Much harsher Treaty of Tilsit for Prussia


The Cons are that Russia's strength for the last two hundred years had depended on a weak Poland;

That's not necessarily a con. I think Napoleon was well aware of the fact that Russia and Britain were specific problems. Considering the Austrians, as OTL showed, it was rather easy for him to march into Vienna and get some terms. Same with Prussia. Britain and Russia, however, were different from geographical reasons. In particular, he couldn't trust the Russians in the same way as he "trusted" the Prussians or Austrians. In their case, he know he could enforce his will. With Russia, he couldn't be sure. Therefore, a loyal buffer state on the frontier of Napoleonic Europe makes sense. And if somehow Russia could be weakened by this, I'd say it's a por.

that Austria and Prussia had colluded in destroying Poland a decade previously and consequently had no real interest in it returning.

That's true. However, a much harsher treaty of Tilsit might include the end of Prussia. Now Austria could exchange Silesia for those areas it gained in the third partition of Poland. That would in fact be a good bargain. But you're right with Austria: the duchy of Warsaw will have a viable claim for the whole of Galicia. And since Italy, Bavaria and Saxony are allied with Napoleon, it will be difficult the enact a further exchange of territories.

Would Austria accept to give up everything they gained in the polish partitions against Silesia, minor territorial corrections in the Alpes and ITaly and French help in a war against the Turks to get Bosnia and Serbia?
 
That's not necessarily a con.

It's not, however it never worked properly in OTL; the Grand Duchy could never be described as even approaching a position where it was a counter-balance to Russia or even Austria. So it was obviously a very ambitious undertaking, and one which didn't pay off in OTL. The obvious suspicion is that it would have been much better for Napoleon had a Polish state not been revived. IIRC, Warsaw did contribute an awful lot of manpower though, particularly for 1812, so perhaps there was some method to the madness.

Would Austria accept to give up everything they gained in the polish partitions against Silesia, minor territorial corrections in the Alpes and ITaly and French help in a war against the Turks to get Bosnia and Serbia?

Probably. I'm not sure Austria was that interested in a war with the Turks at this point though, or the French would consider it a useful trade-off. (Post-Egypt, IIRC the relationship there was pretty good)
 
I just had another idea. Since Napoleon is usually busy trying to provoke a war, he could also give Silesia (along with Brandenburg) to Westphalia which is ruled by his brother Jerome and put his Westphalian puppet forward as the dominant north German state (albeit still tied to France of course). What would that do for him?
 
Austria was allied to France for the entire period from 1756 until the revolution; an alliance which directly produced one political outcome which you yourself touch on; the marriage of an Austrian princess to the then dauphin. It was only trotted out once for the fairly obvious reason that there was only one major European war in that period. It still held in peacetime though.

Yep. Austria and France;communicaed quite a bit during the Revolution, and France played a role in mediating the War of Bavarian Succession and preventing escelation.

This alliance largely came about precisely because of the matter at hand here; because Austria wanted to regain Silesia, and viewed France as the best partner in pursuing that. Austria still wanted to regain Silesia here. France had the power to do that under Napoleon, and doing it would have delighted the Austrians and made them allies.

Did Austria really want Silesia? I have never heard this was a plan a the time; usually they seemed to focus on gaining, say, Bavaria, or expansion in the Southeast.

Yes; an enemy in wars almost always directly provoked by Napoleon’s excessive demands on Austria, not by some sort of dogged Austrian ideological opposition, as you seem to believe.

I dunno. What was the motivation leading up to Austerlitz?


This is simply untrue; Metternich was perfectly prepared to accept French hegemony but Napoleon’s Hitler-like inability to moderate his foreign policy made such a policy impossible. See Paul Schroeder for details. It was never a real alliance, but then neither was any other great power relationship. Napoleon certainly had a better hand with the Austrians than with any of the rest.

I think this is unfair. Napoleon could have broken up Austria in 1809, and yet he didn't. Winners take territory in war.
 
Did Austria really want Silesia?

In the Seven Years War? Oh, hell yes. In fact, the whole thing was started largely because Frederick thought he better get his tuppence-worth in first before Austria did.

I dunno. What was the motivation leading up to Austerlitz?

I forget the exact diplomatic lead-up, but as I recall, Napoleon made large demands in Italy and Germany which basically made the Austrians conclude that war was preferable.

I think this is unfair. Napoleon could have broken up Austria in 1809, and yet he didn't. Winners take territory in war.

I suspect he didn't break-up Austria in 1809 because it would have been simply too ambitious a move to do so at that point. (can you imagine the manpower involved in holding down Spain and the Habsburg domains and everything else?)

And don't say it wouldn't have been the same as Spain, because look at what happened in the Tirol. And they were only flogged off to Bavaria, not one of Napoleon's relatives.
 
Stevep

As a Yank who spent his time studying the Louisiana Purchase and War of 1812, I'm very curious. What are the Pros and Cons of Nap building up a Greater Poland (As Czar Alexander II tried with Bulgaria) to create a solid eastern ally? This in line with chomping off pieces of Prussia to the central German states and Austria? After all, it's not like he can really trust the Russians and Austrians, is it?

usertron2020

The pro would have been huge Polish support. However he had that anyway for the founding of the Grand Duchy.

The big cons would have been the permanent alienation of the three neighbours, Prussia, Austria and Russia. All of whom had gained from the earlier partitions and while a fair amount of that land was regained by the Grand Duchy a lot wasn't. So either it would mean taking a lot of land off the three neighbours, including a lot of non-Poles, which would seriously piss them off. Or just changing the name [to a kingdom of Poland] and possibly taking a little land. Which would have upset the Poles because they would have wanted a lot of the disputed territories and the neighbours because they would fear that sooner or later Napoleon would have given Poland it.

Hence i think he realised that it was too big a can of worms for him to open. One TL I was playing with once, after a modified 1809 in which Austria fought harder and got a grimmer peace he formally restores Poland as a kingdom in part to trigger war with Prussia and Russia because he knows ones' coming and he wants to have it starting when he's ready and with them attacking. You might get something like that because it's in his short term interests but probably about the only likely way it might happen. [On the other hand he's the man who decided to play pass the parcel with the Spanish crown, giving it to his brother - so he might do something as stupid in the east.;)]

Hope that helps. Basically Poland was a useful ally but not that valuable to be worth upsetting so many others. Even if Prussia was virtually totally dismantled there would be Austria and Russia especially and possibly other Germans worried about land with mixed population passing to Poland - although national feeling wasn't anything like its strength in modern times.

Steve
 
the Grand Duchy could never be described as even approaching a position where it was a counter-balance to Russia or even Austria. So it was obviously a very ambitious undertaking, and one which didn't pay off in OTL.

Very true. And I wonder whether Napoleon actually knew that - after all, he reastablished some sizeable duchy, and increased it later on, but never put a relative on the throne...

But harsher Tilsit might result in West- and East-Prussia becoming part of the Duchy. Furthermore, exchanging Silesia against some/all territorial gains of the Polish partitions could increase the duchy even further. Napoleon could essentially recreate the Polish commonwealth - besides those lands which belonged to Russia but which had non-Polish majorities anyway. That would not make a great power, but a serious ally in the region.
 
Austria was allied to France for the entire period from 1756 until the revolution; an alliance which directly produced one political outcome which you yourself touch on; the marriage of an Austrian princess to the then dauphin. It was only trotted out once for the fairly obvious reason that there was only one major European war in that period. It still held in peacetime though.

This alliance largely came about precisely because of the matter at hand here; because Austria wanted to regain Silesia, and viewed France as the best partner in pursuing that. Austria still wanted to regain Silesia here. France had the power to do that under Napoleon, and doing it would have delighted the Austrians and made them allies.

There was an alignment of interest here while lasted to a degree during the period. However not aware of any cases where the Austrians supported the French during the AWI or France supported Austria during its clashes with Prussia later on.

Simply because Austria was allied to royalist France and had a member of its own royal family killed by the republicans, was an important reason why it was a bitter early enemy of republican and then imperial France.

Austria did want Silesia back but it also had other concerns. As I said above I did read that Austria turned down Silesia because of the wider circumstances. Not saying it is accurate but it was a mention in a history book I read. However it could be that leadership in Vienna had a wider view of their empire's needs.


Yes; an enemy in wars almost always directly provoked by Napoleon’s excessive demands on Austria, not by some sort of dogged Austrian ideological opposition, as you seem to believe.

I never said that it was a purely ideological opposition, although the killing of Marie and the conservative nature of the Austria regime played at least a part. However also Austria was the established power in Italy, the southern Netherlands and much of Germany so the two inevitably clashed. France won those battles so it gained lands that Austria wanted back. [As well as the matters of prestige and revenge]. Actually I largely agree about your comments about Napoleon, especially in his later days, but even if he had been more far-sighted it would still have been a rocky relationship.

More to the point what I objected to, several posts back, was you saying that Austria had been less opposed to Napoleon. As I have pointed out it was by far his most persistent opponent on the continent, for whatever reason.


This is simply untrue; Metternich was perfectly prepared to accept French hegemony but Napoleon’s Hitler-like inability to moderate his foreign policy made such a policy impossible. See Paul Schroeder for details. It was never a real alliance, but then neither was any other great power relationship. Napoleon certainly had a better hand with the Austrians than with any of the rest.

I agree about Napoleon's character flaws. As I said above that's not that relevant to the point we started discussing. He probably had a bit better relation with Austria after the Marie-Louise marriage simply because there was a blood link.

Napoleon only had one policy - provoke his opponents into war, smash them, grab bits of territory, repeat. This did not make for a lasting settlement. If he had been a bit less stupid, he could easily have made one with Austria, particularly through the demise of Prussia at Tilsit.

Possibly, although it was Russia that was defeated at Tilsilt? Or did you mean that formally ended the war that had started with his attack on Prussia?

An open ally for five years? Uh? When? I hope you don’t mean after Tilsit, because that relationship collapsed almost as soon as the ink was dry.

The two were allied for several years, agreeing on a number of matters. Unlike with the other powers there was at least some degree of consent to this as Russia, while defeated on the field of battle had not been totally crushed like Napoleon's other continental opponents.

The Cons are that Russia's strength for the last two hundred years had depended on a weak Poland; that Austria and Prussia had colluded in destroying Poland a decade previously and consequently had no real interest in it returning.

The Pros are, well, ambiguous.


Pretty much
 
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