More successful WW2 Allies

[DoomBunny]

If the Pacific War goes a little better than that leads to what do you do if you reach the Japanese Homes Islands earlier than OTL. With no Atom Bomb the Americans would be forced to invade Japan. I wouldn't call that a more successful WW2.

Yeah, that is a big issue. I'm not really sure you can make the Pacific more successful, it ended in the best way possible for the US.

Fixing the Mk XIV earlier might mean an easier slog across the Pacific though, due to US subs being a lot more effective in destroying Japanese ships.

 

[PMN1]

Nazi transportation grinds to a halt because Mosquitos replace Lancasters and key railroads and roads bridges and canals are wrecked on a daily basis with delayed action bombs dropped too.

Anyone know what the maximun production rate for Mosquitos actually is....its not as if you can switch factories making metal aircraft to making wooden ones very quickly. The inability to change to a new construction method was what kept the Wellington in production for so long.

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

You can tell folks are west-centric.

I'll just point out that the German army bled to death in the East. That little (and rather nasty) country called the Soviet union did get involved in WW2 too.

I read in a book once that if the Red Army had managed to trap Army Group A in the Caucusus with Little Saturn then the Red Army would have reached Berlin much earlier. How true this is I don't know but its an interesting possibility.

Regarding strategic bombing, its not so much the aircraft produced but how they're used, Bomber Command should have had a more focused campaign against the transport system. Someone mentioned raids on the coal mines, coal mining is a very labour and energy intensive process so you actually want the Germans to mine as much of it as they can. The trick is to stop it reaching the power stations and factories because the rail junctions have been bombed or the Rhine barges keep getting mined. Do that and all the effort in producing it has been wasted.

 

[Aber]

Regarding strategic bombing, its not so much the aircraft produced but how they're used, Bomber Command should have had a more focused campaign against the transport system. Someone mentioned raids on the coal mines, coal mining is a very labour and energy intensive process so you actually want the Germans to mine as much of it as they can. The trick is to stop it reaching the power stations and factories because the rail junctions have been bombed or the Rhine barges keep getting mined. Do that and all the effort in producing it has been wasted.

The problems with attacking the "transport system" (really railways) are:

• there is significant spare capacity in the system (eg unused capacity, civilian goods, civilian travel)
• unless you hit tunnels or viaducts, repairs can be made quickly
• unless you have sufficient bombers to strike over a very wide area, then alternative routes can be used
• distances between mines and power stations are quite short as it is easier to transport electricity than coal

The allies did not have enough bombers until 1944 to be able to hit, and keep hitting, railway networks enough to seriously downgrade them.

 

[TrekMaster51]

Fletcher refuels the USS Wasp a couple of days ealier, and goes into the Battle of the Eastern Solomons with three carriers available instead of just the Enterprise and Saratoga.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Eastern_Solomons

Instead of what was in OTL small but successful tactical victory on the US side, the US fleet in the Solomons can probably claim at least a a few dozen more IJN carrier planes shot down, and at the least perhaps pick off a couple more Japanese light warships.

 

[ivanotter]

Is it really possible to spot that I believe Eisenhower was a serious military mistake? wow, never thought about that.

I think he was an excellent politician, though, and one of the better presidents.

Bombing railways is a tedious task and not greatly productive. Bombing key points is far better: tunnels, bridges and so on. I believe enough key points were identified.

The same with the oil production. There we key points where repairs or spares or just engineering was particular difficult and lenghty (months apparantly).

I am doubtful if Soviet forces could have doe much more than what they did. Any scope for improvement in the East? not sure about it.

The biggest effort was Kursk and Bagration and those were hugely successful. Could more have been done? doubt it very much.

Ivan

 

[Julian]

The biggest effort was Kursk and Bagration and those were hugely successful. Could more have been done? doubt it very much.

The 2nd Iasi-Kishnev Offensive destroyed the German 6th army (Again), the Lower Dnieper Offensive and the Kiev Offensive were much larger in terms of men involved and losses (Combined) than Kursk or Bagration. The Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive involved all 6 Soviet tank armies, and the vast majority of Soviet and German field strength.

Bagration and Kursk, while notable, are only part of an interconnected series of massive Soviet operations extending from the Black Sea to the Baltics.

As for what the Soviets could do better? Here are some ideas for 1943-44 alone;

1. Destruction of the German Korsun grouping.

2. More succesful winter '43-44 offensive into Belorussia.

3. Destruction of the 1st Panzer Army in early '44.

4. More succesful 1st Iasi-Kishnev Offensive

5. Seizing bridgeheads over the Dnieper much faster, avoiding a month of bloody combat.

6. Destruction of part of the 18th Army in January '44 near Leningrad.

7. Breaching German defenses around Narva and advancing into Estonia.

 

[Simon]

If you want to improve Bomber Command's then introduce the Mosquito earlier, IIRC Freeman was pretty interested when it was first suggested a number of years earlier but wasn't able to make it happen, and force Harris to accept the formation of the Pathfinder squadrons as pretty much all the operational commanders and a number of other senior officers wanted but he resisted. That way even if you stick with mass bombing at least it will be more accurate mass bombing.

You can tell folks are west-centric.

Well since most people here are either Americans or western Europeans with little representation from Russia or eastern Europe that's hardly surprising.

Anyone know what the maximun production rate for Mosquitos actually is....its not as if you can switch factories making metal aircraft to making wooden ones very quickly. The inability to change to a new construction method was what kept the Wellington in production for so long.

Plus you have the whole accuracy versus bomb load debate. Ran accross this page a little while back that looks at some of the possible variable of using Mosquitos instead of Lancasters but can't speak to its accuracy.

 

[phx1138]

Organise wolfpacks of US subs against japanese targets.

Japanese convoys, when there were any, were generally too small to make that necessary. Also, USN doctrine to allow communication between boats was too poor. In all, the hazard wasn't worth it.

I should've said this before: operating out of Hawaii, put all subs in Luzon/Formosa Straits (the #1 productive area), Yellow Sea, Tsushima Strait, & Bungo & Kii Suido. This alone, with all boats based in Pearl, could take a year off the war.

Also: bomb the bridges at Sedan on the first day of the attack on France, before the Germans get the AA in place.

The unconditional surrender business in terms of Germany was a mistake in terms of ending the war earlier, I believe.

It sure was. Back the enemy into a corner... It undoubtedly contributed to Japan's mania to fight to the death, too.

The US day-light bombing on choke-points was a success as far as I know (strangely, not because of a huge improvement of bomb accuracy per se, but more a matter of bombing focus).

So, if the choke points had been saturated in 1943? I think the German machine would have run out of resources very fast.

Attacks on canals & railways, plus mining, IMO, could have crashed Germany's economy in a matter of weeks. Coal shortages for production would have been almost immediate. Traffic tieups would have meant delivery of parts & materials would be disrupted almost immediately after. From there, it's a small step to weapons not being completed or delivered...

Moreover, it would encourage Germany's resistance (such as it was). And, even more important, it would have left Germany strong postwar, when she became an ally. How much shorter would the Cold War have been with Germany starting at 1943-4 levels of wealth, instead of 1923's?

A clever Med strategy would have tied down an amount of German troops south of the Alps. That would have made Overlord so much faster (according to Brooke).

Perfectly possible. Invade Sicily, then Sardinia, & leave the mainland to the Germans. Let them pacify the hostile Italians. Base MTBs & codos & bombers in Sicily & raid the entire length of Italy's coast constantly.

Use the shipping you don't waste supplying Italy to build up forces in Britain, thereby having the strength to invade Normandy in summer 1943. Use the experienced troops (notably Canadians) to take Caen earlier, close the Falaise Gap, open the Scheldt Estuary, & end the war by Xmas 1943.

was it possible to aim solely at the Japanese islands and totally ignoring MacArthur's campaigns?

Absent pushing MacArthur under a bus? Probably not. If you do it, you can end the Pacific War at least 6mo sooner than OTL: that's how long the delay was to take the P.I. Add the delay in taking Iwo Jima & Okinawa, thanks to troops bound for P.I. that didn't arrive...

One other good thing you could do: don't invade Peleliu. A more worthless operation I can hardly imagine, moreso even than Italy & Doolitte.

Mark Clark captures some German troops instead of a roadsign in the Anzio breakout.

Mark Clark run over by a Jeep before he assigns Lucas to Shingle, which, commanded by Lucian Truscott, does what Alex intended. The Germans are forced to pull back. The war in Italy ends at least 6mo early.

Earlier introduction of the P51D, allowing earlier air superiority and greater effect of bombing campaign.

Good--but early intro of the P-51 as an escort would do nicely.

What about earlier appearance of the P-38J, with dive flaps?

Mk XIV torpedo is fixed earlier, thus meaning the US subs don't spend 2 years blowing themselves up with circular runs, missing perfect shots, dealing with dud torpedoes, etc...

It was only 21mo. And only 2 boats are confirmed lost to circulars...

You want a biggie: don't have the maru code compromised by San Francisco customs. (A Customs guy clumsily copied a Japanese codebook. The Japanese promptly changed it. It wasn't broken again until January 1943. It had more impact than the Mk XIV, too, contrary to common belief.)

MacArthur's PT boat is sunk by King Kong.

LOL. Much as I like it, I find it improbable. He could, however, slip while boarding, fall overboard, strike his head on the gangway, & drown. (Just keep any sailors away from him, or there will be conspiracy theories saying he was pushed.)

Alternatively, have MacArthur say, "Hell, no, I'm staying."

If the Pacific War goes a little better than that leads to what do you do if you reach the Japanese Homes Islands earlier than OTL. With no Atom Bomb the Americans would be forced to invade Japan.

Nonsense. The U.S. was perfectly capable of inflicting untold destruction on Japan with fire raids & blockade. Creating famine was dead easy. How long do you suppose Japan would (could!) fight under famine conditions?

The trick is to stop [coal] reaching the power stations and factories because the rail junctions have been bombed or the Rhine barges keep getting mined. Do that and all the effort in producing it has been wasted.

Exactly. And Germany's power grid was very sensitive to shortages... Think Blackout of 2003--on a massive, nation-wide scale.

How about Halsey isn't an idiot at Leyte? (Not much difference AFAICT.)

What about Yorktown not being sunk at Midway? She's put under tow immediately on being hit, & so is at least 50mi away when I-168 arrives...

 

[sitalkes]

A target that was seemingly ignored by the bombers (other than the dam busters) was the electricity grid - forget about the coal mines, hit the power stations and other power insfractructre and the coal (and just about everything else) is useless. It takes up to ten years to build a modern power station, so they could not easily be replaced.

 

[phx1138]

A target that was seemingly ignored by the bombers (other than the dam busters) was the electricity grid - forget about the coal mines, hit the power stations and other power insfractructre and the coal (and just about everything else) is useless. It takes up to ten years to build a modern power station, so they could not easily be replaced.

Not ignored: until late in the war, the bombers couldn't achieve the accuracy to hit targets that small.

OTOH, they did ignore bombing canals & railways, & mining rivers, which would have shut the powerplants just as surely, for lack of coal--& that they could have achieved.

 

[ivanotter]

Bomb accuracy was not good before into 1944. To begin with, even hitting the right country was an achievement.


That's probably why LW focused on dive bombing and a role as flying artillery, rather successfully.

However, utilising the growing bomber force to saturate choke points would have been a better strategy, I should think. Atleast something would have been hit.

The analogy is of course the British dash for the "crown Jewels" in the gulf war. If those pumps had been damaged, it was goodbye to oil for months.

There must have been several of those installations.

Well, yes. Electricity pylons are not so easy to damage, but the power stations are not easy to rebuild, are they? The same goes for the big transformer stations. And they are not easy to hide either.

Mining of the waterways: I believe Churchill was reluctant on that account as he feared Germany would do the same with the UK channels.

Ivan

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yeah, that is a big issue. I'm not really sure you can make the Pacific more successful, it ended in the best way possible for the US.

Fixing the Mk XIV earlier might mean an easier slog across the Pacific though, due to US subs being a lot more effective in destroying Japanese ships.

Once can argue the South Pacific offensive of 1943 was a stratigic waste for the US, a product of ego & mis judgement. The savings in cargo ships, and long range amphibious lift would have been significant. Delaying the Central Pacific offensive a bit would have some pros & cons as well.

Japanese convoys, when there were any, were generally too small to make that necessary. Also, USN doctrine to allow communication between boats was too poor. In all, the hazard wasn't worth it.

I should've said this before: operating out of Hawaii, put all subs in Luzon/Formosa Straits (the #1 productive area), Yellow Sea, Tsushima Strait, & Bungo & Kii Suido. This alone, with all boats based in Pearl, could take a year off the war.

Commerce raiding is only half the story. The USN submarines made a number of attacks on Japanese capitol ships that very likely failed due to the torpedos. Note how the IJN submarines got in five hits on USN carriers. The Saratoga was put out of action twice in 1942 for extended periods, another sunk by torpedo hits and with two others torpedo hit contributing. Later in 1943 a submarine torpedo sank another carrier, the Liscombe Bay. Consider the effects at Midway had the Nautalus gotten a single hit on one of the IJN carriers during its morning encounter.

Also: bomb the bridges at Sedan on the first day of the attack on France, before the Germans get the AA in place.

The first bridges were not in place until after dark. Early morning of the second day was the first opportunity the Allies had to attack them with aircraft. Over 100 French bombers & some thirity RAF bombers attacked, failing to destroy a single pontoon bridge. The did hit some of the vehicles on the adjacent approaches, and may have damaged some of the ferrys.

Maybe if the French artillery commander had reinterpreted his orders and executed a effective fire program on the assmblying German assualt forces during the morning of the 13th, before the massive airstrike. With 170 cannon in range he could have disrupted the preperations for the river crossings for many hours, perhaps a day. It also would have helped bolster the morale of the infantry along the river who watched the Germans approach unmolested.

Perfectly possible. Invade Sicily, then Sardinia, & leave the mainland to the Germans. Let them pacify the hostile Italians. Base MTBs & codos & bombers in Sicily & raid the entire length of Italy's coast constantly.

There have been arguments made for capturing Sardinia Corsica much sooner. it was proposed for march/April 1943 during planning at the Symbol (Casablanca) confrence, but the Joint CoS choose the more conservative option of waiting until Tunisia was secure then methodically moving on to Sicily.

 

[phx1138]

Once can argue the South Pacific offensive of 1943 was a stratigic waste for the US

Unquestionably. Add that effort to the Central Pacific thrust, you're at Iwo Jima probably a year sooner.

Commerce raiding is only half the story. The USN submarines made a number of attacks on Japanese capitol ships that very likely failed due to the torpedos.

The number of attacks on heavies was pretty trivial in the grand scheme. I'd also argue it's better to immobilize a heavy by cutting off her fuel, & tie up the resources keeping her supplied, than sink her.

The first bridges were not in place until after dark. Early morning of the second day was the first opportunity the Allies had to attack them with aircraft. Over 100 French bombers & some thirity RAF bombers attacked, failing to destroy a single pontoon bridge. The did hit some of the vehicles on the adjacent approaches, and may have damaged some of the ferrys.

I had the impression there were permanent crossings already in place that could, & should, have been hit before the Germans crossed the river.

Maybe if the French artillery commander had reinterpreted his orders and executed a effective fire program

It couldn't have hurt.

There have been arguments made for capturing Sardinia Corsica much sooner. it was proposed for march/April 1943 during planning at the Symbol (Casablanca) confrence, but the Joint CoS choose the more conservative option of waiting until Tunisia was secure then methodically moving on to Sicily.

IMO, the Allies should have bottled up PAA in Tunisia & moved on to Sicily or Corsica/Sardinia, rather than wait to reduce.

 

[mattep74]

Commerce raiding is only half the story. The USN submarines made a number of attacks on Japanese capitol ships that very likely failed due to the torpedos. Note how the IJN submarines got in five hits on USN carriers. The Saratoga was put out of action twice in 1942 for extended periods, another sunk by torpedo hits and with two otheers torpedo hit contributing. Later in 1943 a submarine torpedo sank another carrier, the Liscombe Bay. Consider the effects at Midway had the Nautalus gotten a single hit on one of the IJN carriers during its morning encounter.

You know, this was the first i heard about US Subs beeing present at the battle of Midway. I checked the wikisite and it would be intresting if the sub had ended up beeing dead smack in the middle of the japanese carrierforce as the dive bombers showed up. Imagine the captain seeing the strike and shouting for any camera.

As it was now the sub guided the Enterprise divebombers to the correct position by not beeing there

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The number of attacks on heavies was pretty trivial in the grand scheme. I'd also argue it's better to immobilize a heavy by cutting off her fuel, & tie up the resources keeping her supplied, than sink her.

Midway was not won by a huge margin, degrading the manuver of a carrier with a torpedo hit, putting one afire complicate Nagumos situation immensely. It also reduces the odds a US carrier will be tagged.

In the rather 'desperate battles surrounding Guadalcanal from September through October the fight came down to a uncomfortabely thin margin. At the end of October the USN had the beat up Enterprise nominally operational, & the Saratoga in drydock for the second time. Japan still had three carriers operational, tho they withdrew them as their air wings were shot to pieces, and they thought the battle won & they were no longer needed.

Anything that gets the situation to that of late October weeks sooner helps the US a lot & ending the IJN carrier fleets effective history is exactly that. Just putting one temporarily out of action in June through September with a sucessfull submarine attack has a culmalative effect and takes a lot of pressure off the USN.

I had the impression there were permanent crossings already in place that could, & should, have been hit before the Germans crossed the river.

All the permanent bridges were destroyed by the afternoon of 12 May, the day before the German assualt across the river. the French engineers were fair efficient in this through the Ardennes. At least on historian has claimed Guderians corps was using its last pontoon equipment to bridge the Meuse River & had that been broken it would have been another day or two before replacement from the reserve bridge units arrived.

After the initial assualt cleared enough of the river bank late on the 13th ferrys were put in the water & two pontoon bridges completed during the night. A third could not be emplaced as the crossing of the 2d Pz Div was initially repulsed & that section of river bank not cleared of defenders until the 14th.

You may be thinking of several bridges near Liege in Belgium, which were captured by German special operations before the Belgians knew they were at war. those were attacked by Allied bombers 48+ hours after capture and after the German AAA defense was complete.

IMO, the Allies should have bottled up PAA in Tunisia & moved on to Sicily or Corsica/Sardinia, rather than wait to reduce.

There are arguments for that. A Allied landing on Sardinia/Corsica in April creates all sorts of headaches for the Axis. In practical terms the Allies could not swiftly follow up with a grand stratigic blow, but the Axis leaders had no clue this was the case. The Germans tended to over estimate the Allied amphibious warfare capability & with encouragment from the Allied deception operations were prone to scatter garrisons and operational reserves across the map. Sardinia also flanks Sicily from the Noth West and makes amphibious attacks on the Sicilian north coast more practical. The Axis can reinforce Tunisia all the want if the Allies can then capture Sicily. At that point anything the Axis have remaining in Africa is effectively cut off.

 

[phx1138]

Midway was not won by a huge margin, degrading the manuver of a carrier with a torpedo hit, putting one afire complicate Nagumos situation immensely. It also reduces the odds a US carrier will be tagged.

In the rather 'desperate battles surrounding Guadalcanal from September through October the fight came down to a uncomfortabely thin margin. At the end of October the USN had the beat up Enterprise nominally operational, & the Saratoga in drydock for the second time. Japan still had three carriers operational, tho they withdrew them as their air wings were shot to pieces, and they thought the battle won & they were no longer needed.

Anything that gets the situation to that of late October weeks sooner helps the US a lot & ending the IJN carrier fleets effective history is exactly that. Just putting one temporarily out of action in June through September with a sucessfull submarine attack has a culmalative effect and takes a lot of pressure off the USN.

I won't disagree. I just think attacking task forces is a lot harder than it looks, & is a lot less productive in the long run. If it was up to me, English & Nimitz would have relied on DF & traffic analysis to find the heavies, mined every IJN anchorage they could identify fleet units were in, used the movement cypher to track the minesweepers, & shoot the minesweepers. (Also refresh the minefields as needed.) It would have taken maybe 3-4 old boats, say Argonaut (designed as a minelayer) & a few S-boats, or the older Salmons. It saves fleet boats from close surveillance & puts them on the firing line where they belong.

All the permanent bridges were destroyed by the afternoon of 12 May, the day before the German assualt across the river. the French engineers were fair efficient in this through the Ardennes. At least on historian has claimed Guderians corps was using its last pontoon equipment to bridge the Meuse River & had that been broken it would have been another day or two before replacement from the reserve bridge units arrived.

After the initial assualt cleared enough of the river bank late on the 13th ferrys were put in the water & two pontoon bridges completed during the night. A third could not be emplaced as the crossing of the 2d Pz Div was initially repulsed & that section of river bank not cleared of defenders until the 14th.

Thx.

You may be thinking of several bridges near Liege in Belgium, which were captured by German special operations before the Belgians knew they were at war. those were attacked by Allied bombers 48+ hours after capture and after the German AAA defense was complete.

That could be right. Thx again.

There are arguments for that. A Allied landing on Sardinia/Corsica in April creates all sorts of headaches for the Axis. In practical terms the Allies could not swiftly follow up with a grand stratigic blow, but the Axis leaders had no clue this was the case. The Germans tended to over estimate the Allied amphibious warfare capability & with encouragment from the Allied deception operations were prone to scatter garrisons and operational reserves across the map. Sardinia also flanks Sicily from the Noth West and makes amphibious attacks on the Sicilian north coast more practical. The Axis can reinforce Tunisia all the want if the Allies can then capture Sicily. At that point anything the Axis have remaining in Africa is effectively cut off.

I haven't seen the reasons, so thx for that.

You know, this was the first i heard about US Subs beeing present at the battle of Midway.

There was one other extremely important contribution. John Murphy in Tambor, after showing a stunning lack of nerve in failing to attack Mogami, sent a contact report to English, which went to Fletcher. Fletcher, thinking Nagumo intended to press ahead with the invasion (Yamamoto had, in fact, already decided not to), pulled back to defend. He thereby avoided a night action which Yamamoto could scarcely have avoided winning, easily overwhelming Fletcher's comparatively weak escort.