when one looks at early Soviet WW2 offensives one can notice how often Soviets exceeded their grasp and kept going after initial success. Be it december 1941, spring 1942 or even post-Stalingrad 1943. What would be effects of either Stalin realising that such vast offensives are beyond Soviet capability, specially in face of then-strong german army or that he lsitens to generals telling him same thing.
If we can at least prevent 1942 disaster then Stalingrad isn't such touch-and-go battle. While this might not shorten the war by much Soviets would sustain fewer losses (they would still be big specially early in the war) and Soviet army doesn't get the image of stumbling giant, clumsy but able to crush opponents by weight alone.
If we can at least prevent 1942 disaster then Stalingrad isn't such touch-and-go battle. While this might not shorten the war by much Soviets would sustain fewer losses (they would still be big specially early in the war) and Soviet army doesn't get the image of stumbling giant, clumsy but able to crush opponents by weight alone.