With the blessing of Churchill and Roosevelt, what if Rolls-Royce creates a strategic partnership with Pratt & Whitney or Wright where RR exchanges production rights to the Merlin (which the Americans desperately need for fighter development) in exchange for US engine models for UK war priorities (such as the new FAA fighters and bombers)?
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
I have been reminded by the RAF discussion that Wikipedia claims there was a four engine supermarine bomber under development in 1940, but that both the prototypes and working drawing were destroyed by a German air raid in September 1940: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supermarine_B.12/36
There could be possible butterflies if both Wikipedia is correct and the development of these prototypes is not interfered with?
There could be possible butterflies if both Wikipedia is correct and the development of these prototypes is not interfered with?
AFAIK, there were two major problems with the Fairey Monarch engine (other than the fact that Richard Fairey has seriously pissed of the AM over his purchase of Allison engines) was that it lacked sufficient central bearings on the crank shaft and the cast in air passages were to small chocking the engine off air and requiring several pound of boost at sea level just to get the engine to run at a reasonable power level. Whilst solvabl, due to the construction method and castings involved it would have taken a major redesign to do so. If these limitations had been identified at the design stage then the fixes would have been much easier to make (As in the Peerless Air Ministry TL,).
They only made a handful of engines - had more interest been given to it earlier then a number of those issues would have gone away (as you have alluded)
While no more powerful really than a Merlin 30 (which was at that stage very well developed) the engine did have the advantage of being able to work on half its cylinders - providing a single engine carrier aircraft with almost the same redundancy as a twin engine type.
Still the more obvious answer is in a world where Griffon is not delayed - given the man years and treasure expended on it - why not Griffon?
Maybe just find an excuse for RR to rationalise their programmes earlier. No Exe, Peregrine or Vulture. Big downer from that, no Manchester so no Lancaster.
Edit: of course the OTL Manchester could start life with two Griffins before they decide it is underpowered.
Edit: of course the OTL Manchester could start life with two Griffins before they decide it is underpowered.
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Did your friend ever mention this fine old RAF song?
The Shackleton song.
"Shackletons don't bother me,
Shackletons don't bother me.
Clapped out abortions with flaps on their wings,
oil on their pistons and their piston rings.
For we're saying goodbye to them all,
three fifths of five eighths of fuck all.
You'll get no promotion this side of the ocean,
so cheer up my lads, fuck them all.
Oh they say that the shack is a mighty fine kite,
This we no longer doubt. (na na na na na)
When your up there with a Mig on your tail,
This is the way to get out.
Stay cool and stay calm and sedate, Mate,
Don't let your British blood boil.
Don't hesitate, slam it right through the gate,
and smother the bastard in oil.
Singing, shine shine Somersetshire.
The captain looks on her with pride.
He'd have a blue fit, if he saw all the shit,
on the side of the Somersetshire.
Oh, I've been in this Air Force too long.
I've been in this Air Force too long.
So roll on the Rodney, Repulse and Renown,
we'd mention the Hood but the poor bugger's gone down.
Chocks away, chocks away,
and we'll fuck all the S.P.'s that come down our way.
And their wives, and their wives,
and we'll chase all their daughters for their fucking lives.
The first thing we'll pray for,
we'll pray for some beer,
Some glorious, glorious, glorious beer.
And if we have one pint, may we also have ten,
may we have a fucking brewery said the airman, amen.
Chocks away, chocks away,
The next thing we'll pray for,
we'll pray for some money,
some glorious, glorious, glorious money.
and if we have one pound,
may we also have ten,
may we have the bank of England said the airman, amen.
Chocks away, chocks away,
The next thing we'll pray for,
we'll pray for some women.
Some glorious, glorious, glorious women.
And if we have one woman, may we also have ten,
may we have a fucking brothel said the airman, amen.
Chocks away, chocks away,
The last thing we'll pray for,
we'll pray for our Queen.
Our glorious, glorious, glorious Queen.
And if she has one son, may she also have ten,
may she have the fucking air force said the airman, amen."
Song to the tune of "Bless them all."
And a Merry and Happy Christmas to all.
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The original concept that led to the Manchester was for a twin engined medium bomber powered by two Napier Sabres or two Rolls Royce Vultures. The Vulture was originally designed to produce 1,750 horse power, which is around the power output of the early Griffins. Cancel the Vulture and you could still produce a Manchester with twin Sabres (which would be delayed and have reliability issues), go for twin Griffins (which would have the same issues) or do what Handley Page did with the Halifax and just go straight to four Merlins. In any case there is still a path for the twin engined Manchester to become the four engined Lancaster.
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Garrison
Donor
So I did indeed do some tinkering and I've added the following to the Royal Navy and RAF updates respectively, which hopefully has something for everyone 
:
...Carriers of course needed an airwing and in the aftermath of the Chamberlain Mandate the FAA had lobbied hard to accelerate the development of the Fairey Barracuda, a monoplane torpedo bomber to replace the Fairey Swordfish. The Swordfish while a fine aircraft in some respects seemed increasingly obsolescent as it was a slow biplane design in a world where monoplanes were becoming dominant. Its immediate successor was supposed to be the Fairey Albacore, this however was also a biplane and there were serious questions over whether it would offer the kind of performance improvements over the Swordfish that the FAA was now looking for. The one obvious way to speed up development of the Barracuda was to look for an engine that was either in production or much further along in its development cycle than the planned Rolls-Royce Exe, work on which was beginning to suffer in the face of increased demands on Rolls-Royce resources from the RAF and Rolls-Royce’s desire to invest more energy into the Griffon engine that seemed to have more promise than the Exe. As it happened Fairey had their own engine in development, the Monarch. This engine was largely ready for testing in mid-1939, but Fairey had struggled to find any interest and the Monarch seemed destined to be abandoned. That the FAA decided they wanted the Barracuda sooner rather than later, and had received a budget to pursue this goal, changed everything. The decision to use the Monarch as an ‘interim’ engine led Rolls-Royce to cancel the Exe outright and focus on other designs, such as the Griffon. The first Monarch Barracuda flew in October 1940 and while there was still much work to do to bring it to production the FAA was pleased with the capability of the new aircraft, which would enter service in 1942. The FAA was also looking to improve its fighter capabilities, which since this depended on decisions by the RAF will be discussed later...
...This explained why the FAA had been continually left one generation behind in terms of the aircraft available for its carrier groups until they finally managed to get the Fairey Barracuda prioritized, which still left the question of a modern fighter to provide an effective escort for its bombers. The priority of protecting the Atlantic convoys, which included equipping the soon to be deployed Escort Carriers, meant that the RAF were finally required to give some ground on the fighter issue...
:...Carriers of course needed an airwing and in the aftermath of the Chamberlain Mandate the FAA had lobbied hard to accelerate the development of the Fairey Barracuda, a monoplane torpedo bomber to replace the Fairey Swordfish. The Swordfish while a fine aircraft in some respects seemed increasingly obsolescent as it was a slow biplane design in a world where monoplanes were becoming dominant. Its immediate successor was supposed to be the Fairey Albacore, this however was also a biplane and there were serious questions over whether it would offer the kind of performance improvements over the Swordfish that the FAA was now looking for. The one obvious way to speed up development of the Barracuda was to look for an engine that was either in production or much further along in its development cycle than the planned Rolls-Royce Exe, work on which was beginning to suffer in the face of increased demands on Rolls-Royce resources from the RAF and Rolls-Royce’s desire to invest more energy into the Griffon engine that seemed to have more promise than the Exe. As it happened Fairey had their own engine in development, the Monarch. This engine was largely ready for testing in mid-1939, but Fairey had struggled to find any interest and the Monarch seemed destined to be abandoned. That the FAA decided they wanted the Barracuda sooner rather than later, and had received a budget to pursue this goal, changed everything. The decision to use the Monarch as an ‘interim’ engine led Rolls-Royce to cancel the Exe outright and focus on other designs, such as the Griffon. The first Monarch Barracuda flew in October 1940 and while there was still much work to do to bring it to production the FAA was pleased with the capability of the new aircraft, which would enter service in 1942. The FAA was also looking to improve its fighter capabilities, which since this depended on decisions by the RAF will be discussed later...
...This explained why the FAA had been continually left one generation behind in terms of the aircraft available for its carrier groups until they finally managed to get the Fairey Barracuda prioritized, which still left the question of a modern fighter to provide an effective escort for its bombers. The priority of protecting the Atlantic convoys, which included equipping the soon to be deployed Escort Carriers, meant that the RAF were finally required to give some ground on the fighter issue...
Garrison
Donor
So hope you all had good Xmas, will be back with updates next week, this is just to let everyone know what's coming up. The next update will be a different Mers-el-Kebir, and what was going to be a single update on Italy and its actions has now turned into two. After that a general update on the British followed by the Mediterranean fleet staging a spectacular New Years fireworks display...
Do I Look Worried?
Banned
Wartime seductive talk about "national governments." are dangerous. In times of crisis, the survival of democracy depends on two things: a free media and a free opposition. Governments must be held to account and their failings exposed by the media and the opposition even in the midst of crisis. John Curtin resisted all such calls during World War II.
Look at British Labour's decision to join Churchill's government in 1940. It's true that Labour ministers such as Attlee and Bevin largely ran domestic policy while Churchill ran the war, and did many good things. But the price Labour paid was to give up any right to criticise Churchill's mistakes and failings, of which there were many. Indeed Labour was made complicit in those mistakes.
During World War II, under both Menzies and Curtin, Australia had a War Advisory Council on which both government and opposition were represented. This Council received confidential briefings from military chiefs, so that the Opposition was kept informed of the war situation and could make better judgments about the soundness or otherwise of government actions.
Look at British Labour's decision to join Churchill's government in 1940. It's true that Labour ministers such as Attlee and Bevin largely ran domestic policy while Churchill ran the war, and did many good things. But the price Labour paid was to give up any right to criticise Churchill's mistakes and failings, of which there were many. Indeed Labour was made complicit in those mistakes.
During World War II, under both Menzies and Curtin, Australia had a War Advisory Council on which both government and opposition were represented. This Council received confidential briefings from military chiefs, so that the Opposition was kept informed of the war situation and could make better judgments about the soundness or otherwise of government actions.
Garrison
Donor
Demonstrating that they could be trusted in government played no small part in Labour winning a landslide in 1945. Honestly though I think the merits of national government versus remaining in opposition is a discussion for a separate thread.
Labour being part of a 1940's UK WW2 government makes things simpler in terms of averting strike action by UK unions - especially whilst Stalin is on the German side and his friends in the UK are pushing out stuff about aggressive imperialist wars and the UK should stop being so mean to the Germans...
September 7th – September 13th 1940 – North Africa - The Mers-el-Kébir Mutiny
Garrison
Donor
September 7th – September 13th 1940 – North Africa - The Mers-el-Kébir Mutiny
From the moment France fell the Royal Navy had been deeply concerned about the fate of the French navy, the Marine Nationale. The prospect of this force of ships being seized by the Germans or co-operating in the Mediterranean with the Italians was one that had to be taken seriously, even if as was suggested in certain quarters it was an unlikely one. The potential threat to British maritime operations if it did come to pass was simply too great to ignore and it was decided that no measure was too severe to prevent such an outcome. The French had issued solemn assurances that their fleet would never be allowed to fall into Axis hands, but then they had also promised not to make a separate peace and what if the Germans chose to simply tear up the terms of the armistice as they had so many other agreements [1]?
The humiliating content of the Armistice the French had agreed to offered a ready source of propaganda material to illustrate the folly of seeking peace with Germany, what really worried Churchill and the rest of the British government were the reports being filtered through neutral diplomats that German demands had gone beyond anything that the Vichy regime dared lay out in the official terms for fear that it would have undermined the credibility of the Vichy regime before it had even been properly established. These reports contained much exaggeration and false information, however there was a degree of truth to them, Vichy had indeed made concessions to the Germans that horrified many in France when they learned of them
The formal armistice terms meant that France had been forced to hand over much of its stockpile of raw materials and oil, as well as agreeing to paying exorbitant occupation costs, which were reparations in all but name. The secret terms that Petain had conceded included that what was left of France’s functioning industrial capacity be focused on the provision of equipment and munitions for the Wehrmacht, this included French models of tanks and aircraft. The Wehrmacht had little interest in utilizing the equipment themselves, but Germany could barter this production to its allies in Central Europe and the Balkans, and any willing neutrals, in exchange for supplies of food and raw materials. A very small part of this production was to be allocated to Vichy forces in North Africa and the Middle East, in the interests of dissuading attacks by the British or Free French. This latter decision had little effect beyond annoying Mussolini [2].
Far worse than this was the fact that since Petain and co. had argued that France could not supply as much equipment as the Germans were demanding it had been ‘magnanimously’ allowed that France could make up the shortfall by providing Germany with several hundred thousand guest workers, a polite euphemism for slave labour. Some in the senior echelons of the new French government, such as Pierre Laval, freshly appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted it was necessary, unless anyone thought France could possibly fight on? Laval had always been a figure of the right, by the time of the Armistice however he had drifted into being an outright Nazi sympathiser. He believed that this agreement was not only necessary to secure peace, but it was also a means to persuade the Germans that the France could be an ally rather than just another subjugated nation. There have been some suggestions that Laval was simply trying to restore some measure of French power and influence, while also trying to build up the strength necessary to defend the French empire. Given his track record in later ardently enforcing anti-Semitic laws in France and other acts of collaboration he most likely explanation is that he was pursuing both goals.
Despite some rather half-hearted efforts to keep the full extent of the guest worker initiative quiet, largely by targeting ethnic minorities and other ‘undesirable’ elements German demands left Vichy little choice but to go public and by the first week in September radio announcements were being made and posters put up calling for volunteers, needless to say this campaign produced little in the way of results and coercive measures soon followed. This created a sullen atmosphere, especially in some of France’s colonial possessions where there was considerable fear Vichy might turn to them to help fill their quotas. These attitudes had also filtered through to the sailors manning the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir [3].
Admiral James Somerville, commanding Force H, was given the unpleasant task of proceeding to the Mers-el-Kébir, on the coast of French Algeria, and delivering an ultimatum to the fleet based there. They could either join the British or head for some neutral port under escort to be interned. If these options were rejected then Sommerville’s orders were clear, he was to attack the French ships at anchor. Admiral Sommerville felt this order was a mistake, this opinion would not stop him from doing his duty and seeing it through. What happened when the ultimatum was delivered took Sommerville and all his officers by complete surprise as Mers-el-Kébir descended into chaos. Messages relayed from British spotting planes that flew over the port reported there was fighting going on and at least two ships at anchor were sinking, clearly having been scuttled, and fires appeared to have broken out ashore and on at least one ship.
Under the circumstances Force H could only sit and wait to see the outcome of what had to be some sort of mutiny. Sommerville sent several messages to the Admiralty, who were every bit as taken aback by what was going on as Sommerville. Things only began to make some sense in the afternoon when the British intercepted the aviso Rigault de Genouilly, a vessel designed as a dispatch boat rather than a warship and showing clear signs of at least two shell hits. She was manned by barely two-thirds of her usual complement and she also was not flying any colours. The aviso surrendered the moment she sighted the flagship of Force H, HMS Hood, and her crew proceeded to provide a first-hand account of what happened in the port the British.
The mood in Mers-el-Kébir had been turbulent throughout the Battle of Belgium and the Battle of France, fuelled by the propaganda emanating from Paris after the Germans were halted on the Escault. This had been full of confident assertions that the Germans were beaten, and that final French victory was only a matter of time. When all this confidence came undone in the face of Operation Baccarat many could not believe this was simply a matter of the French armies being outmanoeuvred. Claims of betrayal, sabotage, and fifth columnists were rife. In places like Mers-el-Kébir far from the fighting they seemed all to credible and there were dark mutterings about the men in charge of the Vichy regime, though Petain was largely exempt from this at first. The rumours had him as an old man who was a mere puppet for the ambitions of others. This febrile atmosphere meant that when a further round of rumours began circulating claiming that some or all of the ships of the Marine Nationale were to be handed over to the Germans and that the demobilized crews would be pressganged to help fill the German demand for guest workers [4].
The Kriegsmarine had explored the idea of seizing French ships when the armistice was being negotiated, and the Italians had also been keen to obtain at least part of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. However, even amidst the secret protocols the French had agreed to Hitler had seen no reason to press the matter, his primary goal was to end the fighting and secure his grip on the whole of continental Europe. Also, Hitler’s faith in the Kriegsmarine’s surface fleet had declined to the point that he was utterly uninterested in the Marine Nationale.
Such were the losses taken in Norway that even after the failing to have any naval concessions included in the armistice the Kriegsmarine pursued the idea, even in the face of evidence of how ill-suited and difficult to operate the French ships would be if taken into service with the Kriegsmarine. Admiral Raeder was still commissioning reports to try and persuade Hitler to revisit the matter at the end of August, which meant multiple visits to French naval bases. The presence of Kriegsmarine officers ‘measuring up’ their ships just increased the anger and anxiety of the officers and ratings of the Marine Nationale, they believed their ships would end flying the Swastika and they would find themselves slaving in German factories [5].
Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that when it was clear that the intention of the senior French officers was to reject the ultimatum that many under their command saw little point in inviting the wrath of the British, where was the honour in being shelled by the Royal navy simply to preserve their ships and lives to serve the Third Reich? It was this idea that led to mutiny, arson, and sabotage in Mers-el-Kébir without the British firing a shot. Some vessels had been prepared to be scuttled in the event the Germans did try to seize them, without orders to do so being issued from on high, a fact that contributed to several officers who served the Vichy regime facing severe legal troubles post-war. In the end the French battleships Provence and Dunkerque were scuttled along with several smaller warships while the battleship Bretagne and two destroyers were damaged by fire and the sabotage of vital equipment. The battleship Strasbourg escaped the chaos and evaded the British as night fell. The Strasbourg may have been responsible for the hits on the Rigault de Genouilly as confusion reigned about the aviso’s intentions, though this was denied by surviving members of the battleship’s crew.
The Strasbourg’s escape proved only a brief reprieve as by the time it reached the port of Toulon events had overtaken it. When word reached Berlin Hitler and Raeder leapt to the conclusion that the mutiny had been an attempt on the part of some or all of the ships to defect to the Free French. Orders were sent out for German troops to be deployed to secure the ships at Toulon against any further such attempts. When the French caught wind of this the ships at Toulon received contradictory orders, which result in some ships low on fuel being scuttled, including the Strasbourg. Several others fled for neutral ports to be interned and a few chose to defect outright to the Free French, providing a valuable boost to the naval strength of the Free French and giving de Gaulle a wonderful PR moment shaking hands with the senior officers of the cruiser Algérie. Hitler was infuriated by this action and came close to ordering the occupation of the whole of France there and then, only being dissuaded when Laval offered to increase the guest worker quota and to impose even more production burdens on French industry [6].
Regardless of what happened at Toulon the men who had mutinied at Mers-el-Kébir faced the full wrath of French military justice, as much as a gesture to appease the Germans as because of the gravity of their offences, and a number were executed after being found guilty of mutiny. For many of the others who had taken part in events at Toulon and Mers-el-Kébir the fear that had motivated them came true, they were dismissed from military service and shipped to Germany as slave labour. That the Germans treated their French workers rather better than those luckless souls shipped in from Poland, or later the Ukraine, would have been cold comfort to French sailors and many felt they would have been better off in prison or even a POW camp.
Admiral Darlan, in overall command of the Marine Nationale escaped such punishment, but was stripped of his post and forced to resign, which overall was a kinder fate than he perhaps deserved for the position he had put his subordinates in. In early 1941 Darlan somehow found his way North Africa and from there to Allied controlled territory and met with de Gaulle, offering his services to the Free French. Few trusted him, his defection did make for wonderful propaganda against Vichy, after having already milked the mutiny for all it was worth [7].
In France as whole Vichy tried to play down what had happened, which descended into farce as pre-war footage of French warships was inserted into newsreel footage as alleged evidence that the mutiny had been a minor affair and consisted of nothing but the drunken actions of a few malcontents. Such blatant lies convinced no one and alongside the guest worker initiative undermined the legitimacy of Vichy among the French people. Sympathy for the Free French increased and the mythos that emerged around Mers-el-Kébir helped foster the nascent resistance movement.
For the British the reaction in the immediate aftermath was summed up by Admiral Sommerville, he made no secret of his relief that the French had ‘done the job for him’. The mutineers transformed what would inevitably have been a controversial action in neutral quarters, and soured relations with the French, into a tool to berate both Vichy and Nazi Germany [8].
[1] This sums up the dilemma facing the British before OTL Mers-el-Kebir.
[2] The Wehrmacht was hit much harder than OTL in the fighting over the Spring and Summer of 1940, so Germany wants France crushed, but they also want goods they can trade. OTL they spent a long time trying to get the French to produce materiel that could go into Luftwaffe aircraft production and transportation, here they’ve just decided to take what they can get and turn the screws a little tighter on Vichy.
[3] In OTL the Nazi’s were fairly circumspect in their dealings with France until Vichy was dismantled in 1942, they took a rather legalistic approach to trying to control French industry and they didn’t start rounding up ‘guest workers’ until much later.
[4] So obviously the mood in the port is far more rebellious than OTL, courtesy of the greater disappointment after it seemed the Allies had turned the tide.
[5] The Kriegsmarine is a bit more desperate than OTL and willing to press on with a bad idea.
[6] So this has been revised after some comments.
[7] So Darlan is definitely going to be sidelined here, he doesn’t have any ships and no influence in North Africa.
[8] Overall Vichy has been undermined internally and externally. The resistance movement has received a boost and Hitler and co are already thinking in terms of doing away with the regime.
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So Darlan meets with de Gaulle in North Africa in early 1941. Seems like a lot more defections to the Free French.