Except that overreliance on composite archers is what lead to Lepanto (and the earlier defeat at Malta) in first place. This was the actual Turkish conclusion. The difference in firepower--which had initially been subtle--had built to the point that if conditions ever shifted in favor of a European fleet, said fleet would be capable of essentially demolishing their Turkish counterpart on a scale that the Turks couldn't replicate.
Most Overrated Battles (as PoDs)?
- Thread starter John Fredrick Parker
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Except that overreliance on composite archers is what lead to Lepanto (and the earlier defeat at Malta) in first place. This was the actual Turkish conclusion. The difference in firepower--which had initially been subtle--had built to the point that if conditions ever shifted in favor of a European fleet, said fleet would be capable of essentially demolishing their Turkish counterpart on a scale that the Turks couldn't replicate.
Which are far less serious than the First Spanish Armada in terms of being, y'know, a threat to invade England.
I'm not saying that the national myth is right, but saying that the FSA was basically a minor defeat with little consequence is going way too far the other way.
I'm assuming we ignore wikipedia on the Ottomans still.
So:
http://www.theottomans.org/english/family/murat3.asp
Seems to overlook what he did on campaign for good or ill.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/397854/Murad-III
&
http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/people/murad-iii.html
"His reign marked the beginning of the decay of the Ottoman Empire".
http://www.theopavlidis.com/MidEast/part60.htm
doesn't mention him very much, although the chapter being what it is . . .
So . . . are you saying he was even worse than depicted by, for instance, the EB, or are we looking at different accounts?
Is there something wrong with that conclusion?
Trying to make sense of what you're arguing here, as I haven't really studied Lepanto.
Archers were difficult to replace, gunners weren't. They were basically poorer Turkish soldiers from traditional regions who fought with bows as trained by fathers etc. from childhood.
And the composite bow is a very serious weapon at short ranges, especially from odd angles and against less well-armoured Christian marines.
So Lepanto was a big loss in the short to medium term. Macrohistorically maybe not but so very few things actually are.
By guns, I meant naval cannon. The Turks never invested as much as they should have in naval cannon. Your point about Turkish archers is correct, though.
Did I say that? Something can be "overrated" without being "unimportant". A Holy Alliance loss at Lepanto would have been significant, as would a victorious Spanish Armada. However, neither was the undeniable turning point they were often painted as. (Further, in the case of Lepanto, I have a sneaking suspicion that a victory at Lepanto sets the stage for another crushing defeat later on, as the Turks decide that Malta was, naturally, a fluke and they have no need to fix anything.) Spain and Turkey went on, recovered from their losses, sometimes even managed to turn things around.
My point is that the Turks themselves recognized they'd made a strategic blunder here.
There's no doubt that the archers were still formidable, and capable of winning battles. That's what let the Turks convince themselves that no, no, they still had a winning ticket here, no reason to shake things up. But naval war was changing. Lepanto forced them to recognize this. The loss of the archers was a blow--and yet it still could have been overcome. Indeed, they were working to do so.
The tendency with Murad is to play him as a weak, frail man whose decadent tastes made him a puppet to others, thus speeding up the "inevitable" Turkish decline. In truth, he seems to have intentionally weakened the Grand Vizier and much of the central government in an effort to upgrade his own authority, making the factional warfare that had always been a part of the Turkish political scene even worse, as officials in the Harem wound up with an incredible amount of power, due to the combination of their access to the Sultan, and the relative stability of their positions.
And then there was the whole 'war with Persia' that I mentioned.
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Way too small? estimates very from 20-25000 to 60-80000.the first are totally wrong,since the year before,the Persians failed to take Naxos with an army of 25000,and Naxos put in the front line 8000 hoplites(that implies more than double that number with auxilliaries).
(The other states were insignificant? I am sure you are jesting;Sparta and its alliance? whose army could easily equal in numbers and had quadruple quality and skill to that of the Persians?)
Here we must exercise some common sense:the Persians knew Athens(at least the Asian Minor Satraps) and the Athenians were dealing with the cities of Asia Minor frequently.For the city that 10 years later fielded more than 55000 men in land and sea the Persians were more intelligent than to send a small force for a(punitive?) punishment!so what was the punishment? the Athenians had seen the "punitive" action against Eretria which was raised to the ground and its inhabitants taken as slaves and sold in Sousiana.So the Persians came to subjugate not to punish.Hippias had informed the Persians accurately about Athens and its environs and where to land so they would find immediate support...
If the Persians had succeded in their conquest of Athens and of central Greece they would have had a very firm base for their expansion in the Balcans and their empire had the wherewithal and the manpower for expansion in Dalmatia and from there they had North Italy and central Europe practically in their feet...
You understand the situation i think- just because an oppotunity is present dosnt mean IT HAS to be taken.The battle of marathon was really part of a large persian punitive raid to teach athens a lession-and it being the richest and most powerful of the greek states its removal will get rid of any imputous or reason to continue expansion into europe.After all, nothing in europe other then a few tin mines and pices of pottery could really compere to the wealth,power and technoligy of egypt and Aisa. Why conquer a wilderness when the riches of india and the silk rout is to the east!
and dont forget that at the time persia was fighting revolts in egypt, scythian tribesmen and was campaigning against indian princes. With so many comitments, it was really in no posiotion to continue westwerd expansion.
Only revenge and hurt pride could change this mindset-and with no defeat at marathon, persian pride is still intact and untainted.
Perhaps it escaped your attention that Darius had crossed the Danube campaigning north and had been humiliated by the irregular cavalry of the tribesmen;Miltiades was the one who proposed to burn the bridges;so Darius wanted to return and he didn't have to return immediately.He would first organize the campaign and then he would proceed;at any rate the Persians were ready for a western campaign six years later under Xerxes.
This time the Persians would probably follow the left bank of Danube,like the left arm of the Mongols or the Turks later(classic route),since their southern flank was secure.At that time Athens was neither the richest or,
as we said earlier and please don't overlook it,nor the most powerful,Sparta was.
That would not have stopped the sinking of British warships in the channel the the defeat of the fighter command in trying to protect them...
I don't know about turning point, but I'd definitely say that the defeat of the First Spanish Armada deserves to be seen as a great defeat. The fact that one great defeat rarely is enough is a problem with Oversimplified History, not with the idea this particular battle made a difference.
Unfortunately for them, things fell apart.
Would love to (PM me?) see you elaborate on this.
Color-Copycat: I know that's what you meant. But when boarding is a normal tactic, the issue of who has better guns is not quite as big a deal.
Even when it comes to war galleys, naval gunnery does make a difference. During the time it takes for two squadrons to close the gap between them, a fair number of rounds could be let loose, and when the vessels of the Holy League were equipped with as many guns as they were, it did prove to be a major factor in disrupting Turkish units before they even got within boarding range.
I didn't say it didn't make a difference, I'm saying that it's not as big a deal as when we're looking at broadsides being the norm.
I never said that Sealion was more than a flop since it was not the product of
long studied and prepared plan but something conceived at the spur of the moment,nor that I believe the unecessary bombasm of that fool Herman to destroy the RAF over England;the Luftwaffe could certainly defeat RAF over the Channel
fighting equidistant on equal terms,the British army was defeated on the mainland and was unarmed,and a proper plan would succeed.
Er... what? Explain what you wanted to say here, since it makes little sense to me as a reply to that particular post...
Why would the RAF need to fight an ongoing battle over the channel? And what purpose would "winning" that fight serve for the nazis?
The nazis couldnt keep up enough flights over the channel to stop all ship traffic, certainly not in enough local strength to ensure they could defeat any RAF response. Small groups of nazi aircraft would be attacked by groups of RAF planes. And has been said before, their planes were not well suited for attacking mobile ships anyway.
The RN could stay out of the way of the air attacks, but still be close enough to respond if a naval invasion appeared, likewise the RAF can stay safe on the mainland, building up their strength with the undamaged industrial centres. If any invasion did then appear it would face an unharmed navy and vastly more RAF fighters than they did in OTL.
All the while the nazi aricraft are now trying to secure air control over the uk mainland while trying to protect their ships and invasion sites.
No, it would be doomed to fail if they tried this plan, trying to seize air control from a well equipped, well trained, and well rested enemy while in the middle of the actual invasion would be a disaster.
But by then it was a general war of conquest-and you just said yourself he was busey fighting the scythians. He wouoldnt have continued his campaign west without there being a real need too-and no need to avenge a defeat makes any further campaigning pointless. You say Sparta was powerful, true-but they didnt have a fleet and in thelong scale of things were really insignificent in the med. I think that Sp[arta would most likely come to an arrangment with the persians-it only went to war in 480 because it knew it had the backing of Athens. Thermopalaye would have been lost sooner without the athenian fleet guarding the artimesium straits.
Sorry,wrong thinking!the navy can be in range or out of range;out of range is harmless and the invasion proceeds ,in range is sunk and the invasion continuesmand of course incidental losses are foreseen;
Germany had naval bombers,I don't have their exact number in hand,but such production could be accelerated,however,the Luftwaffe bombers,especially the Stuka,as I have said they proved very effective against ships and they had great numbers to suffice for missions against ships and on land.The English airforce could be fair over england not over the channel.Only English patriotic notions presented RAF comparable with Luftwaffe whose experience and numbers they didn't have;
A! wrong arithmetic!vastly less fighters you mean count ratio 1:2 minimum ifo the Luftwaffe and a lot more experience.Your argument is groundless and because I have argued it in other sites,more specialized I am not going to repeat vthe same here.
How do you figure that the RAF would have less fighters? Without the nazis attacking them, their bases or the industry that MAKES the planes then how on earth would they somehow have less? That makes no sense.
And yes, the navy can be out of range of the nazi planes but still within enough range to prevent an invasion. Leave them further north, or mor towards Ireland and they are effectively out of range of the enemy attacks, but can easily (and in short time) sail into the channel to intercept an invasion force or cut off its supply chain.
If memory serves the nazis managed to sink a half a dozen or so british destroyers during the Dunkirk evacuation, destroyers that were stationary at the time. There were signficantly more than a half dozen involved in the operation too. So while having all the advantages the actual effectiveness of the air attacks was very limited. Now, if the ships are at sea, without the need to remain in place and without the need to protect men stranded on shore and you are getting a very different situation altogether.
And how do you find and sink these ships easily? How much fuel will you waste while your planes fly in circles over the expanse of the channel looking for ships to attack? How far would your planes be spread out in this search? And how would you stop the RAF from attacking these spread out planes with greater local numbers?
The RAF did very well against the nazis when they attacked the mainland, what evidence do you have that shows that this trend would suddenly be reversed if the battles were to take place further out?
And you may have "argued" this on other sites but that is totally meaningless. You must present your arguments here for people to challenge because so far what little you have said does not support your claim.