So the fontlines look like this?
Munich Shuffle: 1938-1942
- Thread starter Garrison
- Start date
Garrison
Donor
Well considering my limited, i.e. zero, skill with maps that looks reasonable.
But there will still probably be a book and a movie regardless.I guess the Eagle didn't Land, then. Shame
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1944 – Ardennes – Part II – The German Attack
Garrison
Donor
18th – December 1943 - 27th January 1944 – Ardennes – Part II – The German Attack
The 18th was a day of miserable weather in the Ardennes, cold, foggy and with heavy low-lying cloud that made for a gloomy dawn. The few US soldiers out on patrol were more focused on how long it would be before they could call it quits and head back to where there might be coffee and hot food to be had than watching for an enemy they assumed would be similarly preoccupied and seeking whatever warmth and shelter they could find. The US forces were oblivious to the fact that 6th SS Panzer Army had already begun to move out of their jumping off points as the dawn broke at 0830 hours. The sheer noise of these armoured formations echoing through the Ardennes as they began to advance did not go unnoticed but these reports, as with so many other, were largely ignored as they worked their way US chain of command, in no small part because these reports were sorely lacking in hard information, a situation that would not last for long [1].
The terrible weather was precisely what Hitler had been waiting for to give the word to launch Winter Watch. With the Allied air forces grounded, for several days at least and perhaps as long as a week according to the Luftwaffe weather forecasts, the largest impediment to a successful attack had been removed, at least this was Hitler’s view. Captured American soldiers had revealed that the formations in the Ardennes were almost entirely green troops with no real combat experience and utterly unprepared for a German offensive. To the Fuhrer it seemed that Germany’s fortunes had turned, especially when the initial reports confirmed the leading elements of the Panzer Divisions were slicing through the American positions practically unopposed. While many US units taken by surprise were overrun or routed the reports being sent back to Berlin carefully avoided mentioning that in many places the American troops put up a tenacious defence and the ambitious timetable for the offensive was already slipping. Tragically some of these US soldiers paid the price for frustrating the SS and more than one massacre of surrendered troops took place, with the inevitable galvanising effect on the resistance of the rest of the American forces [2].
The biggest setback on the first day came late in the afternoon when the 7th Panzer Regiment, part of the 10th Panzer Division, attached to 5th Panzer Army, ran into the US 23rd Tank Battalion, one of the units of 12th Armoured Division that had been ordered forward to intercept what the Allied high command was finally realizing was more than a probe, though they still hadn’t grasped the full scale of the attack and they chose to order the 23rd forward while the rest of the division was still reorganizing, a decision greeted with apprehension by the tank crews as they set out. As events transpired the 23rd Tank Battalion found itself in perfect flanking position to fire on the German tanks in a fast-moving column and when they opened up they swiftly knocked out the two lead vehicles, bring the column to halt and precipitating a confused hour long engagement that was only ended by nightfall and both sides falling back out of fear that their opponents were going to receive major reinforcements. The fight saw fourteen Panzers knocked out in exchange for only two Shermans and the Thomas’ attached to the regiment proved highly effective. What to the Germans seemed like a deliberate ambush provoked a shift in the German advance, pushing more weight to the south of Bastogne. The city itself was taken on the third day of the attack as the relatively light forces protecting it were quickly overrun. Anxieties about further attacks from the south forced 5th Panzer Army to detach a substantial force of infantry to protect the city from any counterattack even as the Panzer Divisions raced to catch up with 6th SS Panzer Army, whose spearheads were racing ahead, and the slower pace of the 5th Panzer threatened to leave their flanks exposed [3].
The seizure of Bastogne was technically a victory for the Germans but their determination to race forward would work against them as the battle unfolded. As Patton put it, ‘they were just sticking their head in the noose and waiting for me to pull the lever’. Patton was quite right, the seizure of Bastogne and St. Vith were certainly tactical successes for the Germans but did nothing to address the larger strategic and logistical issues facing the Panzer Divisions. Far from reaping a major victory the German forces were simply stretching their forces thinner and thinner as they advanced and instead of collapsing into chaos as Hitler confidently predicted the Allies were already preparing to counterattack even as they were trying to stem the German advance. They were given some respite on the 20th when a brief break in the miserable weather gave the USAAF and the RAF the chance to take to the air and after days of frustration they were determined to take full advantage of the opportunity [4].
The columns of supplies and infantry desperately trying to catch up with the panzer Divisions were every bit as inviting a target in 1944 as they had been in 1940 and the Allied air forces were far more numerous and capable than during the battle of the Escault. The Luftwaffe also took to the skies to try and stop these attacks and carry out their own bombing missions, but the day exposed just how quickly the balance of airpower had shifted in favour of the Allies and made it clear that Hitler’s insistence on waiting for bad weather was probably the only sensible part of his strategy. The Luftwaffe forces were badly mauled in the fighting, as were the German forces following the Panzer spearheads, exacerbating the issues of the entire German attack becoming strung out and vulnerable to counterattack on the ground. The fighter bombers did not just target the German supply lines. Several Allied depots that were now behind enemy lines were also attacked, and large quantities of precious fuel was destroyed as the Germans had lacked the transportation to disperse it to other locations or rush it forward to the Panzers. Arguably it was the destruction of this captured fuel that was the most important achievement of the days air attacks. Fortunately for the Germans the window in the weather was brief and by the following day the low cloud had settled in once more, though it is doubtful many of them men on the ground felt fortunate as they began to realize how overextended and exposed, they really were [5].
Despite such misgivings the Panzers kept moving and in another blow to the Allies spearheads from the two Panzer armies broke through north and south of Dinant on the 22nd of December, forcing a further withdrawal, though the isolated defenders in Dinant refused to surrender and retained control of the town itself until the end of the battle. At this point even to some of the most sceptical German officers it must have seemed that the coast was in reach after all, the Allies might not be driven into the sea as Hitler insisted but perhaps it might change their minds about their demands for unconditional surrender? Such thoughts showed the sheer desperation the men in charge and required them to ignore what the maps and supply estimates prepared before the battle should have been telling them. Yes, the Panzers were past Dinant, however the 5th Panzer and 6th SS Panzer were no longer two separate spearheads providing mutual support, instead they had effectively been squeezed together, forced to share the same limited road network to move what supplies were available forward and pressed into a narrow front, Patton’s ‘noose’ was drawing tighter. The soldiers fighting on the frontlines might have disagreed with Patton’s sentiments, but he was essentially correct. The bulk of the armour available to the two Panzer armies was being packed into an increasingly tight space at the end of a failing supply line, with their flanks being protected by overstretched infantry, who were in many places not being supplied at all to ensure the Panzers got whatever was available, and it wasn’t nearly enough, especially given the other issues facing them [6].
The Panzer Divisions were being whittled away more by mechanical issues than enemy action at this point, with the Panthers suffering the worst attrition owing to problems with the engine. The Panther was an excellent tank in many respects, but its engine was its Achilles heel. Instructions issued to several battalions before Winter Watch was planned advised that the Panther not be driven for more than 65 kilometres and they had been transported by rail to take part in previous engagements, even when the travel distances were far less than 65 kilometres. The Panther was simply not designed to carry out the sweeping advances achieved by the Panzerwaffe in 1940 and they had been pushed beyond their breaking point and while the Tiger fared a little better mechanically, it was no better suited to swift cavalry style advances than the Panther. The Chimera was the best of the new tanks available in terms of a sustained advance and given that had much of the same running gear as the tanks of 1940 this was hardly surprising. It was the only one of the German tanks that could make the dubious boast of losing more tanks to the enemy than to mechanical problems, even the Chimera was at its limits, and this was without taking the problems of fuel and ammunition supplies into account [7].
This limited manoeuvrability would also have an impact on the combat performance of the Panthers and Tigers. The German crews might have derided the Sherman and the Centaur, however both tanks were far more agile than their German counterparts and were perfectly capable of flanking them and getting shots into their vulnerable sides and rear. This tactic has prompted some post war historians to take the low regard the Allied tanks, even the Thomas and the Churchill in post war German memoirs, were held in as a matter of fact, confirming the superiority of the German tanks. The reality was that any sensible tank commander of any army in the war would go for the easier shot rather than gambling on finding some weak point in their opponents forward armour to penetrate [8].
There have been the inevitable counterfactual discussions about what might have happened if the Germans had not been constrained by logistics. Those based on a reasoned analysis conclude that that the Germans would have found themselves bogged down in a siege if they had reached Antwerp. A powerful defence was being prepared for the port and with Allied control of the seas and the air there was no prospect of the Germans being able to grind down the defences. In practical terms Antwerp was as far out of reach as it had been when the Panzers left their assembly areas. Far from dividing the Allies the German had placed their armoured forces into a trap, one that Patton and O’Connor were determined to close around them [9].
[1] Imagine a lot of eye-rolling at SHAEF about people hearing hundreds/thousands of tanks.
[2] The SS living down to their reputation.
[3] ITTL the 101st were not in position to occupy Bastogne and so the city falls quickly, likewise the Americans don’t hold the Germans up at St. Vith, which seems like a bad thing…
[4] …But it really is just going to make matters worse when they exhaust their momentum.
[5] This is going to go more Crimea 1854 than France 1940.
[6] So Dinant is the equivalent of Bastogne here, a heroic defence that draw attention away from some of the embarrassing failures by SHAEF during the battle.
[7] So I got the Haynes Enthusiast’s Manual for the Panther for Christmas, and it was quite illuminating about the strengths and weaknesses of the tank.
[8] There is the old, I hesitate to call it a joke that it took six Shermans to kill a Tiger, one gets round behind it while the Tiger was killing the other five. Truth is of course that any sane commander would go for a flank or rear shot, the side armour on the Panther especially was thin and flat. It’s another piece of nonsenses like the alleged ‘Ronson’ nickname for the Sherman.
[9] And Patton will get to buff his ego in the next update.
As Nicholas Moran, A.K.A. the Chieftan points out, the reason you take five Shermans to kill one Tiger is that a tank platoon is five Shermans. It doesn't matter what you go up against be it a Tiger, a machine gun nest, or whatever you're going to take the whole platoon or for bigger targets a company.
Right. It's not that it takes five Shermans to kill a Tiger. It's that you take five Shermans when you're going to kill a Tiger.
Garrison
Donor
Indeed, but somehow this display of common sense was transposed into the idea that the German tanks were vastly superior to the Allied tanks. The Panther was a good tank, so long as it didn't have to drives to far, turn too sharply, the fuel system didn't leak and the final drive didn't break...
Yet another excellent reason for attacking the panther from the flank is that it will try to turn towards the attacker. The resulting mechanical failure, fuel leak and fire will finish the job started by the first shot.
I blame Call of Duty. So many people seem to think that WW2 was one on one. Another example is that the US infantryman who has just ejected the clip from his M1 Garand is in dire danger of having a German pop up and shoot him. Newsflash people, GIs traveled in squads.
Garrison
Donor
Pretty bad, and apparently it wasn't supposed to go in reverse on a slope, it was also not supposed to turn when going up a slope, which would be interesting on a curving road.
I always love this... Bizarre, fantastical arrogance that the designers of military equipment seem prone to, where they seem to believe that can divine and dictate how exactly a piece of military equipment can be used, gauranteeing that it will never be asked or be called upon to be used in anything but the prescribed fashion.
Well, aside from the fact that the "not supposed to do anything on a slope"-thing is not proven, the designers were not arrogant here.
There is a lot of complexity and nuance to the low reliability of the Panther:
- Tiger's very capable final drives, steering mechanism and transmission could not be replicated on Panther which was meant to be the main tank produced in huge numbers, which led to the designers being forced to use simplified elements. The transmission was not really affected here and remained reliable (and was one of the most reliable parts of the tank). The steering system however had to have only one fixed turning radius per gear as a result, which means you need an experienced driver to properly anticipate the turn and the gear he needs to use. Except that the Germans never managed to train the tank and maintenance crews enough, which worsened the driving difficulty. The Russians commended the transmission. There are nuances because other than the steering difficulty, the Panther was actually "easy" to drive thanks to the very low lever effort required (the lowest in WW2) and the hydraulic driving assistance.
- The final drives were bad until the September/October 1944 fix, after which they became merely problematic. This was compounded by poor training, but at least it was very easy to access and repair this part. It wasn't impossible to get the final drives right even if Tiger's type was not available (since the T-54 and M26 used the same tech), but the final weight of the VK 30.02 was not properly anticipated and the drives were thus underscaled for the problem (same problem as Panzer 4's drives which were the same size of the T-26's).
- Doing things on slopes specifically wasn't really an issue, but there are reports of detracking in mud and turret traverse issues on slopes, which was a very common problem for WW2 tanks and not specific to Panther.
- The disastrous situation of the Germans when it comes to training, maintenance, recovery, industry and material shortages inherently put any German tank at a disadvantage compared to those of the Allies where all external factors were favorable.
- The engine itself was moderately reliable after its power was brought back to more normal levels in November 1943 (they pushed it too far), but in general rubber shortages meant that it was very hard to make durable seals so it was always bound to have problems. The Russians liked the lubrication however.
- The bias caused by looking at the rushed production and use of the Panther D and some particularly bad reports, as opposed to also accounting for the more mature design in 1944 and even moreso in late 44. You could have tanks with very bad reliability, but also tanks that required almost no repairs even after 4200km of operation. As usual, the quality of the crews and maintenance is key. The point about the rushed Panther D is important since this also happened on the Allied side.
- The current counterjerk/anti-wehraboo narrative which leads people to look more at the negatives of German tanks and the positive of Allied tanks. Of course this was fed by the earlier wave of wehrabooism.
As always, there were positive and negative aspects to every tank made in WW2, and external factors which can help explain why the design couldn't always be entirely fixed (as opposed to cases where the technical problem could be fixed).
I recall reading of a late war action where Panthers got shot up by some British tankers
Rather than reverse the British troopers were amazed when the panther crews started turning around rather than backing up with obvious consequences of getting flank and rear shots
Green crews and possibly a slope might explain why?
Rather than reverse the British troopers were amazed when the panther crews started turning around rather than backing up with obvious consequences of getting flank and rear shots
Green crews and possibly a slope might explain why?