Most Effective Union Army Staff Structure

One of the many issues that plagued the Union Army during the ACW was that there was no centralized staff to oversee the many administrative/operations/logistics issues that went planning/executing the campaigns. This was somewhat alleviated when Henry Halleck was appointed Chief of Staff in 1864, but still wasn't perfect.

So let's say that President Lincoln and Secretary of War Staunton recognized that such a formalized staff was necessary. Who would be the best choices for it, and how early could it be formed?

My ideas are for the following positions:

Chief of Staff: MG Henry Halleck
Chief of Operations: MG George McClellan
Chief of Intelligence: MG George Sharpe
Chief of Logistics: MG Henry Halleck (double hatting)
Chief of Communications/Signals: BG Albert Myer

The staff would report to Lincoln and Staunton, and be in support of the General in Chief of the Union Army.
 
One of the many issues that plagued the Union Army during the ACW was that there was no centralized staff to oversee the many administrative/operations/logistics issues that went planning/executing the campaigns. This was somewhat alleviated when Henry Halleck was appointed Chief of Staff in 1864, but still wasn't perfect.

So let's say that President Lincoln and Secretary of War Staunton recognized that such a formalized staff was necessary. Who would be the best choices for it, and how early could it be formed?

My ideas are for the following positions:

Chief of Staff: MG Henry Halleck
Chief of Operations: MG George McClellan
Chief of Intelligence: MG George Sharpe
Chief of Logistics: MG Henry Halleck (double hatting)
Chief of Communications/Signals: BG Albert Myer

The staff would report to Lincoln and Staunton, and be in support of the General in Chief of the Union Army.
My personal thoughts on this matter is that it’s fairly anachronistic, especially the role of Chief of Operations and Chief of Intelligence. The former is fairly unnecessary, army commanders plan operations, not the staff in Washington. Washington sets the objectives and the army commanders execute an operation based on their objectives.

The same goes for Chief of Intelligence; by the time word has reached Washington, the usefulness of the information is often diminished. All armies developed their own intelligence service (BMI for the AotP and Greenville Dodge’s spies for the AotT) which served them well. The Intelligence reports are then passed onto Halleck, who then passes it onto any relevant information.

In addition, shifting McClellan to a staff role after his victory in West Virginia would go against the public who were clamoring for a hero after Bull Run.
 
My personal thoughts on this matter is that it’s fairly anachronistic, especially the role of Chief of Operations and Chief of Intelligence. The former is fairly unnecessary, army commanders plan operations, not the staff in Washington. Washington sets the objectives and the army commanders execute an operation based on their objectives.

The same goes for Chief of Intelligence; by the time word has reached Washington, the usefulness of the information is often diminished. All armies developed their own intelligence service (BMI for the AotP and Greenville Dodge’s spies for the AotT) which served them well. The Intelligence reports are then passed onto Halleck, who then passes it onto any relevant information

In addition, shifting McClellan to a staff role after his victory in West Virginia would go against the public who were clamoring for a hero after Bull Run.

I don't know if it would be so much "anachronistic". There were intelligence operations occurring on both sides in the war. Why not centralize these operations under the purview of one officer?

Of course army commanders could still plan operations, but the Chief of Operations would work hand in hand with the General in Chief to ensure that these operations were synchronized and supportive of multiple objectives. The Chief of Operations could also develop a standard training doctrine for all new units coming into service.

I agree that having McClellan assume such a role prior to the Peninsula Campaign would not be politically palatable. After all, why sideline a victorious general? But perhaps Lincoln, being a fairly good judge of character, offers McClellan the position after Antietam. I'm not sure if McClellan would accept a staff assignment, but it does keep him in the Army, which could provide him a viable political future.
 
Why not centralize these operations under the purview of one officer?
No such need existed. All sources of Intelligence was human, which is typically slow in communication and thus making it less likely to be useful. All intelligence reports are read by the army commanders, who in turn send their analysis to the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff would then pass the information to other commanders if it’s relevant. There was no formal organisation and doctrine to assess the reliability of the information and so no suitable officer really existed for the job aside from Allan Pinkerton.
Of course army commanders could still plan operations, but the Chief of Operations would work hand in hand with the General in Chief to ensure that these operations were synchronized and supportive of multiple objectives. The Chief of Operations could also develop a standard training doctrine for all new units coming into service.
The first point is valid, but it should be noted that Ulysses S. Grant was successful in synchronizing the 1864 Spring Offensive and constantly coordinated with Sherman. This raises the question as to whether such a position is necessary.

The second point is looking at a 19th Century army from the lens of a 20th/21st Century army. Everyone during the ACW figured that all a regiment needed was to drill using their respective book on tactics and some target practice. Ultimately armies fought with whatever tactic they developed through personal experience such as Willich’s Advance Firing and lying down. In 1863 onward, no more Union regiments should have been raised. The manpower should have been used to replenish the depleted ranks of veteran regiments like the Confederates. It doesn’t always work as the Iron Brigade shows but it’s better than having them suffer casualties before a fight.
I agree that having McClellan assume such a role prior to the Peninsula Campaign would not be politically palatable. After all, why sideline a victorious general? But perhaps Lincoln, being a fairly good judge of character, offers McClellan the position after Antietam. I'm not sure if McClellan would accept a staff assignment, but it does keep him in the Army, which could provide him a viable political future.
Absolutely not. By the end of the Maryland Campaign, the Republican Party absolutely could not stand McClellan and the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan was utterly irreparable. There was no future for McClellan in the Army while the Republicans were there.
 
Using Grant's appointment as Lieutenant General as a POD, I'd go with:
Chief of Staff: MG Henry Halleck.
S-1 (Personnel): MG Nathaniel Banks. He's a popular and honest Republican politician with connections to the main sources of troops (Northern Governors), a business background, and let's just get him out of the field.
S-2 (Intel): BG Grenville Dodge. He was a focus for military intelligence in the Western theater.
S-3 (Operations) [I am going to get so slammed] MG Winfield Hancock. He was never the same in the field after being hit at Gettysburg, but he was still an operational artist.
S-4 (Logistics) BG Montgomery Meigs. It's what he does.
S-6 (Signals) COL Benjamin Fisher. He was Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac before being captured during the Gettysburg campaign. He also busted out of Libby Prison to return to duty and who can hate that?
 
Using Grant's appointment as Lieutenant General as a POD, I'd go with:
Chief of Staff: MG Henry Halleck.
S-1 (Personnel): MG Nathaniel Banks. He's a popular and honest Republican politician with connections to the main sources of troops (Northern Governors), a business background, and let's just get him out of the field.
S-2 (Intel): BG Grenville Dodge. He was a focus for military intelligence in the Western theater.
S-3 (Operations) [I am going to get so slammed] MG Winfield Hancock. He was never the same in the field after being hit at Gettysburg, but he was still an operational artist.
S-4 (Logistics) BG Montgomery Meigs. It's what he does.
S-6 (Signals) COL Benjamin Fisher. He was Chief Signal Officer of the Army of the Potomac before being captured during the Gettysburg campaign. He also busted out of Libby Prison to return to duty and who can hate that?

Very good selections. Banks didn't even occur toe in such a capacity.
 
No such need existed. All sources of Intelligence was human, which is typically slow in communication and thus making it less likely to be useful. All intelligence reports are read by the army commanders, who in turn send their analysis to the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff would then pass the information to other commanders if it’s relevant. There was no formal organisation and doctrine to assess the reliability of the information and so no suitable officer really existed for the job aside from Allan Pinkerton.

The first point is valid, but it should be noted that Ulysses S. Grant was successful in synchronizing the 1864 Spring Offensive and constantly coordinated with Sherman. This raises the question as to whether such a position is necessary.

The second point is looking at a 19th Century army from the lens of a 20th/21st Century army. Everyone during the ACW figured that all a regiment needed was to drill using their respective book on tactics and some target practice. Ultimately armies fought with whatever tactic they developed through personal experience such as Willich’s Advance Firing and lying down. In 1863 onward, no more Union regiments should have been raised. The manpower should have been used to replenish the depleted ranks of veteran regiments like the Confederates. It doesn’t always work as the Iron Brigade shows but it’s better than having them suffer casualties before a fight.

Absolutely not. By the end of the Maryland Campaign, the Republican Party absolutely could not stand McClellan and the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan was utterly irreparable. There was no future for McClellan in the Army while the Republicans were there.

Grant was good a synching the 1864 offensives, but I think a central staff would help with a lot of the coordination. There's a lot that goes into executing a strategic offensive beyond saying "go march off and fight." While individual commanders did rise to the occasion of overseeing those unforeseen contingencies (i.e. Sherman) I think a central staff, again, would help with that coordination and planning efforts. Especially when it comes to ensuring fresh supply of troops.

I am very much looking at this through a 21st Century lens. But 5 years after the Civil War ended, the German states showed how effective a central planning staff could be in coordinating armies. So I don't think it would be too much of a stretch to have this thought occur during the Civil War. There were already very effective staff officers on both sides; the trick would be applying this at the operational level. I do agree with you that the priority should have been to reinforce experienced units rather than stand up new units. This can be chocked up to political considerations at the state level.

Yes, McClellan was persona non grata after the Maryland Campaign (for good reason). Still, Lincoln did show a tendency to keep generals that Republicans weren't too fond of (i.e. Butler). I actually thing Lincoln could tolerate McClellan being in a staff role. It allows McClellan to aptly apply the skills he had (organizational and training development), and it keeps him close where Lincoln and Staunton can keep a better eye on him.
 
The problem was not Lincolns to solve. The War Dept organization derived from pork barrel politics and turf wars in Congress, with a large dollop of corrupt business influence.

This system persisted despite reforms until 1942, when Roosevelt slipped through legislation allowing Stimson & Marshal to completely reorganize the War Dept into a modern military organization.
 
The problem was not Lincolns to solve. The War Dept organization derived from pork barrel politics and turf wars in Congress, with a large dollop of corrupt business influence.

This system persisted despite reforms until 1942, when Roosevelt slipped through legislation allowing Stimson & Marshal to completely reorganize the War Dept into a modern military organization.

Lincoln couldn't have solved this?
 
Lincoln couldn't have solved this?

Not by fiat or executive action. Congress created the War Dept organization by legislation, which could only be set aside through further legislation. To put it another way a independent Quartermaster Corps that answered to a Congressional Committee & not to the Secretary of War was ensured by law, not a organizational entity. Corrupt Congressmen traditionally milked the Quartermaster Corps for contracts to their friends and relatives. Allowing a cabinet secretary of CoS any effective control would threaten that. When WWII spun up Roosevelt, Stimson, & their allies in Congress managed to push through legislation that completely revamped the Departments of the Navy and War, which gave the cabinet secretaries and the CoS actual control of things like purchasing, equipment selection, contract awarding. For a few years Congress lost a lot of control of the military and the Commander in Chief had more or less complete control of his army and navy.

Lincoln never had the political power to accomplish something like that. As a first term President, diving straight into a war on a emergency basis he had to practice triage with what power he did possess. the same Congressmen who ensured the Federal Army had shoddy uniforms, or overpriced supply wagons were legislators Lincoln needed to back him on other matters. Politics stink.
 
There's a lot that goes into executing a strategic offensive beyond saying "go march off and fight."
But 5 years after the Civil War ended, the German states showed how effective a central planning staff could be in coordinating armies. So I don't think it would be too much of a stretch to have this thought occur during the Civil War. There were already very effective staff officers on both sides; the trick would be applying this at the operational level.
I agree on the first point; coordination between Grant and Rosecrans during the Vicksburg and Tullahoma Campaigns might have been useful. But the problem lies in the second point. Unlike the Americans, the Prussians had a massive full-time regular army and correspondingly had the staff to manage the army efficiently. During the ACW, we saw the U.S. Army grow from a police force of 16,000 regulars to an army of hundreds of thousands capable of invading and holding an enemy country the size of several Western European countries. In 1861 and 1862, the pain of creating staff afflicted everyone. From Beauregard's lost order at Bull Run, Grant's verbal order at Shiloh, the overwhelming panic of the staff in Washington after the Northern Virginia Campaign and during Lee's Invasion of Maryland.

Only by 1863 was the staff in Washington generally capable but it was still heavily reliant on department/army staff to actually plan operations and propose them to Washington. Halleck could have certainly done a better job if he had actually bothered to synchronize the offensives like Grant.

Yes, McClellan was persona non grata after the Maryland Campaign (for good reason). Still, Lincoln did show a tendency to keep generals that Republicans weren't too fond of (i.e. Butler). I actually thing Lincoln could tolerate McClellan being in a staff role. It allows McClellan to aptly apply the skills he had (organizational and training development), and it keeps him close where Lincoln and Staunton can keep a better eye on him.
That would be completely wrong. Butler was a darling of the Radical Republicans and Lincoln had to give him command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. McClellan was hated by the Republicans AND Lincoln; there is no future for him in the army so long as the Republicans are in charge.
 
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