On 15 October 1913, Joseph Joffre, chief of staff of the French Army and generalissimo-designate of the field armies to be mobilized in case of a major European war, set in motion a program for the reform of the organization and armament of artillery units. This plan included a program for the creation of nine standard heavy artillery regiments (régiments d'artillerie lourde), each of twelve batteries. This program included a schedule for the creation of the 108 batteries of these regiments that was based on the availability of suitable weapons.
Thus, the number of batteries to be created on 1 April 1914 was a function of the number of older mobile heavy pieces (155mm Rimailho howitzers and 120mm Baquet howitzers) that were available. The number of batteries to be created on 1 October 1914 and 1 April 1915 depended on the number of new 105mm Schneider guns that were to have emerged from the factories by those dates. Similarly, the completion of the program depended upon the supply of the new field howitzers. (The French authorities had yet to decide on the peculiars of this weapon.)
Because of this schedule, the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 found the French field armies with only 47 of the 108 batteries called for by Joffre's program for the creation of standard heavy artillery regiments.
This leads me to wonder about the effects of a slight change in Joffre's program. What would have happened if, rather than waiting for the 105mm guns to emerge from the factories and the technical authorities to produce a new howitzer, he formed all 108 of the new batteries in the spring of 1914, arming all of those that lacked weapons with 120mm de Bange guns. In other words, what would have been the effect of 61 additional batteries of mobile heavy artillery, all of which were armed with 120mm de Bange guns, on the first few weeks of the war.
Please note that the figures provided above exclude the 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment, a one-of-a-kind unit that consisted of 20 batteries, all of which were armed with 120mm de Bange guns that had been mounted on improved carriages. Please also note that I am assuming that Joffre would have been able to arrange for the mounting of de Bange guns on the same sort of carriages that were used by 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment.

Thus, the number of batteries to be created on 1 April 1914 was a function of the number of older mobile heavy pieces (155mm Rimailho howitzers and 120mm Baquet howitzers) that were available. The number of batteries to be created on 1 October 1914 and 1 April 1915 depended on the number of new 105mm Schneider guns that were to have emerged from the factories by those dates. Similarly, the completion of the program depended upon the supply of the new field howitzers. (The French authorities had yet to decide on the peculiars of this weapon.)
Because of this schedule, the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 found the French field armies with only 47 of the 108 batteries called for by Joffre's program for the creation of standard heavy artillery regiments.
This leads me to wonder about the effects of a slight change in Joffre's program. What would have happened if, rather than waiting for the 105mm guns to emerge from the factories and the technical authorities to produce a new howitzer, he formed all 108 of the new batteries in the spring of 1914, arming all of those that lacked weapons with 120mm de Bange guns. In other words, what would have been the effect of 61 additional batteries of mobile heavy artillery, all of which were armed with 120mm de Bange guns, on the first few weeks of the war.
Please note that the figures provided above exclude the 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment, a one-of-a-kind unit that consisted of 20 batteries, all of which were armed with 120mm de Bange guns that had been mounted on improved carriages. Please also note that I am assuming that Joffre would have been able to arrange for the mounting of de Bange guns on the same sort of carriages that were used by 4th Heavy Artillery Regiment.
