Garrison
Donor
I spelt it that way in the first draft and then corrected myself, to the wrong spelling. I will make that small change.
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
BUILD ALL THE TOGS!!!
Seriously though, that would be a really bad idea. They're slow enough and large enough to be deliberately targeted by JU-87s with a reasonable possibility of actually hitting them too.
Two reasons.
1 - Memes
2 - World of Tanks where it kind of became a mascot vehicle and the addition of the silly thing to the game brought it to lots of peoples attention which in turn caused option 1 which caused more people to be aware of it and so on.
Also there's probably the fact that the TOG was never going to be a reality, whilst the Covy was made one and it was a failure that wasted a damn sight more resources, time and effort that could have been better spent elsewhere than a handful of OAP's still thinking it was 1916 all over again when designing a bare handful of vehicles.
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So we are coming more or less to the plan of OTL, right?
Here though, I have some question regarding the different setting and background.
With the TTL battle of Belgium having happened, I guess the Wehrmacht would have to begin the TTL sickle cut with a less powerful force than OTL, even if slightly so, given the some of the panzer divisions would have bloodied in Belgium first. Even if the Germans have a six weeks pause to refill their stocks for another offensive through the Ardennes, I wonder if that'll be enough to make up for what has been consumed in invading Belgium and attacking the Escault line.
Then, there is also the matter of Allied preparedness. Granted, the French command was screwing up in biblic proportions, but overall, not speaking of the command, the Allies have had a fresh taste of German tactics in Belgium, and some lessons and tricks they could resort to, to some degree, in a latter battle. They'd have about six weeks between late May and early July to think about it. For instance, the impact of the RAF wrecking up German supply columns could give some ideas if, when the situation will present itself with a German crossing of the Ardennes; though it's double-edged as I'm sure the OKH will think of this problem and might take some measure to paliate to it after Belgium, lest they risk the same halt as on the Escault. Also, I guess these forces involved in the invasion of the Netherlands would be redeployed to bolster the German advance into France, or relieve units that may.
That's not me saying the Germans would fail in their endeavour, since there are still huge shortcoming in the Allies command and doctrines, but given the different setting for this TTL sickle, I'm tempted to say it would be a harder fought campaign. That said, ultimately, politics in Paris and Bordeaux will dictate the end of it I suspect.
But since the object of this TL seems to be a better position for the British, I'd tempted to guess that this alternate battle will allow a smoother evacuation of the BEF, perhaps even Poles, without the immense loss of equipment that happened OTL at Dunkirk and other places. That in turn might have a serious impact on how the Libyan campaign plays out in 1941, with perhaps an earlier end to it, and also on the Greek campaign, with at the very least the conservation of Crete as a forward base.
Here though, I have some question regarding the different setting and background.
With the TTL battle of Belgium having happened, I guess the Wehrmacht would have to begin the TTL sickle cut with a less powerful force than OTL, even if slightly so, given the some of the panzer divisions would have bloodied in Belgium first. Even if the Germans have a six weeks pause to refill their stocks for another offensive through the Ardennes, I wonder if that'll be enough to make up for what has been consumed in invading Belgium and attacking the Escault line.
Then, there is also the matter of Allied preparedness. Granted, the French command was screwing up in biblic proportions, but overall, not speaking of the command, the Allies have had a fresh taste of German tactics in Belgium, and some lessons and tricks they could resort to, to some degree, in a latter battle. They'd have about six weeks between late May and early July to think about it. For instance, the impact of the RAF wrecking up German supply columns could give some ideas if, when the situation will present itself with a German crossing of the Ardennes; though it's double-edged as I'm sure the OKH will think of this problem and might take some measure to paliate to it after Belgium, lest they risk the same halt as on the Escault. Also, I guess these forces involved in the invasion of the Netherlands would be redeployed to bolster the German advance into France, or relieve units that may.
That's not me saying the Germans would fail in their endeavour, since there are still huge shortcoming in the Allies command and doctrines, but given the different setting for this TTL sickle, I'm tempted to say it would be a harder fought campaign. That said, ultimately, politics in Paris and Bordeaux will dictate the end of it I suspect.
But since the object of this TL seems to be a better position for the British, I'd tempted to guess that this alternate battle will allow a smoother evacuation of the BEF, perhaps even Poles, without the immense loss of equipment that happened OTL at Dunkirk and other places. That in turn might have a serious impact on how the Libyan campaign plays out in 1941, with perhaps an earlier end to it, and also on the Greek campaign, with at the very least the conservation of Crete as a forward base.
Garrison
Donor
Oh I know all about it in WoT, where it was always funny, so long as it was on the other team. Problem was so many people saw it doing dumb stuff on Youtube channels like the Mighty Jingles and failed to understand those were 1 in a 1000 battles.
Garrison
Donor
Your last paragraph there is pretty much hitting it on the nose, the biggest changes will play out after France. This version of the Battle of France will be longer than OTL and the British position afterwards will be very different. Some events in during the Battle will be rather like their OTL counterparts but there will of course be some twists along the way.
Only one was built before it was laughed off the field. It's basically a WWI design with a modern turret, but in terms of production, it wasn't. I think it was basically a "Right School Tie" project, so even getting 1 built was nothing more than a sop to the old gang. As much as I joke about it, there is not enough lead paint, even in 1940, for the General staff to drink to think that actually building the TOG is a good idea. It's the Fairey Battle of the Tank world.
I can't help loving it as such a typically British tank though and it sums up the majority view of the British military since time immemorial - Always the best prepared at the beginning of the next war to re fight the last war.
Given it's health pool, low gun dispersion and fast reload it can be surprisingly effective if it's played right and you're not meeting tanks more than 1 tier higher. After that you are, as Jingles puts it, "a semi mobile giant XP piñata". I'm always happy to see TOGs on my team.
May 24th – June 21st – 1940 – The Battle of Belgium – Aftermath – The Allies
Garrison
Donor
May 24th – June 21st – 1940 – The Battle of Belgium – Aftermath – The Allies
The results of the Battle of Belgium satisfied no one. The Allies may have averted disaster, though the Belgians were far from convinced that this was the case. If one did accept that a catastrophe had been avoided this surely begged the question, how had they come so close to disaster in the first place? Most of Belgium was in Nazi hands and there were anxieties in Paris and London as to how long the Belgians could be expected to continue resisting as King Leopold III seemed unreliable to say the least, and he proved quite willing to bypass his own government to explore the possibility of agreeing term with the Germans. Leopold’s actions would bring Belgium to the brink of civil war when Leopold attempted to return to the throne, but for now they were largely unknown beyond his inner circle of advisors [1].
Searching for a silver lining the British could at least look to the performance of the BEF and the new models of armour that had been deployed. These served as a belated affirmation of the success of the MTA and the procurement decisions made after Munich, though the man responsible for those decisions would receive no thanks for his efforts. The Cruiser IV in particular had been seen to be the best of the Cruiser tank models available and the manufacturers of it, along with the Valentine and Matilda II, were reaching a point on the ‘learning curve’ where output was rapidly improving, with the numbers coming off the assembly lines expected to double and even triple in the coming months. There was a lot less enthusiasm about the Covenanter, whose technical issues persisted despite the continual assurances that the next fix for its cooling problems would be the definitive one. As far as the senior officers of the BEF went Generals Brooke and Montgomery were considered to have acquitted themselves extremely well and had been marked out for greater responsibilities in the near future [2]. On the other hand, there was a feeling that Gort had been, as one of his subordinates put it, ‘stodgy’ and while his decision to fall back to the Escault had been the correct one questions were being asked in the war cabinet as to whether he was the right man to command the BEF in the more dynamic mobile warfare that might resume if a way could be found to penetrate the German lines. For the moment however he was left in place as such a breakthrough by the Allies seemed a nebulous prospect at the moment [3].
These bright spots did not distract from some harsh lessons that had been handed out by the Germans. For one thing the Mk VI B had proven to be every bit as poor in combat as had been feared. Given that of an available tank force of about eleven hundred vehicles around seven hundred and fifty were still Mk VI B this was a serious issue [4]. Even the ramping up of production expected in the next few months would not be enough to retire the Mk VI B until the autumn of 1941 (in fact production exceeded Whitehall’s predictions but even so this would still see the Mark VI B linger on in service far longer than anyone wanted). Even if more Cruiser tanks were available, with even the Covenanter seen as preferable to the Mark VI B, there would still be the major challenge of converting units over, requiring large scale reorganization and retraining [5]. The unpleasant reality was that the BEF would have to solider on with what it had awaiting the dispatch of further formations, such as 3rd and 8th RTR, from Britain once their re-equipping was complete.
Politically Churchill was reinforcing his position, helped by the fact that at the height of the crisis in Belgium several of his cabinet opponents had embarrassed themselves by suggesting the situation in the Low Countries was lost even as the BEF was digging in on the Escault Line. This was not to say that Churchill had not been disturbed by the apparent threat of the BEF being driven into the sea by the initial German assault and he had discretely enquired of the Royal Navy about what contingencies existed for conducting an evacuation of the BEF if the worst should happen? No such plans had been worked out, but several were soon outlined in response to the Prime Minister’ request [6].
If there was one other thing above all others which the British were very unhappy it was the French High command. Brooke’s view of them as a ‘shambles’ and Gamelin as ‘fossilized’ had come to be shared by most of the senior British officers and Churchill himself for that matter. He had spoken with Reynaud several times by phone, and it was clear that the French PM was unenthusiastic about Gamelin and was simply looking for the opportunity to replace. The British perception of Gamelin was hardly helped by the remarks he made about the BEF to Brooke and other officers sent to liaise with him over future plans. He may have placed much of the blame for the failure of Plan D on the Belgians, but he still had plenty left to heap on the ‘English’. He had somehow stopped short of using terms like cowardice, but ‘timid’ and ‘uncooperative’ loomed large in his complaints.
This did not stop him making demands of the British in terms of planning a counteroffensive. To put it simply Gamelin demanded that the BEF be practically doubled in size to provide the Allies with the necessary strength to overwhelm the German lines and drive through them. This demand prompted utter dismay from the British. The increase in the number of British tanks that Gamelin put forward seemed completely detached from reality to those in Whitehall for the reasons already discussed. Gamelin understood his demands were outlandish, but he had no desire to mount a counteroffensive until such time as the Anglo-French forces could overwhelm a Wehrmacht running low on fuel and ammunition. Some sources claim that Gamelin said that he, ‘would be happy to wait for the Americans to arrive’. However sympathetic Roosevelt might have been to the Allies the prospect of American soldiers setting foot in Europe was not one that anyone could take seriously in the summer of 1940, though some argue he simply meant he wanted to wait until the flow of supplies from the USA reached the levels hoped for if Roosevelt won the Presidential election in November. Even this interpretation would mean that Gamelin had little interest in any offensive action in 1940 [7].
Churchill travelled to France on the 29th of May for a face-to-face meeting with Reynaud. Churchill made it clear that he and his Generals were all in favour of a swift counteroffensive, before the Germans could reorganize or try to seize the initiative once more. While the British would strive to make the maximum possible contribution to such an offensive, by land, sea, and air, it must regrettably fall on the French army to take the lead in such an endeavour. If Churchill was hoping that Reynaud was willing to listen to reason, he was sorely disappointed. Gamelin’s insistence on the British ‘pulling their weight’ had found a sympathetic hearing in the French leadership. This was in no small part thanks to Daladier, still smarting from being unceremoniously ousted from office in favour Reynaud in the aftermath of the of the argument over supporting Finland during the Winter War. There was also the spectre of the terrible losses taken by the French in the first world war that loomed every time an offensive was discussed. Reynaud was thus in no position to offer any assurances to Churchill, falling back on the position that it would take considerable time to build up the quantities of supplies and munitions he had been assured would be needed to support such an offensive. Churchill made the proper diplomatic noises, but left France deeply disappointed, and with his faith in the resolve of the French to see the battle through to victory substantially reduced. More than anything he feared that the Germans would not simply sit and wait for the British and French to make such leisurely preparations [8].
[1] Although Leopold was cleared of treason in a post war investigation, his return to Belgium in 1950 provoked a violent general strike, and as mentioned nearly led to civil war. The crisis was averted by his abdication.
[2] Timings will be different, but Brooke will still become CIGS in due course. As for Montgomery, well his time will come but not necessarily where you would expect.
[3] Gort was no military genius, and the likes of Brooke, Montgomery and Slim would rapidly eclipse him. However, if anyone can claim the mantle of ‘The man who saved the BEF’ its Gort.
[4] Which is still rather less than OTL and they will be replaced sooner.
[5] Yes getting heatstroke in a Covenanter is still preferable to being shot to pieces in a Mk VI B IMHO.
[6] The same people who would advocate peace talks in June OTL have jumped the gun here and Churchill is just being prudent of course.
[7] This again is based on various reading about Gamelin, he seems to have been determined to avoid any latter day Nivelle offensive and willing to fight a battle of attrition, with the Germans doing most of the bleeding.
[8] Churchill did make this trip in OTL and the outcome was about as uninspiring as the version portrayed here.
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Garrison
Donor
So two things firstly I am little under the weather so I just spent the last hour frantically working on editing the German aftermath update before I remembered I hadn't posted the Allied update, so at least Saturday's update is definitely ready.
Second thing is that yeah things may be heading in a direction that resembles OTL, but look at the dates. Even if a version of Sickle Cut were as quick as OTL that pushes it to almost the end of the Summer and remember that in OTL the cut off date for creating the conditions for Operation S-----n, basically gaining air superiority, was September 15th. Ponder what that might mean.
Second thing is that yeah things may be heading in a direction that resembles OTL, but look at the dates. Even if a version of Sickle Cut were as quick as OTL that pushes it to almost the end of the Summer and remember that in OTL the cut off date for creating the conditions for Operation S-----n, basically gaining air superiority, was September 15th. Ponder what that might mean.
Garrison
Donor
So inspired by @allanpcameron and this thread:
I felt inspired to take another look at a tank image that might fit Munich Shuffle. Found a couple of blueprint images online, which again are on multiple different websites so I don't know who to properly credit, did some messing around in GIMP and came up with this:
Again no way I could use this for anything else but it scratched an itch.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
I mean above 500 in one thread Yep, 504 pages in Thread 1 & 503 in Thread 2.
www.alternatehistory.com
I felt inspired to take another look at a tank image that might fit Munich Shuffle. Found a couple of blueprint images online, which again are on multiple different websites so I don't know who to properly credit, did some messing around in GIMP and came up with this:
Again no way I could use this for anything else but it scratched an itch.
Garrison
Donor
Well he isn't really. He's setting a pre-condition he knows can't be met in any realistic timeframe, but which lets him deflect any criticism or blame, for the time being.
Wasn't he historically ousted in March, well before the German attack in May, and from what I could read, because of his failure to help Finland?
Halder single handedly destroying German chances of winning since forever. Truly wish they all get sacked for their politicking after a successful sickle cut.
Also not gonna lie but hoped Chamberlain would have a better fate than this. It always broke my heart listening to him deliver the war declaration, and was hoping more actions to prepare would lead to more respect if not longer life. Alas.
Also not gonna lie but hoped Chamberlain would have a better fate than this. It always broke my heart listening to him deliver the war declaration, and was hoping more actions to prepare would lead to more respect if not longer life. Alas.
Garrison
Donor
I could claim that's a butterfly, but its actually just a cock up.
I will edit it later today.Politicking is part and parcel of the Nazi regime. The next update will cover the German reaction to events in Belgium. As for Chamberlain I think historians will take a kinder view of him as the years go by ITTL, after all the argument over whether Munich was playing for time or a capitulation will be settled firmly in favour of the former here. This is ironic as I am no fan of Chamberlain and making him more sympathetic here was one of the challenges of creating the TL.
May 24th – June 21st – 1940 – The Battle of Belgium – Aftermath – Germany
Garrison
Donor
May 24th – June 21st – 1940 – The Battle of Belgium – Aftermath – Germany
Halder could have been in no doubt about the outcome when he was summoned to meeting with Hitler on the 26th of May. After an hour-long tirade detailing all Halder’s failings he was dismissed from his post. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch only survived by wholeheartedly supporting this decision and letting the luckless Halder act as whipping boy for the entire Genera Staff. General Paul von Kleist found himself suddenly elevated to the role of Chief of the General Staff over the heads of some other senior officers who were too close to Halder for Hitler’s liking [1]. It was made very clear to von Kleist that his priority was to assemble the forces necessary to carry Manstein’s plan for a thrust south from Sedan and that this was no longer a subject for discussion. The forces on the Escault were now simply there to keep the Allies attention on them while preparations were made for the thrust towards Sedan. This presented von Kleist with a daunting task since the plan as currently endorsed by Hitler envisioned the use of up to seven panzer divisions, all three motorized divisions and about forty infantry divisions. These requirements meant there would be much activity along the Escault on the German side, and while it would be interpreted by the Allies as the Wehrmacht reinforcing their position, which in turn reinforced Gamelin’s reluctance to mount an offensive, it was simply cover for the reallocation of troops and supplies to execute Manstein’s plan. This meant that until what were considered second lime formations suitable for garrison duty arrived to shore them up the German lines were extremely vulnerable. It was a tremendous gamble, and like so many others in the early part of the war it was one that the Germans got away with [2].
One other decision that was forced on von Kleist by Hitler was to effectively swap the commands of Army Groups A and B. von Rundstedt, on whose staff Manstein was serving, would take over the forces facing the Ardennes while Bock took charge of the forces on the Escault line. This was felt to be a better fit given the changed plans and had the bonus that it would help confuse the Allies, though it also caused a fair degree of confusion for the Germans during the handover and afterwards. All of this was done so Manstein would be able to assist in overseeing the preparations for bringing his vision to life. Manstein’s imprint on the plan was so great that it was later referred to as ‘Manstein’s Scythe’, much to the chagrin of those like Guderian who could felt they were entitled to a share of any credit for the plan. At the time there was still much scepticism about the plan, with ‘Manstein’s folly’ being one of the kinder things it was called by officers dubious about its chances of success [3].
Shuffling the commanders was a trivial thing compared to assembling the forces that would be required to fight the battle. Von Kleist had persuaded Hitler that ‘only’ six Panzer divisions should be used as several would have to be transferred from their positions near the Escault line, one of the reserve divisions having been released to take part in the battle rather too late to have any effect on the outcome, and these divisions had taken significant losses that would have to be made good. This meant not only giving these divisions priority for replacements crews and vehicle but also taking elements from the divisions remaining on the Escault, meaning that what were on paper four Panzer Division still facing the Allies had the total strength of about two and half, with no armour in reserve to call up on if things went badly on either front for the Germans. There were parallel problems with the Motorized divisions and even allocating infantry divisions was an issue as many of the divisions held in the reserve were not considered first rate and Hitler was adamant that the force assigned to the Ardennes plan must be of the highest quality to give it the greatest chance of success. Many of the units who were rotated out of the Escault Line thought they were being transferred into reserve for rest and refit, there was some very loud complaining when the troops finally found out where they were really going [4].
It was not merely the ordinary soldiers who were grumbling. Von Kleist’s demands for men, equipment and supplies prompted many senior officers on the Escault front to complain and come up with excuses as to why his demands could not be met. Von Kleist overrode these by the simple expedient of stating that if they had legitimate reasons to object then he would gladly raise them with the Fuhrer, the objectors invariably found ways to comply with von Kleist’s requests in the face of this offer. Bit by bit von Kleist was able to assemble the forces required. Despite his best efforts to maintain secrecy it was inevitable that the French would become aware of the troop movements near the Ardennes, but the German deception efforts paid off as Gamelin and his staff assumed this was part of the reshuffling of forces from the Escault Line for rest and refit. Far from worrying about threats to Sedan Gamelin saw these activities as an excuse to apply further pressure on the British to accelerate their build up before the opportunity to attack on the Escault was lost. In London these demands were no longer met with scepticism but outright hostility as it was now assumed that even if Gamelin’s demands could have been met instantly he would have found some new excuse to postpone an attack. There was now something of a reluctance to accelerate the build up at all until some firm commitment was extracted from the French as to future command arrangements, after all if the British were expected to take up a larger share of the burden of carrying out future attacks it was only reasonable that they should have a greater say in formulating and executing those plans [5]. Implicit in all these discussions was that someone other than Gamelin should assume overall command. Such discord in the Allied ranks was a considerable boost to the Germans, who heard plenty of stories about it from prisoners taken during patrols on the Escault and deserters, some of whom were Alsatians called up to the French army but whose sympathies lay with Germany [6].
Von Kleist was therefore able to make his preparations with no interference from the Allies, despite the desperate urgings of many on both sides of the English Channel. Still the Manstein Scythe remained an enormous gamble. The formations reinforced with fresh and reassigned units were inevitably not as well integrated as those which had spent months serving together and as they advanced, they would have a large flank potentially open to attack until the infantry, still largely advancing on foot, could close with the fast-moving mechanized forces. This risk was reflected in the name finally given to the plan, Operation Baccarat [7].
One thing that greatly assisted in lowering the risk of the plan was that the ‘powerful reserves’ that had previously so troubled Halder had effectively ceased to exist. All the mechanized and motorized formations in the French reserves had long since been drawn towards the Escault and the infantry had been reduced to some fifteen divisions, in theory. In practice eight of the divisions had been rotated out of the Escault Line as they had been badly mauled in the fighting and needed time to rebuild. That the French were doing what von Kleist claimed to be doing with his troops certainly helped to make his deception seem more plausible to the Allies. The remaining seven divisions were ‘second rate’, considered adequate for follow up or garrison duties, but certainly not troops to face the brunt of an assault by six Panzer Divisions and the full fury of the Luftwaffe [8].
This meant that as von Kleist finalized his preparations the defence of Sedan relied upon a mix of understrength, exhausted formations and untried troops of questionable quality. On top of this any serious effort to exploit the potentially vulnerable flanks of the Panzers would require swift and decisive action from a French High Command that had done nothing to improve its communications and had already proven sluggish in responding to changing circumstances. This was a set of circumstances that von Kleist, von Rundstedt, and their Panzer commanders would exploit to the fullest [9].
[1] This is somewhat earlier than Halder was fired OTL where he lasted until September 1942. Someone had to pay for the failure in Belgium.
[2] Well things have not been going as well as OTL for the Nazis and they had the devil’s own luck in France, so I had felt it was reasonable to give them some of it here.
[3] So this plan is not known as Sickle Cut ITTL, which is good for Manstein on one level, but may well cool relations with some of his counterparts.
[4] In poker terms the Germans are going ‘all in’ to an even greater degree than OTL.
[5] So the co-ordination between the British and the French is breaking down still further at this point rather than improving.
[6] I freely admit I have no idea if such troops existed, but it seems plausible that they did. There may have been some German soldiers going the other way but as far as they know the Escault is still the main front.
[7] I decided not to give it a ‘Case’ name to make things less confusing.
[8] So the position as far as French reserves and concentrated armour goes is worse than OTL given the pull of the Escault and Gamelin having to be ready in case the Germans do give him an opportunity to attack.
[9] As if no one saw this coming.