If Monty is SAC SEA, is Mountbatten going to stay as Chief of Combined Operations?
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
I can't see any reason why not, especially as the British are engaging in a series of major operations, so definitely not the junior partner here.
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part II – Liberating Vientiane
Garrison
Donor
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part II – Liberating Vientiane
In the weeks leading up to the beginning of Operation Douaumont the Japanese removed the Vichy French officials who been forced, to a greater or lesser degree, to carry on in their posts since the Japanese occupation of 1940. These individuals had been required to keep the administration of Indochina running smoothly and maintain the transparent pretence that the colonies had not simply been annexed to the Japanese. With dissolution of Vichy and Anglo-French forces on the brink of invading the Japanese not only dismissed the officials but interned them, in some cases going so far as to execute individuals on the mere suspicion that they might have engaged in any form of resistance activity. Not only did this badly disrupt the running of the colonies at a critical time, but it also failed miserably to cow the increasingly restive native and colonial population. It was seen by many as a clear sign the Japanese were panicking and that the time would soon come to revolt against them. This move also had little effect on the resistance activities in Indochina that so worried the Japanese as the resistance movement was rooted amongst the nationalist elements in the native population, for whom the arrest and execution of colonial officials was hardly a deterrent [1].
It fell to I Burma Corps to carry out the first phase of the operation and when they opened the offensive opened on the 4th of April the Japanese were taken by surprise as the initial thrust was made towards Vientiane in Laos rather than towards Cambodia or Vietnam. Achieving a degree of strategic surprise was an objective in itself for the Allied forces but there were other considerations at work in the decision to target Vientiane. For one a strike into Laos would cut increase the isolation of Japanese forces in Cambodia and Vietnam, weakening their already poor position. There was also however a political dimension to the decision to open the fighting in the north rather than the south. Vientiane lay relatively close to the border with Thailand and with the bulk of the surviving Japanese forces in Thailand having fallen back to the south and the Japanese command expecting Saigon and the port facilities to be the primary target of the Allied offensive, whose scale they consistently underestimated, it was relatively lightly defended. This offered the prospect of a quick French victory, or at least them impression of a French victory as the bulk of their forces were still committed to the attack in the south that wouldn’t begin until the 17th of April. The French leadership had been anxious that there might be a popular uprising in Laos once the attack in the south commenced and if Vientiane was seized by nationalist forces that would not constitute much of an improvement over the Japanese from the French perspective. This was not a viewpoint that garnered much sympathy from the British who felt they had already bent over backwards to accommodate the French role in the operation and a major argument was only headed off by cooler heads emphasizing the strategic value in attacking towards Vientiane before pushing towards Cambodia and making the amphibious assault aimed at Saigon [2].
In addition to the handful of French regiments attached to I Burma Corps there were also three regiments of Thai troops. Two of these were drawn from Thai forces that had been retained to be used as auxiliaries by the Japanese to help maintain order in their homeland. These regiments had suffered large scale desertions as Japanese rule became ever more onerous, but they had provided a cadre to reconstitute the Thai army after the Japanese were ousted and their inclusion in the order of battle was largely aimed at securing the last Japanese holdouts in Thailand and restoring order, which meant ensuring that those who supported the restoration of the pre-war government took control rather than any insurgents or political opponents. These Thai troops took no part in the attack on Vientiane, but they did remove the burden of maintaining lines of communication through Thailand from the British as I Burma advanced. The Japanese attempts to break up or delay the advance when the British attacked these last outpost in Thailand were wholly unsuccessful, given the Japanese lack mobility and air support they were pinned down and bypassed as 1st Cavalry punched through the lines and created a gap through which the rest of I Burma could advance rapidly on Vientiane, where the situation was swiftly descending into chaos as the Japanese found themselves isolated by a combination of guerrilla action and Chindits who had been infiltrated behind their lines in significant number, not to mention constant air attacks by the RAF and RAAF that meant anything much larger than a single soldier leading a pack animal became a target [3].
It was obvious to the Japanese as early as the 7th of April that Vientiane could not be held. The available forces were not strong enough to block the British advance, nor were there forces that could stage a counterattack or relieve the city one the British reached it. The response to this situation by the Japanese was depressingly predicable, ordering the forces concentrated around Laos to stand and fight and to lay waste to the city rather than hand it over to the British or French. Given their bitter experience the British and Indian troops of I Burma were expecting exactly this sort of fanatical defence, however in the case of Vientiane they would be pleasantly surprised as it failed to materialize, largely because of the quality of the Japanese troops who were being called on to fight to the death. Vientiane had fallen without a shot being fired in 1940 and the troops assigned to Laos and its capital had been there to keep the locals in line, not mount a military campaign. Vientiane had been one of the more comfortable billets a Japanese soldier could hope for and given the demands elsewhere the Laotian capital had very much been a place where second and third line troops could be put to use without worrying about such trivial matters as training and discipline, after all no Japanese soldier could expect to be punished for abusing the locals, if anything it was encouraged to help keep them in line. Many of these soldiers were not even from Japan proper, with their ranks being fleshed out by labour battalions that drew manpower from places such as Korea and Okinawa. These were hardly men who were eager to die for the honour of the emperor [4].
Vientiane had been completely flanked and isolated by the 15th of April and the plan now called for thrusts from the north and south led by British forces while the French regiments led an attack from the west. When the initial defensive lines inside the city crumbled the advancing allied troops feared some sort of trap, but it soon became clear that the Japanese forces in the city were disintegrating, once the first units broke the collapse of morale spread rapidly. Far from a determined fight to the finish the city had fallen by the 18th, with large numbers of Japanese prisoners being taken in what was seen as a major humiliation by the Japanese high command. The French raised their flag over the city on the 16th and quickly sought to reassert control, liberating the surviving local administrators the Japanese had interned and putting them back to work, with few questions asked about their loyalty to Vichy or the exact nature of their prior collaboration. These actions would have long term consequences for the French but for the moment the focus was on continuing the push across Laos to reach the Vietnamese coast at Vinh. With the rapid collapse of Vientiane, I Burma still had plenty of momentum to continue operations while the Japanese struggled to create any effective defensive line and the remnants of the Japanese forces in Laos were forced out of the country and pushed back to Vinh by the 22nd of June, effectively cutting Vietnam in half and isolating the defenders in the north from those now engaged in heavy fighting in the south. The offensive in Laos had been far less costly than had been feared and achieved its goals far more quickly than the planners had assumed, which was just as well given the issues that afflicted the drive on Saigon [5].
[1] I wouldn’t go so far as to say they celebrated the death of French officials, but they weren’t mourning them either.
[2] The French are getting increasingly jumpy about the future of their colonies. Mainly they are worried about nationalists, but they also have one eye on the British who are going to have a lot of troops in French territory.
[3] The Japanese really were not expecting a move towards Laos at this point and they are paying the price.
[4] The dregs of the Japanese army in other words.
[5] The French are fighting in Vietnam; it’s bound to go well…
Another great update! This is the one timeline that has me refreshing the first page daily looking for the next installment. Can't wait for the final moves in the end game!
How long before they get to the Seat of the Border County Prefecture in Tonkin?
Something tells me anglo-french relations are just going to be a bit strained post-war
Garrison
Donor
It will a charming little place the British pass by on their way south.
A complicating factor is that a lot of those 'British' troops in South East Asia are actually Indian and not hugely sympathetic to helping the French re-establish colonial rule. And of course a lot of nationalist movements will be looking to the deal the British have struck in India as an inspiration.
If De Gualle knows what's good for him, he'll try to strike a similar bargain, but...
Garrison
Donor
The British are in a very different position than OTL. They've repulsed all the attempts to conquer their colonial possessions, and have ended up controlling more territory than they started with, though they are not planning on staying in these new areas one minute longer than necessary. they've been spared the humiliating defeats in Asia of OTL and can move forward from a strong position. The French by contrast are still trying to shake off the humiliations inflicted by the Germans and the Japanese, they are afraid any concessions will set off a cascade they can't control.
Ob yeah, I think it is, the other timelines IIRC only involves the French and the Americans, with the British participation at most only involved a small attache.
Garrison
Donor
Here I've assumed that the USA isn't keen on diverting resources to what they see as a peripheral operation, the British are mainly interested because it provides another stepping stone to the one piece of the British Empire the Japanese did successfully take in 1941.
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part III – Cambodia and the Vũng Tàu Landing
Garrison
Donor
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part III – Cambodia and the Vũng Tàu Landing
IX Corps and XXXIII Indian Corps launched their advance into Cambodia on the 10th of April, attacking on a broad front that pinned the Japanese defenders in place and prevented them from concentrating what reserves they had available, which as had become commonplace for the Japanese were sorely lacking. In the case of the Cambodian fighting this was not entirely a matter of a lack of manpower, it also reflected a strategic decision to concentrate the Japanese forces in the front lines, hoping to hold their positions and repel the offensive before it could gain momentum. This strategy fared poorly, with the British forces breaking through at several points on the 13th and steadily pushed the Japanese back over the next few days, with armoured units taking the lead and threatening to completely isolate and encircle large parts of the retreating Japanese troops. These armoured units remained heavily reliant on the M3 Stuart and the M3 Grant in combat. There was an element of the South East Asian theatre of operations still coming off second best when it came to equipment and vehicles, despite the fact that victory in Europe was clearly imminent in the spring of 1944, but there was sound reasoning behind the decision to keep using tanks that were classed as obsolete by the standards of the fighting in Northwest Europe. Some US divisions assigned to the European theatre had seen their Lee tanks issued and withdrawn again before ever seeing combat and it was far easier to persuade the Americans to ship these surplus vehicles to Asia than to release any current model Shermans, especially given the divergence in Allied goals for the Asia-Pacific region in 1944. There were few complaints from the tanks crews themselves. Both vehicles were perfectly serviceable against the Japanese and the75mm gun of the M3 Lee/Grant was essentially used as self-propelled artillery given the lack of Japanese armour to engage. There was also an advantage to using these vehicles in that crews and maintenance personnel were by now thoroughly familiar with the operation of all their tanks and this helped to ensure a high level of serviceability and effective tactical use [1].
What pitifully few Japanese tanks were available for the defence of Indochina were ever more obsolete that the Lee or the Stuart. This did not reflect a lack of imagination or engineering skill on the part of the Japanese. Better designs had been drawn up, however these largely existed only as blueprints and mock-ups and the few more modern models that were produced never left the Home Islands. There was also the consideration that in terms of defending Japan and holding off the Allied advance there was an emphasis on airpower, which increasingly leant on building up the Kamikaze squadrons. In practical terms then the Japanese countermeasures to British armour consisted of tank trap and landmines, the former of which were dug by conscripted local labour and were poorly prepared, with many being inadequate to the task of blocking the advancing tanks, either owing to shoddy workmanship or deliberate sabotage. One drawback with the Lee/Grant was that it had never been adapted for the DD amphibious tank capability so when it came to amphibious operations it would have to be delivered to the beaches by landing craft alone, meaning the first wave of troops landing at Vũng Tàu would have very limited close fire support [2].
Despite their significant disadvantages the Japanese soldiers in Cambodia proved to be far more resolute than those encountered at Vientiane and while they were steadily driven back they didn’t break, forcing the British troops to grind forward as one position after another showed a stubborn refusal to lay down their arms when cut off and both Banzai charges and suicide tactics once again made their appearance, provoking a harsh response from the British units and meaning that as the battle progressed few Japanese POWs were taken relative to the scale of the forces involved. The British forces continued to advance regardless, but the decision was taken around the 24th of April that a halt would have to be called at the beginning of May to regroup and prepare a fresh drive towards Phnom Penh, and then onwards towards Vietnam. This also gave the Japanese the opportunity to regroup, but Slim believed that the losses taken from continuing a ragged, disorganized, advance would be far worse than those that might be incurred by allowing his front line forces the chance to reorganize and resupply before attacking freshly dug in Japanese troops. Slim was also counting on the limited Japanese capacity to take advantage of this lull, and the fact that while the ground forces might have come to a halt the RAF was still harassing the Japanese forces on every day where the weather permitted severely hampering their efforts to regroup. The British advance halted on the 3rd of May and would not resume until the 18th, by which time the landing at Vũng Tàu was imminent and ff the three major axes of attack used by the Allies in Indochina the Vũng Tàu landing was by far the most fraught [3].
To the French a landing on the Vietnamese coast seemed the obvious and logical move to swiftly take Saigon and reclaim one of the key regions of the French colonial empire and they had spent the better part of six months working on plans for the amphibious operation, with plans being the operative word. The final plan for the landing had something of an improvised air to it quite at odds with Malamute, Millennium and even Operation Jasper. The reasons for this have been a subject of argument between British and French historians over where responsibility for this lay. The truth is there were multiple intersecting problems that led to the difficulties faced by the French troops as they came ashore at Vũng Tàu. As alluded to one problem was the constant changing of scale and objectives that afflicted the planning of the landing. Whereas a clear framework for Malamute and Millennium had been laid out, though not without some time consuming arguments, amphibious component of Douaumont had been subject to constant changes as strategic situation shifted and various senior officers tried to modify the scale of the operation and the balance of forces involved, with some versions even envisioning the addition of British forces, which did not sit well with de Gaulle, or indeed Montgomery, and was swiftly dropped. Had the planners been granted eighteen months or even a year to prepare these arguments probably wouldn’t have mattered. With barely six months to hammer out the plan the result of this ‘chopping and changing’ was that when the intent to make the landing at w Vũng Tàu with a purely French force was finally confirmed there were a myriad of details that had to be hastily ironed out. Further complicating matters was the fact that the preparations were also subject to more than their fair share of misfortune [4].
HMS Formidable had been due to help provide air support alongside HMS Indomitable and HMS Ark Royal but an electrical fire in March had forced her to return to Singapore for repairs and an investigation into the cause of the problem. With no other carrier immediately available, the US navy having declined requests to assist, the operation would have to make do with reduced air cover. A far more significant problem was the amount of information that reached the Japanese that not only indicated an amphibious assault was imminent but even identified where it was likely to take place. At the beginning of March the French tried to land parties on the planned invasion beaches to gather samples and assess their suitability for armoured vehicles. The same technique had been used in Normandy, but the French suffered a setback west of Vũng Tàu when a party was intercepted, and several members were wounded and captured. How much information they may have given the Japanese is uncertain as they were all executed within a couple of weeks of being taken prisoner. There was also the problem that some of the contacts the French had established in Vietnam proved less than reliable, passing intelligence to the Japanese about what sort of questions the French were asking. Fortunately for the French the Japanese proved sceptical about the reliability of this intelligence, at least in so far as the location of the potential landing was concerned. The Japanese were well aware of the deceptions practiced before the D-Day landings and feared that this was further Allied sleight of hand to persuade them to look the wrong way. This did not mean that they ignored the possibility that the information was accurate and Vũng Tàu did receive its share of the available resources to shore up the defences as the Japanese did what they could to resist the threat of an assault from all directions [5].
In addition to misfortune there were also some dubious assumptions made by the French about the scale of the defence likely to be encountered. They chose to believe that the Japanese would pursue a defence in depth approach with only a limited deployment to the landing zones and they were more concerned about avoiding any traffic jams on the beaches than the capabilities of the defenders and thus chose what was with hindsight an overly broad landing zone that diluted the force density of the assaulting troops, despite some of the reports delivered by the landing parties who did return from recceing the beaches. When the troops reached the shore just after dawn on the 21st of May they faced determined opposition at many points and the few breakthroughs were imperilled by exposed flanks. By midday there were grave concerns among the commanders gathered aboard the cruiser Duquesne that they might have to withdraw from at least the eastern part of the landing zone. They were spared taking this grave decision by two developments ashore [6].
Efforts to land tanks in support of the initial landing waves had been less than successful, with many of the tank landing craft being damaged or sunk by artillery fire, severely limiting the support available to the first waves of French soldiers ashore. Fresh attempts to land armour between 1400 and 1530 hours were far more successful, and the guns of the M3 Lee quickly neutralised defensive positions that had been pinning troops down and allowing them to advance and secure the flanks of the units that had managed to move off the beaches during the morning. At the same time fresh airstrikes from the available carrier forces broke up Japanese formations that had been trying to advance to attack the isolated French spearheads. With the pressure relieved the landing force was able to make a more general advance and with the situation stabilized the orders went out from the Duquesne to send in more follow up troops. By nightfall the Japanese had either abandoned their forward positions or been cut off and isolated. The French had stabilized a beachhead about 3km in depth, though Vung Tàu, which it had been hoped to seize the day after the landing, did not fall until the 25th of May and there were still a few isolated skirmishes with the Japanese up to ten days after the landing. Putting the port in service meant a lot of back breaking labour hauling crates and sacks from supply ships to storage dumps and this was carried out by Vietnamese labourers, though not without the French finding themselves facing an impromptu ‘workers committee’ that insisted on negotiating with the French military commanders. Given the desperate need to get the port into operation the French had little choice but to open a dialogue, regardless of the precedent this might set as they sought to re-establish control in Indochina [7].
Such problems were for the future. For now, the British and the French were focused on the task of defeating the Japanese. This was a task made all the harder by the desperation fuelled determination of the Japanese forces to make the Allies pay for every inch of ground as they advanced on Phnom Penh and Saigon [8].
[1] The British do have better tanks, but only so many of them and with war still raging in Europe there’s no desire to divert them to SEA. Likewise for all their productive capacity the Americans are still focused on sending their best equipment to Europe.
[2] One of those areas where the rapid progress of the Allies has created a bit of a gap. There are plenty of DD tanks in Europe with no water to cross, but plans to send some to SEA are still just that, plans.
[3] Cue much complaining from the French about the British ‘halt order’.
[4] Lots of having to adjust French ambitions to the resources actually available.
[5] Bad luck and the French assuming that everyone would be glad to welcome them back to get rid of the Japanese.
[6] It is not the best executed amphibious assault of the war, though not the worst if you include the Germans in Norway.
[7] This will have no negative consequences whatsoever obviously.
[8] And the final phase of the liberation of Indochina is next.
So, at this point, the japanese are holding onto cambodia and central/south vietnam (I probably read that incorrectly so do please correct me)
Also, given the fact that the Japanese are being driven back on all fronts (and they are about to go on Chiang's wild ride in China soon) Will there be a more prominent faction for peace ITTL? Also, with the british now heavily involved in the pacific war and taking down Japan, that does raise a question on what will the post-war order look like?
There also should be considered that there's probably not going to be an Ichi-Go Offensive, instead it'll be the Nationalists on the attack- which means that the Nationalists will have a lot more credibility with the people, and be in a much stronger position. Though, the Soviets may be able to take Hokkaido and all of korea given the extra time alloted to them thanks to an earlier end to the european theater... I sincerely cannot wait until the Cold War begins, as it'll be quite interesting
Garrison
Donor
There will be long entries on China, Korea, and Manchuria, but those are few months in terms of the timeline, late 1944 rather than the summer. After Indochina its back to Germany, for the ultimate updates on the war in Europe.
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Garrison
Donor
The British haven't had any issues, mostly because they never needed to create any large scale movements in their own colonial territories, the French are distinctly less happy about the situation and would really prefer it if everyone just went back to the status quo, whether they like it or not. This will create significant issues for the French down the line.
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part IV – The Advance to Phnom Penh and Saigon
Garrison
Donor
4th April - 27th July 1944 – Indochina – Operation Douaumont - Part IV – The Advance to Phnom Penh and Saigon
Even as the French were establishing their beachhead at Vung Tàu the British forces were preparing to launch a fresh drive into Cambodia and Slim’s belief that the halt would benefit his forces far more than the Japanese was vindicated as XI Corps resumed its attack and rapidly broke through the hastily formed Japanese lines and when the XXXIII Indian Corps renewed their attack on the 20th of May and they made equally good progress as the Japanese were already completely off balance after XI Corps assault and the IJA forces were also facing persistent air attacks from RAF and RAAF forward airstrips, while the IJAAF squadrons had been obliterated, meaning there was nothing the Japanese could do to disrupt British supply lines as they drove steadily south and pushed to flank Phnom Penh, hoping to pin the Japanese defenders in the city and force their capitulation. There was no desire to chase them into the countryside and then have to engage in endless skirmishing against enemy soldiers potentially willing to fight to the death [1].
The pressure on the Japanese was increased exponentially as the French began their breakout from the Vung Tàu beachhead on the 1st of June. Despite the limitations of the port facilities the French had successfully reinforced and resupplied, the latter in no small part because of the organizational skills demonstrated by the ‘workers committee’. Their efforts greatly assisted in stabilizing the bridgehead and preparing the breakout, though these efforts were not met with complete enthusiasm by some in the French command structure. The speed with which the French launched their breakout attempt took the Japanese by surprise and what was now two French divisions with armoured support attacked east of Vung Tàu. Despite being caught by surprise the Japanese initially put up a stiff resistance in the face of a fairly narrow front of assault but by the 8th the French forces broke through, aided by Vietnamese resistance groups targeting Japanese communications and supply lines. By the 14th of June the French reached Tân Hải and the Japanese abandoned Xã Long Sơn, as the French spearhead pivoted westward to drive on Saigon [2].
The withdrawal from Xã Long Sơn had seen a clear breakdown in discipline amongst some Japanese forces. These were units that had functioned purely as garrison troops for years and efforts to improve their training and readiness in preparation for a potential invasion had been inadequate and flawed and attempts to organize a counteroffensive to push the French back and stabilize the southern front fizzled out into series of small-scale local counterattacks that did little to delay the French and absolutely nothing to discourage the continuing British advance towards the Cambodian capital, though they inevitably took a toll in lives and the French troops soon adopted the same harsh attitude to Japanese troops when they sought to surrender that had been ingrained into the British [3].
On the 30th of June the leading elements of the British forces reached the outskirts of Phnom Penh, but they did not advance into the city until the 3rd of July, by which time they had completely encircled the city. Being cut off with no hope of breaking out, and orders not to do so, made the Japanese defenders desperate and the fight for the city was a brutal one, especially as the Cambodian resistance took to the streets and joined in the fighting. Under attack from without and within the Japanese forces found themselves broken down into isolated pockets and even at their most stubbornly determined to fight to the finish they could only slightly delay the inevitable. Phnom Penh fell on the 9th of July and if the French residents were disconcerted by the sight of a Union Jack flying over the city, they were appalled by the nationalist banner that flew alongside it. This flag had been hastily produced but would prove remarkably enduring as it would eventually form the basis for Cambodia’s national flag. Whatever the feelings of the French they could do little about it as the British would remain in control for several months after they took Phnom Penh, and they were happy to work with the natives who proved adept at restoring order and get the city running again [4].
The French advance from Vung Tàu halted near Saigon on the 8th of July, to prepare their assault on the city. Their tactics differed from those of the British at Phnom Penh in that the French had no interest in trapping the Japanese in Saigon, hoping that if they were left a route to fall back then the city might be taken without the bitter fighting that had scarred Phnom Penh. They were frustrated in this objective by the actions of the Vietnamese resistance movement, who proved to be remarkably well prepared and organized when they launched their uprising in Saigon on the 10th of July. One of the key leaders of the resistance movement, Ho Chi Minh had infiltrated the city around the 2nd of July and managed to coordinate the distribution of weapons and the selection of targets designed to cause maximum chaos for the Japanese, including bombing the Japanese HQ as well as radio stations and a telephone exchange. These attacks were highly successful, and the Japanese command structure was decapitated on the first day as the General and his staff were holding a meeting when the bomb went off. The French reacted to this development by launching their assault on the 11th and over the next few days the Japanese were steadily cleared from the city. Somewhere around the 15th Ho Chi Minh himself was killed, with many believing that he had been assassinated by the French while meeting with them. Perhaps unsurprisingly no official records have every been discovered to support this belief, but it was taken as fact in post-war Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh’s status as a martyr to the cause of Vietnamese nationalism led to Saigon being renamed in his honour after Vietnamese independence [5].
Saigon was secured on the 20th of July and Operation Douaumont was officially declared at an end on the 27th of July, though as usual mopping up operations would continue for several more months to remove the last Japanese holdouts. The fall of Saigon was trumpeted as a major victory for French arms and evidence that the country was a full member of what was now being referred to as the United Nations and thus deserving of a place in shaping the peace that was going to be made in the aftermath of the capitulation of Nazi Germany. In truth it was something of a hollow victory, the same resistance movements that had fought the Japanese now expected to be taken seriously as they put forward their own political agendas, if France wanted to restore the status quo ante they would have to fight the nationalists to do so and with the war in the Pacific still raging neither the British nor the Americans were willing to tie down resources fighting people who had recently been fighting alongside them, especially not in the name of thwarting demands for self-determination on the part of native peoples, and certainly not when so many of the British Empire troops in the region were Indian soldiers whose sympathies lay with the native peoples. Under the circumstances the French had little choice except to extend an olive branch to the Nationalists in Indochina, and by the time the war in the Pacific ended it was too late to snatch it back [6].
That defeat was becoming all too familiar in Tokyo did not make the recriminations over the loss of Indochina any less vitriolic. As the defence perimeter around the Home Islands crumbled this brought no immediate outbreak of realism among the Japanese leadership, they simply settled deeper into a bunker mentality and turned to ever more desperate measures to stop the Allies, including the work of the infamous Unit 731 [7].
For the British ejecting the Japanese from Indochina had been a chore and one they were relieved had been achieved at a relatively modest cost. With the task completed their attention turned north, to Japan itself of course, but more immediately to the one corner of the empire still under enemy occupation, Hong Kong [8].
[1] The Japanese forces in Indochina are looking at attacks from multiple directions and unable to concentrate enough forces to counter any one of them, let alone all of them.
[2] The French have recovered from their initial problems, which is bad news for the Japanese.
[3] There will be a lot of heated debates about Allied treatment of Japanese POWs starting around the 1990s ITTL.
[4] The British finding new and inventive ways to annoy the French.
[5] So yes there is still a Ho Chi Minh city, but all else will be different.
[6] The irony that retaking Indochina sooner will force the French to deal with the nationalists more reasonably.
[7] That will end well…
[8] Which will not be the last major operation for the British.