What is possibly the most powerful that Russia can be in our present world? Like we still have Cold War, Communism and it's collapse, but what possible way we could have starting from the Yeltsin presidency to make as Russia realistic powerful as it can be. By "powerful" I don't mean by just militarily, but by economically, culturally, technologically, quality of life, etc. What would it's GDP be? How would it fare in world affairs? I mean c'mon, we're talking about the largest country in the world with so many resources that is sadly in OTL is mostly exploited by the corrupt elite. So how would it look like in this alternate world?
Most possible powerful post-Soviet Russia?
- Thread starter Shadow1080
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Russia somehow manages to emulate Czechia's successful post-Communist economic transition, instead of the OTL version, with the Oligarchs everywhere?
Unfortunately, most of the corrupt elites were former Communist Party elites. Their careers depended on scratching backs in a very exclusive club. Convincing them to go back to school and eventually become small business owners is not very realistic, unless paradoxically the state forces them to in a long, costly program. Any central government capable of preventing rapid liberalization and embarking on an anti-corruption campaign would find itself thrown out before long unless it engaged in some pretty large-scale purges. You'd have to have a much earlier PoD, perhaps going back before the Russian Revolution if you want to eliminate the oligarchs.
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Or just have Yeltsin be a better leader and have him kick out or jail all oligarchs. Does that make sense?
WILDGEESE
Gone Fishin'
The main block to this is it's terrible demograhic problem as a hangover from WWII. If you can somehow avoid this 'triple echo' you could easily get a larger Russian population with it's greater military and industrial capacity.
Ref: "Russia's population problem": YouTUBE
Not so much.. How about make the oligarchs honest for the good of the nation. Allow them to be rich, but it needs to be within reason. Disband private armies.. Crack down on mafia..
Get the people jobs.. Don't dis those on pension from soviet times.
Go before the UN.. take out TV ads.. Get the attention of the west to help. Hey we are not the enemy.. We want to help.
Get yeltsin who was a symbol for a bit then a different symbol.. To quietly retire.
This is just the tip
. Lots of other stuff need to happen
But to make Russia strong - Russia needs to invest in itself and technology.. Needs to educate the people.. Needs to get the south under control...
Outin was great first time.. Then he decided not to go.
Restored Russian pride.. Gave Russians hope..
Again.. He decided not to leave.. Seems to be a pattern in Russian history. If he would have walked away he would have left Russia a democratic example.. Instead its hail to the new czar in New cloths
That's going to be difficult. Bare minimum, the Baltic States are leaving the USSR unless Russia is planning on occupying them militarily.
I could see Russia keeping Belarus, Armenia and the Central Asian states as republics of the Russian Federation (or whatever it ends up being called ITTL). Maybe Ukraine. Possibly Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well, if not all of Georgia. IDK about Azerbaijan.
That would be a net drain.
The difference between a rich nation and a poor one, is in per-capita wealth not total wealth.
Hollywood doesn't suck up to the PRC, because they are worried that if they don't the PLA will launch an invasion and conquer them with human wave attacks. They do so, to be permitted to release their movies over there and fear the much lower profits if a movie would get banned. Same goes for universities and the donations with plenty of strings attached. Now if China had only 1/10th it's population they'd be a less attractive market, but if they had twice it's population and a much less purchasing power they wouldn't be of interest at all.
Well, from 1991-1993, Russia was going to regress without a doubt, that's going to be an inevitable knock on effect of losing such a huge economic block.
However for a far stronger Russia, the 1993 Constitutional Crisis or the 1996 Elections are your best bet. In 1993 ousting Yeltsin, would have seen Alexander Rutskoy as the President of Russia. Not exactly a stellar president, but far better and more competent than Yeltsin. He had ideas of scaling down the level of privatization and creating a slower process of privatization, which could have very well totally deflected the Russian financial crisis of 1998 if done properly 5 years earlier. As a former military man, he knew the consequences of Chechnya seceding, and about how using brutal tactics would not work. He probably would deal with the Chechens militarily like OTL, but in a more moderate and less brutal manner. At least, we don't want to see Grozny flattened to the ground.
For 1996, your best bet is to get Gennady Zyuganov or Grigory Yavlinsky to win the Elections. Yavlinsky was better in economics than Zyuganov, but Zyuganov was no slouch himself either. A 1996 PoD won't butterfly away the 1998 financial crisis, however it will quieten the effects by a good deal. If we go by 1993 PoD, and putting a better GDP growth of 0.5% to 1.5% as a result of no shock therapy, then the Russian economy in 2008 would be around 30% higher, and if we go by the 1996 PoD, the russian economy would be around 20% higher. A good deal in my opinion.
If Zyuganov's monetary block policies and sterilization policies as well as renationalization of major industries had been conducted, then, the 2008 crisis likely wouldn't have seen the Russian growth rate shrink by -7.8%. Somewhere between 2% to 4% would be more realistic in this scenario.
Also diversify the economy, don't become dependent on oil.............again. Conduct Yavlinsky's 500 Days Program. It would have been the best foundations for a future diversified Russian economy that doesn't depend on just oil. Oil would become still a good portion of the russian gdp, however reducing it by 5% to 10% would still give the Russian economy a huge breather.
Conduct the 2003 and 2008 Military reforms as early as possible. OTL they were proposed during the Chechen Wars, however, they were left unchecked and unheard. This will mean that Russian overexpenditure on the military will go down a decade earlier, which will save around $460 Billion dollars in total, which would give huge breathing room for Russia to invest in it's economy and grow their foreign reserves.
These are the ones i can tell right now, but there are loads more.
However for a far stronger Russia, the 1993 Constitutional Crisis or the 1996 Elections are your best bet. In 1993 ousting Yeltsin, would have seen Alexander Rutskoy as the President of Russia. Not exactly a stellar president, but far better and more competent than Yeltsin. He had ideas of scaling down the level of privatization and creating a slower process of privatization, which could have very well totally deflected the Russian financial crisis of 1998 if done properly 5 years earlier. As a former military man, he knew the consequences of Chechnya seceding, and about how using brutal tactics would not work. He probably would deal with the Chechens militarily like OTL, but in a more moderate and less brutal manner. At least, we don't want to see Grozny flattened to the ground.
For 1996, your best bet is to get Gennady Zyuganov or Grigory Yavlinsky to win the Elections. Yavlinsky was better in economics than Zyuganov, but Zyuganov was no slouch himself either. A 1996 PoD won't butterfly away the 1998 financial crisis, however it will quieten the effects by a good deal. If we go by 1993 PoD, and putting a better GDP growth of 0.5% to 1.5% as a result of no shock therapy, then the Russian economy in 2008 would be around 30% higher, and if we go by the 1996 PoD, the russian economy would be around 20% higher. A good deal in my opinion.
If Zyuganov's monetary block policies and sterilization policies as well as renationalization of major industries had been conducted, then, the 2008 crisis likely wouldn't have seen the Russian growth rate shrink by -7.8%. Somewhere between 2% to 4% would be more realistic in this scenario.
Also diversify the economy, don't become dependent on oil.............again. Conduct Yavlinsky's 500 Days Program. It would have been the best foundations for a future diversified Russian economy that doesn't depend on just oil. Oil would become still a good portion of the russian gdp, however reducing it by 5% to 10% would still give the Russian economy a huge breather.
Conduct the 2003 and 2008 Military reforms as early as possible. OTL they were proposed during the Chechen Wars, however, they were left unchecked and unheard. This will mean that Russian overexpenditure on the military will go down a decade earlier, which will save around $460 Billion dollars in total, which would give huge breathing room for Russia to invest in it's economy and grow their foreign reserves.
These are the ones i can tell right now, but there are loads more.
That is, PoD can only be after August 19, 1991 or October 28 (the beginning of the second stage of the 5th Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, when it adopted a program of radical reforms and gave Yeltsin extraordinary powers). This determines several problems that cannot be avoided without the ASB.
Most importantly, a large-scale economic recession of more than 30% was predetermined by the structural and monetary policy of the USSR since at least 1965. I read the documents of the Soviet government, where both the scale of the economic recession and the direction of the restructuring of the economy with the decline of high-tech and manufacturing industries with an increase in the share of mining and primary processing of raw materials are predicted quite accurately. Unfortunately, by August 1991, the possibilities to mitigate the fall had already been exhausted due to the unwillingness of the Soviet leadership, and primarily Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, to take unpopular measures.
The privatization of state property and the creation of oligarchs were necessary. The only alternative to this was the preservation of enterprises in the hands of "red directors" who, with the help of various schemes, seized money from state enterprises in their favor, turning them into ruins. Ukrainian President Kuchma writes about this directly in his memoirs.
Yeltsin as a politician was an order of magnitude higher than Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. Level of Yeltsin as a politician was an order of magnitude bigger than Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. And if Yeltsin dies in the summer of 1993, this will not solve the problems of the constitutional system and the preservation of the federation, for which it was necessary to shoot at the White House and adopt a new constitution. The conflict between the new President Rutskoy and Khasbulatov is inevitable and most likely Khasbulotov will become the winner, since he had the opportunity to call early elections and change the constitution through the Congress
My steps towards a better Russia after August 18, 1991
1) The head of Chechen-Ingushetia, Zavgaev, takes an anti-coup stance during the GKChP. This prevents the 1991 Chechen revolution and Chechen-Ingushetia remains one of the many Russian regions where the post-communist nomenclature remains in power. Dudayev doesn't receive power and becomes the Chechen Musa Shanibov. Chechnya will be turbulent in the first half of the 1990s, but nothing that the local police and the Internal Troops cannot handle
2) Premier. The best candidate at the end of 1991 was former (and future) Finance Minister Boris Fedorov. He took a tough stance in the area of monetary and budgetary policy and, unlike Gaidar, was more consistent in his policy. If Fedorov cannot be passed through parliament as prime minister, then he must be the head of the Central Bank in order to balance the possible emission desires of the Government and parliament
3) No currency corridor. Russian industry was already showing signs of growth at the end of 1994, but the appreciation of the ruble relative to its purchasing power made it uncompetitive.
4) The ideal version of industrial policy is to abandon massive concessional lending in exchange for a protectionist tariff. This will not close the Russian market from import competition, but will give Russian industry time and motivatiom to modernize.
5) The fight against the mafia should be more active, but I am not sure which of the possible candidates for the Ministry of Internal Affairs will better cope with this
Most importantly, a large-scale economic recession of more than 30% was predetermined by the structural and monetary policy of the USSR since at least 1965. I read the documents of the Soviet government, where both the scale of the economic recession and the direction of the restructuring of the economy with the decline of high-tech and manufacturing industries with an increase in the share of mining and primary processing of raw materials are predicted quite accurately. Unfortunately, by August 1991, the possibilities to mitigate the fall had already been exhausted due to the unwillingness of the Soviet leadership, and primarily Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, to take unpopular measures.
The Czechia was in a better economic position than Russia and was more loyal to foreign capital.
The privatization of state property and the creation of oligarchs were necessary. The only alternative to this was the preservation of enterprises in the hands of "red directors" who, with the help of various schemes, seized money from state enterprises in their favor, turning them into ruins. Ukrainian President Kuchma writes about this directly in his memoirs.
No one in Russia wanted to pay the bills of Uzbeks or Georgians, and financing their ineffective economies at the expense of Russia was one of the main sins of the Soviet regime from the point of view of Russian citizens. IOTL any form of post-Soviet federation was buried when Yeltsin realized that Ukraine didn't want to join it and Russia would have to finance the USS alone. The (con)federation including of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan made sense, but this required an agreement with Ukraine, and the Ukrainian communist elites chose independence after the GKChP.
The opinion about the greater competence of Rutskoy is very controversial, to put it mildly. Rutskoy was weak as governor of Kursk later.
Yeltsin as a politician was an order of magnitude higher than Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. Level of Yeltsin as a politician was an order of magnitude bigger than Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. And if Yeltsin dies in the summer of 1993, this will not solve the problems of the constitutional system and the preservation of the federation, for which it was necessary to shoot at the White House and adopt a new constitution. The conflict between the new President Rutskoy and Khasbulatov is inevitable and most likely Khasbulotov will become the winner, since he had the opportunity to call early elections and change the constitution through the Congress
The slowdown in privatization was not a solution to the problems of the Russian economy, as I wrote earlier, and this didn't contribute to solving the fiscal problems that led to the 1998 crisis
Rutskoy was a hawk and a hardliner against everything that moves. This is evidenced by both his speeches and other sources. If he was in power, I would be more worried about the "small victorious war" in Crimea.
Yavlinsky never had a chance to become president of Russia because he didn't have the opportunity to become popular among the broad strata of the Russian population.
I don't see a person among the CPRF who is capable of pursuing tough fiscal and financial policies. IOTL communists recognized the importance of hard budget constraints only when Russia had no other choice after default.
This requires a different Gorbachev, and a different Gorbachev has been pursuing a better economic policy since 1988.
My steps towards a better Russia after August 18, 1991
1) The head of Chechen-Ingushetia, Zavgaev, takes an anti-coup stance during the GKChP. This prevents the 1991 Chechen revolution and Chechen-Ingushetia remains one of the many Russian regions where the post-communist nomenclature remains in power. Dudayev doesn't receive power and becomes the Chechen Musa Shanibov. Chechnya will be turbulent in the first half of the 1990s, but nothing that the local police and the Internal Troops cannot handle
2) Premier. The best candidate at the end of 1991 was former (and future) Finance Minister Boris Fedorov. He took a tough stance in the area of monetary and budgetary policy and, unlike Gaidar, was more consistent in his policy. If Fedorov cannot be passed through parliament as prime minister, then he must be the head of the Central Bank in order to balance the possible emission desires of the Government and parliament
3) No currency corridor. Russian industry was already showing signs of growth at the end of 1994, but the appreciation of the ruble relative to its purchasing power made it uncompetitive.
4) The ideal version of industrial policy is to abandon massive concessional lending in exchange for a protectionist tariff. This will not close the Russian market from import competition, but will give Russian industry time and motivatiom to modernize.
5) The fight against the mafia should be more active, but I am not sure which of the possible candidates for the Ministry of Internal Affairs will better cope with this