beyond simply sweeping all before them courtesy of their superior spirit and utterly unable to change course when their plans began to fall apart [4].
[1] Imperial Japan, a government that makes Hitler look cautious and prudent.
[2] Again making Nazi Germany look stable.
[3] As we shall see very soon.
[4] So the Japanese are barrelling ahead unaffected by the changed situation in Europe and the Mediterranean.
Well, I can't wait to see how the IJN and IJA will fare in a (slightly) better-prepared Malaya...
Is Burma better prepared as well, for that matter ?
Is Burma better prepared as well, for that matter ?