However, by the time of Operation Jasper those Greek troops who had chosen not to be repatriated after the formal surrender of Greece...
????

Greece never surrendered ITTL; the Greek government still holds Crete. No Greek soldiers would be repatriated to the mainland.

Perhaps this is an editing error, including text from a version in which the Greek government surrendered like Belgium in 1940.

Also - IMO, if the Allies hold Crete, operations against the Dodecanese would start with invasion of Karpathos and Kasos, just east of Crete. The garrisons would be much smaller than in Rhodes, and the distance from Crete short enough that the operation could be staged as shore-to-shore. Also it could easily be covered by land-based air from Crete. There would be an immediate benefit, as Allied shipping could now freely pass around the eastern end of Crete to Heraklion, while Allied warships could enter the Aegean Sea.
 
????

Greece never surrendered ITTL; the Greek government still holds Crete. No Greek soldiers would be repatriated to the mainland.

Perhaps this is an editing error, including text from a version in which the Greek government surrendered like Belgium in 1940.

Also - IMO, if the Allies hold Crete, operations against the Dodecanese would start with invasion of Karpathos and Kasos, just east of Crete. The garrisons would be much smaller than in Rhodes, and the distance from Crete short enough that the operation could be staged as shore-to-shore. Also it could easily be covered by land-based air from Crete. There would be an immediate benefit, as Allied shipping could now freely pass around the eastern end of Crete to Heraklion, while Allied warships could enter the Aegean Sea.
ITTL with Crete holding, would Karpathos and Kasos have been taken over?
Otherwise, it makes a whole heap of sense to start close to Crete before moving on to Rhodes. There may also be value in taking the smaller islands around Rhodes beforehand if full secrecy is not essential to taking Rhodes.
 

Garrison

Donor
????

Greece never surrendered ITTL; the Greek government still holds Crete. No Greek soldiers would be repatriated to the mainland.

Perhaps this is an editing error, including text from a version in which the Greek government surrendered like Belgium in 1940.

Also - IMO, if the Allies hold Crete, operations against the Dodecanese would start with invasion of Karpathos and Kasos, just east of Crete. The garrisons would be much smaller than in Rhodes, and the distance from Crete short enough that the operation could be staged as shore-to-shore. Also it could easily be covered by land-based air from Crete. There would be an immediate benefit, as Allied shipping could now freely pass around the eastern end of Crete to Heraklion, while Allied warships could enter the Aegean Sea.
I will edit that to say occupied, but there would have been some troops returned to Greece, but I will edit that slightly as well.

ITTL with Crete holding, would Karpathos and Kasos have been taken over?
Otherwise, it makes a whole heap of sense to start close to Crete before moving on to Rhodes. There may also be value in taking the smaller islands around Rhodes beforehand if full secrecy is not essential to taking Rhodes.
Also going to make a small revision for this as well.

As always thanks for the feedback.
 
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Garrison

Donor
So, two small edits added:

troops who had to be repatriated to Italy because of injury, illness and disciplinary offences, simply not being replaced. Even maintaining this number had required the withdrawal of units from several of the smaller islands of the Dodecanese, and as a result many of these had been quietly picked off by British and Greek forces operating out of Crete, in or two cases these actions amounted to little more than Allied troops simply coming ashore and accepting the surrender of the occupying forces
The troops who would face the dispirited Italian defenders had suffered their own dark days during the fall of Greece, stripped of weapons and equipment and forced to abandon their homes and family as they were evacuated to Crete. However, by the time of Operation Jasper those Greek troops who had chosen to remain in uniform and continue fighting after the occupation of their homeland
 
I will edit that to say occupied, but there would have been some troops returned to Greece, but I will edit that slightly as well.
I cannot see any way any Greek soldiers would be returned to the mainland. The Greek government exists and is at war with Germany and Italy (and Bulgaria). All Greek soldiers would be bound by their conditions of enlistment (or conscription) to serve until the end of hostilities. Any soldier leaving his assigned post to go to the mainland would be guilty of desertion and possibly treason.
 
I cannot see any way any Greek soldiers would be returned to the mainland. The Greek government exists and is at war with Germany and Italy (and Bulgaria). All Greek soldiers would be bound by their conditions of enlistment (or conscription) to serve until the end of hostilities. Any soldier leaving his assigned post to go to the mainland would be guilty of desertion and possibly treason.
only reason I see some returning is if they were ordered to go back to start resistance activities in the name of the government to fight off the communist threat
 

Garrison

Donor
I cannot see any way any Greek soldiers would be returned to the mainland. The Greek government exists and is at war with Germany and Italy (and Bulgaria). All Greek soldiers would be bound by their conditions of enlistment (or conscription) to serve until the end of hostilities. Any soldier leaving his assigned post to go to the mainland would be guilty of desertion and possibly treason.
only reason I see some returning is if they were ordered to go back to start resistance activities in the name of the government to fight off the communist threat
I've cut the reference altogether, it has no real relevance to the narrative.
 
June 12th – June 28th 1943 – Rhodes - Operation Jasper - Part II – No Mere Diversion

Garrison

Donor
June 12th – June 28th 1943 – Rhodes - Operation Jasper - Part II – No Mere Diversion

Rhodes was subjected to a series of air raids conducted by light and medium bombers during the two weeks before the invasion, including attacks on the primary airfield on the island which had served to carry out patrols and reconnaissance over the Dodecanese islands. Much like their army counterparts the Regia Aeronautica forces on the island were suffering shortages of supplies and spare parts. This meant thar while the bombing raids destroyed around twenty aircraft on the ground at least a third of these were already inoperative and being cannibalized for parts. Of the operational aircraft eleven were lost in exchange for six RAF bombers and by the time of the landing the Italian effectively had no air cover. This sudden flurry of activity did not go unnoticed by the commander of the Rhodes garrison, but the anxious reports sent to Rome were greeted with an indifferent response. The reasoning in Rome was that if the Allies were making a show of targeting Rhodes, then it was almost certainly an attempt to divert attention from an offensive elsewhere, meaning that dispatching reinforcements was out of the question, that Rhodes might a serious target as well as being a diversion was not something that seemed to occur to anyone in the Italian General Staff .Orders were nonetheless sent out to prepare other troops in the Dodecanese to be concentrated for dispatch in the event there was some sort of actual attack on the island. These orders were however not given any particular urgency, and what troops were left in the rest of the Dodecanese were scattered and would require a great deal more time and resources to assemble than was readily available and thus little was accomplished prior to the Greeks landing at Ialysos [1].

The landing began on the 12th of June with the opening of the bombardment of what shore defences there were in the vicinity of Ialysos by the naval task forces thirty minutes before dawn. The first troops went ashore forty-five minutes later accompanied by fresh air attacks and met little resistance. The defensive positions consisted of sandbagged machine gun nests, and some dug in artillery pieces behind them, all strung together with layers of rusty barbed wire and some improvised anti-tank obstacles that had been added rather late in the day. The primary purpose of most of these defences had been to prevent small scale raiding parties coming ashore, not a full-scale amphibious landing. The hastily improvised anti-tank obstacles proved ineffective even against the light Stuart tanks, being either brushed aside or being of such poor quality that they could be pulled up by supporting Greek infantry. The major obstacle the first wave faced were a series of small minefields scattered across the landing beaches that claimed a few casualties. Once the troops were able to move beyond these however, they were able to rapidly secure the beachhead and push further inland [2].

Taken completely by surprise most of the troops who had been assigned to man the beach defences were asleep when the attack began and were rudely awakened by the guns of Ajax and the rest of the naval force, those who survived to be awakened that is. The response of the Italians was thus laggardly to say the least, indeed in one location by the time the Italian troops were finally ready to move out of their barracks and make for the beaches they came under immediate fire from a Stuart that had raced forward. With the barracks itself providing little protection from the 37mm main gun of the tank most of the troops made a break for it and scattered, twenty-seven of them though chose to surrender with another dozen killed or wounded. The crew of the tank all received commendations for their action, which rather illustrated the pattern of complete confusion on the part of the Italians that dominated the fighting during the morning of the 12th. The Italian troops who did reach their positions fared little better. In the face of determined Greek troops, many of whom had spent the past two years hoping for the chance to avenge the humiliation of 1941, the Italian line swiftly crumbled and what followed was a rout, not a retreat. By midday the second and third wave of troops were ashore, and the Greeks were regrouping to make their thrust towards the town of Ialysos itself, well ahead of even their most optimistic estimates [3].

The reports reaching the commander of the Italian forces on Rhodes, Admiral Inigo Campioni, were inevitably panicked, confusing and contradictory, including spurious reports of large airborne landings and a further amphibious force heading for the south of the island, with this latter almost certainly being a sighting of fishing vessels going about their normal business. Given the circumstances the commander can be forgiven for concluding that the genuine reports of the scale of the landing at Ialysos were grossly exaggerated and what he was facing was a commando raid by several hundred troops at most. In response he organized a detachment of less than four hundred men to counterattack the Greeks and either overwhelm them or force them to evacuate. What followed was an encounter battle as this force, unaware of how rapidly the Greeks had advanced, ran into the leading elements of the invasion force at about 15:15 hours. Initially the Greeks were outnumbered, and things seemed to be going in favour of the Italians, but the Italian troops were not well supplied with ammunition and the shock of running into the Greeks led to a degree of command paralysis. The opportunity to score a victory had passed by 16:30 as the Greeks facing the Italians had been reinforced and further units had moved up on the flanks of the Italians. By the time the Italians realized their predicament it was already too late, they were completely encircled and were forced to surrender just after 19:30 hours, with Greek forces already taking control of Ialysos port [4].

Finally realizing the true scale of the attacking force Campioni now sought to concentrate his remaining forces, easier said than done as carrier air attacks and local sabotage meant that telephone communications were crippled, and some units were out of radio contact and still unaware an invasion was underway. Pushing north the Greeks reached Rhodes town on the 15th and halted before the town to regroup and prepare for a possible assault, though they were hoping to spare the town. Shortly after dawn on the 16th of June a delegation from the Greeks approached the town under a flag of truce and were escorted to the commander of the garrison. The written terms were simply enough, insisting that the Italian troops laid down their arms and promising medical assistance for the wounded and everything else that would be expected under the rules of war. Reports of the conversation between the delegation and the Italian officers present paint a different picture. According to the Italian accounts, hotly disputed by Greek historians, the occupying force was warned in no uncertain terms that they would face harsh consequences if they chose to fight street by street for the town, with the inevitable civilian casualties. The Italians did not agree a surrender and the post war accounts from Campioni denied that his actions were influenced by any Greek threats. Nonetheless he ordered a phased withdrawal from the town, falling back towards the east with a series of small holding actions staged in Rhodes to allow for an orderly retreat. The strategic rationale put forward for this decision was that allowing the Italian forces to be surrounded in the town would have brought about the swift collapse of the defence of the island, whereas falling back offered the prospect of retaining mobility and holding out for reinforcements [5].

Whether one accepts this reasoning or not the plan required a degree of co-ordination and discipline that eluded the Italians. Some elements withdrew well ahead of schedule, meaning that others who held as ordered were flanked and bypassed. In some cases, troops made a run for it and scattered, taking days to reconstitute. The troops assigned to sabotage the port facilities fared particularly badly. No preparations had been made prior to the landings to put the port out of action and lacking demolition explosives or tool the sabotage effort amounted to no more than setting fire to some buildings before the Italians beat a hasty retreat. By nightfall the fires had long since been put out and the essentially intact port was in Greek hands, with a few scattered Italian units still fighting on the eastern edge of the town. On the morning of the 18th the divisional reserves began to disembark in Rhodes town and the Greek flag was officially raised as the last Italian troops withdrew or surrendered. In addition to infantry reinforcements the bulk of 4th Independent Armoured also arrived that day, along with jeeps and trucks to provide greater mobility for the foot soldiers.

The decision to withdraw from the town may not have ended the Italian defence of Rhodes, but it was a mortal blow. Italian losses came to over a thousand men, with some seven hundred of them having surrendered rather than being killed or wounded. The prisoners were treated according to the usual standard of the Allies and if their conditions were hardly comfortable, they were certainly better than those faced by the comrades still fighting, especially when they were swiftly shipped off to Crete and then on to Egypt and finally Britain to be interned. The remaining Italian forces on the island now could only hope for either reinforcement or evacuation, and both would prove a forlorn hope [6].

[1] The Italians are of course correct that the Allies are trying to draw attention away from elsewhere, they have simply underestimated the scale of the resources the Allies are willing to commit to a diversion and the determination of the Greeks.

[2] Fortress Europa this is not.

[3] Troops who have basically had little to do since 1941 up against determined attackers, never going to end well.

[4] The Italians are expending their forces in a piecemeal fashion, which is good news for the Greeks.

[5] It may well be an excuse, or Campioni was simply unwilling to see the town wrecked in a futile battle.

[6] The battle for Rhodes isn’t over yet, though defeat is staring the Italians in the face.
 
The Greeks at least now covered themselves in some glory, now they just need to sing it to high heaven all over the peninsula.
 
The Turks might be a bit upset as I think they still maintained a claim on the island.
But then again staying neutral is as much a choice as getting involved is, and I can't see anyone in Greece being willing to hand the newly liberated islands to anyone else.
 

Garrison

Donor
The Turks might be a bit upset as I think they still maintained a claim on the island.
But then again staying neutral is as much a choice as getting involved is, and I can't see anyone in Greece being willing to hand the newly liberated islands to anyone else.
And I can't see the Turks pressing any claims, given that they have remained stoically neutral throughout the war.
 
June 12th – June 28th 1943 – Rhodes - Operation Jasper - Part III – The Liberation of Rhodes

Garrison

Donor
June 12th – June 28th 1943 – Rhodes - Operation Jasper - Part III – The Liberation of Rhodes

Any hopes the Italians might have had about reinforcements to replace their losses were swiftly dashed. It took the High Command in Rome until the 14th to even order the gathering of a relief force for dispatch to Rhodes and it didn’t set out until the 19th. When word of the force being dispatched to their aid reached Admiral Campioni [1], he was far from pleased. What was on its way was less than five hundred men packed onto commandeered fishing boats and a single small formerly Greek freighter, now renamed Cavalluccio Marino carrying ammunition, supplies and fuel for the troops defending Rhodes, though by this point the Italian forces on Rhodes had no mechanized transportation and the last operational Regia Aeronautica aircraft had been evacuated. The escort provided for this convoy was also completely inadequate, consisting of a pair of MAS boats, numbers 43 and 77, that had been patrolling the area and had the misfortune to be available when the orders went out. Admiral Campioni not unreasonably concluded that there was little point in waiting on this convoy and began falling back to what he hoped was a more defensible line, a decision that was clearly vindicated as things went badly for the convoy from the start. The submarine HMS Usk along with several others had been assigned to watch the waters around Rhodes and early on the 20th she spotted the convoy [2]. The Cavalluccio Marino was in an exposed spot on the outside of the cluster of fishing vessels rather being in the centre of the convoy and the two MAS boats were positioned at the front and rear of the convoy. They were watching for aircraft and surface ships, since they were poorly equipped for anti-submarine warfare. Usk fired a spread of torpedoes, and one struck the Cavalluccio Marino, which was more than enough to inflict fatal damage and she sank in under ten minutes. MAS 43 tried to chase Usk, essentially trying to bluff her into diving and fleeing, while MAS 77 picked up survivors from the freighter. Unfortunately for the Italians, the captain of Usk called MAS 43’s bluff and continued to shadow the convoy, only briefly breaking off to send a report on its speed and course. There being no other targets worth expending torpedoes on the Usk was merely a spectator as the remains of the convoy chose to carry on to Rhodes, though the commander had to veto the over eager suggestion from his first officer that they surface and engage with their deck gun! Around 1300 hours the convoy was intercepted by a trio of Bristol Beaufighters who conducted an attack with rockets and cannon that sank one fishing boat and badly damaged MAS 77, which had to be abandoned as its engine was beyond repair. Despite being expected to sink MAS 77 somehow stayed afloat and was found battered and broken on the coast of Rhodes on the 23rd of June, by which time the surviving fishing boats of the convoy were also in Greek hands [3].

The convoy was supposed to rendezvous with the Italian forces and offload at a small cove which they reached on the 22nd of June, having waited for morning to make their approach. Even if the Cavalluccio Marino had survived offloading it would have been a panful task, assuming any of the troops waiting there had been willing or able to assist in the landing. Instead as the survivors of the relief force began to offload in the absence of any communication with their comrades on the Island the convoy came under artillery fire from the Greek troops had been dispatched to the cove in response to reports of the convoy’s movements, and the nearest Italian troops were now more than twelve kilometres further south and incapable of offering any support. The shelling created panic among the soldiers already making for shore in small boats, though none of the boats were actually hit by the shells but several capsized, either owing to near misses from the shells or the efforts of the men aboard them to turn back. Several hits did land on the fishing boats and one on MAS 43. This hit did little damage but did persuade the crew of the MAS boat to withdraw, leaving the fishing boats to their own devices. One of them boats was set on fire by a shell from the light artillery pieces and the boats which chose to make for shore came under mortar and machine gun fire. The fire from the hidden defenders stopped almost as swiftly as it had started, and a voice called out in halting Italian for the soldiers on the beach to surrender. Given that artillery shells were still falling on the fishing boats, where both the troops and the crews were trying to abandon ship or flee, the Italians had little choice and the white flag was soon raised, with the inevitable jokes from the Greek troops afterwards about how it was probably the first thing the Italians had packed when preparing for the landing. The truth was that having been sent into ambush with no support there was little else the Italian troops could have done except die in a futile effort to break out, and the jokes aside the Greeks were deeply relieved that Italians has shown common sense [4].

The Italian garrison forces had no idea about the fate of their reinforcements until the Greeks started broadcasting radio messages stating that they had destroyed the relief force at sea, a gross exaggeration intended to undermine Italian morale and reinforced by having Italian prisoners calling on their comrades to lay down their arms. Trying to destroy the morale of the Italian garrison forces was a futile effort as it was already at rock bottom by the 22nd. Efforts to establish a new defensive line had been thwarted by the presence of the Stuarts and Crusaders of 4th Independent Armoured. The Stuarts were a constant nuisance, outflanking and harassing the Italian infantry as they tried to redeploy and where they did manage to dig in the Crusaders rolled up and blasted their improvised defences with 6pdr HE rounds. The Crusaders had received applique armour to upgrade their protection, though this had reduced the tank’s top speed, which was not really a consideration on Rhodes. The Italians were limited to the speed of marching feet, and the occasional animal drawn cart, while lacking any weapon that posed a serious threat to the Greek armour. Some tank traps were prepared to try and disable and destroy the advancing tanks, but all the Greek losses can be attributed to accidents or wear and tear rather than enemy action. The major impediment to the operation of their armour was the difficulties involved in getting fuel and ammunition forward to keep them running [5].

Admiral Campioni found himself caught between two increasingly irreconcilable objectives. One was to keep in contact with the coast, in the hope that some further relief force, or evacuation effort might arrive. By this point he was out of communication with his superiors and unaware that the situation on Rhodes had been written off after a report from MAS 43 was relayed to Rome. Campioni’s other objective was to avoid his forces being outflanked to the west and south, which allow would Greek troops to attack the rear of his position. By the 26th the eastern most elements of the Italian force had been pushed back all the way to the coast, leaving the entire force trapped in a roughly semi-circular perimeter close to Fatou. At this point the Italians were down to about nineteen hundred effectives, still possessing a moderate supply of ammunition for their rifles, but out of almost everything else. A small squadron of Greek flagged fighter bombers had been deployed to a forward airfield on Crete and these now went in action and began a series of attacks against the Italian positions throughout the 26th and 27th, accompanied by a softening up effort by light artillery and tank guns. On the afternoon of the 27th the inevitable happened and a group of Italian officers were allowed through the lines to offer the surrender of the Italian troops, Campioni having being injured during a bombing raid, which had forced to accept the necessity of surrender. The formalities were swiftly completed, and the Italians laid down their arms at 2000 hours, with Rhodes officially liberated on the 28th of June 1943 [6].

For the Greek government the liberation of Rhodes achieved all their goals. It showed their troops were willing and able to take the battle to the Axis and it bolstered their credibility with the population on mainland Greece as radio broadcasts made great play of Operation Jasper. In a somewhat darker turn of events Rhodes also offered a base of operations from which the Greek government could carry out operations on the mainland with less scrutiny from the British and the Americans, and some of these operations were directed against the Communist partisans, which created an enmity that only grew as the war drew to a close [7].

For the Italian High Command, the reaction was one of anger, not at the defending troops but because they had been advocating pulling back from the Peloponnese for months, recognizing that the islands were far too difficult to defend with the resources currently available and they had suffered a humiliating and unnecessary defeat because of the insistence on defending every corner of Mussolini’s imperial ambitions. That there had been no withdrawals came back to the desire of Count Ciano and his ministers to appease the Germans, and they wished to be seen to falling in line with Hitler’s policy of holding every inch of ground, regardless of strategic reality. The loss of Rhodes only served to fuel further discontent in Rome, and in cities such as Turin where it was threatening to reach boiling point and the long suppressed Communist movement was coming to the fore in taking advantage of the rising tide of anger. Hitler was certainly concerned by events on Rhodes, fearing that it might indeed be a prelude to a full-scale assault on Greece and the rest of the Balkans. To the dismay of the General Staff he ordered that Greece be reinforced with more Heer troops, events in Rhodes having once again demonstrated how unreliable that in fact the Italians were, indeed he was beginning to voice the opinion that he had been deceived previously, that the Italians were just another breed of mongrel sub humans, not the inheritors of Imperial Rome, and should be treated accordingly. The General Staff shrugged off this ominous development and prevaricated over carrying out Hitler’s orders to redeploy troops, delaying long enough that the orders were rescinded when Operation Millennium was launched, not that this brought much cheer to von Kleist and his staff given the massive setbacks Germany was to suffer in Operation Citadel and on D-Day [8].

[1] OTL Admiral Campioni was in command on Crete during the battle with the Wehrmacht when Italy surrendered in 1943 and was executed by the Italian puppet government in 1944. Suffice to say he will live a rather longer life as an Allied POW than as German one.

[2] Like Campioni HMS Usk has a rather better fate here as IOTL she was sunk in April 1941.

[3] The convoy is a classic example of needing to be seen to do something, regardless of whether it makes sense.

[4] So the relief effort ends as a bit of a farce rather than a tragedy.

[5] Neither tank is really a first line machine at this point, but more than good enough to cope with conditions on Rhodes. By the next time the Greeks mount a significant operation they will have upgraded somewhat.

[6] So yes Campioni was wounded and will walk with a limp for the rest of his life, which will last for several more decades ITTL.

[7] Shifting political balances in the ranks of the Allies are going to make restraining communist expansion a political/strategic goal as we enter the final phase of the war in Europe.

[8] Both coming very soon.
 
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